The symbolism of the 'apple' in the Old Testament is that it is taken from 'the tree of knowledge of good and evil'. So it represents the advent of self-consciousness — Wayfarer

That's a great interpretation that aligns with Barfield's ideas. Is that an original interpretation of yours? That idea in connection with Barfield is something I want to study.

Good thoughts on Otherness that I agree with. My main concept that I'm working through right now is that Otherness is the seed, or one of the seeds of oppression. Looking at Barfield's idea, and your idea about the Apple, you can imagine Adam and Eve (whether they historically existed being unimportant) being birthed into consciousness, and immediately, there is The Other. Male and Female. Two separate consciousnesses separated from the spiritual umbilical cord they had with God.

On the other end of the dichotomy of otherness is equality. Augustino doesn't want equality because he recognizes that different people have different levels of talent (from what I can tell); I recognize that as a simple fact, but that view will inevitably lead to commodifying people, an element in the Western consumerism you're so critical of, Augustino. Social equality as such, on a basic level (economic level) isn't achievable in the world, but the equality I'm talking about is spiritual, and this longing for spiritual equality is what fuels more complex social problems like gender equality and race equality. Otherness is, again, the antithesis to spiritual equality. Seeing a homosexual as 'the other', seeing a black person as 'the other', seeing a less talented person as 'the other', all lead to dehumanization of the subject, which leads to oppression. Their otherness is not a sinful state as traditional Christian ethics would avow, but just the opposite: viewing them as the other is what creates oppression, which leads to what Christians view as sin. Because humanity is so deeply entrenched in this dehumanizing nightmare-world, the only remedy is spiritual, and the only spiritual remedy is forgiveness, which has to be acted out by persons, not offered conditionally from on high. And what's more, the divine is present in all human acts of forgiveness. It's still forgiveness, not "from" God, but in collaboration with God. The oppressed is the only one who can do this. On a political level, the problem is that the progressive left doesn't have the inner spiritual life to bring about the equality they seem to want (to say nothing of their hypocrisies that I've mentioned). How can a new inner spiritual life be brought about in the West in order to enact these concepts? It's a dizzying prospect, but tying in Barfield's concept of the evolution of consciousness actually might bring a sense of hope to the situation; it's almost a superseding of progressive humanism in that it comes out of the godforsaken age we're in and reunites with God, reaches out the hand to God's outstretched hand.

Ultimately this is always true because Otherness is the true esoteric bondage that lies beneath the exoteric bondage of social oppression. Both oppressor and oppressed are equally in bondage to Otherness. — Noble Dust

I don't know if you are aware of Hegel's 'Master/ Slave' dialectic? Only the slave can work his way to freedom; for Hegel the master can never be free. Freedom is equated with recognition of one's own humanity. Only the slave recognizes the humanity of the other (the master), which means that recognition of the master's humanity is really null and void since it comes only from one who is not recognized as human by the master himself.

So. only the oppressed, even while remaining outwardly repressed, can win their own freedom. The oppressor can never achieve this without first willingly becoming the oppressed.

that view will inevitably lead to commodifying people, an element in the Western consumerism you're so critical of, Augustino. — Noble Dust

How so?

equality I'm talking about is spiritual — Noble Dust

Does this mean moral equality amongst people? Or?

How can a new inner spiritual life be brought about in the West in order to enact these concepts? It's a dizzying prospect, but tying in Barfield's concept of the evolution of consciousness actually might bring a sense of hope to the situation; it's almost a superseding of progressive humanism in that it comes out of the godforsaken age we're in and reunites with God, reaches out the hand to God's outstretched hand. — Noble Dust

I'm highly highly skeptic of historical narratives which have direction. Human history, I am quite convinced, has no direction. We're not "heading" towards anything. Have you ever read anything by Eric Voegelin?

So. only the oppressed, even while remaining outwardly repressed, can win their own freedom. The oppressor can never achieve this without first willingly becoming the oppressed. — John

Thus spoke the slave :P Nietzsche didn't call it slave morality for no reason.

The Stoics were materialists, but their materialism didn't (and doesn't!) preclude them from being spiritual or recognizing a God; that God is simply immanent (as was the case with Spinoza). Unlike Spinoza, the Stoics can be said to have thought that two substances exist, one passive on active, in nature; the active being the intelligence or soul of the universe, not being material in the same sense as solid objects, represented as being a divine fire, commonly. There are significant similarities between Spinoza and the Stoic.

