whether we ought to believe true things, i.e. facts. — AJJ

True things are propositions, not facts. Truth is a property of propositions, which on some accounts, obtain that property via corresponding to facts. (That's it the only theory about how propositions obtain truth-value, but it's one of the more popular theories.)

Facts are states of affairs, ways that the world happens to be.

You continue to ignore the context, and claim that the Truth is not particularly relevant to a discussion about whether we ought to believe true things, i.e. facts. — AJJ

Oh. I thought it was a "Brief argument for Objective Values". Not quite the same thing. And The Truth deserves and requires a topic of its own, not a derail in this one. :chin:

If there are no objective values then there are no facts (since there’s nothing that we ought to believe). There are facts, therefore there are objective values. — AJJ

This garbled statement is what we started off with. It contains so many oddities that it's difficult to know where to start. But it is not obvious from this that this topic is about The Truth. Not to me, anyway.

Yeah, the claim comes down to something like "It's a fact that we ought to believe facts" or "It's a fact that if there are facts, then there is an implication (not simply a disposition that people have) that we ought to believe those facts," and the claim is that this would somehow be the case even in a counterfactual situation, or even in a possible world, where humans never existed. The problem is that he's not bothering to argue for this. Well, at least not beyond an argument that it's nonsensical/foolish/etc. to claim otherwise.

There's so much about this topic that's unclear. It seems to be trying to justify the existence of objective values by asserting that there are facts. It doesn't say whether "objective values" are accurate reflections of that which is, or merely impartial and unbiased observations. Then there is "ought", which says that there is a reason to believe the original thesis. But he won't describe or explain what this reason is.

What does this topic seek to demonstrate? That there are objective values? That Objective Reality exists? That facts exist? That the existence of objective values is dependent on the existence of facts? What? :chin:

Oh. I thought it was a "Brief argument for Objective Values". Not quite the same thing. And The Truth deserves and requires a topic of its own, not a derail in this one. :chin: — Pattern-chaser

And the bit people are getting hung up over is whether we ought to believe facts. And so this is mainly what the discussion has been about.

If there are no objective values then there are no facts (since there’s nothing that we ought to believe). There are facts, therefore there are objective values.
— AJJ

This garbled statement is what we started off with. It contains so many oddities that it's difficult to know where to start. But it is not obvious from this that this topic is about The Truth. Not to me, anyway. — Pattern-chaser

“Difficult to know where to start” = “I don’t understand this and have nothing cogent to say”

“Difficult to know where to start” = “I don’t understand this and have nothing cogent to say” — AJJ

No, not really. I have this to say. In fact ( :wink: ), I already said it:

There's so much about this topic that's unclear. It seems to be trying to justify the existence of objective values by asserting that there are facts. It doesn't say whether "objective values" are accurate reflections of that which is, or merely impartial and unbiased observations. Then there is "ought", which says that there is a reason to believe the original thesis. But he won't describe or explain what this reason is.

What does this topic seek to demonstrate? That there are objective values? That Objective Reality exists? That facts exist? That the existence of objective values is dependent on the existence of facts? What? :chin: — Pattern-chaser

Yeah, like I said.

So you have no answer to my questions, nor to those of your other correspondents. So where will you take your topic now?

True things are propositions, not facts. Truth is a property of propositions, which on some accounts, obtain that property via corresponding to facts. (That's it the only theory about how propositions obtain truth-value, but it's one of the more popular theories.)

Facts are states of affairs, ways that the world happens to be. — Terrapin Station

Whatever man. Here’s the OED’s first definition: “thing that is known or proved to be true.”

So you have no answer to my questions, nor to those of your other correspondents. So where will you take your topic now? — Pattern-chaser

This is truly astonishing. I mean... look back over the thread mate, bloody hell.

I was just bloody answering your questions.

What does this topic seek to demonstrate? That there are objective values? That Objective Reality exists? That facts exist? That the existence of objective values is dependent on the existence of facts? What? — Pattern-chaser

What I got out of it is that (a) we're assuming that (objective) facts exist, and (b) that the fact that objective facts exist is sufficient to imply that there is also a fact that we ought to believe facts, because the fact that we ought to believe facts is somehow more or less embedded in facts period.

(a) I'm fine with as a realist. (b) I don't think is obvious at all. It seems a rather outrageous claim on the face of it, actually, as we're not at all addressing how that part is supposed to basically be embedded in facts, we're not addressing how an objective "ought" could obtain period (what properties, of what, is it?), etc.

Whatever man. — AJJ

Aren't you on this site because you're interested in philosophy?

Whatever man. Here’s the OED’s first definition: “thing that is known or proved to be true.” — AJJ

Which has what to do with my question?

I'm asking because there are good reasons, well-accepted, with long philosophical arguments behind them, why "fact" and "truth" are used as they are in philosophy, and by extension, in the sciences. The OED definition you're quoting has a number of philosophical problems. It might capture a common way that the term is thought of colloquially, but we're supposed to be interested in and at least putatively doing something sort of like philosophy when we post here, no?

It seems to me that facts are things, and that they’re true. That’s the definition I’ve been assuming for this argument. Swapping out that definition would be to play a different game anyway; why not define “values” as “baby geese” while you’re at it, and cause the argument to fail that way? “Facts” here means “things that are true”.

