I would say he draws the generalization from particular instances that people habitually draw generalizations from particular instances. He's just pointing out how we usually call that process, "custom" or "habit". That doesn't mean we can't agree with his observation that this seems to be what people do in general. I don't think he claims that his generalization escapes the problem of induction, though he goes overboard when he says that the principle of custom is "universally acknowledged", but he does say that this principle is just a name we use for the propensity we have to draw inferences from particular instances, he doesn't say this principle is the cause of that propensity.

But even if he were inconsistent on that point and really used induction to conclude that Custom is a universal principle, that wouldn't show that there is no problem of induction, but rather that it's sometimes hard to see the problem, even for Hume!

I would say he draws the generalization from particular instances that people habitually draw generalizations from particular instances. He's just pointing out how we usually call that process, "custom" or "habit". That doesn't mean we can't agree with his observation that this seems to be what people do in general. — leo

I think Hume's point was to show the arbitrariness in our propensity to draw generalization. The words "habit" and "custom" are his words. Why does he use those words? What is he trying to convey?

It seems like there's no justification for his conclusion that we all have that propensity. I see no reason to agree with him.

but he does say that this principle is just a name we use for the propensity we have to draw inferences from particular instances, he doesn't say this principle is the cause of that propensity. — leo

Granted, but doesn't Hume have his reason why he calls the propensity a "habit" when he could have just stuck with the word "propensity"?

But even if he were inconsistent on that point and really used induction to conclude that Custom is a universal principle, that wouldn't show that there is no problem of induction, — leo

I think there two propositions here regarding induction:

1. The use of induction cannot be justified. (Logical claim.)

2. Our use of induction is based on something arbitrary such as a habit, or a custom. (Empirical claim.)

I do agree that first proposition is really a problem. However I don't see how the second one can really be demonstrated.

If induction is logically a fallacy, then how come Induction ovens work?

Furthermore, if induction was such a mistake, then how come Bob Newheart has not been inducted into the TV Hall of Fame yet?

P.s. I have not condcted proper research for the background of my post. Thus, I am not sure if Induction ovens exist, and/or if Bob Newheart is in the Tv Hall of Fame or not. But you get the gist of my intent.

I agree that induction can't be justified using deduction, — Purple Pond

And that is the only kind of justification which Hume is seeking to deny to induction. He isn't trying to discredit induction as an enterprise, he is only asking how, in general, it might get done. Rather than inventing some infallible method, he quite sensibly looks at how animals generalise beyond their experience. You can question the flow of sources backing up his biological and psychological claims about the role of habit, but you can't say he is inconsistent. Quite the opposite. He is probably reaching these claims through the exercise of precisely those habits of mind that he ends up claiming are efficacious (though fallible) for such a purpose.

What I find odd is that right after Hume talks about how induction is unjustified — Purple Pond

Nope! He approves of it.

From what I see, it's not only that Hume uses induction when he argues that induction is unjustified, — Purple Pond

Nope! He loves it.

Hume is using induction as if it were a perfectly fine method to show that, after all, it's a rather arbitrary method (habit, custom). — Purple Pond

Nope! Not arbitrary, depends on experience.

And that is the only kind of justification which Hume is seeking to deny to induction. — bongo fury

My reading of Hume gives me the impression that he denies that there's any kind of justification of induction. What kind of justification do you have in mind that he would approve of?

but you can't say he is inconsistent. Quite the opposite. He is probably reaching these claims through the exercise of precisely those habits of mind that he ends up claiming to be efficacious (though fallible) for such a purpose. — bongo fury

Hume may believe that induction is efficacious, however that doesn't excuse him from coughing up justification in order to persuade others. Put it this way, how is he supposed to convince me of his inductive conclusion is accurate when he puts serious doubts on the very process of induction?

Nope! He approves of it. — bongo fury

He approves of it in the sense that when he stops philosophizing he forgets all his skeptical doubts and goes on with his day. It doesn't mean that he thinks that there is any rational reason why induction will continue to work.

