The first problem (1) with Spinoza’s two definitions of “substance”, in relation to his overall philosophy, is the consideration that, by definition, a conception cannot itself be something, or that, which is in itself. — aRealidealist
I’m challenging the internal or rational/logical self-consistency of Spinoza’s philosophy on “substance.” Now as to the parsing of my sentence that you’ve quoted, let me rephrase it: by definition, a conception is not itself something which is in itself (i.e., something which is independent, &, or, in itself). — aRealidealist
...conception cannot be in itself... ...in as much as they’re modes, & therefore must exist in or through something other than itself (not in itself [according Spinoza’s own statements]). — aRealidealist
“Both insentience and sentience are of reality. Simultaneously of substance.” — Both are of “reality”, sure, the point is just that they’re not the same or identical realities. Simultaneity of being isn’t identicality. — aRealidealist
This is wrong, firstly because “reality”, per se, cannot actually predicate or support anything, in as much this is merely a subjective categorical term that’s applied onto or over designated things/objects (it isn’t really a thing or object itself); & secondly because predication isn’t real outside of conception or judgement (it cannot be a reality independently of these), & therefore remains (as the categorical term of “reality”) wholly ideal or subjective in nature & character. — aRealidealist
One doesn’t “have” insentience or sentience, one either is sentient or insentient. This is a very important distinction, for it excludes sentience & insentience from being viewed as contingent states, such that they cannot rationally/logically be maintained as being modes of a substance, since they aren’t possessions of, i.e., they cannot be “had” by, it. — aRealidealist
...substance conceiving through itself is not a mode of substance. — creativesoul
Are you denying that “conceiving” or conception is a mode? — aRealidealist
Determining distinctions between kinds of conception is one thing, understanding Spinoza another; your attempts at both, either way, are quite dissatisfactory. Moreover, no conception is something, or, that, which is in itself, as I’ve stated in my O.P.; for this can only be asserted of “substance”, according to Spinoza, not of any conception (no conception is “substance”, therefore no conception is something, or, that, which is in itself [as I’ve maintained in the O.P.]). You have no idea what you’re talking about. — aRealidealist
...no conception is something, or, that, which is in itself, as I’ve stated in my O.P — aRealidealist
III. By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception. — creativesoul
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