I can't make out what you are trying to say. If a certain belief leads to good actions, then why can't we conclude that we ought to hold that belief?

You insist that we ought to believe the truth, but why? Unless there is a good which comes from believing the truth, which is better than the good which comes from believing the lie, then this claim is unfounded. Do you have a principle whereby it is demonstrated that believing the truth is always better than believing a lie?

I don't see the bottomless pit. The bottom is what is good. You want to make the bottom the truth. Clearly these two are not equivalent, so why do you give supremacy to truth over good? I give supremacy to good because human beings are active beings, involved in doing things, activity is the natural tendency for the human being and to be sedentary is unhealthy. Therefore I assume that beliefs are for the sake of these activities which we engage in, and the beliefs which we ought to hold are the ones which are conducive to good actions. If a true belief is conducive to good actions then it is one that we ought to hold. If it is not, then there is no reason to hold it. And if a false belief is conducive to good actions, then it ought to be held.

A belief needs to be judged in relation to something in order to determine whether or not we ought to hold it. Being fallible human beings, with fallible minds, we have no guarantee that what we think is the truth is really the truth, so we cannot judge our beliefs in relation to the truth. Therefore we need to judge whether or not we ought to hold this or that belief in relation to something other than the truth. I think that we ought to judge the beliefs in relation to the actions which they bring about, whether they bring about good or bad activities.

If a certain belief leads to good actions, then why can't we conclude that we ought to hold that belief? — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m saying the ought resides in the actions, and not the belief in the lie. It would be possible to take the same actions without believing the lie, so believing the lie isn’t strictly necessary. It might appear necessary in practice, but there’s certainly no ought to believing the lie in the abstract. As I said, this shows the ought does not reside in believing the lie, like I’m saying in does in the truth.

You insist that we ought to believe the truth, but why? Unless there is a good which comes from believing the truth, which is better than the good which comes from believing the lie, then this claim is unfounded. Do you have a principle whereby it is demonstrated that believing the truth is always better than believing a lie? — Metaphysician Undercover

Is it even possible for bad things to come from believing the truth? Can you give an example of this? If the truth of a nearby exploding volcano causes people to panic and run over one another, then it’s not believing the truth that has lead to this, but the implicit lie that it is good to panic and run over one another.

I don't see the bottomless pit. The bottom is what is good. You want to make the bottom the truth. Clearly these two are not equivalent, so why do you give supremacy to truth over good? I give supremacy to good because human beings are active beings, involved in doing things, activity is the natural tendency for the human being and to be sedentary is unhealthy. Therefore I assume that beliefs are for the sake of these activities which we engage in, and the beliefs which we ought to hold are the ones which are conducive to good actions. If a true belief is conducive to good actions then it is one that we ought to hold. If it is not, then there is no reason to hold it. And if a false belief is conducive to good actions, then it ought to be held. — Metaphysician Undercover

What is true is good. I’ve already said you can form the same bottomless pit with “good”. Is it good to believe true things? No? Well is it good to believe that?. And so on. Eventually you’re forced to say yes, because it’s good to believe true things, and we ought to do things that are good.

A belief needs to be judged in relation to something in order to determine whether or not we ought to hold it. Being fallible human beings, with fallible minds, we have no guarantee that what we think is the truth is really the truth, so we cannot judge our beliefs in relation to the truth. Therefore we need to judge whether or not we ought to hold this or that belief in relation to something other than the truth. I think that we ought to judge the beliefs in relation to the actions which they bring about, whether they bring about good or bad activities. — Metaphysician Undercover

We always judge our beliefs in relation to the truth, it’s impossible to do otherwise. By saying, “I’m taking this action not because I’m certain it’s true, but because good will come of it”, you’re actually saying, “I’m taking this action because I believe it is true that good will come of it, and we ought to believe true things.”

It would be possible to take the same actions without believing the lie, so believing the lie isn’t strictly necessary. — AJJ

I don't recognize how this would be possible. Actions are determined as necessary in relation to particular ends. The end is the belief, of what is required. So, we have a belief of what is needed and we tailor our actions toward that belief. We can consider different possible actions for fulfilling the same belief. However, the action, as required for the belief, is contingent on the belief. So it really doesn't seem possible to come up with the same action without the same belief as to what is required. If we change the belief, the contingent actions will change accordingly. How do you suggest that we could change the belief of what is required, and still come up with the same action as being required for the new belief.

