You tell me — Bartricks

What I told you is that if you're just telling me your view then I wouldn't need a citation for anything.

What I told you is that if you're just telling me your view then I wouldn't need a citation for anything — Terrapin Station

That's a claim. Citation please.

So you're not going by my rules, and you think that someone telling you their own views needs a citation. Why?

If you're asking a question, then you want me to give you something. So you do the work.

Now, provide citations in support of all of your claims please. All. Of. Them.

I'm not trying to convince you of anything.

I'm not trying to convince you of anything. — Terrapin Station

Citation please.

If you ask me a question, you want something from me - an answer. Well, if you want something from me, you do the work - you're the wanter.

Still living by your rules.

If I leave the windows open in the car when I go through the car wash I get the inside cleaned too.

So good persuasive tactics from you. I'm sure folks are impressed. You'll have lots of followers soon.

So good persuasive tactics from you. I'm sure folks are impressed. You'll have lots of followers soon. — Terrapin Station

Citation please.

I get places much faster by never stopping at red lights. It works until you have a major accident.

I really hope you're not much older than fifteen.

Bit pervy.

If reason could value something other than what it values, or is valuing, per se, and not merely on account of differing circumstances, then what good could it be as a divine commander? — Janus

I don't understand your question or its relevance to the OP.

The argument I am considering is this:

1. If moral values are the values of a subject, then they will be contingent, not necessary
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent (that is, if something is valuable, it is valuable of necessity not contingently)
3. Therefore moral values are not the values of a subject

That is considered by most to constitute a decisive refutation of all subjectivist views about moral values and prescriptions.

I think it is a bad argument. I think it will apply to all views, not just subjectivist ones. So it must be unsound because not all views can be false. And I think it is unsound.

But I don't really understand your question or how it bears on the above .Which is not to say it doesn't, just that I don't see it yet.

If reason could value something other than what it values, or is valuing, per se, and not merely on account of differing circumstances, then what good could it be as a divine commander? — Janus

I don't understand your question or its relevance to the OP. — Bartricks

I don't know why I am still bothering. Oh well, here goes...

The argument you are considering to be a bad argument claims that moral values are not the values of a subject.

You say that moral values cannot be the values of just any old subject, such as you and I, because we might disagree, and that would make moral values subjective or contingent in a bad way.

Still, you say it is a bad argument because moral values are the values of a subject, namely Reason. But then instead of saying that this makes the moral values necessary, because the values of reason are necessary, instead you claim that they are still contingent because Reason might change her mind at any time.

If Reason can change her mind and her values are subjective and contingent, then how is that any better than our own moral valuing, which are subjective and contingent? In other words if what you say about the contingency of Reason's values is accepted, then why should we accept her as a Divine Commander?

I have allowed for Reason changing her mind when circumstances demand, but if she were able to simply change her mind even though circumstances have not changed, then she could not be a reliable guide to moral values, unless you allow that they are merely subjective and contingent in a bad way. If that were so, then we might as well trust our own diverse individual moral judgements, which are not delivered by Divine Reason, but simply by humans reasoning.

I have presented this in good faith; it's what I really think about what you have been claiming, but I'm open to being corrected if I have misunderstood you in some way. If you don't answer in good faith then I'm done with you Barty.

The ancients assumed that reason would lead us all to the same understanding. But their criterion was not ‘objectivity’ in the modern sense - the ideas of objectivity and for that matter subjectivity have changed considerably in the transition to modernity. The Eclipse of Reason discusses this in detail.

Fifteen year-olds usually are.

Still, you say it is a bad argument because moral values are the values of a subject, namely Reason. — Janus

Ah, he was saying that reason is a subject? I'm not sure how that would make sense to him/wouldn't just be equivocating the word "subject," but I don't suppose I'd get an honest, straightforward answer from him.

The ancients assumed that reason would lead us all to the same understanding. But their criterion was not ‘objectivity’ in the modern sense - the ideas of objectivity and for that matter subjectivity have changed considerably in the transition to modernity. The Eclipse of Reason discusses this in detail. — Wayfarer

The historical "objectivity" of reason that he's referring to was a symptom of psychological projection. That's been remedied to some extent (though certainly not wholesale) by a greater realization of and improved empathy towards other people in the world, who can be, who can look at things, who can reason, quite different from ourselves.

1. If moral values are the values of a subject, then they will be contingent, not necessary
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent (that is, if something is valuable, it is valuable of necessity not contingently)
3. Therefore moral values are not the values of a subject — Bartricks

2 seems clearly false to me

1. If moral values are the values of a subject, then they will be contingent, not necessary
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent (that is, if something is valuable, it is valuable of necessity not contingently)
3. Therefore moral values are not the values of a subject — Bartricks

You’re referring to ‘value’ as a property of the subject. This is inaccurate, and the main reason why the argument fails.

Value is a relation between an experiencing subject and the events/objects of their experience. It is neither an inherent property of the subject nor of the event/object.

Moral values are relations between a subject and their experience of behaviour: theirs and/or others’. It is a property of the subject only in relation to behaviour, and a property of behaviour only in relation to the subject. This means that moral values are contingent upon both subject and behaviour.

But as a subject we are aware of the self as an event/object of experience, too - and a small and temporary one at that. And yet we are aware of the value of certain behaviours irrespective of the lifetime of the subject. So we posit the existence of an ‘eternal subject’ that is not a limited or temporary event/object of experience - to which all events/objects must necessarily relate, because value is not contingent in our experience upon limited, temporary events/objects.