The "otherness" being referred to here isn't something the Stoics would recognize, or so I think. Each human having or being a part of the divine is to be respected and revered as a result. When we're disturbed by their "otherness" we disturb ourselves with things not in our control, which Stoicism abjures. That's not to say Stoics are indifferent to all conduct of others and would not object to certain conduct, particularly conduct which is harmful (as it would harm a part of the immanent deity and so be contrary to the divine; not "in accordance with nature"). What we do and think is within our control, and to the extent we can prevent harm we should do so. But what makes someone "other" is in many cases insignificant, and our concern with such otherness is an undue concern with things beyond our control. Stoicism emphasizes our control of ourselves, not the control of others.

I find the simplicity of Stoicism admirable. I think its modern resurgence is encouraging from a spiritual perspective.

But Ciceronianus, I feel that otherness is in many regards in our control. The state of our society, the state of the world, is due to people who are just like us, they don't have more than two hands, more than one head, and more than two legs. And we can change it. We can work to make it different. That's eminently within our power. It's not within our immediate power - perhaps - but that doesn't mean that it's forever outside of our grasp. Now orienting yourself this way towards a large goal doesn't lead to suffering, what can lead to suffering is attachement to such a goal in the face of the progression of reality. We can fight for what we believe in, and we can seek to make the world a better place, without increasing our psychological suffering. We don't have to sit down in our desks and accept it, as if it wasn't human beings like us who have created the world.

Nietzsche was a disturbed, but nonetheless brilliant, idiot.

I don't know if you are aware of Hegel's 'Master/ Slave' dialectic? — John

I'm not, thanks for the info. I pretty much agree with the concept, it's not far off from what I'm saying about forgiveness only issuing from the oppressed. The oppressed is the only one in a position of being able to offer forgiveness. To me, one of the powerful things about forgiveness in this regard is that it's an everyday concept that bridges the gap between theoretical, arm-chair ideas about oppression on the one hand, and real life on the other. Forgiveness is visceral, it's emotional in the same way that oppression itself often is.

Freedom being the recognition of one's humanity...I can get with that. I'll have to think on it. Freedom is hard to define. There's a glimmer of truth in the idea that only the oppressed can then experience freedom (whatever freedom is); but I would counter that by saying that even the oppressor is oppressed; an act of oppression is always born from oppression first experienced by the one who is now oppressing. An example is how often sexual abuse is a cycle. The abused becomes the abuser. So this is where I depart from Hegel's concept. Hegel's concept along with Marx never seem to realize this. This is one reason, Augustino, I'm in favor of a history that has a direction; these concepts to me are beginning to take shape in history. Ironically, this view of oppression leads to a more hopeful view because it defines everyone as both oppressor and oppressed, and so, if only the oppressed can experience freedom...then there's hope for a spiritual equality for all of humanity. Augustino, this answers your question about whether it's a "moral equality". I would say no, but I would ask for your definition of moral equality. And again, the apparatus by which oppression is ended is forgiveness, and since only the oppressor can offer it, in reality, this can mean essentially anyone, because again, everyone is both oppressor and oppressed. This is why the potential for this transformation of humanity lies within humanity itself, in collaboration with the divine, which needs to issue from a rediscovery of an inner spiritual life.

Postmodernism represents quite possibly the most dangerous ideological virus that has infected the human mind. And the source of it isn't some success of science or anything of this sort - the source of it is an attitude which comes from within the human heart. The post-modernist sees that science has succeeded in changing some of our physical circumstances. Now that success has aroused and awakened the worm from his heart. — Agustino

I think you're demonising. Certainly there are people like that, but I'm not addressing them - what would be the use? My aims are a lot more modest. Sure, I'm a traditionalist - I'm interested in the 'dialectic of the enlightenment' and other subjects.

The symbolism of the 'apple' in the Old Testament is that it is taken from 'the tree of knowledge of good and evil'. So it represents the advent of self-consciousness
— Wayfarer

That's a great interpretation that aligns with Barfield's ideas. Is that an original interpretation of yours? That idea in connection with Barfield is something I want to study. — Noble Dust

That interpretation is along gnostic lines. Apart from anything, 'the tree' is also a reference to 'the tree of life' which is a universal archetype. You can run riot with such ideas, but I think that the tree of 'the knowledge of good and evil' has a clear meaning in terms of the dawning of self-consciousness. Have a look at this article on the topic by Stephan Hoeller - he's a modern gnostic and well worth knowing about.

