Why do you insist on focusing on the differences rather than the similarities? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because the ability to make distinctions is fundamental to being able to argue a case. You've been arguing this up hill and down dale for days already, it's going nowhere.

How is mathematics mind-independent? — Metaphysician Undercover

In my view it isn't. Mathematics, like logic, is a way that we think about relations, in this case, unlike logic, focused on "unit" type abstractions and the idea of quantification of the same. The relations we're thinking about are objective initially, but then we extrapolate from that, so that a lot of mathematics is "thinking about (our) thinking about relations." So mathematics isn't mind-independent. It isn't objective. It wouldn't exist without people thinking in that way.

OK, I think I see what you mean, some conventions are more universal than others. There are some conventions such as those of mathematics and logic which are accepted by the vast majority of humanity, while other conventions are accepted by a smaller proportion, and some by an even smaller proportion, and some which might only be accepted by a few people.

But this appears to assume a static point in time, at which time the conventions are judged for universality. X convention is accepted a by certain population at time T, and Y convention by a certain population at time T, etc. Don't you think that we need to add a temporal dimension? Say Z convention is a newly discovered mathematical principle. Since it is new, it is only accepted by a few. It doesn't fulfill the conditions for universality, it is just being accepted by a very particular, and extremely limited culture, despite the fact that within a hundred years or so, it might obtain universality.

So I don't think that explaining the difference between mathematical and moral conventions, in this way, properly represents reality. By looking at a static point in time, and judging the universality of a convention, one doesn't account for the evolving nature of conventions. I think that we should establish universality by referring to temporal extension, the longevity of the convention, rather than by looking at how widespread a convention is at any particular time. In this way, we don't get fooled by fads and fashions, which appear to have great universality, but from the perspective of temporal extension, they do not. — Metaphysician Undercover

This can work both ways, and in other contexts. Hence my point about it not being impossible for anomalies to arise with regards to established scientific conventions or laws of nature.

How is mathematics mind-independent? Doesn't mathematics consist of humanly produced symbols, and rules? Either you must believe that the human beings didn't produce these symbols, or you believe that what is symbolized is not humanly produced. The former appears to be clearly false. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't have a stake in the mathematical realism vs. mathematical anti-realism debate, but I don't think that your above argument against the former is a good one, since it seems to miss the point. What has been humanly produced can be mind-independent. It isn't about origin, it's about either the present or a hypothetical future state of affairs. Does (not "did") a mathematical truth obtaining depend on any mind? What would happen to mathematical truths if there were no longer any minds? These are the sort of questions that matter in that debate.

And with respect to the latter, when I write an equation, doesn't it symbolize what I am thinking? How could the equation symbolize something other than what I am thinking? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it symbolises what your isolated thinking symbolised. You have to switch to past tense unless you are literally constantly thinking about nothing other than this mathematical equation, which would be ridiculous and obviously false.

If some mathematical principles are cross-cultural, and persist through time, and some moral principles are cross-cultural and persist through time, how does this proposal provide a valid method for differentiating between the two? — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a false equivalency.

Saying that some math principles persist through time sidesteps the fact that the vast majority of established math principles persist, and will continue to persist. That new math knowledge such as zero, calculus, non-euclidian geometries, etc are added to the math corpus is not the same phenomenon as the demonstrable evolution of moral conventions (such as slavery, divine right of kings, stoning adulterers and homosexuals, burning heretics at the stake ... .)

As I've argued, there are clearly specified, universally agreed upon criteria for judging the truth or falsity of established math, science, and logic claims independently of culture, religion, race, gender, social status ... But not for moral claims.

I wasn't asking those questions. I was using them as examples.

Your position is very predicable, so I didn't really need you to state it. Your sort of relativism is self-defeating, but that's another kettle of fish.

The idea that it's self-defeating is sophomoric, although admittedly, people who espouse sophomoric brands of relativism online don't help in this regard.

The idea that it's self-defeating is sophomoric, although admittedly, people who espouse sophomoric brands of relativism online don't help in this regard. — Terrapin Station

You don't help yourself, then.

Yeah, I'm sure you could give a nutshell summary of my views on this issue (so that I'd agree that your summary captures my views).

Yes, I could give you a nutshell.

Here.

