@creativesoul

The posts which consisted solely of insults have been deleted. Play nice.

The first problem (1) with Spinoza’s two definitions of “substance”, in relation to his overall philosophy, is the consideration that, by definition, a conception cannot itself be something, or that, which is in itself. — aRealidealist

Rubbish.

That's a problem with your definition, not Spinoza's. As I said earlier... you're just denying Spinoza's definitions. The problem here - of course - is that whether or not Spinoza is guilty of incoherence/self-contradiction is determined by his definitions... not yours. His is below.


III. By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.

Duly noted.

“an idea or conception of a mode is not enough to justify it” — I think that it’s important to note that I’m speaking about the mode of conception, in general, & not an individual conception, which can or cannot be, of some particular mode; the former isn’t capable of being or not being as such, as the latter is, for the mode of conception is apriori defined as only being through something other than itself, namely, a mental thing, & therefore cannot be rationally/logically justified as being in any other way; unlike your example of a “tree in your backyard”, which can or cannot be as such, or, in another way, in as much as its determinate reality isn’t apriori contained or justified in its mere idea or conception (it could be a big tree or a small tree, this kind of tree or that kind of tree, the general idea or conception of it doesn’t necessarily determine such a fact). So, to be clear, an individual instance of a particular conception of a mode is capable of being or not being as such, while the nature of modes apriori cannot be otherwise than it is (I refer to Spinoza’s definition of “mode”, cited in the O.P.).

So, now, on the grounds of Spinoza’s acceptance of modes of thought, like conception, one can raise the same problem or contradiction to him that Descartes was faced with when positing the absolute reality of both mental & physical forms. Such that Spinoza’s “substance” being able to explain the reality of physical or extended forms is downright false, something which he pretends to have done past Descartes, & cannot be rationally/logically maintained, for it involves contradiction or inconsistency (as the first objection in my O.P. notes).

What’s a problem with my definition? Are you stating that Spinoza grants that a conception is that which is in itself & is conceived through itself??? Or is that something which you’re personally maintaining? I’m not just denying Spinoza’s definitions, I’m simply eliminating them due to the rational/logical inconsistencies between them (or what follows from them).

I'm saying that your charge of "by definition" does not follow from Spinoza's.

III. By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.

That's it. We could simplify it without loss.

Substance is conceived through itself.

So, it's wrong to say that a conception cannot be in itself according to Spinoza.

Modes in the attribute of thought also have to be justified in something else (substance) because there are a priori distinctions which are not part of reality (contradictions, misidentifications, etc.).

Substance isn't specifically mental either. It's not the mental substance being posed against the physical substance. Spinoza is rejecting such a separation of substance (hence one substance rather than two). His point is substance is the same for both the mental and physical. The mental and physical share the same substance (i.e.are justified in the unity of reality).


You are misreading Spinoza as a dualist, suggesting he poses separate mental and physical substances.

I’m challenging the internal or rational/logical self-consistency of Spinoza’s philosophy on “substance.” Now as to the parsing of my sentence that you’ve quoted, let me rephrase it: by definition, a conception is not itself something which is in itself (i.e., something which is independent, &, or, in itself). — aRealidealist

So, you're saying that "substance" is "a conception", and as "a conception" is "not itself something which is in itself" then "substance" is logically incoherent. Your argument rests, then, on the supposition that "substance" is "a conception". I think this introduces a complexity which is not necessarily present in Spinoza's philosophy.

I agree with some of the comments above that you're introducing a dualism between 'conception' and 'substance' due, I think, to your own philosophical stance, which I would guess to be nearer to representative realism.

One point that might help clear this up: what is the meaning of 'substance' in philosophy as distinct from common language? What about a 'substance' makes it primary or irreducible?

“Modes in the attribute of thought also have to be justified in something else (substance) because there a priori distinctions which are not part of reality (contradictions, misidentifications, etc.).

Substance isn't specifically mental either. It's not the mental substance being posed against the physical substance. Spinoza is rejecting such a separation of substance (hence one substance rather than two).” — Though the whole point is that the very possibility of the justification or explanation for a mode of thinking, like that of conception, can only be had apriori through the reality of some mental, & never a physical, extended or bodily, form; & therefore if the mode of conception is real, then ultimately so must a real mental substance upon which it depends.