Barfield was a follower of Steiner whom I think was arguably a gnostic - not in the special sense of a particular lineage or spiritual movement, but the general sense of being concerned with an inner or higher knowledge.

I think you're demonising. Certainly there are people like that, but I'm not addressing them - what would be the use? My aims are a lot more modest. Sure, I'm a traditionalist - I'm interested in the 'dialectic of the enlightenment' and other subjects. — Wayfarer

:-}

But Ciceronianus, I feel that otherness is in many regards in our control. The state of our society, the state of the world, is due to people who are just like us, they don't have more than two hands, more than one head, and more than two legs. And we can change it. We can work to make it different. That's eminently within our power. It's not within our immediate power - perhaps - but that doesn't mean that it's forever outside of our grasp. Now orienting yourself this way towards a large goal doesn't lead to suffering, what can lead to suffering is attachement to such a goal in the face of the progression of reality. We can fight for what we believe in, and we can seek to make the world a better place, without increasing our psychological suffering. We don't have to sit down in our desks and accept it, as if it wasn't human beings like us who have created the world. — Agustino

From the Stoic perspective, I think the fact that there are people different from us (other than we are) is not in our control; what is in our control is how we react to it. We need not be angered, disturbed, concerned or alarmed by these differences. To the extent we are, we allow what isn't in our control to influence us adversely.

Certainly, we can do various things to influence others and should in some cases; whether and how we do so is a question of judgment. One of the things which distinguished Stoicism and Epicureanism in history was that Stoicism encouraged participation in public life generally (something which made it attractive to many Romans of the equestrian and senatorial class, for whom life and honors was primarily in the public realm and private life often unimportant).

From the Stoic perspective, I think the fact that there are people different from us (other than we are) is not in our control; what is in our control is how we react to it. — Ciceronianus the White

Certainly. But I'm not referring to people different than us, simply to the state of society. Otherness isn't necessarily other people who happen to have different beliefs and so forth. It's also social organisation, cultural values, etc. which we may wish to alter or make better or improve.

I agree with Wayfarer in this. Postmodernism is a very small part of the problem, because very few people involved in practical life take it seriously. It is a joke to most of such people. I would hazard a guess that even the majority of philosophers today don't take it very seriously. Certainly most of those working in England and America, and probably much of Europe, at least outside of France, think in most ways against it. For, example, I nave read Zizek referring scornfully to "the Post Modern sophists". Even in France the most significant philosophers today, such as Badiou and Meillassoux, are deliberately working against and away from postmodernist tendencies.In fact the biggest problem is the objectification of spirit, which is in line with the rise of the scientific paradigm. This objectification is common to realists, anti-realists, idealists and materialists alike.

In fact ironically post modernism is the only significant contemporary philosophical movement which, although certainly not unequivocally and perhaps only by tenuous affiliation, in confined areas and in small measure, may be seen to be in opposition to the objectification of spirit. See for example the Christian phenomenology of Michel Henry (although he is arguably no Post Modernist); which can be understood to have something in common with Nikolai Berdyaev, a philosopher I very much admire, and who I have noticed you occasionally refer to favorably. Other examples are the apophatic Christian philosophers, such as Marion and Caputo, who arguably are Post modernist in orientation.

There's a glimmer of truth in the idea that only the oppressed can then experience freedom (whatever freedom is); but I would counter that by saying that even the oppressor is oppressed; an act of oppression is always born from oppression first experienced by the one who is now oppressing. An example is how often sexual abuse is a cycle. — Noble Dust

This is a psychological explanation which may or may not turn out to be true in a majority of cases. I think Hegel's point is a more phenomenological one. The point is, that from a position of complete unfreedom (which is the need to have one's humanity recognized by others, coupled with the failure to be able to recognize the humanity of others) no escape is possible.

"And again I say unto you, It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God." Matthew 19:24

Only from the position of the poor man or slave is it possible to free oneself from this need for recognition while simultaneously recognizing the other. The Master can never do it unless he become a slave or a poor man (in that sense). The rich man needs to give away all that he has in order to be free.

I believe this is also a meaning of Christ's saying recorded in the Gospel of Matthew:

" Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the Earth".

