So how it is that a proposition is true when it matches something that's not true (or false) is that "true" is what we're naming that matching. — Terrapin Station

You’re giving “the matching” the name “true” there, not the proposition.

You’re giving “the matching” the name “true” there, not the proposition. — AJJ

Yes, the matching is what's true (on correspondence theory). The matching is a property of proposition. In other words, the proposition matches the fact due to the content/structure of the proposition.

That’s precisely what is under discussion mate. You can’t just assert your own view and expect that to convince anyone. — AJJ

You have not understood the problem of Moore's paradox. It is not axiological but logical. That is not simply my view. If you think this is not correct then identify the value judgment that is contained in it.

It can be clearly demonstrated that facts are not dependent on beliefs. Otherwise the claim that one ought to believe facts makes no sense. It can also be clearly demonstrated that the acceptance of facts is independent of judgments of value. People starve whether I believe it or like it or not.

Is the claim that we ought to believe facts a belief or a fact? Beliefs may or may not be true, but a fact cannot be false, otherwise it would not be a fact even though it may be believed to be a fact. But whether it is a fact or not cannot be determined by belief, otherwise it would both be a fact and not a fact since some might accept it as a fact and others not.

Right.

So facts are states of affairs, and are neither true nor false. But then if it’s a fact that the cat is sitting on the mat, then we must say that it is neither true nor false that the cat is sitting on the mat. How then is it even possible for a proposition to match this fact? It neither is, nor is not the case that the cat is on the mat.

But then if it’s a fact that the cat is sitting on the mat, then we must say that it is neither true nor false that the cat is sitting on the mat. — AJJ

The fact is neither true nor false. A proposition about the fact is true or false. Propositions are the sorts of things you say, such as "The cat is sitting on the mat." The way it's possible for the proposition to match is that the proposition has nouns/things/entities such as "cat" and "mat," and it posits a relation of those entities. That matches the fact-in-the-world.

The fact is not true because true is the relational property of (a proposition) matching a fact. Facts don't have a relational property of matching a fact.

This doesn’t answer my question of how it is that a proposition can match something that neither is nor is not the case.

I’ll be honest and say I don’t entirely know what you’re on about, and I’m quite tired now. You seem to think the argument is that beliefs determine facts. This is not the argument. The argument is that there are facts and we ought to believe them.

This doesn’t answer my question of how it is that a proposition can match something that neither is nor is not the case. — AJJ

We're not saying that the cat being on the mat is not the case. "Is the case" is another way of saying "is a fact." It's not another way of saying "is true" BECAUSE "true" is about the matching relationship.

We're not saying that the cat being on the mat is not the case. "Is the case" is another way of saying "is a fact." It's not another way of saying "is true" BECAUSE "true" is about the matching relationship. — Terrapin Station

If “is the case” means the same as “is a fact”, then something that “is the case” (since that just means “is a fact”) neither is nor is not the case, which (since “is the case” means “is a fact”) is to say it neither is nor is not a fact.

You seem to think the argument is that beliefs determine facts. This is not the argument. — AJJ

The premise of the argument is that if there no objective values there would be no facts. The claim is that without the former there cannot be the latter. This is a determinate relation.

If “is the case” means the same as “is a fact”, then something that “is the case” (since that just means “is a fact”) neither is nor is not the case, which (since “is the case” means “is a fact”) is to say it neither is nor is not a fact. — AJJ

Where is someone saying that something be a fact, or being the case, where the latter is another way of saying "is the case," isn't a fact or isn't the case? Where are you getting that from aside from using the terms as a synomym for "is true" and equivocating?

The premise of the argument is that if there no objective values there would be no facts. The claim is that without the former there cannot be the latter. This is a determinate relation. — Fooloso4

It’s not that our beliefs determine facts. It’s that facts are necessarily things that ought to be believed, but not that what they are is determined by beliefs.

The premise of the argument is that if there no objective values there would be no facts. The claim is that without the former there cannot be the latter. This is a determinate relation. — Fooloso4

The idea is rather that the values are a fact, somehow as a necessary upshot of facts in general. How that's supposed to work is left completely unattended, aside from saying that it's nonsense to believe otherwise.

Where is someone saying that something be a fact, or being the case, where the latter is another way of saying "is the case," isn't a fact or isn't the case? Where are you getting that from aside from using the terms as a synomym for "is true" and equivocating? — Terrapin Station

You’ll have to be clearer, I can’t make sense of that.

The idea is rather that the values are a fact, somehow as a necessary upshot of facts in general. How that's supposed to work is left completely unattended, aside from saying that it's nonsense to believe otherwise. — Terrapin Station

Well, it’s not left unattended. I demonstrated that believing otherwise is nonsense, I didn’t just say it.