Here is a nutshell.



As requested.

As expected, you did an impressive job with that. That's a sound basis for critiquing/characterizing my views.

I have read several books by Armstrong, beginning with the first, Through the Narrow Gate, which was her account of her seven years as a monastic in a very severe silent order. That more or less precipitated a breakdown and departure from the order, although subsequently she discovered she also suffers from a rare kind of epileptic condition which had contributed to some of her difficulties. Then I read A History of God: The 4,000-Year Quest of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, which I thought was very good - her best book in my view - and also The Case for God, which mentioned before. I didn't care for her book on the Buddha. But overall, I am an admirer of Armstrong and her approach, based on comparative analysis and history of ideas, which I think is helpful in this time of polarised views.

The other point is, I generally agree with her 'logos/mythos' distinction, if only as an heuristic. Scientific realism has become the de facto outlook of today's secular intelligentsia - there is a deep sense, for many people, that the 'world revealed by science' is the real world, and that all forms of spirituality are outmoded superstitions. Dennett, whom she was responding to in that article, publishes books about it. So I believe, as she says, that the modern mentality is the consequence of a particular kind of cognitive mode which makes no room for the imaginative and spiritual aspects of existence. Actually it's deeply de-humanising, as evidenced by Dennett's anti-humanist polemics, such as humans being 'moist robots'.

The curious thing is that the educated materialists see the world as if they're intelligent animals - which is what their philosophy says they are - rather than as rational beings (in the Greek sense). For them, 'rationality' is restricted to only what can be demonstrated with respect to mathematically-quantifiable data, in the framework of the universe as understood through mathematical physics, devoid of intelligence and intention.

I have read several books by Armstrong, — Wayfarer

How about D.M. Armstrong?

He was professor where I studied philosophy. Arch materialist.

. . . which would make it far more disingenuous that you sometimes act as if you're not familiar with any physicalists/materailists who are not eliminativists.

when you present a coherent argument I will attempt a coherent response.

I respect that you almost always present aspects of the "tool paradigm" even though you feel I don't present "coherent arguments" (and in a simple comment about Armstrong and whether you'd be familiar with non-eliminativist physicalism at that).

There can't be one without the other!

I don't think that's the case, as I don't think that difference and similarity can be properly opposed such as to have co-dependent or reciprocal relationship. Similarity is derived from same. Same is an ideal, an absolute, an assumed oneness, while difference is relative, being based in a relation between particulars. So there is a categorical separation between them.

Similarity is a combination of sameness and difference; it cannot be derived just from sameness.

I don't see the difference which you are claiming. Mathematical principles come into existence, they have in the past come into existence, and from the point that they come into existence, they spread from acceptance amongst a small group of people to a large more widespread group, then they may persist, onward into the future. Moral principles, such as the abolishment of slavery, and the abolishment of stoning adulterers and homosexuals, have come into existence in the past, they start from a small group of people, then spread to a larger group, and may persist onward into the future. Where is the basis for your claim of a "false equivalency"? — Metaphysician Undercover

The conventions by which we judge the truth or falsity of established math, logic, and science claims are universally agreed upon and once established persist. The conventions by which we judge the morality or immorality of behaviors are not universally agreed upon, but rather are situated historically and culturally, and are disputed between social groups, and demonstrably can evolve from being moral to immoral and vice versa.

There can't be one without the other! — Wayfarer

Similarity is a combination of sameness and difference; it cannot be derived just from sameness. — John

Yes, I agree. He's wrong yet again. The one wouldn't make any sense without the other. Similarity wouldn't make any sense without difference. What he is saying is nonsense.

Surely it's time to lay this thread to rest, it's somewhere between deep water and swamp at this point. May we only hope that Colin's epiphany is beneficial for everyone.

__//|\\__

It generated a remarkable number of replies for what wasn't much more than a 'drive-by' OP! I would have felt more satisfied if Colin had engaged some more, since there were a few respondents who were sympathetic with his position.

:)

I should have stuck with my original response, but it's a topic of interest to me so I just couldn't help myself.

I know very well what that's like.

