If it's not legal to park there, of course it's morally wrong to park there. — Metaphysician Undercover

Really? Does it then follow that Ohio Quakers who hid fugitive slaves in 1850 were acting immorally because they were acting illegally?

Any judgement of "wrong" necessarily implies morally wrong, because that's what a judgement of right or wrong is, a moral judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

*facepalm*

:-} Appeals to authority, as if I'm going to go off and search Hume's works! It's like trying to get blood out of a stone...what is the evidence...????

What I'm saying is that morality deals with our capacity to differentiate between good and bad, right and wrong. So, it follows that any type of decision making which is such as to distinguish between right and wrong, and this includes correct and incorrect, is inherently a subject of morality. Therefore all legal issues which distinguish between right and wrong are moral issues, and even the principles of mathematics and logic, where it is considered that there is a right answer, are issues of morality.Have you read Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics" where he discusses the intellectual virtues, and contemplation as the highest virtue? — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree in part, but not with the italicized passage. Again I think you're blurring the distinction between facts and values, and I think it is a legitimate distinction. Bertrand Russell discusses the issue in the concluding chapter of HIstory of Western Philosophy - how science gives great powers, but which can be used for either good or evil. There are right and wrong answers to mathematical problems, but getting a maths problem wrong is not normally regarded as morally culpable. Nor are legal issues always questions of morality, you might have an ownership dispute between two parties who are both fine upstanding citizens, or absolute scoundrels, as far as the law is concerned it doesn't matter.

(I think a key text on this issue as Alisdair McIntyre's After Virtue, which laments the 'fracturing of moral discourse' which has happened in Western culture. There is no recognised common source of moral truths. It is significant that after writing it, McIntyre converted to Catholicism.)

Anyway, that gets back to what I was saying before about there being real or ultimate goods. To utilize an old image, the ultimate truth is the pole towards which the moral compass points. If you are Christian, say, then your judgements are based on Biblical principles, which are in turn underwritten, if you like, by divine command. Similarly if you're Buddhist, then your actions are hopefully in conformity with the Dharma.

It is the absence of those kinds of moral codes that gives rise to today's relativism and subjectivism, or BrainGlitch's 'meta-ethical nihilism'. That really amounts to saying that all such judgements are ultimately personal or subjective, which again implies that there is no objective morality. By contrast, I think an objective morality is to believe that there are real moral consequences.

Are there "legal issues" (what we're actually talking about is legislation, but maybe that's a "legal issue") that do not distinguish between right and wrong and thus are not moral issues? — Terrapin Station

Perhaps, I don't know law very well.

Really? Does it then follow that Ohio Quakers who hid fugitive slaves in 1850 were acting immorally because they were acting illegally? — andrewk

Those who had respect for that law clearly would have believed that they were acting wrongly, and therefore immorally, by disobeying the law, but here we approach the issue of subjectivity. There's lots of laws which I believe are wrong, therefore I believe they're immoral. But that's the thing with morality what I say is wrong, someone else might say is right. When the law says "it's morally wrong to do X", (park on that side of the street), I do not necessarily believe that X is morally wrong, that's free will.

..anyone who deviates from it - even if for good reason - is changing the definitions,,, — Sapientia

I haven't seen any good reasons here yet, just a whole lot of assertions, along with the odd facepalm.

So how about it, where are the good reasons? Why should any judgement, of good or bad, right or wrong, correct or incorrect, be outside the category of morality?

:-} Appeals to authority, as if I'm going to go off and search Hume's works! It's like trying to get blood out of a stone...what is the evidence...???? — John

It's not an appeal to authority. You asked, so I referred to some of his arguments which I think are both relevant and good arguments. You don't have to look into it, just as I don't have to reproduce them here for your sake. But I will consider it.

I haven't seen any good reasons here yet, just a whole lot of assertions, along with the odd facepalm. — Metaphysician Undercover

You can lead a horse to water, but you can't make it drink. If you don't see it, you don't see it. I doubt anything I say will change that.