It’s not that our beliefs determine facts. It’s that facts are necessarily things that ought to be believed, but not that what they are is determined by beliefs. — AJJ

You are equivocating. It is not, according to Clark, that what the facts are that is determined by beliefs but rather that they are at all is determined by beliefs, for as he says:

If there are no objective values then there are no facts — AJJ

By objective values he means things we ought to believe. If there are not things we ought to believe then there are no objective values and therefore no facts.

The idea is rather that the values are a fact — Terrapin Station

Right, but to be more precise, the claim is not simply that it is a fact that there are values but a fact that there are objective values.

I have asked AJJ whether it is a fact that we ought to believe, which is to say, whether "we ought to believe" is an objective value.

Clark is attempting to collapse the fact/value distinction.

By objective values he means things we ought to believe. If there are not things we ought to believe then there are no objective values and therefore no facts. — Fooloso4

Yeah. But that’s not to say that the very existence of facts is determined by our beliefs, but that a necessary part of what they are is that they ought to be believed.

If there are no objective values then there are no facts... — AJJ

If facts are true statements and there are no objective values then saying that there are no objective values is a fact. If we ought believe true statements, then we ought not believe the above quote.

You’ll have to be clearer, I can’t make sense of that. — AJJ

Just start with this. You claimed that someone was saying or something implied the following:

"something that 'is the case' neither is nor is not the case."

Where are you getting that from?

Yeah. But that’s not to say that the very existence of facts is determined by our beliefs, but that a necessary part of what they are is that they ought to be believed. — AJJ

But that is not what he says. Or perhaps it is not what he actually says but what you say he says. In either case, the statement is:

If there are no objective values then there are no facts (since there’s nothing that we ought to believe). — AJJ

If a necessary part of what facts are is that they ought be believed, then if this necessary part does not exist, if they are not believed, then they do not exist.

Just start with this. You claimed that someone was saying or something implied the following:

"something that 'is the case' neither is nor is not the case."

Where are you getting that from? — Terrapin Station

I understand your objection now.

So a fact is a state of affairs, which is something that is the case, which is neither true nor false. You still have to answer how it is that a proposition could match such a thing.

Actually the word “fact” doesn’t even mean anything here. It means “state of affairs”, which means “is the case”, which means “fact”. The word just refers to itself.

If a necessary part of what facts are is that they ought be believed, then if this necessary part does not exist, if they are not believed, then they do not exist. — Fooloso4

It’s not that they don’t exist if they’re not believed. Everyone could stop believing facts and they’d still exist. It’s that they can’t exist without the necessary factor that they ought to be believed.

It’s not that they don’t exist if they’re not believed. Everyone could stop believing facts and they’d still exist. It’s that they can’t exist without the necessary factor that they ought to be believed. — AJJ

What cannot exist does not exist.

And I contend facts do exist, which means they ought to be believed if that is indeed a necessary part of their existence.

If facts are true statements and there are no objective values then saying that there are no objective values is a fact. If we ought believe true statements, then we ought not believe the above quote. — creativesoul

The argument, rephrased a little, contends that there must be objective values if there are facts. If this is the case then it’s not actually possible for “there are no objective values” to be a fact.

And I contend facts do exist, which means they ought to be believed if that is indeed a necessary part of their existence. — AJJ

What is it that you contend and what is it that Clark contends? Is your OP a statement in his words or yours?

Is the claim that facts ought to be believed a fact? I have asked this question before.

In what sense is being believed a necessary part of the existence of facts? Can something exist without its necessary parts? According to what you say, in the case of facts, it seems they can; and so, in what sense is believing them a necessary part of their existence if their existence does not depend on them? They ought to be believed implies that they are not necessarily believed, and so, being believed is not a necessary part of their existence.

What is it that you contend and what is it that Clark contends? Is your OP a statement in his words or yours?

Is the claim that facts ought to be believed a fact? I have asked this question before. — Fooloso4

The OP is more or less a quote.

Yes, I would say so.

In what sense is being believed a necessary part of the existence of facts? Can something exist without its necessary parts? According to what you say, in the case of facts, it seems they can; and so, in what sense is believing them a necessary part of their existence if their existence does not depend on them? They ought to be believed implies that they are not necessarily believed, and so, being believed is not a necessary part of their existence. — Fooloso4

Come on now, it’s not “being believed” that is necessary, it’s that they ought to be believed.

You still have to answer how it is that a proposition could match such a thing. — AJJ

I explained that, but I'll do it again, one step at a time.

Start with the word "cat." Do you understand how the word "cat" can correspond with a cat?

No mate, this was the important bit:

Actually the word “fact” doesn’t even mean anything here. It means “state of affairs”, which means “is the case”, which means “fact”. The word just refers to itself. — AJJ

If “fact” doesn’t actually mean anything then you can’t match a proposition to one.