Is it even possible for bad things to come from believing the truth? — AJJ

I'm not talking about where bad things come from, I'm talking about where good things come from. So this question is irrelevant. If good things are the things which are desired, as needed, then we ought to tailor our beliefs such that they naturally bring about good things. If, in the process of judging a particular belief, the possibility that it might bring about something bad comes up, then we need to consider this. But we start from a good, what is needed, and until believing the truth is demonstrated as something needed, or good, truth has no relevance.

What is true is good. I’ve already said you can form the same bottomless pit with “good”. Is it good to believe true things? No? Well is it good to believe that?. And so on. Eventually you’re forced to say yes, because it’s good to believe true things, and we ought to do things that are good. — AJJ

You don't seem to be grasping the principle. Truth is good and good is truth, is a bottomless pit, because it's circular. To avoid the circle (bottomless pit) we need to ground something. So we ground "good" in action, activity. Activities are things which bring about real change in the world. "Truth" does not do the same thing, it doesn't bring about any activities, or change in the world. The person knowing what is good will be inspired to act, to bring about the good, while the person knowing the truth would be sedentary without a sense of what is good. It's good to believe X, because X belief inspires one to act, and this creates change which is believed to be good. But we cannot say this about "truth". Knowing the truth does not necessitate any particular actions. So we cannot say that it's good to know the truth until we can say what good the truth brings about. However, we can say that a certain belief is good, because it brings about good actions, regardless of whether or not it is true.

We always judge our beliefs in relation to the truth, it’s impossible to do otherwise. By saying, “I’m taking this action not because I’m certain it’s true, but because good will come of it”, you’re actually saying, “I’m taking this action because I believe it is true that good will come of it, and we ought to believe true things.” — AJJ

This is not true at all. Our beliefs regarding actions are based in probability. We proceed when there is a high probability of success, not when we are certain that it is true that there will be success.

But it's not absurd to deny that facts are what we ought to believe, as the example of the noble lie demonstrates. It is arguable that in some cases it's for the person's own good to believe a lie. If that's the case, then it's not the facts which ought to be believed. We ought to believe what is good for us to believe, regardless of the facts. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, and also we need to observe the difference between:

(1) It's true that that we ought to believe facts
(2) It's a fact that we ought to believe fact
(3) One (and maybe everyone, or close to it) has the disposition that we ought to believe facts

Those are all saying something different.

(3) may very well be the case. Maybe almost everyone has that disposition, for most facts at least, but that can be the case while we deny both (1) and (2). AJJ is trying to assert (1) and/or (2).

Ought vb. - Expresses an emotional, practical, or other reason for doing something. — WordWeb

Lots of contributors to this topic are using the term "ought" over and over. Fair enough. But, given your use(s) of "ought", can you please clarify what the associated reason(s) is/are?

For example, if we ought to believe facts, why ought we? What is the reason?

[I'm not arguing that we shouldn't believe facts, I'm asking why we ought to believe them.]

Can't access that section of the book, but I think there is something in the argument. — Wayfarer

If you're looking on Amazon (re their "Look Inside" feature), here's a trick that often works. The "Look Inside" books have a search feature. Utilizing that, you can either search for a relatively uncommon word that you know is in the passage in question, or you can search for a very common word, such as "the," if you know the page number you need. You'll get results of all of the occurrences of the word in question in the book, and when you click on the page number you need, or a page right before or after it (sometimes it takes some educated guesswork via referencing the table of contents or index, which are usually part of the preview), you'll be able to see that section even though it wasn't part of the preview.

That worked for me in this case.

How do you suggest that we could change the belief of what is required, and still come up with the same action as being required for the new belief. — Metaphysician Undercover

If I’m lied to and told there is no erupting volcano but I need to leave the area for some other innocuous reason, then I won’t panic and run over people. But neither will I panic and run over people if I’ve learned that this is something I shouldn’t do anyway. The ought resides in the action/non-action, not in believing the lie.

I'm not talking about where bad things come from, I'm talking about where good things come from. — Metaphysician Undercover

And I was saying that bad things cannot come from truth, but they obviously can from lies. Therefore it cannot ever be bad to believe the truth, but it can be bad to believe lies, so an ought cannot ever reside in believing lies, but it can do so in the truth.