Thus in Spinoza accepting the reality of the mode of conception, he apriori excludes the rational/logical possibility of justifying or explaining the reality of physical, extended or bodily, phenomena; such that he never did justify or explain the reality of these, which he considered himself to have done past Descartes, but only irrationality/illogically maintained their coexistence in the same subject in which he based modes of thought (which is as absurd as simultaneously predicating insentience & sentience in the very same object).

So, to be clear, I’m not introducing dualism into Spinoza, I’m merely demonstrating that he never actually escaped it.

”So, it's wrong to say that a conception cannot be in itself according to Spinoza.” — Your knowledge of Spinoza is obviously lacking... “Particular thoughts, or this or that thought, are modes..” (“Ethics”, Part. 2, Prop. 1, Proof.), “By mode, I mean..,.. that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself” (Part. 1, Definition V.).

So, obviously, thoughts or conception cannot be in itself (as I’ve expressed at the beginning of my first objection that you’ve quoted), in as much as they’re modes, & therefore must exist in or through something other than itself (not in itself [according Spinoza’s own statements]).

No, I’ve never either directly or indirectly maintained that Spinoza’s “substance” is a conception; but, according to Spinoza himself, “substance” is “that which is in self”, such that a conception of it cannot be dependent on any other conception, i.e., it cannot be conceived through another but only in itself; my point is just that Spinoza’s definition or reasoning never leads to a knowledge or rational/logical conception of what this “substance” is.

Moreover, I don’t introduce a dualism in Spinoza, in as much as he himself acknowledges the contrariety between mental & physical, extended or bodily, forms, thus he states, “That, therefore, which determines the mind to thought is a mode of thought, and not a mode of extension; that is, it is not body.” (“The Ethics”, Prop. II, Proof.)

I’m just pointing out that he can’t rationally/logically explain the reality of mental & physical, extended or bodily, phenomena, by merely posting their coexistence in a single subject (which is as absurd as simultaneously predicating insentience & sentience in the very same object); for it’s rationally/logically contradictory, & so false.

But that's the very approach Spinoza is abandoning: it is substance which justifies, not a priori mental concepts. Mental concepts are just modes in the attribute of thought.

Substance is not modes (of the attribute of thought).

Spinoza does not exclude the rational/logical possibility of justifying or explaining the reality of physical, extended or bodily, phenomena. In fact, he outright holds the opposite: that these are justified by substance.

But notice that this “substance”, which is different than its modes, is never observed outside of definition! That which is in itself, is only expressed in definition; & so its ability to justify or explain the reality of two distinct kinds of modes, such as that of thought & extension, is only nominally advanced, & never on rational/logical grounds (since it’s altogether apriori rationally/logically contradictory, as contradictory as simultaneously predicating insentience & sentience in the very same subject or object).

:strong: :smirk: (×2) I wish I had more patience for the OP's onanistic twaddle. Good efforts on your parts though! I leave this thread now to your learned yet tender mercies, peeps. Hasta ...

Spinoza's point is that the question of rational/logical grounds has been misunderstood. It is other than to that kind of transcendent account you suggest here.

Only reality (substance/justification) can predicate an instance of insentience or/and sentience (depending on what modes we are talking about).

Since neither the distinction of insentience or sentience is justified on its own (what do either of those concepts mean? Are there any sentient beings in a backyard? What about non-seinteint ones?), they can only be justified under the same substance. To have insentience, it must be of reality. To have sentience, it must be of reality. To have both, they must be of reality.

This is a feature, not a bug. Consider the a priori definitions of sentience and insentience under the attribute of thought. Are these true? Yes, both definitions are necessary so. Why? They are of reality. The words sentience and insentience pick out a specific definitions of meaning as opposed to not. Both insentience and sentience are of reality. Simultaneously of substance.

As for subject and object, this is not true. Substance is not a mode. It's lacks the finite definition of modes. Unlike a sentient mode or a insentience mode, substance is not limited to being only of one. It's of all. As such, it is of all modes which are opposite each other, sometimes simultaneously (if reality happens to have those opposite modes together).

...conception cannot be in itself... ...in as much as they’re modes, & therefore must exist in or through something other than itself (not in itself [according Spinoza’s own statements]). — aRealidealist

Substance is in itself and conceives through itself(according to Spinoza's own definitions).

Conception is a mode of substance.

There is no self-contradiction here.