In summary:

With that definition in place the argument works, as far as I’m concerned. The principle objection has been over whether we ought to believe true things. It has been claimed that we sometimes ought to believe lies. I responded that it’s not that we ought to believe the lies, but that we ought to act in the way those particular lies facilitate. On top of that I believe I have demonstrated the absurdity of denying that we ought to believe true things, because of the bottomless pit of questions that invites. There has to be something we ought to believe (does the statement “there is nothing we ought to believe” not defeat itself?), and that thing will be true and good to believe, which are the reasons we ought to believe it.

A couple of people have claimed I’ve not been supporting the argument or answering objections. It should really be obvious that’s not the case.

It seems to me that facts are things, and that they’re true. That’s the definition I’ve been assuming for this argument. Swapping out that definition would be to play a different game anyway; why not define “values” as “baby geese” while you’re at it, and cause the argument to fail that way? “Facts” here means “things that are true”. — AJJ

All you're doing here is telling me why you couldn't care less about the convention in philosophy and the sciences. Which is why I asked if you're not interested in that. I guess you're not.

You say, ignoring the summary I just gave of my reasoning.

You say, ignoring the summary I just gave of my reasoning. — AJJ

What I was curious about was whether you're not interested in (learning (about)) philosophy.

You've already demonstrated that you're not going to listen to explanations of what's wrong with the argument at hand, or what you'd need to do in order to fix it. We've been through that already.

Aye. So facts are states of affairs. Are states of affairs not things and true?

Aye. So facts are states of affairs. Are states of affairs not things and true? — AJJ

Re "things" it depends on how you're using that term. Some people use it "technically" where they seem to use it as more or less a synonym for "object" (a la a "whole/solid to-normal-human-perspective item that could be handled/manipulated either by hand or at least by machinery"). If you're using it that way, then most facts wouldn't be things. Most facts are comprised of (dynamic) relations (of things in that sense and of other sorts of existents). But if you're using "thing" more in the vein of a variable like x, or in the vein of being describable/depictable/etc., then sure.

Re facts being true. No. They are not true. That's just the point of the standard philosophical distinction. What is true (or false) is a proposition. Not a fact. Propositions are about facts--they're claims about facts. In the most common take on it, propositions have the property of being true if the proposition corresponds to the fact it's about. Otherwise the proposition is false. Facts aren't true or false.

Re facts being true. No. They are not true. That's just the point of the standard philosophical distinction. What is true (or false) is a proposition. Not a fact. Propositions are about facts--they're claims about facts. In the most common take on it, propositions have the property of being true if the proposition corresponds to the fact it's about. Otherwise the proposition is false. Facts aren't true or false. — Terrapin Station

So states of affairs can be considered things, good. But how is that a proposition is true when it corresponds to something that is neither true or false?

So states of affairs can be considered things, good. But how is that a proposition is true when it corresponds to something that is neither true or false? — AJJ

Because what it refers to to be "true" is that the proposition corresponds to a fact. In other words, it "matches" the fact. The fact itself wouldn't have that property--what would it be corresponding to or matching?

So states of affairs can be considered things, good. But how is that a proposition is true when it corresponds to something that is neither true or false?
— AJJ

Because what it refers to to be "true" is that the proposition corresponds to a fact. In other words, it "matches" the fact. The fact itself wouldn't have that property--what would it be corresponding to or matching? — Terrapin Station

It would have to be part of the objective Truth. You haven’t actually answered my question. How is that a proposition is true when it matches something that is neither true or false? You can’t just say “Because it matches”, you need a logical explanation why the match has that effect.

See "Moore's Paradox": https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moore%27s_paradox

It is not a matter of value, that is, what one ought to believe, but of logical contradiction. If I say: "It is raining but I do not believe it is raining" then do I accept the assertion that it is raining, that is, do I accept it as a matter of fact? Doesn't the assertion that I do not believe it mean that I do not believe it is a fact that it is raining? If, however, I accept it as a matter of fact that it is raining, then what does it mean to assert that I do not believe it, if not that I do not accept it as a matter of fact? It may be a fact that it is raining and a fact that I do not believe that it is raining, but to assert both at the same time is absurd.

[Note: "I do not not believe it" as it is used here does not mean that one believes it but finds it hard to believe.]

It may be a fact that it is raining and a fact that I do not believe that it is raining, but to assert both at the same time is absurd. — Fooloso4

That is absurd, but I don’t see what bearing this has on the OP argument. It seems to me that if you asserted both those things you’d simply be lying about at least one.

It may be a fact that it is raining and a fact that I do not believe that it is raining, but to assert both at the same time is absurd.
— Fooloso4

That is absurd, but I don’t see what bearing this has on the OP argument. It seems to me that if you asserted both those things you’d simply be lying about at least one. — AJJ

The point is, once again, that it has nothing to do with "objective values" and what one "ought to believe". The problem is not axiological but logical. Facts are not a matter of what we "ought to believe". What we ought to believe is not a matter of fact.

The point is, once again, that it has nothing to do with "objective values" and what one "ought to believe". The problem is not axiological but logical. Facts are not a matter of what we "ought to believe". What we ought to believe is not a matter of fact. — Fooloso4

That’s precisely what is under discussion mate. You can’t just assert your own view and expect that to convince anyone.

On correspondence theory, "The cat is on the mat" (a proposition, which we're denoting by putting it in quotation marks) matches the cat being on the mat (the state of affairs that the cat is on the mat).

We are naming that relationship "truth," or we're naming the property of having that relationship "being true." We could have named it something else--"sploof" or "wikwak" or whatever sound we want to make. The sound we're using is "truth/true."

So how it is that a proposition is true when it matches something that's not true (or false) is that "true" is what we're naming that matching.