If good things are the things which are desired, as needed, then we ought to tailor our beliefs such that they naturally bring about good things. If, in the process of judging a particular belief, the possibility that it might bring about something bad comes up, then we need to consider this. But we start from a good, what is needed, and until believing the truth is demonstrated as something needed, or good, truth has no relevance. — Metaphysician Undercover

And all the time you’re doing this you are appealing to the truth; the truth of what is good, and whether or not good will come of a certain belief or an action. Why do we appeal to these truths if it is not good to do so, if it’s not the case that we ought to?

You don't seem to be grasping the principle. Truth is good and good is truth, is a bottomless pit, because it's circular. To avoid the circle (bottomless pit) we need to ground something. So we ground "good" in action, activity. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you have this backwards. Action is grounded in the good. How else would we choose our actions, if not in reference to the good, or at least what we perceive the good is? And it’s not a circle to say that truth and goodness are the same thing, to say that good things are true things and true things are good things. Truth/goodness are the ground you mentioned, not action, which is based on our perception of these things.

Knowing the truth does not necessitate any particular actions. So we cannot say that it's good to know the truth until we can say what good the truth brings about. However, we can say that a certain belief is good, because it brings about good actions, regardless of whether or not it is true. — Metaphysician Undercover

I just don’t think you’ve thought about this. Of course knowing the truth necessitates action. The only way it wouldn’t would be if it were true that we should never take any actions.

This is not true at all. Our beliefs regarding actions are based in probability. We proceed when there is a high probability of success, not when we are certain that it is true that there will be success. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you just haven’t thought about this. The only way we can judge something to be probable is in reference to the truth that it is probable.

The only way we can judge something to be probable is in reference to the truth that it is probable. — AJJ

You just bent the facts under consideration into a very strange shape, so that they will resemble your thesis. Wouldn't it be better simply to express the facts in a clear and understandable fashion? :chin:

I don’t know what you’re struggling with. We can only judge that a coin has a 50/50 chance of landing on tails by referring to the mathematical truth that this is the case. If there was no truth to refer to, you couldn’t possible have any idea of the outcome.

I don’t know what you’re struggling with. — AJJ

Apparently not. I'm observing that you have ordered your words in a peculiar way, one that is not easy to understand, so that they would resemble the theme you wish to promote. Look:

The only way we can judge something to be probable is in reference to the truth that it is probable. — AJJ

This is not a normal or helpful way of saying "we can only know something if it's true". And I wonder what is the point of saying so? Isn't it the sort of thing we usually take for granted? Is there a reason to say it explicitly? Are you soon going to inform us that we can only be "X" if it's true that we are "X"?

It was said that we do not judge our beliefs in relation to the truth, but base them on probability. I said that we can only judge something to be probable by referring to the truth that it is, i.e. by judging in relation to the truth.

I don’t know what you’re struggling with. We can only judge that a coin has a 50/50 chance of landing on tails by referring to the mathematical truth that this is the case. If there was no truth to refer to, you couldn’t possible have any idea of the outcome. — AJJ

Saying that it's a fact that there's a 50/50 probability that a coin lands on heads or tails is saying that coin flips really are random . . . which is not believed to be the case. What is rather commonly believed to be the case is that coin flips are too hard to predict, because the variables are so fine-grained/subtle--having to do with slight differences in the force applied, plus air movement and pressure, plus miniscule variations in the composition of the coin (as well as dirt etc. on the surface), and so on. The probability reflects an epistemic gap, not a simple ontological fact.

If I’m lied to and told there is no erupting volcano but I need to leave the area for some other innocuous reason, then I won’t panic and run over people. But neither will I panic and run over people if I’ve learned that this is something I shouldn’t do anyway. The ought resides in the action/non-action, not in believing the lie. — AJJ

The point I made though, is that the action comes about as a result of the belief. If the reason for leaving is innocuous, then you will not see the need to leave, and you will not necessarily leave. So the example doesn't bring to the discussion what you want it to bring.

And I was saying that bad things cannot come from truth, but they obviously can from lies. — AJJ

As I said, this is irrelevant if not actually false, because what is important is bringing about good things. Bad things may come about, at any time or place, and knowing the truth cannot prevent them, just like inaction cannot prevent bad things. So unless you establish a relationship between "good" (which is what inspires one to act) and "true", then whether or not bad things can come about from knowing the truth is completely irrelevant to preventing bad things, or bringing about good things.