”Only reality (substance/justification) can predicate an instance of insentience or/and sentience (depending on what modes we are talking about).” — This is wrong, firstly because “reality”, per se, cannot actually predicate or support anything, in as much this is merely a subjective categorical term that’s applied onto or over designated things/objects (it isn’t really a thing or object itself); & secondly because predication isn’t real outside of conception or judgement (it cannot be a reality independently of these), & therefore remains (as the categorical term of “reality”) wholly ideal or subjective in nature & character. Which goes back to me saying that Spinoza, &, moreover, all monists, only ever nominally express the reality of this supposed all encompassing & homogeneous single substance, while failing to demonstrate its rational/logical possibility (indeed, because it’s inherently contradictory).

”Since neither the distinction of insentience or sentience is justified on its own (what do either of those concepts mean? Are there any sentient beings in a backyard? What about non-seinteint ones?), they can only be justified under the same substance.” — The distinction between the two is very justified, in as much as it’s conceivable, & is therefore capable of possibly being rationally/logically distinguished, which is ipso facto the evidence of the reality of their distinction; for if they weren’t really rationally/logically distinguishable, their distinction would be inconceivable in the very first place. Correspondingly, consider the sun, shining light onto your backyard, are you claiming that either it or its functions cannot be expressed without involving sentience in what’s explained? In explaining nuclear fission, is sentience explained or needed to be? So obviously they cannot be justified in or as the same substance; for one insentient substance doesn’t involve the reality of another sentient one for it be (as is clear from the example of the sun & nuclear fission); but only in the relation of diverse substances.

“To have insentience, it must be of reality. To have sentience, it must be of reality. To have both, they must be of reality.” — One doesn’t “have” insentience or sentience, one either is sentient or insentient. This is a very important distinction, for it excludes sentience & insentience from being viewed as contingent states, such that they cannot rationally/logically be maintained as being modes of a substance, since they aren’t possessions of, i.e., they cannot be “had” by, it.

“Both insentience and sentience are of reality. Simultaneously of substance.” — Both are of “reality”, sure, the point is just that they’re not the same or identical realities. Simultaneity of being isn’t identicality.

”Unlike a sentient mode or a insentience mode, substance is not limited to being only of one.” — As I’ve just explained above in the third paragraph of this post reply, sentience & insentience aren’t something that one can have, it’s something which one is or isn’t. This point alone should show you not only show how these are not, nor can be modes of a substance, let alone modes of the same individual substance.

“Substance is in itself and conceives through itself.” — Substance is conceived through itself, granted, but the point is that the conception itself, as a mode, isn’t, nor can be.

Conception is a mode of substance. There is no self-contradiction here.” — I never claimed that he contradicted himself by merely asserting conception as a mode.

No. The point is that substance conceiving through itself is not a mode of substance.

Are you denying that “conceiving” or conception is a mode?

“Both insentience and sentience are of reality. Simultaneously of substance.” — Both are of “reality”, sure, the point is just that they’re not the same or identical realities. Simultaneity of being isn’t identicality. — aRealidealist

Spinoza's point is they are of identical reality. The a priori definition of the modes insentience and sentience in the attribute of thought are of the same reality. Both definitions are true of reality. It isn't the case we have one otherworldly plane with just the definition of sentience and another with just the definition of non-sentience.

And indeed, simultaneity of being isn’t identically. The beings (modes) of insentience and sentience are not identical. It's reality which is identical. Insentience and insentience, are not the same thing, just of the same reality.

Much like all the books on my shelf are entirely different objects, yet all of them are identical in being of my shelf.

This is wrong, firstly because “reality”, per se, cannot actually predicate or support anything, in as much this is merely a subjective categorical term that’s applied onto or over designated things/objects (it isn’t really a thing or object itself); & secondly because predication isn’t real outside of conception or judgement (it cannot be a reality independently of these), & therefore remains (as the categorical term of “reality”) wholly ideal or subjective in nature & character. — aRealidealist

This is mistaken. For Spinoza, substance isn't predicated over other objects. It's self-defined. There is a thing, the absolute infinite of substance. It is not merely a subjective categorial term. Nor is it a mode of extension (e.g. an empirical state, an instance of some thinking the concept, etc.). Nor is it a mode of thought (e.g. an a priori definition of a mode of thought, like the meaning of sentient or non-seinteint).