There are right and wrong answers to mathematical problems, but getting a maths problem wrong is not normally regarded as morally culpable. — Wayfarer

The point though, is that it is through the very same type of training process whereby we learn to judge all the different types of correctness. This is entirely a matter of learning the relevant conventions. So if all forms of learning how to judge correctness can be classed together like this, we need a name for this classification. This judging of correctness is what we call, morality.

There is very little difference between learning to judge Johnny's politeness as correct behaviour, and learning to judge "4" as the correct answer to "2+2". You learn to recognize "2+2=4" and apply the symbol "correct". Likewise, you learn to recognize the appropriate behaviour and apply "good". Yes, while I agree that one deals with the behaviour of the subject, so it is subjective, and the other deals with an assumed objective reality, I believe the process of judging X as correct, or incorrect, is very similar. So if the subject here is this judgement process itself, whereby we judge between right and wrong, not the judgements being made, then these two, objective and subjective judgements should be classed together.

It is the absence of those kinds of moral codes that gives rise to today's relativism and subjectivism, or BrainGlitch's 'meta-ethical nihilism'. That really amounts to saying that all such judgements are ultimately personal or subjective, which again implies that there is no objective morality. By contrast, I think the obtain to an objective morality is to believe that there are 'real moral consequences'. — Wayfarer

Yes, so that's the point, all judgements are inherently subjective. That is why we can class all forms of judgements in one category, as human judgements. Objectivity, we can see, comes about through producing conventions and adhering to them. It is through this adhering to the meaning of the symbols "2", "+", "=", etc., that mathematics gives us objectivity. And other forms of logic operate in the same way, there is a need to adhere to conventions. So we can extend that need, to adhere to conventions, right down to issues of human behaviour.

If it's not legal to park there, of course it's morally wrong to park there. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's lots of laws which I believe are wrong, therefore I believe they're immoral. But that's the thing with morality what I say is wrong, someone else might say is right. When the law says "it's morally wrong to do X", (park on that side of the street), I do not necessarily believe that X is morally wrong, that's free will. — Metaphysician Undercover

What? So, if it's illegal, then it's immoral. Even if the law itself is immoral. So, if the law says it's illegal not to kill someone who insults your family, then it is immoral not to kill that person. But you don't have to believe that, even though it would be irrational not to, given your premise.

Or, if it's illegal, then it's immoral, even if you believe otherwise. But then, you also believe that if it's illegal, then it's immoral. So that would result in contradictory beliefs.

What? So, if it's illegal, then it's immoral. Even if the law itself is immoral. So, if the law says it's illegal not to kill someone who insults your family, then it is immoral not to kill that person. But you don't have to believe that, even though it would be irrational not to, given your premise. — Sapientia

I've provide my definition of moral, as concerning goodness or badness, right or wrong, of human behaviour, in all forms of right or wrong. You appear to be using "immoral" in a different way, which is very confusing.

Look, if it's illegal, then from the perspective of those who uphold the law, it is immoral. If you think that this law is immoral, then from your perspective, the illegal act is morally correct.

I've provided my definition of moral, as concerning goodness or badness, right or wrong, of human behaviour, in all forms of right or wrong. You appear to be using "immoral" in a different way, which is very confusing.

Look, if it's illegal, then from the perspective of those who uphold the law, it is immoral. If you think that this law is immoral, then from your perspective, the illegal act is morally correct. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, you're now changing from "if it's illegal, then it's immoral" to "if it's illegal, then it's immoral from the perspective of those who uphold the law"? That's a big difference.

Perhaps, I don't know law very well. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay. It seems like it would be important to know this, though, if we're going to claim that "illegal" necessarily implies "morally wrong."

please elaborate

So if the subject here is this judgement process itself, whereby we judge between right and wrong, not the judgements being made, then these two, objective and subjective judgements should be classed together.