True, it is an explanation that involves psychology, but it's also an intuitive conclusion, not a phenomenological or logical one. The problem here for me is that I have a hard time imagining oppression being something that repeatedly is born in different people without apparent prior cause, as if isolated incidents of oppression just pop up in the world. This is tied up with the concept of Otherness; imagining that people essentially just randomly develop evil, oppressive tendencies actually perpetuates otherness, because it's such a bizarre premise in the first place that evades any obvious explanation. This is a classic aspect of otherness; the other is evil, and there's no explanation as to why. Hegel's idea doesn't seem to address the problem of the origin of oppression. In other words, the dichotomy of oppressor and oppressed should be seen as dynamic and diffuse, not binary. So while I don't necessarily disagree with your explanations of Hegel's ideas, at least in theory, I still think we have to look at oppression as being a cycle. The question is what the root cause of the cycle is; I don't have an answer right now. But what I'm positing in this thread is that forgiveness is the antidote. I don't think this goes against the scriptures you're quoting, because again, the meek includes both oppressor and oppressed, viewed this way.

Edited for clarity.

Yes, but isn't the real problem that of how to escape oppression and achieve freedom? I think to do that freedom must be presupposed as primary. So, to me the concern over origins is a concern with determinism; and once you enter the deterministic circle the possibility of freedom evaporates.

Certainly I agree that forgiveness is a necessary part of the answer. The oppressed must forgive the oppressor in order to be free of him. But I don't think that necessitates making excuses for the oppressor. He can be seen as having deliberately chosen evil, and yet still forgiven nonetheless. If his actions are determined, and thus not of his own doing, then there would be nothing to forgive. Do I need to forgive the lion for eating my children, or the lightning for killing my beloved? I would say it would not be appropriate to forgive something which is merely of necessity acting according to its nature.

Yes, that is the real problem, I agree. I like Berdyaev's view of freedom as primary, the same as you're saying; he sees it as something prior even to divinity, as far as I understand. But if you take determinism at face value, as the idea that human actions are ultimately jump started by an outside force (and so at it's mercy), and if freedom is not outside the will but the foundation of it, then oppression could be seen as emanating from freedom. Seeing it this way gives meaning to oppression as a cycle. I don't see this as a problem, especially in light of ideas from people like Barfield and Teilhard de Chardin who see humanity evolving, whether strictly in consciousness (Barfield), or organically into consciousness (Teilhard).

I'm not trying to make excuses for the oppressor, but maybe I'm inadvertently doing that. The problem I keep trying to explain is simply that each of us is both oppressor and oppressed. So when we talk about the oppressed needing to forgive the oppressor, this is a non-linear process (if you will): I forgive you, you forgive me, I forgive Augustino, he forgives me, he forgives you, you forgive him...Wayfarer forgave his father, I haven't forgiven mine yet, but will in the future, etc., ad infinitum until everyone is forgiven. So I'm looking at it on at first a small scale. I'm not looking at Hitler, etc. Those are logarithmically much more massive instances of the same principle that us everyday people deal with. It's best to start existentially with myself.

Certainly. But I'm not referring to people different than us, simply to the state of society. Otherness isn't necessarily other people who happen to have different beliefs and so forth. It's also social organisation, cultural values, etc. which we may wish to alter or make better or improve. — Agustino

Yes, but I think a Stoic would view what should be altered and how it should be altered very differently than most. A Stoic is supposed to be largely indifferent to such things as money, power, property, the opinions of others, what others desire, customs, and the more we speak of social organization and cultural values the more speak of such things as they relate to many people. So I think a Stoic would think that many--perhaps even most--of what creates conflict and disagreement among groups of people to be a function of their misguided concern for and desire for matters and things which are of no real importance, and the desire to possess or exercise control over them. I don't think a Stoic would do anything which would foster such concerns and desires and it seems our politics, at least, is entirely devoted to them.

Do you think the idea of freedom as primary is compatible with a theologically evolutionary view of spirit, though? Barfield and de Chardin I think, both entertain such views. Barfield I have read quite recently and extensively, and I am aware that he, following Steiner (who himself follows Goethe and also, somewhat puzzlingly, claims very extensive and specific clairvoyant knowledge of 'spiritual reality') does assert that there is a spiritual telos. The problem I have with this idea is that it is ultimately deterministic, and seems to deny genuine freedom and creativity; because freedom and creativity rely on the possibility that there are many ways the story of God and humanity may turn out.

