No such thing as the world! That's a good one. — Sapientia

Note that this claim is part of the "New realist" ontology of philosopher Markus Gabriel, so I'd say it's quite respectable.

Note that this claim is part of the "New realist" ontology of philosopher Markus Gabriel, so I'd say it's quite respectable. — jamalrob

Philosophers can come up with clever arguments for just about anything. That's what they do. I try to bring things back down to earth.

That was all pretty standard stuff per Scott Soames.... check out Understanding Truth. Awesome.

Correct me if I am wrong, but you seem to be admitting (at least) that there could not have been any statements had there not been any intelligent life, but why? In your view, what is it exactly about intelligent life that makes the existence of statements possible? — Theorem

How else do you think that there could have been statements? Are there any other realistic alternatives that you can think of? It'd surely require someone or something capable of making statements, and intelligent life forms such as us fit that description.

But how is this line of inquiry even relevant? What matters is whether they would be mind-dependent. I don't have to play along with your Socratic line of enquiry, you know. Please state the supposed relevance of this line of enquiry before we continue.

Yes I do, mostly because I subscribe to the notion that statements are sign relations that require one or more minds as fundament in order to be instantiated. — Theorem

What does that mean? And why would that be required?

That was all pretty standard stuff per Scott Soames.... check out Understanding Truth. Awesome. — Mongrel

Maybe I will.

Is Quantum Mechanics true? What has its truth or falsity of quantum mechanics got to do with anybody's mind?

We (minds, that is) could all suddenly cease to exist, and the sentence would still be there. — Sapientia

'There anyway'.

Unfortunately, a lot of people think that philosophy amounts to "playing stupid." (I can explain why a lot of people misinterpret it that way.) Philosophy really isn't playing stupid though. This is a case where either you're playing stupid or you effectively really are. — Terrapin Station

No such thing as the world! That's a good one. — Sapientia

Well, I'm involved in the "Many Worlds Interpretation" thread. What makes you think that your assumption of "the world" is the correct one, and these speculative physicists who believe in many worlds are wrong?

If you believe in "the world", and they believe in "many worlds", then why should I believe in any "world" until someone explains to me what it means to be a world.

What makes you think that your assumption of "the world" is the correct one, and these speculative physicists who believe in many worlds are wrong? — Metaphysician Undercover

Who is talking about "correct"?

You said:

You can use "the world" all you want, but I do not know what this refers to — Metaphysician Undercover

You can't talk about whether some definition or another is correct if you don't even have any idea what the term refers to.

You can't talk about whether some definition or another is correct if you don't even have any idea what the term refers to. — Terrapin Station

Exactly! How can you know what the word refers to if there are multiple definitions to choose from and none of them can be considered to be the correct one?

Just stipulate a definition and move on. What's wrong with that?

That's what I am asking. I'm not the one claiming the reality of "the world", I'm the one asking what that means.

That's what I am asking. I'm not the one claiming the reality of "the world", I'm the one asking what that means. — Metaphysician Undercover

In what context?

It was suggested that the world is something which exists independent of minds, and also that I am a part of this world. To begin with, that appears contradictory to me, unless I don't have a mind.

Also, what I observe is many objects independent from me. They are separate from me, and I am not part of them. I am "part" of many things, groups and organizations, mostly by choice, though I am part of my family, and part of the greater society, not by choice. What is this "world" which I am supposed to be part of?.

It was suggested that the world is something which exists independent of minds, and also that I am a part of this world. To begin with, that appears contradictory to me, unless I don't have a mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

A bit of hay may adhere to the fleece. It doesn't mean the fleece is hay-dependent. (I'm shopping for a spinning wheel. Woo Hoo!)

What is this "world" which I am supposed to be part of?. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not overly fond of your wording here. Partitioning the world invites questions about whether its boundaries are finite or infinite. World here means a domain and I believe it's an abstract object because it's a set.

A bit of hay may adhere to the fleece. It doesn't mean the fleece is hay-dependent. (I'm shopping for a spinning wheel. Woo Hoo!) — Mongrel

What part of the word "part" do you not understand? To say that the hay adheres to the fleece is not the same as saying that the hay is part of the fleece. How could the fleece be hay-independent if the hay is part of the fleece.