And all the time you’re doing this you are appealing to the truth; the truth of what is good, and whether or not good will come of a certain belief or an action. Why do we appeal to these truths if it is not good to do so, if it’s not the case that we ought to? — AJJ

This is not the case. We act when we believe good will come from the action. In no way am I claiming that we act when we think that we know the truth about what is good. This is what I said about actions being based in the probability of success, not in the certainty of truth or falsity.

just don’t think you’ve thought about this. Of course knowing the truth necessitates action. The only way it wouldn’t would be if it were true that we should never take any actions. — AJJ

Ugly fallacious logic. It is not true that we should never take any actions. Therefore we should take action now.

You need to explain how knowing the truth necessitates action.

Again, you just haven’t thought about this. — AJJ

I said that we can only judge something to be probable by referring to the truth that it is, i.e. by judging in relation to the truth. — AJJ

And I said that this is normally taken for granted. Does it really need stating, even here, in the midst of a debate in a philosophy forum? I suspect not.

The point I made though, is that the action comes about as a result of the belief. If the reason for leaving is innocuous, then you will not see the need to leave, and you will not necessarily leave. So the example doesn't bring to the discussion what you want it to bring. — Metaphysician Undercover

I understand our actions are based on our beliefs. I understand you as saying that this means it can be the case that we ought to believe certain lies. I’m saying that it isn’t that we ought to believe the lies, but that we ought to act in the way the lie facilitates. My example illustrated this; you’re just being a pedant.

We ought to believe what is true, since believing what is true leads to doing good anyway, unless you can give an example where this wouldn’t be the case, where believing the truth would lead to doing wrong.

This is not the case. We act when we believe good will come from the action. In no way am I claiming that we act when we think that we know the truth about what is good. This is what I said about actions being based in the probability of success, not in the certainty of truth or falsity. — Metaphysician Undercover

We act when we believe it is true that good will come of the action. We appeal to the truth. Why do we appeal to the truth? Because we ought to, because it is good to do so. Your third sentence there contradicts the second; to believe that good will come from an action is to think you know the truth about what is good. You’ll have to quote where I said anything about certainty in regard to choosing our actions; what I’ve said is that when we choose our actions we appeal to the truth, or our perception of it.

Ugly fallacious logic. It is not true that we should never take any actions. Therefore we should take action now.

You need to explain how knowing the truth necessitates action. — Metaphysician Undercover

Say we know it is true that we ought to be kind to others. This necessitates that we be kind to others, otherwise we would not be abiding by the truth. It makes no sense to say we don’t need to abide by the truth, because if that statement is true, then we don’t need to abide by that either.

I said that we can only judge something to be probable by referring to the truth that it is, i.e. by judging in relation to the truth.
— AJJ

And I said that this is normally taken for granted. Does it really need stating, even here, in the midst of a debate in a philosophy forum? I suspect not. — Pattern-chaser

What? I explain the context of my remark, you quote my remark back to me without the context. I was responding to a statement that denied what you rightly acknowledge as the obvious.

AJJ, what you are ignoring is that this is nothing more than Christian apologetics. What is most problematic is not the claim that we ought to believe the facts or what is true but Clark's claims as to what the facts are. He is claiming we ought to believe what he believes because it is based on facts and is true.

Aye, well maybe it is true mate, but don’t worry about it. No one is going to force you to be a Christian.

understand our actions are based on our beliefs. I understand you as saying that this means it can be the case that we ought to believe certain lies. I’m saying that it isn’t that we ought to believe the lies, but that we ought to act in the way the lie facilitates. My example illustrated this; you’re just being a pedant. — AJJ

As I explained, your example failed, and I still don't think that what you claim is possible. Our actions are tailored to our beliefs, the actions are designed to bring about what is believed. I really do not see how it is possible to change the belief and expect that the different belief would bring about the same action. You seem to believe that this could be done, but your example did not show it.

We ought to believe what is true, since believing what is true leads to doing good anyway, unless you can give an example where this wouldn’t be the case, where believing the truth would lead to doing wrong. — AJJ

I gave you my example, one could believe what is true, and still be sedentary. Therefore believing what is true does not necessarily lead to doing good actions. Doing wrong is irrelevant because one could not do what is good without doing wrong, simply by being inactive. Being inactive is neither doing good nor doing wrong.

We act when we believe it is true that good will come of the action. We appeal to the truth. — AJJ

This is false, and I went through it already. When I proceed with a project, a plan, I believe that there is a high probability that I will be successful, and that good will come from the procedure. When I start the procedure I do not believe that it is true that good will come from the action because I have respect for the fact that failure is possible, there could be an accident, and harm could come from the procedure instead.