Nope! Not arbitrary, depends on experience. — bongo fury

I specifically mentioned his words, "custom", and "habit". To me it makes it seem like Hume is implying that our inductions are quite arbitrary. You say, "depends on experience" but for Hume there is no warrant for extrapolating beyond what we observe and remember. If you say that he does warrant such things, I'm dying to know what his warrant is.

What kind of justification do you have in mind that he would approve of? — Purple Pond

Habit, custom.

Hume may believe that induction is efficacious, however that doesn't excuse him from coughing up justification in order to persuade others. — Purple Pond

Why not? Do you not advocate science, on the grounds of its success?

Put it this way, how is he supposed to convince me his inductive conclusion is accurate when he puts serious doubts on the very process of induction? — Purple Pond

He doesn't put doubts on the process. Like I said, he only wants to recommend that you give up the futile search for a justification in deduction.

He approves of it in the sense that when he stops philosophizing he forgets all his skeptical doubts and goes on with his day. — Purple Pond

Which, if I remember rightly, he implies was a relatively louche existence. But if he was a scientist, it would mean getting on with his science. Following inductive habits and customs, of course.

It doesn't mean that he thinks that there is any rational reason why induction will continue to work. — Purple Pond

Yes, it does. Just not a guarantee.

I specifically mentioned his words, "custom", and "habit". To me it makes it seem like Hume is implying that our inductions are quite arbitrary. — Purple Pond

He definitely doesn't want you to think that way.

... for Hume there is no warrant for extrapolating beyond what we observe and remember. — Purple Pond

You mean extrapolating deductively? Yes, that's right. No warrant for induction in deduction from experience.

If you say that he does warrant such things, I'm dying to know what kind of warrant he approves of. — Purple Pond

Habit, custom.

Yet he has not, by all his experience, acquired any idea or knowledge of the secret power by which the one object produces the other; nor is it, by any process of reasoning, he is engaged to draw this inference. (Hume) — Purple Pond

So, we readily assume causality when "one object produces the other" ...

For wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding, we always say, that this propensity is the effect of Custom. (Hume) — Purple Pond

... but only when it habitually does so.

In other words, when you regularly see two kinds of events following each other, you will start assuming that the first event causes the second.

By employing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity. — Purple Pond

In fact, we may not know why the cause causes the consequence, but since it does, we (used to) call it "Custom".

If you systematize this empirical approach, you get experimental testing, which is indeed the core knowledge-justification method of science.

What warrant gives Hume the right generalize that all humans and animals possess this induction instinct, past, present, and future? — Purple Pond

(later on) Pavlov's dog:

Classical conditioning (also known as Pavlovian or respondent conditioning) refers to a learning procedure in which a biologically potent stimulus (e.g. food) is paired with a previously neutral stimulus (e.g. a bell). It also refers to the learning process that results from this pairing, through which the neutral stimulus comes to elicit a response (e.g. salivation) that is usually similar to the one elicited by the potent stimulus.

If you repeatedly show to people experiment tests in which a dog will associate ringing a bell, with food (the dog will start salivating), you will condition these people into believing that repeated occurrence of such two events will lead to a learning process in which these two events will be understood/misunderstood to be cause and consequence, i.e. causality.

In the context of Karl Popper's falsificationism, the generalization from a mere sample is permitted. It will not be proof but merely evidence for the causal pairing, until a counterexample is produced somewhere.

We have long ago abandoned verificationism:

Logical positivists within the Vienna Circle recognized quickly that the verifiability criterion was too stringent. Notably, all universal generalizations are empirically unverifiable, such that, under verificationism, vast domains of science and reason, such as scientific hypothesis, would be rendered meaningless.

