Why the Euthyphro fails

Bartricks

In another thread I have argued that moral values are the values of a subject, Reason.

To paraphrase Socrates in the Euthyphro, the question most philosophers are going to want to ask is "is something morally valuable because Reason values it, or does she value it because it is morally valuable?

But when you think about it, the question is redundant, because the theory just is that something is morally valuable because Reason values it. So what's the problem supposed to be, exactly?

Well, the problem is that it appears self-evident to the reason of most that if something is morally valuable it is not just morally valuable here and now, but always and everywhere. That is, moral value does not vary over time and space alone. If it is bad today to be a sadist, then it is morally bad tomorrow to be one, other things being equal.

Yet if moral value was constitutively determined by a subject's valuing attitudes, then in principle nothing would prevent something from being morally valuable one day and not the next.

In other words then, our reason tells us that moral values and prescriptions are fixed across space and time. But if moral value is made of a subject's values, then it would not be fixed across space and time. Therefore, moral value is not made of a subject's values.

I think this argument is bad. Thoroughly bad. I have numerous problems with it.

The first point I want to make is that, so far as I can tell, no-one can escape it.

For example, if you identify moral value with your own values - so, if you are an individual subjectivist - then what's valuable one day might not be tomorrow. It depends on what you value at the time.

If you identify moral value with the values of some collective, the same applies.

So if you're an individual or collectivist subjectivist about moral values and you use the Euthyphro to try and dispatch my kind of view then you have taken a shot at me through your own head.

And if you think that moral value is emanating from some kind of weird 'form of the good' or something, then as well as being bonkers, you too cannot stop what is valuable one day from not being the next - for what's to stop this Platonic obelisk from emanating value towards something one day and not the next?

Even if you are a nihilist and think that nothing is morally valuable in reality, you face it too. Or at least, you do if you accept that it is 'possible' for something to be morally valuable. For what's to stop moral value suddenly coming into existence, on your view? And if that happened, then what had no value at all one day, would have moral value the next.

So the first thing I would say about the Euthyphro is that it seems to apply to everyone - even nihilists. Yet it is impossible for all views about moral value to be false. So something must be wrong with the objection.

unenlightened

To paraphrase Socrates in the Euthyphro, the question most philosophers are going to want to ask is "is something morally valuable because Reason values it, or does she value it because it is morally valuable? — Bartricks

So the first thing I would say about the Euthyphro is that it seems to apply to everyone - even nihilists. Yet it is impossible for all views about moral value to be false. So something must be wrong with the objection. — Bartricks

I'm not altogether clear where you are taking your stand, aside from making Apollo your god.But I would say that a question cannot be 'wrong' in the way that a statement can be false. So the way I would put it, that you might find congenial, is that value is the relation between subject and world. The fault with the question is that it is like asking if the Stockton to Darlington railway is in Stockton or Darlington. The answer is both and neither, and all stations between.

Bartricks

↪unenlightened

Hm, no, when I say that something is wrong with the objection, I mean this objection:

1. If moral values are the values of a subject, Reason, then they will be contingent, not necessary
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent (that is, if something is valuable, it is valuable of necessity not contingently)
3. Therefore moral values are not the values of a subject, Reason

And I meant by wrong that the argument is unsound, because an argument that would refute all theories - including nihilism - must be unsound, for not all theories about moral value can be false.

So, those who wield the Euthyphro objection against my kind of view, should first note that it works against theirs too.

That, I am hoping, will wipe the smile off their smug faces.

I haven't mentioned Apollo.

god must be atheist

o ask is "is something morally valuable because Reason values it, or does she value it because it is morally valuable? — Bartricks

Who is she?

Bartricks

↪god must be atheist

Not really sure I understand the question. She's Reason, the one whose values are moral values and among whose prescriptions are to be found moral prescriptions.

Bartricks

↪god must be atheist

I mean, if you ask me who I am, all I can really say is 'me'. I'm me. The one who wrote this and thought the things it expresses. Likewise, she is the one whose values are moral values, etc.

god must be atheist

↪Bartricks

Reason has no gender. It's not a she or a he. It is an it.