Enter ‘good’ as an abstract subject - a value. Suddenly a value is no longer seen as a relation contingent upon an experiencing subject and the objects of their experience, but becomes the subject itself. An eternal subject, no less. Something necessary. And it’s no surprise that we find ourselves to be ‘created’ in its image...

Moral values are not the values of a subject, they are relations between a subject/observer (singular or collective) and their experience of behaviour. As such they are contingent, not necessary.

If something is valuable, it is always valuable only in relation to a subject/observer, and is therefore contingent upon the subject/observer. The question is: who or what is the subject/observer?

2 seems clearly false to me — bert1

Yeah, me too. His support of it is a combo of the old "it's self-evident" trope and an appeal to authority/supposed popularity (among authority).

Moral values are relations between a subject and their experience of behaviour: theirs and/or others’. It is a property of the subject only in relation to behaviour, and a property of behaviour only in relation to the subject. This means that moral values are contingent upon both subject and behaviour. — Possibility

Say what?

It's okay to say that it's a relation between the subject and what they're valuing, I suppose, but the valuing part of that equation only occurs in the subject's brain.

For what reason?

↪bert1 For what reason? — Shamshir

Because they are contingent on a subject's will, whether that will is a human, animal, rock, Reason or God.

That is considered by most to constitute a decisive refutation of all subjectivist views about moral values and prescriptions. — Bartricks

I don't recognise this at all. Mind you I am out of touch. Does anyone else recognise this picture of the prevailing moral philosophy? I got the impression that most moral philosophers were relativists.

EDIT: Looks like Bartricks might be right. Seems the majority of philosophers are moral realists and moral cognitivists according to philpapers survey. That seems very strange to me. We should take a leaf out of AI thinking on this I reckon. EDIT2: that's not to say that they all agree with the argument Bartricks says they agree with. Bartricks argument was not a subject of the philpapers survey.

EDIT: Looks like Bartricks might be right. Seems the majority of philosophers are moral realists and moral cognitivists according to philpapers survey. — bert1

Don't forget that moral realism includes all forms of ethical naturalism as well as some of the 'true to archetype' forms of virtue ethics, so the moral realism required for the premise to be acceptable (arguments from authority issues aside) is not specified by the survey. Ethical naturalism particularly would class as realist, but be in opposition to the premise that moral values are not our values.

Then there's realists about morality who don't see morals as values at all but laws, or those who think moral statements are not normative at all but descriptive, those who think morality is a virtue, not a value (but still a non-subjective one). All of whom would still describe themselves as moral realists.

In all, I think the number of philosophers who believe in a non-subjective external source of moral valuing (which is what the premise here demands) is very slim. Certainly a minority.

Looks like Bartricks might be right. Seems the majority of philosophers are moral realists and moral cognitivists according to philpapers survey. — bert1

What I was skeptical about wasn't this, but a specific claim about interpreting Euthyphro.

It's okay to say that it's a relation between the subject and what they're valuing, I suppose, but the valuing part of that equation only occurs in the subject's brain. — Terrapin Station

The ‘valuing part’ you refer to is a set of measurable/observable events in the brain that can be related to the experience of valuing. That doesn’t amount to a value relation, and it doesn’t prove that a value relation is only in the subject’s brain, any more than a quantity is.

The ancients assumed that reason would lead us all to the same understanding. But their criterion was not ‘objectivity’ in the modern sense - the ideas of objectivity and for that matter subjectivity have changed considerably in the transition to modernity. The Eclipse of Reason discusses this in detail. — Wayfarer

This is an important point. One that I raised earlier:

The Greek understanding of reason is significantly different from modern versions. — Fooloso4

The irony here is that while appealing to reason Bartricks has demonstrated that he is incapable of reasoned thought and argument, relying instead on insults and personal attacks.

The ‘valuing part’ you refer to is a set of measurable/observable events in the brain that can be related to the experience of valuing. That doesn’t amount to a value relation, — Possibility

Then I wouldn't say that it's a relation. Valuing only occurs in the subject's brain. What is valued is not only in the subject's brain (usually; the exception is if the subject values their thoughts, ideas, etc.). If you don't want to say that the relation is between the subject valuing something and what it is that they value, then it's not a relation, because there's nothing else to be had.

Mind taking a little side trip with me?

What is the

specific claim about interpreting Euthyphro. — Terrapin Station

you are skeptical of, and, in what way are you skeptical of it?

okay, you lost me. Can we go back a bit...

Is your problem with this statement I made?

Moral values are relations between a subject and their experience of behaviour: theirs and/or others’. — Possibility

Or is it with something else?

What is the

specific claim about interpreting Euthyphro. — Terrapin Station

you are skeptical of, and, in what way are you skeptical of it? — Mww

The claim was "the Euthyphro is considered by virtually all contemporary moral philosophers to be . . . a damning criticism of subjectivist views"

Aside from simply being a naturally skeptical person, I'm skeptical of that claim because for one, I can't recall even one philosopher interpreting Euthyphro as being about a subjectivist account of ethics. Aside from that, usually one of the primary critical focuses is the philosophy of religion issue re whether particular properties of God are the case in a way that could at least potentially be arbitrary, or whether there's something more primary than God that non-arbitrarily determines what those properties (like piety) of God would be.