If you really believe that you ought to believe the truth, you should have respect for this. When judging whether or not to proceed with an action, we often consult truths to aid us in the judgement, but there is no truth to whether or not the action will be successful, prior to carrying out the action, and to believe that there is is to believe a falsity.

Your third sentence there contradicts the second; to believe that good will come from an action is to think you know the truth about what is good. — AJJ

There's no contradiction. Do you recognize the difference between saying "X is probably the case", and "it is true that X is the case". When I believe that my action will be successful, and I have the confidence to proceed, I do not believe "it is true that my action will be successful", I believe "my action will probably be successful".

It is you who is being pedantic, trying to restrict the use of "believe" to truth. So you claim "I believe I will be successful" means "I believe it is true that I will be successful". But believing does not necessarily imply truth, as your pedantic ways suggest. It sometimes means to have faith and confidence, and this is the case when we believe in the success of our actions. When we believe in our actions, we have faith in our ability to judge, and confidence that the good will come from the action. Truth is not relevant here.

Say we know it is true that we ought to be kind to others. This necessitates that we be kind to others, otherwise we would not be abiding by the truth. — AJJ

Do you not see the unwarranted jump which you are making here? You are jumping from knowing or believing the truth to "abiding by the truth". Knowing the truth does not make one abide by the truth. People often know what they ought to do, yet act in a contrary way, like when they knowingly break the law. This is what I've been trying to tell you, knowing the truth does not inspire one to act well, it is something else which inspires morality. And this is why the inspiration to be moral must take priority over the inspiration to know the truth

Aye, well maybe it is true mate, but don’t worry about it. No one is going to force you to be a Christian. — AJJ

That is not the point. You said:

It seems to me to be a sound reason to believe in objective values: — AJJ

It it not a matter of whether I or anyone else is being forced to be a Christian. It is a question about whether his argument is sound. It's not. I suppose that those who already believe what he is claiming believe that one ought to believe it but it does not hold water as a philosophical argument.

Althought I might not know much about objective realsim. I could say that denying these could be catastrophic. The way we see the world helps you navigate it even if our senses deceive us it's an good evolutionary trait this why we still have it, part of this could be due to neurosis also other than that it's for our best interest. Better to be safe than sorry. If we're in the wilderness and a bush shakes and we think a snake is behind the bush we might preemptively startle and move out of the way real quick. In this sense we don't have time to think and subscousiouly react and move out of the way for our survival.And by contradicting what we see as its opposite could be harmful. Take aesthetics. We all have a broad view or what it means for something to beautiful on the outside and inside. But our biases ego and point of view get in the way of how we interpret things, delusion, deception that takes us farther and makes things less clear. Values are the extension of our human condition like an invisible contract.

As I explained, your example failed, and I still don't think that what you claim is possible. Our actions are tailored to our beliefs, the actions are designed to bring about what is believed. I really do not see how it is possible to change the belief and expect that the different belief would bring about the same action. You seem to believe that this could be done, but your example did not show it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, you should be aware that at this point you’re just repeating what you think without considering what I’m saying.

I gave you my example, one could believe what is true, and still be sedentary. Therefore believing what is true does not necessarily lead to doing good actions. Doing wrong is irrelevant because one could not do what is good without doing wrong, simply by being inactive. Being inactive is neither doing good nor doing wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, because it’s not true that we should be sedentary. If you’re dying in front of me from a heart attack then it would be wrong from me to remain sedentary, it would be true that I should help you, and therefore good for me to do so.

We act when we believe it is true that good will come of the action. We appeal to the truth.
— AJJ

This is false, and I went through it already. When I proceed with a project, a plan, I believe that there is a high probability that I will be successful, and that good will come from the procedure. When I start the procedure I do not believe that it is true that good will come from the action because I have respect for the fact that failure is possible, there could be an accident, and harm could come from the procedure instead. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is to say you take it as true there could be an accident, but that you also take it as true that it could work out. You believe that good could come from the action. My use of “will” rather than “could” should not have indicated certainty to you. To believe something isn’t to be certain of it.

When judging whether or not to proceed with an action, we often consult truths to aid us in the judgement, but there is no truth to whether or not the action will be successful, prior to carrying out the action, and to believe that there is is to believe a falsity. — Metaphysician Undercover

You’ll have to quote where I actually said that. I’ve been saying that we judge our actions in relation to the truth, or our perception of it. That doesn’t mean we check the truth to see if the action will definitely be successful or not, but that we judge its goodness and likelihood of success by reference to our understanding of the truth.