Where did you get the idea that Reason is female? Because you keep fucking it? (Sorry about the pun, :-) I could not resist it.)

Daniel C

It seems to me that this problem is described in a way where the reality on which moral principles are based, is a fixed one, especially if its nature is subjective. As soon, however, as you start to allow for objective reality to play a roll in moral decisions things change and moral principles are no longer as "fixed as they used to be and start to get relative. Example: as a moral principle it may be a good thing to give a poor beggar some money, but if you do this in a vicinity where crime statistics are high you may find yourself under physical attack by robbers after having done your "good deed" by giving money to the poor beggar. This moral principle of helping others in need loses its absoluteness, because it has become clear that this principle cannot / should not only be based on a "fixed subjective reality" - objective reality needs to be taken into account with its relativizing effects.

Bartricks

↪god must be atheist

No, not an it - a subject of experiences. Like me. Like you. We're not 'its'. We are persons. I just plumped for 'her' because I think historically Reason has been talked about as if she were a 'her'. But it really isn't important and it is not the matter under debate here.

Bartricks

↪Daniel C

I do not follow your point. I am a subjectivist about moral values - a divine command theorist about them - and so I am clearly my view is targeted by the Euthyphro.

But I think all views are subject to it. So, let's assume - crazily - that moral values are objective. Well, how would holding that view give one any grounds for denying a premise of the argument I presented?

So, here's the Euthyphro again, adjusted for moral objectivism.

1. If moral values are objective, then moral values with be contingent, not necessary
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent
3. therefore, moral values are not objective

For instance, take an objective property like shape. The vodka and lemonade in front of me has a certain shape. It is the shape of the glass it is in. But it doesn't have that shape of necessity, but contingently. I just tilted the glass, and the shape of the vodka and lemonade changed.

Now, shape is objective, yet no object has its shape of necessity. So if moral value is objective one cannot, on those grounds alone, conclude that therefore moral values are necessary.

Thus, the argument applies to moral objectivism as much as it does to moral subjectivism.

Bartricks

↪Daniel C

Note, I am not saying that sometimes it might be right to give money to a beggar, sometimes not (for obviously that is true). I am saying that, for all moral objectivism entails, one could have two otherwise identical acts of giving money to a beggar, and one be right and the other wrong. Just as, by analogy, one can have to otherwise identical objective objects, and one could be one shape and the other another.

Bartricks

↪Daniel C

So the idea that if morality is objective, then somehow the Euthyphro does not apply to you, is a total and utter myth.

Regardless of whether moral properties are conceived of subjectively or objectively, they are going to be contingent, not necessary.

Upon realizing this the moral objectivists should, of course, shit their pants.

Daniel C

Bartricks. I can't see how, for one moment, the element of "contingency" can be ignored / side-stepped when moral principles are at stake. To concept of "morality" cannot be restricted to being an abstraction, because it has to find some application in practical reality, and this is the point where "contingency" is entering.

Bartricks

↪Daniel C

I do not think that's quite right. We can make sense of the idea of fixed values and prescriptions - fixed values and prescriptions that are as practical as you like. The point, though, is that whatever you identify their source as being, that source could issue and have different prescriptions and values. So my point is that the idea that it is only if you identify the source as a subject that you face the euthyphro is a myth. Objective or subjective, nothing is going to explain the supposeday immutable nature of moral norms and values.
So everyone must admit either that they cannot explain why moral norms and values are fixed, or else admit that contrary to rational appearances they are not fixed. Everyone.

Fooloso4

To paraphrase Socrates in the Euthyphro ... — Bartricks

This is not a paraphrase, it is a misunderstanding of Plato's dialogue.

The Greek understanding of reason is significantly different from modern versions. In any case, Socrates question is about justice not reason. The dialogue, like many of his others, ends in aporia. Reason does not provide an answer.

The dialogue and what came to be known as the Euthyphro problem are two different things.

Bartricks

↪Fooloso4

No, it really isn't. Anyway, it doesn't matter. This thread is not about Plato's dialogue, despite the name. It is about a famous objection to divine command theories - an objection that has its roots in that dialogue, but is what it is. And what it is, is the objection I outlined.