It is real outside anyone existing conception and judgement. It is, in the the terms you are using, a thing-itself. Substance is there whether or not anyone thinks about it.

One doesn’t “have” insentience or sentience, one either is sentient or insentient. This is a very important distinction, for it excludes sentience & insentience from being viewed as contingent states, such that they cannot rationally/logically be maintained as being modes of a substance, since they aren’t possessions of, i.e., they cannot be “had” by, it. — aRealidealist

I wasn't suggesting they were contingent states. For that, I would have to be referring to a contingent entity which was sentient or non-sentient. I was talking about the a priori (so definitely not contingent) and how as a mode of thought, it could not justify itself. The point being explaining a priori concepts is more complex than just asserting their necessity (though asserting their necessity is a description enough to describe that feature).




This conceiving through itself, yes.

Since it is substance doing the conceiving, and substance is not a mode, this is not conceiving or conception of a mode.

...substance conceiving through itself is not a mode of substance. — creativesoul

Are you denying that “conceiving” or conception is a mode? — aRealidealist

No. I'm drawing a distinction between kinds of conception... as one must if they are to understand Spinoza.

Determining distinctions between kinds of conception is one thing, understanding Spinoza another; your attempts at both, either way, are quite dissatisfactory. Moreover, no conception is something, or, that, which is in itself, as I’ve stated in my O.P.; for this can only be asserted of “substance”, according to Spinoza, not of any conception (no conception is “substance”, therefore no conception is something, or, that, which is in itself [as I’ve maintained in the O.P.]). You have no idea what you’re talking about.

“Spinoza's point is they are of identical reality. The a priori definition of the modes insentience and sentience in the attribute of thought are of the same reality. Both definitions are true of reality. It isn't the case we have one otherworldly plane with just the definition of sentience and another with just the definition of non-sentience.

Much like all the books on my shelf are entirely different objects, yet all of them are identical in being of my shelf.” — Dependency on another, &, being identical in reality aren’t the same thing (offspring are dependent on progenitors, not literally identical with them in reality), an important point that’s been repeated a few times now. Sure, Spinoza holds that both are dependent on one, single thing (indistinguishable from or identical with itself), but not that the modes of thought & the modes of extension are identical or of an identical reality; in fact, contrary to such a position, he maintains that both can only be conceived without & independently of each other.

Moreover, the relationship between the two can be, in fact, likened to one worldly plane in relation to another, sort of like parallel universes, in as much as he asserts a parallelism between the reality of states of thought & that of bodies or body, hence, he writes, “The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things” (“The Ethics”, Part. 2, Prop. VII); in other words, the series, order or connection of states of thought/ideas correspond or parallel the series, order or connection of states of bodies/bodily things (despite the fact of each of them only being conceivable independently of the other), according to him.

Also, your bookshelf comparison isn’t admissible in the way that you want to use it here, for a bookshelf is an empirical object that’s sensibly perceivable apart from, &, or, relatively positioned with, the book or books which it holds, while this isn’t the case for the modifications of “substance”; yet, nonetheless, simply note that not only is each book separable from the bookshelf, but also from one another, further proving how distinguishable things can never be identical, i.e., can never be thought of as being one & the same, & therefore necessitate a relation between diverse things as their justification or explanation.

“This is mistaken. For Spinoza, substance isn't predicated over other objects. It's self-defined. There is a thing, the absolute infinite of substance. It is not merely a subjective categorial term. Nor is it a mode of extension (e.g. an empirical state, an instance of some thinking the concept, etc.). Nor is it a mode of thought (e.g. an a priori definition of a mode of thought, like the meaning of sentient or non-seinteint).

It is real outside anyone existing conception and judgement. It is, in the the terms you are using, a thing-itself. Substance is there whether or not anyone thinks about it.” — The referent of the term “substance” or “thing” isn’t a categorical qualification, the point is that the determination of a given thing being in-itself, or, in-another, is; this fact of being either is never self-evident in any bare perception or experience, & so only ever categorically understood. Moreover, “substance” is predicated over “objects”, in as much as it’s acknowledged to not be restricted to or entirely immanent in any particular states of objectification, for it’s beyond & transcends such limitations & constraints, though it’s the condition of them.

