You’re making things up in your head. — aRealidealist

:rofl:

Directly address my last post, if you want me to continue here. If not, I rest my case on it.

“.., and as such is a conception”— Substance isn’t a conception; this fact alone is enough to contradict your beliefs in regard to Spinoza.

Substance isn’t a conception... — aRealidealist

By substance, I mean that which... ...IS conceived through itself...

Further reduced...

Substance is conceived.

Either being conceived does not count as conception, and you're right, or being conceived does count as conception and you're wrong...

Are you claiming that being conceived does not count as conception?

They're also wrong if being conceived not does count as conception, since it would render Substance not a conception.

In this case, Substance would not involve conception to obtain, so the contradiction they suppose would not be present.

Yes.

I'm no Spinozan scholar, but jeez! I've laid it out as simply as I know how.

You haven’t made any case, you’re also making that up in your head, too, as far as I’m concerned; so rest or no rest, I’m carless either way. Moreover, I’ve already addressed you, over & over, you’ve just ignored my responses; in Spinoza’s philosophy, “substance” isn’t a conception, & cannot be understood as being the same thing, now whether or not you comprehend what that means isn’t my problem but yours.

“By substance, I mean that which... ...is conceived through itself...” — “Substance” is that which is conceived through itself, but it isn’t the conception in which it’s (supposedly) conceived through itself. What’s so hard to understand about that? Do you insist on understanding “substance” as a conception, to thereby contradict the basic views of Spinoza?

I’ve already addressed you, over & over, you just ignore my response; in Spinoza’s philosophy, “substance” isn’t a conception... — aRealidealist

You've yet to have addressed the issue I've raised here... today. In very simple terms to understand, Spinoza's definition of substance is all the evidence needed to know that your claim about Spinoza's notion of substance is false, on it's face. Spinoza's own words falsify what you're arguing here. Those same words verify what I've charged you with from the beginning.

You're just denying Spinoza's definition.

Either being conceived does not count as conception, and you're right, or being conceived does count as conception and you're wrong...

Are you claiming that being conceived does not count as conception?

:up: :up:

*Incorrigible is as incorrigible does.*

Even at Walmart checkouts & airport kiosks now cheap glossy copies of Spinoza For Dummies must be on display racks along side The Inquirer & other tabloids.

:smile:

I could be mistaken here, but I'm fairly certain Spinoza's definition of substance also has everything to do with what it would take for something to be self-caused.

I’m not denying Spinoza’s definition, in as much as you’re just misunderstanding them. “Substance” isn’t a conception, in Spinoza’s philosophy, nor can ever be; no one that I’ve known as held such a view about Spinoza, you’re all by yourself in the minority here (so your personal interpretation holds no weight).

“Are you claiming that being conceived does not count as conception?”— When dealing with realities, the thing of which one has a conception, or conceives, i.e., that which is conceived, is independent of the instance of the conception of it, but the conception itself isn’t. Thus “substance” isn’t a conception. You’re completely overlooking the point.

Are you claiming that being conceived does not count as conception?

That's a simple question with a simple "yes" or "no" answer. Which is it?

Such your cheerleading self up, lol. You should get yourself some tutus & pom-poms from Walmart while you’re there picking up a personal copy of “Spinoza for dummies.”

...substance isn’t a conception. — aRealidealist

It most certainly is according to Spinoza. It's a particular kind of conception. Self-caused. Infinite. Etc.

Sigh...

:roll:

Nowhere does Spinoza speak of conceptions being self-caused (in the same way that the conception of eternity or an eternal thing isn’t itself eternal, the conception of a “self-caused” thing isn’t itself self-caused); again, you’re making stuff up in your head. Have you ever actually read “The Ethics”?

Being conceived counts as an instance of conception, but the thing of which one has a conception doesn’t. Very simple.

Fer fuck's sake...