Do you know what 'paraphrase' means? And have you read the actual dialogue? (No and no).

The dialogue and what came to be known as the Euthyphro problem are two different things. — Fooloso4

Er, yes. And it is the Euthyphro problem that I am interested in here. Like I said!! Can you read?

Fooloso4

Do you know what 'paraphrase' means? — Bartricks

The first definition that pops up when you Google it:

verb
express the meaning of (the writer or speaker or something written or spoken) using different words, especially to achieve greater clarity.

You are not expressing Plato's meaning. As I said, the issue is justice not reason.

And have you read the actual dialogue? — Bartricks

I certainly have.That is how I knew it was about justice not reason. In fact, I used it when teaching intro to philosophy many times. Which leads me to wonder whether you have read it.

Er, yes. And it is the Euthyphro problem that I am interested in here. Like I said!! Can you read? — Bartricks

Er, well you continually refer to "the Euthyphro".

Bartricks

↪Fooloso4

I don't believe you. Teaching intro to philosophy - hahahahaha. Yeah, to your bathroom mirror.

The dialogue is not called 'the Euthyphro'. It is called 'Euthyphro'. And the problem that I am addressing is the one I outlined in the OP. That one.

This thread is about the problem outlined in the OP. It is not - not, not, not - about Plato's dialogue. Start one up about that dialogue if you want (tip: read it first though). But this thread - this one, started by me - is about the Euthyphro problem or criticism or argument. The one I outlined in the OP. The one you've got nothing whatsoever to say about.

Tell me, when you go to an art gallery do you just spend your time looking at the frames?

aletheist

And it is the Euthyphro problem that I am interested in here. — Bartricks

The Euthyphro is usually posed as a question: Is something good because God wills it, or does God will it because it is good? The first option makes goodness an arbitrary choice by God, while the second subordinates God to an external principle of goodness. Like many philosophical dilemmas, it sets up a false dichotomy; something is good because it is consistent with the eternal and unchanging nature of God, and everything that God wills is consistent with His eternal and unchanging nature.

Bartricks

↪aletheist

I outlined the argument - the argument this thread is about - and here it is:

1. If moral values are the values of a subject, Reason, then they will be contingent, not necessary
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent (that is, if something is valuable, it is valuable of necessity not contingently)
3. Therefore moral values are not the values of a subject, Reason — Bartricks

Now, which premise are you denying?

Fooloso4

I don't believe you. Teaching intro to philosophy - hahahahaha. Yeah, to your bathroom mirror. — Bartricks

Believe what you want. It is not something I usually bring up on the forum since I would rather be judged by what I say rather than by my credentials. There are, however, a few here who know enough about me to know the truth.

I don't see any value in continuing this. If you were not blinded by your assumptions you would find that there are other points that I brought up that you either ignored or more likely did not understand.

aletheist

↪Bartricks

I am not addressing your argument at all, just describing the actual Euthyphro dilemma as it is commonly set forth by contemporary philosophers. It is about the relation between goodness and God, not the relation between "moral values" and "Reason."

Bartricks

↪aletheist

So, not addressing the problem in the OP. A problem that doesn't mention God (note too, the original didn't either).

Once more then, here is the problem:

1. If moral values are the values of a subject, then they will be contingent, not necessary
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent (that is, if something is valuable, it is valuable of necessity not contingently)
3. Therefore moral values are not the values of a subject

I think it is a bad argument. One of the reasons it is bad - just one - is that you can replace 'a subject' with something objective, and the argument works just as well.

Anyway, as you seemed obsessed with God - because no doubt 'God' is the one mentioned in all the versions you're reading online - make that subject God and tell me which premise you're denying.

Bartricks

↪Fooloso4

Believe what you want. It is not something I usually bring up on the forum since I would rather be judged by what I say rather than by my credentials. — Fooloso4

What makes you think I'm not judging you based on what you say? I am. That's precisely what I am doing.

Where - where - did you say anything at all that addressed the argument I outlined (the Euthyphro)?

