Would you be able to provide a reference for the page/s on which Clark argues this point in his book?

Bottom of 108 to 109

If facts are acceptable as necessarily the case under a given set of conditions......who cares whether or not we ought to believe them? Acceptance grants their authority, over which belief would have nothing to say.

Well, I care. You could swap “believe” for “accept” and it seems to me the argument works the same.

You could swap “believe” for “accept” — AJJ

Not really, and maintain rational integrity. Acceptance is analytic, insofar as that which is accepted is self-sufficient (accepted because it’s a fact). Belief is synthetic, insofar as there remains a contingency to the proposition which some additional proposition would need to rectify (if one does not believe the fact he should be able to justify his dissention).

To go a step further, acceptance grants that some particular cause and effect are empirically manifest, the primary conditions for facts in general. If one believes he ought not to accept some fact, by association he does not grant that particular cause and effect to be at least sufficient, and at most he does not grant those conditions to be possible and/or non-contradictory.

Much more parsimonious to either accept facts as facts or not, and leave such vagaries as “ought to believe” by the metaphysical wayside.

Not really, and maintain rational integrity. Acceptance is analytic, insofar as that which is accepted is self-sufficient (accepted because it’s a fact). Belief is synthetic, insofar as there remains a contingency to the proposition which some additional proposition would need to rectify (if one does not believe the fact he should be able to justify his dissention). — Mww

It’s absurd to deny that we ought to take facts
to be true, whether that means believing or accepting, for the reason I gave in my OP.

To go a step further, acceptance grants that some particular cause and effect are empirically manifest, the primary conditions for facts in general. If one believes he ought not to accept some fact, by association he does not grant that particular cause and effect to be at least sufficient, and at most he does not grant those conditions to be possible and/or non-contradictory. — Mww

I don’t see how whether we think something is a fact or not has any bearing on the abstract notion that we ought to believe/accept facts.

Much more parsimonious to either accept facts as facts or not, and leave such vagaries as “ought to believe” by the metaphysical wayside. — Mww

Again, swap “believe” for “accept” and the argument works the same. If you deny that we ought to accept facts, it invites the question, “Well ought we to accept that?” and so on until it’s accepted that we ought to accept true things, which are facts.

If you’re simply saying you don’t care about that, then OK.

If there are no objective values then there are no facts (since there’s nothing that we ought to believe). There are facts, therefore there are objective values. — AJJ

The first thing that strikes me about this is the word "ought". "Ought" says that there's some kind of reason or compulsion that requires us to believe this thing.

Ought - expresses an emotional, practical, or other reason for doing something — WordWeb

I think other respondents have already commented that a fact (in the context of this discussion) simply reflects something in the world that is. There is no ought here; what is, is.

The next thing is not going to be welcome to many readers :wink:, which is what you mean by "objective"? Without getting too involved, can we agree that "objective" refers directly to that which is? That it refers directly to an accurate correspondence with Objective Reality?

If that's an acceptable working definition, then we can return to the quote you gave us. There are objective values because Objective Reality exists. Any accurate observation of (some aspect of) Objective Reality gives rise to one or more facts. So yes, there is an Objective Reality, there are objective values, and there are facts.

But isn't this quite basic stuff when it comes to debating objectivity? Is there anything contentious here, apart, perhaps, from the words/terms used to express the concepts? Have I missed something deep and meaningful? :chin:

If there are no objective values then there are no facts (since there’s nothing that we ought to believe). There are facts, therefore there are objective values. — AJJ

I agree that there could be no objective values without facts, but we cannot derive "if there are no objective values then there are no facts" from this. That would be some sort of inversion fallacy. "If there are no facts, then there are no objective values" is not convertible to "if there are not objective values then there are no facts".

It is probably the case that objective values are dependent on facts, and that's why I agree with that, but as the others point out, facts are not dependent on objective values. We do not say that X is a fact because it is what we ought to believe, we say that we ought to believe X because it is a fact. This leaves the issue of why we ought to believe facts as unanswered, and unaddressed, so we cannot conclude that because there are facts there are objective values.