Pavlov's dog is very reasonable, and the dog's approach is epistemically absolutely sound. Pavlov's dog is a Popperian falsificationist who rejects verificationism, which he undoubtedly dismisses for being an unrealistic requirement, which would prevent him as a dog from learning anything at all.

So I ask: do philosophers agree that Hume is inconsistent in his Enquiry? if not, how do you explain away Hume's supposed inconsistency? — Purple Pond

Hume is not inconsistent. The laws of nature can only be learned by using the laws of learning in nature. Pavlov's dog is not a verificationist who first wants to verify all possible cases. Pavlov's dog is a falsificationist, just like science is.

Habit, custom. — bongo fury

You mean the habit of the mind to associate two or more things that are constantly conjoined, justifies our belief that they will be constantly conjoined in the future? Why? It's not obvious that our habits of association in the past are relevant to what will happen in the future. Am I missing some point?

Why not? Do you not advocate science, on the grounds of its success? — bongo fury

Because mine and Hume's personal beliefs about the efficacy of induction are not of any importance in this discussion. We're here to consider arguments not personal beliefs. The point is that Hume needs to provide justification for his use of induction irrespective of his or my personal beliefs about induction.

He doesn't put doubts on the process. Like I said, he only wants to recommend that you give up the futile search for a justification in deduction. — bongo fury

But what's left? You say habits and customs, but first I need you to explain exactly how they justify our use of induction.

Yes, it does. Just not a guarantee. — bongo fury

You mean lend probable support? You would then have to assign probabilities to events. How do you do that without assuming that the past will be like the future?

To cut a long story short, in my opinion, Hume makes sense by supporting falsifcationism because Pavlov's dog does that too. I guess that is why Karl Popper struck a chord by publishing "Science as Falsification".

I think Hume's point was to show the arbitrariness in our propensity to draw generalization. The words "habit" and "custom" are his words. Why does he use those words? What is he trying to convey? — Purple Pond

He says: For wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding, we always say, that this propensity is the effect of Custom

I take it that he refers to things we do without thinking about them, out of repetition. Like tying one's shoes or walking, there is no reasoning that goes into them when we do them, we're not thinking about how to tie our shoes or how to walk, we do them out of "habit" or "custom".

Like we infer generalities from particular instances without thinking that we're doing it, if everytime we observe some object A we observe the object B nearby, then out of repetition the next time we observe object A we assume the object B is nearby, out of "habit" or "custom".

The words "habit" or "custom" are not meant to be a justification of induction, he's just relating our habit of generalizing an observation from previous instances of that observation to our habit of renewing an act from previous instances of that act.

In a sense, when we observe object A, we're renewing the observation of object B even if we haven't actually observed it yet. Like we renew the act of walking because it worked the previous times that we did it, even though in principle it's possible that the ground is going to suddenly disappear or that gravity is going to be suddenly 1000 times stronger, but we act as if the way we walked in the past is still going to work, it's just what we do.

And we act as if the correlations we identified in our past observations will keep being the case. Until we find an instance where the correlation stops working, then we come up with a new habit.

It seems like there's no justification for his conclusion that we all have that propensity. I see no reason to agree with him. — Purple Pond

There is no more justification to his conclusion that we all have that propensity, than there is justification to the conclusion that object B will be there when we observe object A, or that the way we walked in the past will keep working in the future, but we act as if the conclusion is valid until we find a counterexample. Hume couldn't think of anyone who didn't have that propensity, so out of habit he said that we all have that propensity. You don't have to agree with him, but you can make your own observations and reach your conclusions out of your own habits.

I think there two propositions here regarding induction:

1. The use of induction cannot be justified. (Logical claim.)

2. Our use of induction is based on something arbitrary such as a habit, or a custom. (Empirical claim.)

I do agree that first proposition is really a problem. However I don't see how the second one can really be demonstrated. — Purple Pond

I wouldn't say the first proposition is only a logical claim, it is also empirical, if we were omniscient I suppose we could justify induction in some cases. It is our empirical observations showing that some generalizations we made are not always valid even though we thought they were, that lead us to say that we can't know whether a generalization is valid even if we think it is.