Yes, so that's the point, all judgements are inherently subjective. That is why we can class all forms of judgements in one category, as human judgements. Objectivity, we can see, comes about through producing conventions and adhering to them. It is through this adhering to the meaning of the symbols "2", "+", "=", etc., that mathematics gives us objectivity. And other forms of logic operate in the same way, there is a need to adhere to conventions. So we can extend that need, to adhere to conventions, right down to issues of human behaviour. — Metaphysician Undercover

We can readily see though, that we can differentiate two distinct categories of conventions relevant to this discussion:

(1) conventions that are established across cultural and societal bounds, such as those we invoke when we judge the truth or falsity of math and logic and science and everyday empirical claims and ...

(2) conventions that are situated historically and culturally, such as those we invoke when we judge the morality or immorality of a given behavior.

There is very little difference between learning to judge Johnny's politeness as correct behaviour, and learning to judge "4" as the correct answer to "2+2". You learn to recognize "2+2=4" and apply the symbol "correct". Likewise, you learn to recognize the appropriate behaviour and apply "good" — Metaphysician Undiscovered

There's a world of difference. You're obfuscating a really basic difference in moral philosophy in a way that will inevitably entail relativism. It's like saying 'there's no difference between novels and history, they're both simply types of books'.

Objectivity, we can see, comes about through producing conventions and adhering to them. It is through this adhering to the meaning of the symbols "2", "+", "=", etc., that mathematics gives us objectivity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Objectivity doesn't obtain via conventions. If anything about mathematics is objective, it's because it's mind-independent.

except that it is only intelligible to a mind, so, not mind-independent, but opinion-independent.

Okay. It seems like it would be important to know this, though, if we're going to claim that "illegal" necessarily implies "morally wrong." — Terrapin Station

I'm not sure whether he stands by that claim or whether he has abandoned it. If he stands by it, then I find his position difficult to make sense of in light of his recent reply to me.

Except that it is only intelligible to a mind, so, not mind-independent, but opinion-independent. — Wayfarer

It depends what the dependence/independence is regarding. It doesn't have to be about intelligibility. It might be about truth, for example.

All I'm saying is that mathematics is only perceptible to an intelligence capable of understanding numbers. Like, you can't teach mathematics to your pets. So I agree that '2+2=4' is not dependent on anyone's opinion, i.e. is 'mind-independent' in that sense, but on the other hand, it can only be known by a mind, it is not a physical fact. But that is a whole other thread and topic, i.e. 'reality of abstract objects'.

All I'm saying is that mathematics is only perceptible to an intelligence capable of understanding numbers. Like, you can't teach mathematics to your pets. So I agree that '2+2=4' is not dependent on anyone's opinion, i.e. is 'mind-independent' in that sense, but on the other hand, it can only be known by a mind, it is not a physical fact. But that is a whole other thread and topic, i.e. 'reality of abstract objects'. — Wayfarer

Yes, and like I was saying, the relevance of any attempted counterargument to a realism of some sort will depend on the context of the dependence/independence claim. The context might be metaphysical or epistemological. But if the claim was in a metaphysical context, then an epistemological counterargument might miss the point. For example, if the claim is about truth or existence, then countering that it wouldn't be intelligible, perceivable, or known can miss the point, since the claim isn't about that. I have seen that a lot in those sorts of discussions.

There's a world of difference. You're obfuscating a really basic difference in moral philosophy in a way that will inevitably entail relativism. It's like saying 'there's no difference between novels and history, they're both simply types of books'. — Wayfarer

Right, they're both books. So how do you justify "there's a world of difference"? You could just as well say they have different titles, or different covers, how does that entail a world of difference?

When we define or describe something, we move from the most well known (the more particular) to the less well known (the more general). So for instance, a human being is an animal, is a living thing, is an existing thing. The most particular "human being" is the most well known because the particular is present to our senses, while the more general is abstract, and often difficult to grasp. Despite this fact, that the abstract, the general, is less well known, it still serves as the defining feature.