The objectification of spirit that Berdyaev warns against seems to be exemplified in Steiner's notion of a 'science of anthroposophy' or 'spiritual science'. I do have a lot of respect for Steiner and Barfield and also for a man who was, early on in his spiritual development, Steiner's disciple, but who later converted to Catholicism and wrote the great anonymous spiritual classic Meditations on the Tarot; I am speaking here of Valentin Tomberg. I suspect it was this tendency of anthroposophy to objectify the spirit that turned Tomberg away from it and towards Catholicism.

Do you think the idea of freedom as primary is compatible with a theologically evolutionary view of spirit, though? — John

I'm working through it still, but intuitively, yes. This might sound like bad philosophy, but the two ideas taken separately both resonate in my mind, so, in my thinking, a harmonization must exist. Again, I don't place primary importance on discursive reasoning for these topics. I place a lot of emphasis on intuition. Berdyaev's critique of discursive reasoning in the first chapter of The Meaning of the Creative Act has been pretty influential for me. I think I've always intuitively felt the existence of a spiritual telos. I've always had an obsession with eschatology. I guess it depends on how we're defining these various terms; "consciousness", "spirit", "evolution"...I think of Barfield's evolution of consciousness as originating primordially in myth (the positive gnostic sense of the word), in a time when there was a spiritual unity instead of metaphor; language (imbued with a spiritual power) evolved with the birth of consciousness into a dualistic split between subject and object; primordially, there was one participatory reality, and metaphoric language signifies the first split between subject and object. To say "the spirit is a breath" or "the spirit is a wind" is to remember when they were one and the same. Barfield always seems too sheepish to actually come out and say this because he was so focused on a philological approach to the topics that interested him, instead of taking a specific religious stand. He didn't seem to want to step too far outside his specialty. Anyway, taking Berdyaev into account, these metaphors become objectifications of the spirit, as Barfield's participation begins to wane, and abstract reason begins to take shape as consciousness evolves. So, all that being said, I don't see how these concepts are deterministic. It seems like you equate any sense of origin with determinism; maybe I just don't understand the academic philosophical concepts of determinism well enough, but I see no problem with viewing an evolutionary theology as stemming from a primordial freedom. A static view of consciousness actually feels more deterministic to me; God imbued mankind with one unchanging consciousness and now he's enslaved to it unless he "accepts Jesus", or some form of the usual narrative. In this view he's basically just deterministically enslaved to God's will because he's a static being. No freedom in sight.

because freedom and creativity rely on the possibility that there are many ways the story of God and humanity may turn out. — John

This is an interesting thought that I haven't entertained before. I think there's actually wisdom in this idea that doesn't clash with the concept of a spiritual telos. There are, in a sense, many ways the story can turn out; many potential versions of a telos. You could maybe build an argument that the evolution of consciousness is pointing towards the birth of a telos, one that we don't yet know. So instead of discursively abstracting a resonable-sounding telos given the data, we can look at the evolution of consciousness and predict that "something will happen in the end", we're moving towards something, thanks to human creativity and freedom. Granted I haven't done this in this thread, I've more or less suggested my own telos. But it's an interesting idea.

The objectification of spirit that Berdyaev warns against seems to be exemplified in Steiner's notion of a 'science of anthroposophy' or 'spiritual science'. — John

Yes, and Berdyaev was critical of Steiner, and for good reason I think. Steiner remains an enigma, though...bioydynamic farming has been shown to be effective (I work in the wine industry; biodynamics has done wonders for the winemaking process, granted it's still on the fringe). My bigger concern about Steiner is that his followers seem to border on the cultish. Barfield's focus on language is what's important to me, as far as anthroposophy goes. But even Barfield's excessive admiration for Steiner feels a little off.

I place a lot of emphasis on intuition. Berdyaev's critique of discursive reasoning in the first chapter of The Meaning of the Creative Act has been pretty influential for me. — Noble Dust

Ah, now that's a book I haven't yet read, but want to, since I am very much involved in the arts and I really resonate with Berdyaev's philosophy.

I also place a lot of emphasis on intuition; in fact I think it's indispensable even to any process of discursive reasoning. How do we know that one thing follows form another? We just see it; it is intuitively obvious or self-evident to us. Intuition is absolutely intrinsic to both analysis and synthesis, I believe.

I think I've always intuitively felt the existence of a spiritual telos. I've always had an obsession with eschatology. — Noble Dust

Perhaps a general telos; love, the creation of novelty or redemption perhaps? But nothing too rigid?