The important prevailing philosophical discourse of Spinoza's time revolved around ideas of what it would take to be self-caused, notions of God, etc. I tried to invoke those considerations, but you said that they were irrelevant. They may be irrelevant to what you are arguing about Spinoza, but they are not at all irrelevant to what Spinoza was arguing.

Anything besides direct quotes from Spinoza, for fuck’s sake, is irrelevant. You thinking otherwise is quite telling.

Being conceived counts as conception, but the thing of which one has a conception doesn’t. Very simple — aRealidealist

You're equivocating the term conception.

The irony... given that you've charged Spinoza with self-contradiction and/or incoherence.

Sigh...

Anything besides direct quotes from Spinoza, for fuck’s sake, is irrelevant. You thinking otherwise is quite telling. — aRealidealist

Wonderful. So I tell myself... what on earth are you still doing arguing with this person when they believe that Spinoza's own life circumstances are irrelevant to Spinoza's philosophy....

How is distinguishing between the thing of which one conceives, &, the conception itself, e.g, the sun is different from my conception of it, equivocating? So, yea, no equivocation on my part, you’re just being really difficult, borderline dumb at times.

Funny how, without dropping names, the party in question starts telling on him/her self by talking shit ... :snicker:

I'm not the "pom-poms" type, son. And don't need my own copy of Spinoza For Dummies with you wantonly plagiarizing your copy all over this thread. You just keep on misconceiving "conceived through itself" all the while proving that my conception of you vis-à-vis your textually uncorroborated muddle is more than ... fair. :kiss:

How is distinguishing between the thing of which one conceives, &, the conception itself, e.g, the sun is different from my conception of it, equivocating? — aRealidealist

Equivocating is when an author is using two different senses/acceptable uses/definitions of the same term in the same argument. In this case, you're using two different definitions of the term "conception" in the very same claim...

Being conceived counts as conception, but the thing of which one has a conception doesn’t. — aRealidealist

Define "conception" here in a way that we can substitute both instances of it in the above quote with that definition and the claim remain meaningful.

If you can do that, then you're not equivocating.

You can't.

“Equivocating is when an author is using two different senses/acceptable uses/definitions of the same term in the same argument.”— Lol, I was only reusing the terms that are included in your own question which you raised to me; so if there’s any equivocation, it stems from your own question.

So...

Your equivocating the term "conception" is somehow my fault?

:brow:

I didn’t equivocate, if anything, you did in the wording of your own question. How you don’t understand the difference between a thing & a conception is beyond me. “Substance” & conception are no more the same than the sun is with our conception of it (are you claiming that they’re the same thing)? Your whole objection & opposition is foolish, to say the least.

“You just keep on misconceiving ‘conceived through itself’" — I’m not misconceiving anything of the sort. Spinoza clearly only ever asserts “substance” to be “that which is in itself”, & not any conception (do you claim Spinoza did otherwise?); even if, its conception is formed independently of any other conception, this isn’t the same as the conception being in itself, as being independent of every other conception isn’t the same as being independent of everything (a fundamental distinction that your friend can’t seem, or doesn’t want, to wrap his head around).

Yes, we do claim states otherwise. He outright states substance is conceived through itself.

By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself [emphasis mine]: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception. — Spinoza, Ethics Part 1, Prop III.

Substance is itself and also conception through itself. It's not just no other conception, but the conception of itself too. It's not independent of everything (that would be an oxymoron; it would have to independent from itself), just everything but substance (i.e. everything else, rather than everything).

“Yes, we do claim states otherwise. He outright states substance is conceived through itself.” — The point is, though, him stating that “substance” is conceived through itself doesn’t mean that he’s saying the same thing about (any) conception; for, indeed, in his view, it’s dependent on “substance”, as a mode, & so (by essence) it cannot be as such. Correspondingly, please show me one, single time, just one, in any of his writings, where he states or claims that conception is that which is in itself, or that his “substance” is a conception? You won’t & can’t.