“I wasn't suggesting they were contingent states. For that, I would have to be referring to a contingent entity which was sentient or non-sentient. I was talking about the a priori (so definitely not contingent) and how as a mode of thought, it could not justify itself. The point being explaining a priori concepts is more complex than just asserting their necessity (though asserting their necessity is a description enough to describe that feature).” — In the way that you’re speaking of it, to “have” something, or to possess something, particularly sentience or insentience, is or would be a contingent state, though; in as much as possessor & possession are never necessarily related but only contingently (like your books & bookshelf, there’s no necessary relation between them [those books weren’t always & don’t have to be there]), & so aren’t absolutely united (as mode & substance are). Yet, to be clear, it’s not solely about asserting the want of logical necessity, when objecting to Spinoza’s conception of “substance” & “mode”, but also that of a qualitative essentiality which is lacking in his very formation of the conception itself.

Determining distinctions between kinds of conception is one thing, understanding Spinoza another; your attempts at both, either way, are quite dissatisfactory. Moreover, no conception is something, or, that, which is in itself, as I’ve stated in my O.P.; for this can only be asserted of “substance”, according to Spinoza, not of any conception (no conception is “substance”, therefore no conception is something, or, that, which is in itself [as I’ve maintained in the O.P.]). You have no idea what you’re talking about. — aRealidealist

Of course you're entitled to believe I'm wrong. What if I'm not though?

Here's what I find important to keep in mind, for starters at least...

Spinoza was of financially solid socio-economic circumstances(privileged well-educated upper class) at a time when the church had the most power(they wrote the rules). Spinoza argues against the church and believers at the time. He was a heretic to many as a result. Blasphemy was sometimes taken much farther than mere exile, which was his punishment. Someone of a lesser important social status might well have been hanged/burned to death for offering/openly espousing an outline of monism, that if true, is solid reasonable ground against the God of Abraham.

Spinoza argues for god as the origen of everything(a creator of some things, and the origen of everything), but his philosophy does not support the God of Abraham. Rather, he argues for god using a methodological approach that I would call ontological monism. His language use is densely populated with key notions at the time. Too much so, to my own chagrin.

Only that which conceives all by itself counts as substance.

When substance(god) first conceives, it(god) does so entirely through(in and of) itself, as it must. It is all that exists. That kind of conception is more along the lines of creation. Some of those new creations are capable of conception themselves. They are dependent upon substance, but not the other way around.

So, not drawing this distinction between kinds of conception leads one to where you're at now. Draw it and the problem dissolves.

I’m only responding to the second half of your post, for the rest is ultimately irrelevant. Very simply put, is “substance” a conception? Is “substance” dependent on conception for its reality? If not, then no conception is “substance”, &, therefore, by definition, cannot be that which is in itself (as I’ve noted over & over). You’ve got no point here, let it go, your distinction is inadmissible, not to mention not supported by Spinoza’s statements in the least.

Spinoza is making this precise distintion to over come the problem dualism has for accounting for finite/contingent states.

Substance is of a different kind than other things, an absolute infinite, without the sort of contingent form or limitation which defines both the body (each limited state) and the mind (each limited thought).

Rather than being dependent on conception (a singlaur form of thought), Substance is itself a conception which is always. It has no particular form which makes it true over false. Unlike modes of thought and extension, it does not dependent on a specific limited form to be true. Substance is true and the same, no matter which modes are present or true.

Put in your terms, Substance is ALWAYS conceived. There is no moment without the conception of Substance.

If you do not grasp this, if you think Substance might or might not be conceived, you do not understand what Spinoza is arguing.

Any objection to Spinoza made on this terms does not carry. Spinoza was never claiming a conception of Substance which might or might not be, which had to be conceived through a specific, limited/contingent conception to be.

...no conception is something, or, that, which is in itself, as I’ve stated in my O.P — aRealidealist

Not according to Spinoza... Look for yourself.

III. By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception. — creativesoul

Either being conceived does not count as conception, and you're right, or substance is conceived through itself, and as such is a conception independent of any other conception, and thus he has drawn a distinction between kinds of conception.

:smile:

The conception can be formed independently of every other conception, not independently of every thing, such as “substance”; thus there’s a distinction between conception & “substance”, & so the former cannot be that which is in itself, as the latter is, according to Spinoza. Lol, nowhere in your quoting of Spinoza’s definition of “substance” does he state, let alone suggest, that its conception is also something which is in itself (making for two things that are in themselves, both “substance” & its conception [which is completely wrong]). You’re making things up.