Your bridge example is a practical illustration of why it is we ought to believe facts, but I’m simply saying we ought to believe facts because they’re true, because it’s absurd to say otherwise. In practice the things we believe may or may not actually be facts, but I’m talking abstractly - that it is abstractly the case that we ought to believe facts. — AJJ

Saying that it is absurd to say otherwise does not resolve the issue. We need to say something about "ought" which demonstrates that we ought to believe facts. "Ought" refers to what is good, so we need to show that it is always good to believe facts to make the inductive conclusion, and the consequent proposition, that it is good to believe facts. There is still a problem with this approach though, and that is that what is good, therefore what we ought to do, goes far beyond believing facts. There are many things which we ought to do which cannot be described as "believing facts". So it is a mistake to define "ought" in this way, which limits it to believing facts.

You've hit upon an important issue here, what is commonly referred to as the noble lie. This is introduced in Plato's Republic. The noble lie is an instance of the rulers lying to the ruled, for their own good. If we accept the noble lie as a valid moral principle, then we deny the inductive principle that we ought to believe facts. Many would argue that the particular noble lie expressed by Plato is wrong, but it may be argued still, that sometimes it is better for a person not to know the truth. And this indicates that "ought" goes beyond "truth".

Facts in no way generally hinge on us or anything about us. — Terrapin Station


I know mate. Again: that is what makes them objective, rather than subjective. That is why we ought to believe them. — AJJ

The only part of your argument that's being questioned is the "ought"! Ought says there's a reason to believe facts. What is that reason? Above, you seem to be saying that, because facts are true, we ought to believe them. This implies someone or something 'out there' who/which somehow compels us to believe. There is no active someone or something; there is only (! :smile:) that which is. There is no need for further justification. Agreement with that which is cannot be challenged or doubted. So there is no ought, only that which is.

If it is the case that facts are things we ought to believe, then the OP argument works. The reason I’ve given that it is the case that we ought to believe facts is that it’s absurd to deny it, because you continually invite the question, “Well ought we believe that?”

You can do the same thing with “good”. Is it good to believe facts? If you say no, then you continually invite the question, “Well is it good to believe that?”

As to the noble lie, it might be the case that the lie is beneficial, in which case we ought to believe that it’s beneficial. However, that doesn’t mean we ought to believe the lie if we know it to be one.

Facts don’t depend on whether or not we believe them, sure, but I don’t see how that has a bearing on whether we ought to believe them. — AJJ

It has a bearing because there can be a fact where "we ought to believe it" is not the case, which makes the argument invalid logically. An example is where (when) no people exist.

The reason I’ve given that it is the case that we ought to believe facts is that it’s absurd to deny it, because you continually invite the question, “Well ought we believe that?” — AJJ

First, "Continually inviting a question" is sufficient for "absurd"? What definition of "absurd" are you using, then, and what does it have to do with logical validity?

What you seem to be shooting for is a variation on the old "objective truth" argument chestnut . . . which doesn't at all work. You seem to be thinking that if someone says "P is a fact" ( where we're ignoring that facts aren't propositions, they're not things that people say, etc.), then necessarily they're implying not only "You ought to believe that P," but "It's true that you ought to believe that P," or "It's a fact that you ought to believe that P." But that's not the case. No normative (no ought/should/ought not/should not/etc.) is true or is a fact (both factually and in my view). Normatives are ways that people feel about what people should ideally do/be like.

First, "Continually inviting a question" is sufficient for "absurd"? What definition of "absurd" are you using, then, and what does it have to do with logical validity? — Terrapin Station

Here’s the definition from my Dictionary app: “utterly or obviously senseless, illogical, or untrue; contrary to all reason or common sense; laughably foolish or false”

The rest is just you asserting your own credo and I don’t care about that.

So in what way does "Continually inviting a question" fit the definition of "absurd" you're using?

So in what way does "Continually inviting a question" fit the definition of "absurd" you're using? — Terrapin Station

Because you’re in effect saying “there is nothing that we ought to believe, including the proposition that there is nothing we ought to believe.”

Because you’re in effect saying “there is nothing that we ought to believe, including the proposition that there is nothing we ought to believe.” — AJJ

So the issue isn't continually inviting a question, but something else.

Re your comment here, if we're saying that it's not true, it's not a fact, that there is anything that we ought to believe, why is that absurd? How does it fit your definition of absurd?

So the issue isn't continually inviting a question, but something else. — Terrapin Station

The issue is continually inviting the question, which in effect makes a senseless statement, the one I just gave.

Re your comment here, if we're saying that it's not true, it's not a fact, that there is anything that we ought to believe, why is that absurd? How does it fit your definition of absurd? — Terrapin Station

Because it invites the question, “Ought we believe that there isn’t anything we ought to believe?” It’s like I’ve said, this question is continually invited, which in effect makes the senseless statement I gave in my previous post.