So, all that being said, I don't see how these concepts are deterministic. It seems like you equate any sense of origin with determinism; maybe I just don't understand the academic philosophical concepts of determinism well enough, but I see no problem with viewing an evolutionary theology as stemming from a primordial freedom. A static view of consciousness actually feels more deterministic to me; God imbued mankind with one unchanging consciousness and now he's enslaved to it unless he "accepts Jesus", or some form of the usual narrative. In this view he's basically just deterministically enslaved to God's will because he's a static being. No freedom in sight. — Noble Dust

What you have written here is suggestive; I see some interesting questions and possible directions to follow. Perhaps the reason I associate the question of origin with determinism is because of the idea inherent in it of first cause or initial determination. The models of nature are either probablistically or rigidly deterministic, both of which, excluding any other supernatural factors. seem to rule out genuine freedom. Evolution always seems to be associated with the idea of naturalistic process, and is hard to associate with any idea of an order that does not involve one thing leading to another.

I'm not sure what you mean by "a static view of consciousness" or "one unchanging consciousness". I do think spirit necessarily changes, and consciousness with it, but I tend to think of the changes as ineluctably mysterious; and so I hesitate to associate them with such a loaded idea as 'evolution'. The idea of natural evolution, it seems to me, is that given the starting conditions and the laws or invariances of nature, (whether rigid or probabilistic) it has turned out the only way it could have.

There are, in a sense, many ways the story can turn out; many potential versions of a telos. You could maybe build an argument that the evolution of consciousness is pointing towards the birth of a telos, one that we don't yet know. — Noble Dust

Are you thinking here of something like a shared mystical understanding?

Ah, now that's a book I haven't yet read, but want to, — John

What have you read from him? It's probably his most mystical writing, in a way. He ties creativity to a bunch of different aspects of life and the world. It can get a little bewildering, but it's incredible. A quote from that book that reflects what you're saying about intuition:

"The task of philosophy is to find the most perfect formulation for truth, perceived in intuition, and to synthesize formulae. These carry conviction by the light which shines out from them, rather than by demonstration or conclusions."

Perhaps a general telos; love, the creation of novelty or redemption perhaps? But nothing too rigid? — John

Are you asking me? I think love and redemption are certainly part of the end, I'm not sure about the creation of novelty, you'd have to expand on that. An interesting side thought is how much western culture loves great stories; novels, movies, the golden age of TV, etc...in a sense, eschatology permeates all of Western society in that way, and I wonder if our obsession with stories is descended from the Gospel. I'm not making any kind of claim, just making the observation.

I'm not sure what you mean by "a static view of consciousness" or "one unchanging consciousness" — John

I guess I was thinking if there's no evolution of consciousness, then humanity has always had the same modes of thinking; discursive reason, intuition, imagination, along with emotions, memories, sense data...and I don't think that's true. I think a lot of complex factors (many of them spiritual) lead to changes in consciousness over the course of history. So I don't really think in Teilhard's terms of consciousness being connected to material evolution.

I tend to think of the changes as ineluctably mysterious; and so I hesitate to associate them with such a loaded idea as 'evolution'. — John

This is a nuanced idea that I can entertain.

Are you thinking here of something like a shared mystical understanding? — John

Not necessarily, I was just trying to describe a mindset of accepting teleology without knowing what it will be as being a tenable position.

If you can't reconcile origins with freedom, how do you view both concepts?

@John@Noble Dust

Good convo, just want to toss in a parenthetical aside about Hegel's Master/Slave dialectic, partially to refresh myself.

The reason the master can't recognize the slave's humanity is because he can't even recognize his own. For Hegel, freedom arises out of self-consciousness, and self-consciousness is a recognition of one's essential negativity. Negativity, in this context, doesn't mean 'evil,' but the negation of everything 'determinate' about oneself (To make this more concrete, it's a bit like smelting one's identity by melting away everything that comes from one's contingent lifeworld - Who am I? Am I a Mainer? A US Citizen? A dispatcher? A brother? Importantly the same process has to be done with reference to what one desires too. What remains is not simple nothing, but the absolute freedom of self-relating nothingness.)

The slave, in Hegel's strange parable, is a slave because he has experienced the fear of total annihilation. He was utterly at the mercy of one who could kill him, but was spared and made into a slave. In experiencing this fear, says Hegel, he has experienced immediately his inner nothingness.