You may claim that there's a world of difference between a book of fiction, and a book of fact, but the defining feature of each, is that it is a book, so I think your claim is unjustified. Books are all written by human beings, so they're all classed as artefacts, and that's a big similarity in the world. And that they are of the same type of artefact, a book, is an even bigger similarity. Your claim is like claiming that there is a world of difference between a human being and another animal. There is not. That they are both living is a big similarity, and that they are both animals is an even bigger similarity. We have to pass through all these categories before we get to the most general. And even of two existing things, if "existing thing" is the most general category, there is not a world of difference between them, because they necessarily have that in common.

Objectivity doesn't obtain via conventions. If anything about mathematics is objective, it's because it's mind-independent. — Terrapin Station

Well I've been trying to get a good description of what constitutes "objectivity". I think we've all agreed that it has to do with being external to the mind. How is mathematics mind-independent? Doesn't mathematics consist of humanly produced symbols, and rules? Either you must believe that the human beings didn't produce these symbols, or you believe that what is symbolized is not humanly produced. The former appears to be clearly false. And with respect to the latter, when I write an equation, doesn't it symbolize what I am thinking? How could the equation symbolize something other than what I am thinking?

We can readily see though, that we can differentiate two distinct categories of conventions relevant to this discussion:

(1) conventions that are established across cultural and societal bounds, such as those we invoke when we judge the truth or falsity of math and logic and science and everyday empirical claims and ...

(2) conventions that are situated historically and culturally, such as those we invoke when we judge the morality or immorality of a given behavior. — Brainglitch

OK, I think I see what you mean, some conventions are more universal than others. There are some conventions such as those of mathematics and logic which are accepted by the vast majority of humanity, while other conventions are accepted by a smaller proportion, and some by an even smaller proportion, and some which might only be accepted by a few people.

But this appears to assume a static point in time, at which time the conventions are judged for universality. X convention is accepted a by certain population at time T, and Y convention by a certain population at time T, etc. Don't you think that we need to add a temporal dimension? Say Z convention is a newly discovered mathematical principle. Since it is new, it is only accepted by a few. It doesn't fulfill the conditions for universality, it is just being accepted by a very particular, and extremely limited culture, despite the fact that within a hundred years or so, it might obtain universality.

So I don't think that explaining the difference between mathematical and moral conventions, in this way, properly represents reality. By looking at a static point in time, and judging the universality of a convention, one doesn't account for the evolving nature of conventions. I think that we should establish universality by referring to temporal extension, the longevity of the convention, rather than by looking at how widespread a convention is at any particular time. In this way, we don't get fooled by fads and fashions, which appear to have great universality, but from the perspective of temporal extension, they do not.

Moral conventions demonstrably are culturally and historically situated.

Historically situated means operant in a given culture during a given time span.

On the other hand, the conventions for judging the truth or falsity of arithmetic, as well as other well-established math, logic, and science operate cross culturally, and are not likely to change, precisely because these conventions are clearly specified and universally agreed upon.

Right, they're both books. So how do you justify "there's a wold of difference"? You could just as well say they have different titles, or different covers, how does that entail a world of difference?

For heaven's sake, because 'literature' and 'history' are different subjects. Imagine enrolling in Eng. Lit. and on your first class, the lecturer says, right, today we commence on the History of the American Civil War. Don't you think you might feel you were in the wrong class? Or would you say, 'hey, what's the difference, it's all just literature anyway'?

Personal experience may be sufficient to convince you personally, however you cannot claim to know god exists if that knowledge can not be demonstrated to others.

What you actually have is a belief that god exists from personal experiences.

Knowledge would be results others could reproduce and confirm.

Knowledge would be results others could reproduce and confirm.

That's what monasteries are for.

Thanks! Now I see what you're referring to, and I think you make many valid points.