Your third sentence there contradicts the second; to believe that good will come from an action is to think you know the truth about what is good.
— AJJ

There's no contradiction. Do you recognize the difference between saying "X is probably the case", and "it is true that X is the case". When I believe that my action will be successful, and I have the confidence to proceed, I do not believe "it is true that my action will be successful", I believe "my action will probably be successful". — Metaphysician Undercover

To believe that good will (or might) come from something is to believe you know the truth about what good is, otherwise how would you have any idea that good will come from something? It doesn’t seem to me that what you’ve said there challenges this.

It is you who is being pedantic, trying to restrict the use of "believe" to truth. So you claim "I believe I will be successful" means "I believe it is true that I will be successful". But believing does not necessarily imply truth, as your pedantic ways suggest. It sometimes means to have faith and confidence, and this is the case when we believe in the success of our actions. When we believe in our actions, we have faith in our ability to judge, and confidence that the good will come from the action. Truth is not relevant here. — Metaphysician Undercover

To have faith in something is to have faith that it is true. To have confidence in something is to have confidence that it is true. This isn’t pedantry, it’s pointing out the obvious.

Say we know it is true that we ought to be kind to others. This necessitates that we be kind to others, otherwise we would not be abiding by the truth.
— AJJ

Do you not see the unwarranted jump which you are making here? You are jumping from knowing or believing the truth to "abiding by the truth". Knowing the truth does not make one abide by the truth. People often know what they ought to do, yet act in a contrary way, like when they knowingly break the law. This is what I've been trying to tell you, knowing the truth does not inspire one to act well, it is something else which inspires morality. And this is why the inspiration to be moral must take priority over the inspiration to know the truth — Metaphysician Undercover

We can only be moral if we first know the truth about what is moral. Knowing the truth about what is moral absolutely does inspire us to be moral, according to our understanding. When someone acts in way contrary to what is moral, they are acting on the implicit lie that it is not actually contrary to what is moral to do what they’re doing. Have you not recognised the way we justify our actions to ourselves? Have you ever justified an action by appealing to its wrongness? Where does the inspiration to be moral come from, if not from understanding the truth about what is moral?

No, because it’s not true that we should be sedentary. — AJJ

But you haven't explained how knowing that it is true that one ought to do something leads to the person actually doing something.

I’ve been saying that we judge our actions in relation to the truth, or our perception of it. — AJJ

And I do not agree with that, for good reasons, as I explained.

To believe that good will (or might) come from something is to believe you know the truth about what good is, otherwise how would you have any idea that good will come from something? It doesn’t seem to me that what you’ve said there challenges this. — AJJ

This is ridiculous. You are reducing confidence to a belief in truth, when in reality the confidence which is required to proceed with an action has nothing to do with the apprehension of truth. If an action worked for me in the past, I will proceed with it again. I may even develop a habit. I am proceeding with the action to bring about what I perceive as a good, not because I believe that I know the truth about what good is.

To have faith in something is to have faith that it is true. To have confidence in something is to have confidence that it is true. This isn’t pedantry, it’s pointing out the obvious. — AJJ

Again, this is ridiculous. If you want to reduce the faith and confidence which is required for the actions of an animal such as a human being, to a matter of believing that something is true, then that's your own business. But if you are inclined toward understand the truth about what motivates animals to act, and what produces the faith and courage required for such acts, you would be wise to dismiss this premise as faulty.

We can only be moral if we first know the truth about what is moral. — AJJ

We teach children to act properly when they are far too young to understand the "truth about what is moral". Only at a much later age, if they study philosophy, will they come to understand about what it is to be moral. So it is very clearly untrue that we must understand the truth about what is moral, before we can be moral. In reality we learn to act morally long before we understand the truth about what it means to be moral. In fact, philosophers today continue to debate about the truth of what it means to be moral, and if they are respectable philosophers they recognize that the truth about what it is to be moral has not yet been uncovered.

No, because it’s not true that we should be sedentary.
— AJJ

But you haven't explained how knowing that it is true that one ought to do something leads to the person actually doing something. — Metaphysician Undercover

I know it is true that I should help you when you’re having a heart attack, therefore I help you. Like I’ve said, goodness and truth - or how we perceive them - are the basis for our actions.