Regarding the second proposition, I wouldn't say Hume is attempting to prove that induction is based on something arbitrary. Rather he's using induction to relate induction to what we usually call habit or custom.

Is it a problem to use induction to say that we cannot know whether the generalizations reached through induction are universally and eternally valid? I wouldn't say so. The conclusions he reaches can be taken as temporarily valid until we find a counterexample. Until then, it works, just like tying our shoes or walking works.


Taking a step back, it seems to me your desire to justify induction is the desire to find universal and eternal truths. But does it really matter if we can't find them? What if we can't find them because there is no such thing as "the way the world is", but rather the world changes through us? If we participate in shaping the world through our will, then there are no universal and eternal truths to be found out there, rather if they exist they would be found in here, in us. Such a truth wouldn't be arrived at through induction, but through something else, say a profound feeling. Or it could even be that there is no universal and eternal truth, but you could still hang on to your own truths, your own beliefs, your own habits or customs, which could work long enough for you that you don't have to care whether they aren't eternal outside of you, as long as they are eternal to you.

You mean the habit of the mind to associate two or more things that are constantly conjoined, justifies our belief that they will be constantly conjoined in the future? — Purple Pond

It justifies our provisional (falsifiable) theories, yes.

Why? — Purple Pond

Seems to work.

It's not obvious that our habits of association in the past are relevant to what will happen in the future. — Purple Pond

Eh?? You don't choose to adopt such habits of association, then, in your daily life?

Am I missing some point? — Purple Pond

You're not alone in finding the whole situation to be a scandal.

mine and Hume's personal beliefs about the efficacy of induction are not of any importance in this discussion. We're here to consider arguments not personal beliefs. — Purple Pond

Yes, arguments, not only beliefs. Including arguments about whether deductive argument from observationally verifiable premises is sufficient to support induction. Hume argues it is not.

The point is that Hume needs to provide justification for his use of induction — Purple Pond

Which is that it seems to work.

But what's left? You say habits and customs, but first I need you to explain exactly how they justify our use of induction. — Purple Pond

They seem to work.

Yes, it does. Just not a guarantee.
— bongo fury
You mean lend probable support? — Purple Pond

No, because as you say:

You would then have to assign probabilities to events. How do you do that without assuming that the past will be like the future? — Purple Pond

So I mean, rather, it lends inductive (fallible, less than certain) support to a hypothesis which may or may not be framed in probabilistic terms. But which, if it is so framed, will - as I think you are rightly pointing out - imply a universal hypothesis about the appropriateness of a particular statistical or probabilistic framework.

To cut a long story short, in my opinion, Hume makes sense by supporting falsificationism because Pavlov's dog does that too. — alcontali

Which points up that the question too rarely asked in this kind of discussion is: "which are the good habits and customs... the good inductive hypotheses thereby produced?". Falsifiable ones, yes. Let's assume that. But that leaves an embarrassment of riches to choose from. Unlike the dog, we may want to decide (and formulate) what are the best habits to follow.

But which, if it is so framed, will - as I think you are rightly pointing out - imply a universal hypothesis about the appropriateness of a particular statistical or probabilistic framework. — bongo fury

Yes, as to the universality of Popper's falsificationism, you can even subject Pavlov's dogs, who are clearly falsificationist animals, to repeated attempts at falsification, in order to find a counterexample of a dog who is not.

In that sense, falsificationism itself can be subjected to the rigours of falsificationism.

Falsficationism clearly "eats its own dog food".

Ha ha, I like the philosophical dog, but I don't think we are on the same page here.

I meant the alleged appropriateness (complete and utter) of some particular probabilistic framework in the inductively (and therefore uncertainly) projected state of affairs wider than the evidence. I didn't mean some test of falsificationism as a doctrine. I was clarifying for Purple that Hume is not appealing to probability to justify induction.