I'm not overly fond of your wording here. Partitioning the world invites questions about whether its boundaries are finite or infinite. World here means a domain and I believe it's an abstract object because it's a set. — Mongrel

I was just stating my observations. Things which I observe to be independent from me are independent things. By the same principle that I hold them to be independent from me, I also hold them to be independent from each other. What makes one thing a "part" of another? If I am supposed to be a part of this thing, "the world", is this thing not independent at all?

There was no suggestion that the world is a domain, and I don't know what you mean. Is "the world" just meant to signify a domain name? I don't get it.

How could the fleece be hay-independent if the hay is part of the fleece. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the fleece could persist beyond the removal of the hay. It's not the definition of "world" you should be preoccupied with here. It's "dependent."

Exactly! — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, man, let's continue to play stupid. That's some quality philosophizing.

If the fleece could persist beyond the removal of the hay. It's not the definition of "world" you should be preoccupied with here. It's "dependent." — Mongrel

I don't see how that's relevant. That something could persist in time (the fleece), beyond the point in time in which something was a part of it (the hay), does not negate the fact that this thing is a part of that thing's existence. Existence necessarily has temporal extension. If your original claim is that the hay is a part of the fleece, you can only remove this fact by limiting the temporal extension of the existence of the fleece to a time when the hay is not a part of the fleece. You would claim that the temporal part of the fleece's existence, during which the hay is a part of the fleece, is not actually part of the fleece's existence. But then you contradict the original claim that the hay is a part of the fleece.

Back to the original point. If I am part of the world, how is it possible that the world exists independently of me? That is the explanation I am waiting for, in order that I can understand what is meant by "the world". As far as I can see, either the world is completely independent from me (in which case I am not a part of it), or I am part of the world (in which case it is nonsense to speak of the world as something independent from me). Otherwise I need a firm definition of what "part" means.

We could start a thread to explore different sorts of ontological dependence.

f I am part of the world, how is it possible that the world exists independently of me? That is the explanation I am waiting for, in order that I can understand what is meant by "the world". — Metaphysician Undercover

Paradoxes often occur in respect of this question. A paradox might arise when there are two apparently contradictory statements, both of which appear to be true. And this is a case in point. It is true that we are 'part of the world', but it is also true that 'the world is different to us'.

The latter statement is based on the obvious fact that as a being, an organism, we have to differentiate ourselves from what is not ourselves. That is not an ability that we're born with, but is learned in very early stages of infancy. But once learned it forms an essential part of the ability to negotiate our way in the world. Part of the developmental cycle is learning that things do indeed exist separately to us. I recall when I was in infants school, playing hide-and-seek in the playground, I was convinced that if I couldn't see the person that was looking for me, then they couldn't see me either. I learned very quickly that I was wrong, and from that began to understand how I would appear to another person. In hindsight, that ability to see things from an apparently external perspective, is a normal and important part of mental development. (I wonder if kids with autism disorders ever develop that?) Something similar occured when I noticed, aged about 6, that my own drawings lacked perspective - I suddenly saw the faults in all the drawings I had done of airplanes and the like. Basically, I realised that I couldn't draw; whereas previously, I couldn't tell the difference between what I drew, and other drawings. That too was a small milestone in cognitive development.

All of this is part of normal psychology and not controversial. From the realist point of view that one arrives at as a part of the process of maturation, the world just carries on, and I am only one person in it, born at such and such a date, one day to die.

But I don't think the issue of 'mind independence' can be resolved on the common-sense or realist level. What the 'mind-dependence' problem requires is an analysis of the role of the mind in what we understand as reality. And that, I think, is a very difficult question, because it requires something more than a common-sense analysis. My beef with a lot of what is said about it, is that most people just regard the common-sense attitude as being definitive; as if common sense really constitutes a philosophical analysis, when the role of philosophy is precisely to question what most people think of as 'common-sense'.

The latter statement is based on the obvious fact that as a being, an organism, we have to differentiate ourselves from what is not ourselves. That is not an ability that we're born with, but is learned in very early stages of infancy. — Wayfarer

The differentiating of ourselves, to see oneself as a thing separate from other things, is not the real problem I am having here, this seems to come naturally. As you describe, it is a sort of learnt thing, but it is highly intuitive as we deal with individual objects, and see ourselves as individuals, separate from others. The real issue is the assumption that I am part of something, "the world", some larger whole.