I’ve been saying that we judge our actions in relation to the truth, or our perception of it.
— AJJ

And I do not agree with that, for good reasons, as I explained. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you’re just repeating what you think without considering what I’m saying. As I have explained, appealing to probability doesn’t help you. When you base a action on a probability, you are judging that probability in relation to the truth, as you perceive it, that it is probable.

To believe that good will (or might) come from something is to believe you know the truth about what good is, otherwise how would you have any idea that good will come from something? It doesn’t seem to me that what you’ve said there challenges this.
— AJJ

This is ridiculous. You are reducing confidence to a belief in truth, when in reality the confidence which is required to proceed with an action has nothing to do with the apprehension of truth. If an action worked for me in the past, I will proceed with it again. I may even develop a habit. I am proceeding with the action to bring about what I perceive as a good, not because I believe that I know the truth about what good is. — Metaphysician Undercover

And again, you’re just repeating what you think without considering what I’m saying. How can you perceive something as good without knowing -
or believing you know - what the good is?

To have faith in something is to have faith that it is true. To have confidence in something is to have confidence that it is true. This isn’t pedantry, it’s pointing out the obvious.
— AJJ

Again, this is ridiculous. If you want to reduce the faith and confidence which is required for the actions of an animal such as a human being, to a matter of believing that something is true, then that's your own business. But if you are inclined toward understand the truth about what motivates animals to act, and what produces the faith and courage required for such acts, you would be wise to dismiss this premise as faulty. — Metaphysician Undercover

Bald assertion mate.

We can only be moral if we first know the truth about what is moral.
— AJJ

We teach children to act properly when they are far too young to understand the "truth about what is moral". Only at a much later age, if they study philosophy, will they come to understand about what it is to be moral. So it is very clearly untrue that we must understand the truth about what is moral, before we can be moral. In reality we learn to act morally long before we understand the truth about what it means to be moral. In fact, philosophers today continue to debate about the truth of what it means to be moral, and if they are respectable philosophers they recognize that the truth about what it is to be moral has not yet been uncovered. — Metaphysician Undercover

In the same way that animals are not moral agents, I would say children are not either. Animals cannot murder, only kill. It’s only by understanding the immorality of killing that it can become murder.

But whatever. I’d like to ask this important question again: Where does our inspiration to be moral come from, if not from our understanding of what is moral?

It seems to me to be a sound reason to believe in objective values:
— AJJ

It it not a matter of whether I or anyone else is being forced to be a Christian. It is a question about whether his argument is sound. It's not. I suppose that those who already believe what he is claiming believe that one ought to believe it but it does not hold water as a philosophical argument. — Fooloso4

Ohh! So it’s not a sound argument. It doesn’t hold water as a philosophical argument. Right, my mistake everyone, I had no idea this was so simple.

Ohh! So it’s not a sound argument. It doesn’t hold water as a philosophical argument. Right, my mistake everyone, I had no idea this was so simple. — AJJ

You have moved further and further away from philosophical engagement. It's that simple.

It should be noted that you have not provided anything that ought to be believed, no facts or objective values, that connect God and religion and reality. You have not shown that the claim that believing facts is a value, objective or otherwise. It really is so simple.

Aye, whatever you say mate.

At least your "argument" is getting briefer.

I said that we can only judge something to be probable by referring to the truth that it is, i.e. by judging in relation to the truth.
— AJJ

And I said that this is normally taken for granted. Does it really need stating, even here, in the midst of a debate in a philosophy forum? I suspect not. — Pattern-chaser


What? I explain the context of my remark, you quote my remark back to me without the context. I was responding to a statement that denied what you rightly acknowledge as the obvious. — AJJ

I was commenting on how you twisted your sentences to include 'The Truth' - an important concept, but one which is nowhere near central to the discussion going on. Not being a central issue, The Truth is (a) usually taken for granted, and (b) not really relevant to this particular discussion. But you are trying to drag it in....

I was commenting on how you twisted your sentences to include 'The Truth' - an important concept, but one which is nowhere near central to the discussion going on. Not being a central issue, The Truth is (a) usually taken for granted, and (b) not really relevant to this particular discussion. But you are trying to drag it in.... — Pattern-chaser

I explain the context of my remark. You quote my remark back at me without the context. I explain the context again. You continue to ignore the context, and claim that the Truth is not particularly relevant to a discussion about whether we ought to believe true things, i.e. facts.