So, say something clever - start by addressing the actual argument rather than telling me what you've read about on Wikipedia. You know, like an actual teacher would.

aletheist

So, not addressing the problem in the OP. — Bartricks

Right, I was instead addressing the problem named in the thread title. And the original was about "the pious" and "the gods," so the common version that I presented simply updates the terminology for a monotheistic context.

make that subject God and tell me which premise you're denying. — Bartricks

The first one, obviously. If moral values are the values of God, then they are necessary, not contingent, since they must be consistent with His eternal and unchanging nature.

Bartricks

↪aletheist

So you didn't read the OP, just trotted out the standard stuff.

So, by 'God' you mean a mind who, if he is valuing X, is incapable of valuing Y? A mind whose attitudes are fixed - whose attitudes the mind itself is incapable of changing?

As well as appearing to be inconsistent with possessing omnipotence, the whole point of the objection is to draw attention to the fact that you cannot 'explain' why this would be the case. If we're talking about a subject - a mind - then clearly any mind can value something other than what he/she is actually valuing.

Just stipulating that this one can't doesn't address the problem.

That's why most contemporary moral philosophers think the argument refutes 'God' command theory, for in place of an explanation we simply find a stipulation.

aletheist

So, by 'God' you mean a mind who, if he is valuing X, is incapable of valuing Y? A mind whose attitudes are fixed - whose attitudes the mind itself is incapable of changing? — Bartricks

Indeed, immutability is one of the standard attributes of God in classical theism. Of course, treating God as a "subject" and a "mind" is rather anthropomorphic.

As well as appearing to be inconsistent with possessing omnipotence ... — Bartricks

That God always wills and acts in accordance with His eternal and immutable nature is perfectly consistent with what omnipotence means in classical theism.

Janus

If we're talking about a subject - a mind - then clearly any mind can value something other than what he/she is actually valuing. — Bartricks

If reason could value something other than what it values, or is valuing, per se, and not merely on account of differing circumstances, then what good could it be as a divine commander?

Terrapin Station

Well, the problem is that it appears self-evident to the reason of most that if something is morally valuable it is not just morally valuable here and now, but always and everywhere. That is, moral value does not vary over time and space alone. If it is bad today to be a sadist, then it is morally bad tomorrow to be one, other things being equal. — Bartricks

If your reason or intuition is suggesting this to you, your reason or intuition are mistaken. It's clearly the case that moral values can and do vary from person to person, and even over time for the same persons.

Terrapin Station

2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent — Bartricks

They're contingent, not necessary.

Bartricks

↪aletheist

The argument in the OP says "a subject". The Euthyphro criticism applies to all subjectivist views. All of them.
It is you who has decided that because everything you've read on the internet says 'God' that the OP must say God too. It doesn't. The argument is addressed to any and all attempts to identify moral values and prescriptions with those of a subject, an agent of some kind.

Now, my point, for the umpteenth time, is that the argument actually applies to everyone. Which implies it is faulty. It is faulty.

Anyway, why do most contemporary moral philosophers think it refutes the 'God' version of subjectivism? Because if you just stipulate that the subject in question cannot, of necessity, change, then you haven't explained why. And, on the face of it, the stipulation seems false. If God is an agent, why can't he change his mind? No good just saying "oh, well I've defined him as unchanging". Again, get over the childish megalomania and realize that saying things doesn't make them so (well, there are exceptions, but meh).

It isn't consistent with omnipotence. I do things in accordance with my nature. So do you. For whatever I do, it was my nature to do it - my nature being partly constituted by the things I do.

But I'm not omnipotent. Nor are you. So, 'doing things in accordance with your nature' is not sufficient for omnipotence.

An omnipotent being can do anything he god damned wants. Including prescribing today what he proscribed yesterday. I mean, even I can do that - you saying being all powerful involves being able to do 'less' than I can do? Wow, good definition of omnipotence!!

So, you just have to insist - apropos nothing - that God's values and prescriptions are necessary and not contingent - which anyone can do about anything.

It is intuitively obvious that no mind values anything or prescribes anything of necessity. If you think otherwise, explain. Don't just give me a definition, give me a representation of reason that implies what you say. Note, a representation of reason, not a representation by a priest.

Why the Euthyphro fails

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