Then he is set to work, shaping the world not according to his desires, but to the desires of another. In (a) experiencing the nothingness of his identity and (b) acting upon the world with no determinate purpose of his own, he comes to understand, so the story goes, the essence of freedom, of what a man really is. His 'in-itself' has become 'for-himself' The Master can't understand this, because he's still totally immersed in his life world, acting out blindly inherited desires he's never questioned, but feels as his own.

He requires the recognition of the slave because he is not able himself to confront and work upon the world, but requires a mediating workman. Since he has not made his identity's in-itself for-himself, and since, for Hegel, an in-itself always needs to express itself, he must seek the for-itself in another. The slave, on the other hand, has freed himself from such a dependence (though this, too, is just the beginning of a much longer process.)

What have you read from him? — Noble Dust

I have read Slavery and Freedom , Spirit and Reality and am reading Freedom and the Spirit

An interesting side thought is how much western culture loves great stories; novels, movies, the golden age of TV, etc...in a sense, eschatology permeates all of Western society in that way, and I wonder if our obsession with stories is descended from the Gospel. — Noble Dust

Yes, the story is generally conceived as having a definite beginning and ending and in that sense seems most consonant with the Western view of cosmology and history. However, The Epic of Gilgamesh and the Odyssey, among many others, do predate the Gospel.

I guess I was thinking if there's no evolution of consciousness, then humanity has always had the same modes of thinking; discursive reason, intuition, imagination, along with emotions, memories, sense data...and I don't think that's true. I think a lot of complex factors (many of them spiritual) lead to changes in consciousness over the course of history. So I don't really think in Teilhard's terms of consciousness being connected to material evolution. — Noble Dust

That's a novel way of thinking about it for me. I had always thought of the evolution of consciousness as consisting in different ways of reasoning discursively, intuiting, imagining, emoting, remembering, sensing and so on. I hadn't thought of it in terms of other modalities altogether. I'll have to think some more on that.

I do agree with you about spiritual factors (meaning non-material factors) leading to changes in consciousness.

If you can't reconcile origins with freedom, how do you view both concepts? — Noble Dust

I do tend to think it all starts with freedom; so I have no problem with the idea of origin per se, but rather with the idea of origins as being ultimately determinative.

I have read Slavery and Freedom , Spirit and Reality and am reading Freedom and the Spirit — John

Quit playing around, and read Philosophy of Inequality by him ;)

I haven't considered that book yet. You seem to be suggesting it is his magnum opus. If so, why would say it is?

You've reminded of some interesting elements of Hegel's dialectic here. I particularly like the idea of "self-relating nothingness" which I think ties in with a non-objectifying conception of spirit, and the Christian idea of 'dying before you die'.

As an aside, inexplicably I am reminded of Heidegger's thinking of authenticity as 'being towards death' which if I remember right, he says is orienting towards 'the possibility of the impossibility of Dasein's being'.

I don't have anything more to say about that right now, so I'll leave it there.

I haven't considered that book yet. You seem to be suggesting it is his magnum opus. If so, why would say it is? — John

Because that's the book he wrote when it was very likely he was going to die - so the gloves came off. That's him at his most honest.

It's interesting you should say that, I searched the book on Amazon earlier and found this in the lone review of it:
"It is written with a more unrestrained style than is usually found in Berdyaev's books. It is Berdyaev with the gloves off, fighting mad. (Berdyaev in a later postscript disavowed its angry tone, although he did not repudiate its ideas.)".

Anyway, it sounds interesting, I'll probably read it after Destiny of Man and The Meaning of the Creative Act.

I have found more sympathy in general with Berdyaevs philosophical writings, than with those of most other philosophers. I find that what he says is mostly exactly what I have already thought, only crystallized and elaborated more fully, obviously. So reading him is a fascinating exercise for me.

It's interesting you should say that, I searched the book on Amazon earlier and found this in the lone review of it:
"It is written with a more unrestrained style than is usually found in Berdyaev's books. It is Berdyaev with the gloves off, fighting mad. (Berdyaev in a later postscript disavowed its angry tone, although he did not repudiate its ideas.)". — John

I did NOT write that review >:O


Regarding the angry tone, it is a political book, and the imminence of death forced Berdyaev to be authentic and true. That's what I like about it. It's truthful - there's no mish-mashing that is present in some of his other, more intellectual and less political works.