Just as well it's not poker machines eh? X-)

Yes, that would be bad. :-$

For myself, I can't see an overburden of negatives that come with posting on these forums as long as it doesn't take up too much time, and leave too little for reading and other important pursuits. At least it sharpens both the mental and the physical writing skills. (Y)

The conventions by which we judge the truth or falsity of established math, logic, and science claims are universally agreed upon and once established persist. The conventions by which we judge the morality or immorality of behaviors are not universally agreed upon, but rather are situated historically and culturally, and are disputed between social groups, and demonstrably can evolve from being moral to immoral and vice versa. — Brainglitch

OK, let's assume that you've created a proper equivalency here. Let's say that conventions which are universally agreed upon are necessarily of one category (math science logic category), while conventions which are commonly debated are placed in another category, moral category. Since they are all of the same essential character, as conventions, we can say that there is likely a scale of degree separating these, such that the boundary is a sort of grey area. Or, as I prefer, some of the moral conventions such as those concerning murder and stealing, approach the level of universal acceptance, and some of the mathematical conventions, such as "imaginary numbers" are quite debatable.

If some mathematical conventions are debatable, and some moral conventions are not, as I believe from those examples, then your equivalence is not valid, and this is not what truly characterizes the categorical separation between math and morality. But let me put that issue aside, to focus on that "grey area", which makes the boundary between "universally agreed" and "debatable", because I think that determining the nature of the boundary will expose the true nature of the categories.

The grey area consists of conventions which are neither universally accepted, nor are they commonly debated. These are the conventions of common language use. They are not universally accepted, because they vary across languages, yet we simply use the ones which we are familiar with, without commonly debating them. (They are debatable though, as the discourse between Sapientia and I indicates).

Do you agree that when we accept conventions without debating them, these conventions are the ones which pass into the category of universal acceptance, and this is generally speaking, the category of math, science, logic? When we are inclined to dispute and debate conventions, these are conventions of the moral type. Does this indicate to you, as it does to me, that the conventions of the moral category are more important to us than those of the other category? We perceive them as having more influence over our lives, affecting us more, having bearing on our own personal freedoms, thus we are more inclined to dispute and debate them. So the fact that the conventions of the math category are universally accepted, is a reflection of the fact that they are inherently unimportant to us individually. Our acceptance of them has very little impact on our daily lives, so we accept them, as they are offered, without dispute. Moral conventions, on the other hand, appear to us as to have great significance over our daily lives, so we debate and dispute them, not wanting to allow someone else's principles to have control over our own lives.

So this is what I see as the true nature of these categories. One, the moral, consists of conventions which appear to have significant influence over us, and therefore we are inclined to debate them at any opportunity, and not accept them openly. The other, the science, math, logic conventions do not appear to have significant influence over our personal freedoms, they only affect the way we intellectualize, therefore we freely accept them. Then, what has happened in reality, is that the conventions of the science, math, logic category have been so universally accepted, that they have been empowered, by this universal acceptance, to actually have significant impact over us.

Yes, categories have fuzzy bounfaries. (I don't think imaginary nymbers is anywhere near such a boundary, btw.)

A major indicator of the categorical difference between established math, logic, and science claims on the one hand, and moral claims on the other, is that dispute about the truth or falsity of a math, logic, science claim, is readily resolvable by appeal to the clear, universally agreed-upon rules and standards, but there is no resolution, even in principle, for dispute about the truth or falsity of whether or not most actual instances of given behaviors are moral or immoral.

The fact that some moral prescriptions and proscriptions, such as murder and stealing, are found across many societies does not provide a way to judge whether a given instance of killing counts as "murder" or not, whether the killing was justified or not, whether there are there are mitigating factors that reduce the immorality or obviate it entirely or not, whether a preventive strike is morally warranted or not, whether a revenge murder is immoral or not, whether an instance of the taking of property counts as stealing or not, whether such taking is morally permissible or not, the cobditions under which it is morally permissable to take without permission.

Furthermore, there is unresolved dispute about whether the remedy for such behaviors is moral or not. Is it mroal to cut off the hand of a thief? Put him in prison? For how long? Hang him? Transport him to the wilds of America or Australia? Is it moral for the murderer to surrender a daughter to the family of the victim in recompense?

Dispute about any of this is not resolved by invoking a univrsally established set of rules and standards, such as those used to resolve dispute about the truth or falsity of established claims in math, logic, science.