The issue is continually inviting the question, which in effect makes an insensible statement, the one I just gave. — AJJ

If the issue is "continually inviting a question," then continually inviting a question should be absurd regardless of the question, for any argument.

If the issue is the content of the question, then that's different.

The other option would be that the issue is continually inviting a question of x type, in which case neither (a) continually inviting a question nor (b) inviting (but not continually) a question of x type would be sufficient to be absurd.

At any rate . . .

Because it invites the question, “Ought we believe that there isn’t anything we ought to believe?” It’s like I’ve said, this question is continually invited, which in effect makes the insensible statement I gave in my previous post. — AJJ

Rather than dealing with the plethora of other problems there, let's stick to this: In telling me why it's absurd per the definition you used, you should appeal to a term that's in the definition you used. You're not doing that.

I was using the word insensible rather than senseless. My mistake.

Senseless vs not senseless literally?--as in, involving our senses?

As in nonsensical.

Haha--as if that removes the ambiguity.

Try it this way. Is there a way to not simply be making a value judgment about it (about the question, or alternately phrased, the claim that we're talking about--that it's neither true nor a fact that we ought to believe anything)?

If it's simply a value judgment, then that's what you're hinging a logical argument on? (Or hinging a claim of invalidity on?)

Yeah, I think we should part ways now in this argument. I don’t want to discuss this with anyone who can’t see why the below statement makes no sense:

“there is nothing that we ought to believe, including the proposition that there is nothing we ought to believe.” — AJJ

The acceptance of facts has nothing to do with values, objective or otherwise. It is comment sense or prudential reasoning.

But that is not the apologist game Clark is playing. He wants us to believe that Christian values are objective values and ought to be believed because they are based on facts.

Yeah, I think we should part ways now in this argument. I don’t want to discuss this with anyone who can’t see why the below statement makes no sense: — AJJ

How about trying to support how it would be a fact (of what? what would it be a property of? etc.) that we ought or ought not do anything?

("I'm claiming that it's a fact that if P is a fact, then it follows that we ought to believe that P, and if you don't agree, then I think I should just ignore you, because you're speaking nonsense" isn't a very good argument, by the way.)

If it is the case that facts are things we ought to believe, then the OP argument works. The reason I’ve given that it is the case that we ought to believe facts is that it’s absurd to deny it, because you continually invite the question, “Well ought we believe that?” — AJJ

But it's not absurd to deny that facts are what we ought to believe, as the example of the noble lie demonstrates. It is arguable that in some cases it's for the person's own good to believe a lie. If that's the case, then it's not the facts which ought to be believed. We ought to believe what is good for us to believe, regardless of the facts.

As to the noble lie, it might be the case that the lie is beneficial, in which case we ought to believe that it’s beneficial. However, that doesn’t mean we ought to believe the lie if we know it to be one. — AJJ

This is what's absurd. It's not the lie itself which is beneficial it's the belief in the lie which is beneficial. The lie would be useless if no one believed it. If the people know that it is a lie, then they will not believe it, regardless of whether they ought to believe it or not.

1. If there are no objective values then there are no facts
2. There are facts
So,
3. There are objective values

I don't agree with premise 1 because it asserts that without objective values there can be no facts. It needs to be proved.

:up: Can't access that section of the book, but I think there is something in the argument.

As to the noble lie, it might be the case that the lie is beneficial, in which case we ought to believe that it’s beneficial. However, that doesn’t mean we ought to believe the lie if we know it to be one.
— AJJ

This is what's absurd. It's not the lie itself which is beneficial it's the belief in the lie which is beneficial. The lie would be useless if no one believed it. If the people know that it is a lie, then they will not believe it, regardless of whether they ought to believe it or not. — Metaphysician Undercover

But then it seems to me it isn’t that we ought to believe the lie, but rather that we ought to behave in the way that the lie facilitates. If you consider the lie and the truth abstractly then it seems obvious that we ought to believe the truth over the lie. If you answer that we ought sometimes to believe the lie, then that demonstrates that the ought doesn’t reside in believing the lie, but in the consequent actions of believing the lie. If you try to say the same thing about the truth, you’re making the statement that true things are not things we ought to believe, which lands you in that same bottomless question pit I’ve been talking about.