But, consider the context. This was an article that Karen Armstrong wrote for a popular newspaper, not for a religious studies journal (although, having said that, Armstrong is quite a competent scholar in that field).

Bear in mind, Armstrong's response was to the question 'should we believe in belief?', which was also put to four other columnists, one of whom was the evangelical atheist Dennett, and about whose polemics the question was posed. Armstrong's point is one that was elaborated much more fully in her book of around the same time, called A Case for God.

That book was intended mainly as a propaedeutic, not as a comprehensive 'theory of religion'. Her point is that in the context of the bitter criticisms of religion by the popular atheists, and the 'culture wars' sorrounding them, that 'belief' has been rendered into a kind of pseudo-scientific gobbleddegook that no right-thinking person would believe. And as I said weeks ago now in this same thread, if religion was as stupid as Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett said it was, then you would be stupid to believe in it. So Armstrong is trying to retrace the steps by which Western culture got into what she considers a false dichotomy between fundamentalism on the one side, and militant atheism on the other.

Now, I have considerable respect for Greek Orthodox theology. But I don't think Armstrong is trying to undermine it nor trying to replace it with a kind of sloppy ecumenism. She's trying to make the point that you have to enter into the imaginative domain the great traditions to understand their meaning, and that you're not going to do that by entertaining 'beliefs as propositions' (especially dubious propositions about 'creation science'.) To put it idiomatically, you have to 'walk the talk'! She's trying to get that difficult point across in a popular newspaper article, and I really don't think she does too bad a job of it. I'm not uncritical of Armstrong, but I think she provides a much-needed historical and cross-cultural perspective on some vexed issues. Have a read of Alain Du Bouton's review of her Case for God, published a week later, in the same newspaper.

Moral conventions demonstrably are culturally and historically situated.

Historically situated means operant in a given culture during a given time span.

On the other hand, the conventions for judging the truth or falsity of arithmetic, as well as other well-established math, logic, and science operate cross culturally, and are not likely to change, precisely because these conventions are clearly specified and universally agreed upon. — Brainglitch

We know that mathematical conventions come into existence. There was a time when there was no zero, no algebra, no calculus. So it's not true to say that they are not likely to change, because evidence demonstrates that they do change. What I suggested is that we could look for particular fundamental principles which persist through time. But couldn't we also find some fundamental moral principles which are cross-cultural, and persist through time? If some mathematical principles are cross-cultural, and persist through time, and some moral principles are cross-cultural and persist through time, how does this proposal provide a valid method for differentiating between the two?

For heaven's sake, because 'literature' and 'history' are different subjects. Imagine enrolling in Eng. Lit. and on your first class, the lecturer says, right, today we commence on the History of the American Civil War. Don't you think you might feel you were in the wrong class? Or would you say, 'hey, what's the difference, it's all just literature anyway'? — Wayfarer

Why do you insist on focusing on the differences rather than the similarities? "Wayfarer" and "Metaphysician Undercover" are two distinct subjects, but within the category of moral responsibility, we are the same, that's what gives rise to the concept of human equality. Within the context of morality, what validates your claim of difference between the subjects "literature" and "history" ? This principle of difference which you are proposing is that wich supports "might is right".

If you assign difference to subjects such as mathematics and science, as a separation from ethics and
philosophy, you allow the possibility that one is superior to the other. Are you ready to accept the consequences of such a proposed differentiation? I do not think that the belief that science is superior to ethics is a healthy belief, and I think you're with me on that. So if you desire to maintain equality between the subjects, why do you propose such a separation without also proposing a means for maintaining equality?

That is why I say that we focus on similarity rather than difference. It is by establishing individual subjects as the same, members within the category, that we establish equality. Once equality is firmly established as the principal, we can consider the differences, all the time maintaining the primary principle that the two are the same, but with differences. If we approach from the perspective of assumed difference, we will never find a principle of equality, and due to the natural inclination of human beings to judge with respect to value, one will be judged as superior to the other.