To be a part of something implies that I have a role, a function, or purpose. Why should I assume that such is the case with respect to my relationship to this thing called the world? I can justify the notion that I am a part of a larger thing called my family, because I can understand real relationships here. My siblings have the same mother and father as I do, my cousins have shared grandparents, etc.. If I extrapolate, I can extend this such that I am part of the local society, the human race in general, and I can even say that I am part of life on earth. How does "the world" fit into this though? That's where I find difficulty. I can see myself as part of life on earth, because I can see a certain relationship between myself and other living things, in the fact that we are all alive, but I'm really not sure how I'm supposed to conceive of myself as part of the world.

Whenever I think of the world, I seem to be faced with this division, this separation. "The world" seems to signify all that is other from me, and I cannot seem to force it to signify something that I am a part of.. Whenever I try to establish a conceptual relationship between myself and the world, I do so by means of the relationships described above. But I don't ever get to "the world" because there is a disjoint at the end of the living, which causes the world to loom on the other side, as the other.

How do I get beyond those particular relationships which justify the notion that I am part of something bigger, life on earth, to the conclusion of a most general relationship, that each and every thing animate or inanimate, is a part of the same thing which I am a part of, the world? This is so completely counter-intuitive to what comes naturally, and what we learn, to differentiate and separate individual things, as if things really have separate existence. Why would we be learning to differentiate and separate individual things, as if individual things each have their own separate existence, if they were really all part of one, the world? .

Whenever I think of the world, I seem to be faced with this division, this separation. "The world" seems to signify all that is other from me, and I cannot seem to force it to signify something that I am a part of. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is the fundamental existential problem of life. Overcoming or healing that sense of otherness or separation is the goal of all philosophy in my view.

But this "sense of otherness" appears to be very real. In fact I think it is real. If it is, then to overcome it simply by assuming the existence of a unity called "the world" is to create an illusion, a fiction. It would be like if, when you wish that something isn't so, you simply assume that it is otherwise, in order to avoid facing the facts. If that is the case, then the only real way to overcome otherness is to actually create the relationships necessary to produce the world. It requires real effort to bring about what we want to be the case. Simply assuming that it is the case does not suffice.

We could start a thread to explore different sorts of ontological dependence. — Mongrel

I think that might be a good idea. Here's an issue I've come across a number of times already in the philosophy forums. It is the idea of co-dependence, and the claim is that one thing is dependent on another, while the other is dependent on the first. It is used to put an end to analysis.

"We cannot analyze these things further, because there is a co-dependence here which prevents us from separating these two things."

So for instance, the claim would be that we cannot analyze space and time separately because there is a co-dependence between them which prevents us from separating them, even in theory. The insistence would be that "space" and "time" really do not refer to separate things, so it would be a faulty analysis to separate them.

My opinion is that there is no such thing as a real co-dependence, and the term is simply used to disguise circular logic, or to make circular logic appear to be acceptable.

I wouldn't call it co-dependence because that term has a significant psychological meaning. Interdependence... yes. I disagree with you there. Probably best to get regular ontological dependence under control first, though.

"Co-dependent" is the term I've actually encountered here at tpf. To me, it is used in a way which differs from "interdependence". Interdependence implies two distinct things with some type of reciprocating relationship between the two. "Co-dependent" is used to signify something stronger than that, such that the two named things are really just two aspects of one and the same thing, inseparable in principle. There is no "bond", or "relationship" binding the two, as they are one and the same thing. In other words, it is claimed that analysis has determined that the two named things are not actually two named things, but two different facades, or perhaps "dimensions" of the same thing.

It is claimed that special relativity demonstrates that time and space are really one and the same thing. The problem there though, is that this is produced by synthesis rather than analysis. However, you could consider wave/particle duality as such a co-dependence produced by analysis, two distinct names with two distinct descriptions, which are believed to be two facades of the same thing.

By the way, what do you even mean by ontological dependence?

There's an SEP article on ontological dependence.

A quick glance of that article reveals that "ontological dependence" appears to be all smoke and mirrors. They define it as something other than a causal dependency or a logical dependency. But the examples given seem to all be understandable in terms of either causal or logical dependency

So just be aware that although you may not like the concept of ontological dependence, that may be the concept in play in someone else's thoughts. I'm sure you wouldn't intentionally cause confusion. People who do that are cursed souls.