Pardon me if I'm being too serious here. Or yet unclear.

What I find odd is that right after Hume talks about how induction is unjustified he seems to go on and use it. — Purple Pond

Isn't he saying that, although induction is unjustified and unjustifiable, we use it anyway because we have no choice? When there's nothing better available, we use induction, Occam's Razor, and all manner of other rules of thumb (guesswork). Is there an alternative? :chin:

I guess an alternative is to do nothing and wait for the uniformity of nature to cease.

An interesting tidbit: If you think about it, there's only one way for nature to be uniform, and an infinite ways it can vary.

An interesting tidbit: If you think about it, there's only one way for nature to be uniform, and infinite ways it can vary. — Purple Pond

No such luck...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_riddle_of_induction

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/437915

I guess an alternative is to do nothing and wait for the uniformity of nature to cease. — Purple Pond

I'm not quite sure how this corresponds to what I said. :chin: What's the point you're making?

Isn't he saying that, although induction is unjustified and unjustifiable, we use it anyway because we have no choice? — Pattern-chaser

Hume says we use induction because we are compelled to use it by our very nature, and not because there is no other method.

When there's nothing better available, we use induction, Occam's Razor, and all manner of other rules of thumb (guesswork). Is there an alternative? :chin: — Pattern-chaser

The problem with that is, according to Hume, there's no reason to think that induction, or any other rules of thumb, would be better, for example, than consulting a psychic, or any other attempt to predict the future.

The problem with that is, according to Hume, there's no reason to think that induction, or any other rules of thumb, would be better, for example, than consulting a psychic, or any other attempt to predict the future. — Purple Pond

I can't really disagree with that. Deduction is the ideal-world tool, but cannot always be correctly applied. The obvious example of this is when there is simply insufficient evidence to derive the things we're after. So, if deduction can't be used, we look for alternatives. Because we have no real choice. And induction is one of those alternatives. But deduction it ain't, and it does not carry with it the authority of deduction, any more than Occam's Razor does. But I agree with Hume on the difficulty of rating the efficacy of these lesser alternatives to deduction. I believe it to be next to impossible. So what do we do? We guess, as we always do. :blush:

In my view, I think we first have to distinguish two possible interpretations of the assertion 'induction is habit', namely an empirical interpretation versus a grammatical interpretation.

The empirical interpretation is to view the idea of induction as being distinct from the idea of repetition, whereby 'induction is habit' is viewed as an a posteriori empirically contingent assertion correlating two distinct ideas, say, the internal mental state of expectation and its association to external observations of repetition. As you point out, this interpretation appears to be self-undermining, since according to Hume no empirically contingent proposition can have universal justification, which in this case can lead to semantic skepticism concerning the very meaning of induction.

The grammatical interpretation is that induction is defined directly in terms of observed repetition. In which case, 'induction is habit' is a deflationist assertion, i.e an analytic a priori definition of induction without empirical implications, as opposed to being an empirically contingent assertion. In which case semantic skepticism regarding the meaning of induction might be considered to have been circumvented, assuming one is happy to accept the notion of repetition as being an empirical notion that can ground the rational idea of induction without presuming it's existence. Alternatively, if one rejects the idea that repetition is an empirical notion, one might instead be willing to accept the converse, namely that idea that induction is a directly observable mental state (at least in terms of an inward experience of anticipation) and that it is this 'experience of induction' that serves to ground the idea of repetition within the faculty of reason .

Yet however complicated the phenomenology of induction is, presumably we can at least draw the conclusion that induction doesn't have a purely empirical justification nor a purely rational justification.

Unfortunately neither the empirical nor the grammatical interpretation fits with either our counterfactual intuitions concerning induction; For if a cause of type 'A' is understood to entail an effect of type 'B' when situated within a background context 'C', then an absence of 'A' implies the absence of 'B' whenever 'C' remains the same as in the former case. And whilst there are many cases in which we directly observe frequencies of conjoined absence, we mostly appeal to counterfactual reasoning rather than to observation to infer the consequences of absent causes (e.g. what doesn't happen when a nuclear bomb fails to detonate).

At the very least, we cannot argue for causation without appealing to circularity or to counterfactual situations embedded within vague background contexts, for which we cannot explicitly provide a constructive argument, and in which our observations and logic are inseparably interwoven.

The grammatical interpretation is that induction is defined directly in terms of observed repetition. In which case, 'induction is habit' is a deflationist assertion, i.e an analytic a priori definition of induction without empirical implications... — sime

Induction is saying "That swan is white, therefore all swans are white", isn't it? How much more complicated must we get?

From what I see, it's not only that Hume uses induction when he argues that induction is unjustified, Hume goes on to use induction pointing out evidence that our use of induction is on shaky ground (habit, custom). — Purple Pond

This is incorrect. Hume is pointing out the error of human understanding.

Yet he has not, by all his experience, acquired any idea or knowledge of the secret power by which the one object produces the other; nor is it, by any process of reasoning, he is engaged to draw this inference. But still he finds himself determined to draw it: And though he should be convinced that his understanding has no part in the operation, he would nevertheless continue in the same course of thinking. There is some other principle which determines him to form such a conclusion. — Hume

Please read this again. And again.

Your opening post is really good. I don't have time tonight to expand on this. But you just demonstrated the kind of thinking Hume is critiquing above.

I'll come back to this again.

36. This principle is Custom or Habit. - Hume. — Purple Pond

Or as we call it these days "conditioning.' Pavlov's dog does not reason, but becomes accustomed habitually to expect food on hearing a bell. It is the foundation of learning, but has no logical basis.

Hume's philosophy is a critique of reason, that can be summed up in two matching limits.

You cannot derive an 'ought' from an 'is'.
You cannot derive a 'will be' from a 'has been'.

For some reason people who are happy to assent to the former often have difficulty with the latter.

Or as we call it these days "conditioning." — unenlightened

... or induction, of course.

Pavlov's dog does not reason — unenlightened

... except by induction.

It is the foundation of learning, but has no logical basis — unenlightened

... if logic means deduction (as it usually does).

You cannot derive a 'will be' from a 'has been'. — unenlightened

... by deduction.

For some reason people who are happy to assent to the former often have difficulty with the latter. — unenlightened

Because they assume logic and reason are deductive?

or induction, of course. — bongo fury

Indeed, but giving it another name does not give it a justification. Do you think you have done that? Or that someone else has?

it is true
why? tell us, do
it happened before
it'll happen therefore
chicken, "I was fed every morning"
today my family mourning
what is induction?
forever a fraction
never a whole, all
like deduction, standing tall

Indeed, but giving it another name does not give it a justification. Do you think you have done that? Or that someone else has? — unenlightened

I merely think I understand Hume to have pointed out that justification (or reason or logic or derivation or inference) is sometimes deductive but just as often inductive (habitual or associative).

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/331201

I find it hard to believe that Hume's inconsistency with respect to his use of induction would go unnoticed by major philosophers. So I ask: do philosophers agree that Hume is inconsistent in his Enquiry? if not, how do you explain away Hume's supposed inconsistency? — Purple Pond

I don't think that's completely accurate.

It seems you agree with the uncertainty of induction. I'm not an expert but Hume is probably suggesting an explanation for the situation. He proposes habit/custom as one but, from your post, never claims that it's the only explanation for it. There must be an explanation right? What could it be? Habit/custom? What else?

He proposes habit/custom as one but, from your post, never claims that it's the only explanation for it. — TheMadFool

By employing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity. — Hume, 36.

My emphasis.

My emphasis. — bongo fury

:ok: :up: