"He had opened his heart to the sublime indifference of the universe". — Janus

I fail to see anything ‘sublime’ in it.

Well, the problem is posited with a solution. Otherwise, it would be pessimistic.

I fail to see anything ‘sublime’ in it. — Wayfarer

Oh well, as with anything you need to have a feel for it I guess...

Marx.

Don’t you think ‘a feel for the indifferent’ is somehow oxymoronic?

It's a feel, not a logical proposition. Do you believe the universe cares about us?

The universe of modern science is what can be measured with telescopes and so forth, so of course it would be absurd to consider a universe so construed as a feeling being as it is by its very constitution a collection of objects and physical energy. Camus and Sartre were very much a product of the ‘death of god’ phase of Western culture, so it natural that they assume this ‘unfeeling universe’ of modern science. as the background to their philosophies. But it’s still a cultural construct in some important sense.

You didn't answer the question.

That's as near as you're going to get from me. :smile:

... the radical existential Christian philosopher Lev Shestov. — Janus

It has been a long time (1976-77) since I read Shestov, but I do not recall his work as being "Christian".

Emil Cioran

Who needs philosophers when you got scientists...

http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2017/07/climate-change-earth-too-hot-for-humans-annotated.html?gtm=bottom&fbclid=IwAR28nXGJUSYpusnKj_yVTMqbItdeKCL7cwUeD0CaDKeY_fd_f9aI_eyvm

Certainly in some readings of Zen - ‘Chop wood, draw water’ - there’s a sense of finding the transcendent in the round of everyday life. But there’s still a transcendent dimension. That is what is explicitly rejected in Camus. — Wayfarer

You may be right. I'm still not sure. Camus could have just said that Sisyphus remained brave, that he didn't complain, that he learned to cope with his fate. But he goes beyond that, saying we must imagine Sisyphus happy (heureux - also interpreted as 'fortunate').

You're right that it was the 'chop wood, draw water' image I had in mind, along with that of raking pebbles. I recognise they are Zen images, although I was not thinking specifically of Zen but of Buddhism more generally.

I don't see Camus's atheism as a barrier to his having Buddhist influences or parallels, since a deity is not a necessary part of Buddhism.

However, I admit to not having read Camus's essay - only excerpts - , so i had better go and do that, in order to be better informed about the topic.

I don't see Camus's atheism as a barrier to his having Buddhist influences or parallels, since a deity is not a necessary part of Buddhism. — andrewk

Deity is not necessarily part of Buddhism, but it's still a religion; non-theistic =/= atheistic

Agreed, but I would add that

atheistic =/= irreligious

(notwithstanding the attempts of some pop atheist celebrities to argue otherwise).

Really? I would certainly equate irreligious and atheist. But then I suppose with Schopenhauer you have someone bitterly critical of religion but who nevertheless expresses admiration for the ascetic ideal.

I would look towards someone with a bit more positive of a worldview than Schopenhauer. Thomas Paine was who I had in mind, or indeed any of the number of high-profile deists that were around the end of the eighteenth century. Thomas Jefferson was another.

Further, as far as I can understand what I've read, Siddhartha Gautama was not a theist.

Buddhism is of not ‘theistic’ in the Western sense, but in Chinese Buddhism, the Buddha is treated much as a deity and the Bodhisattvas a pantheon. But even in its original and most austere form, Buddhism was still concerned with escaping from or transcending the endless realm of saṃsāra. There is nothing remotely similar in 20th c European existentialism, (although here are some parallels explored by Edward Conze.)

Deism seemed to me a kind of ossified form of religion which depicted ‘God’ as a kind of remote cosmic engineer, and as such way-station to later scientific atheism.

What is depressing about Marx?

Well, the problem is posited with a solution. Otherwise, it would be pessimistic. — Wayfarer

I mean, even the "solution" is itself pesimissitc. The highest aim of our lives is to essentially dissolve the conditions for future experience. Samsara is seen as so dissatisfying and so permeated with dukkha that not even a "finger-snap" is desirable.

What's the fundamental difference between an atheist killing himself to stop the dukkha, an antinatalist advocating for people not to breed for the same reason, and a buddhist, given a belief in samsara, advocating for and pursuing nirvana?

Is this really the best we can do? Just lay down and die (either physically, or in the buddhist sense), defeated, because life hurts too much? I can't think of anything more pesimissitc.

even the "solution" is itself pesimissitc — Inyenzi

As I said, if the Buddhist path was simply that life is suffering, then indeed it would be pessimistic philosophy, but it says there is an end to suffering. You're assuming that the goal of the path is non-existence, which it isn't; it is said to be a state of utmost bliss.

As I said, if the Buddhist path was simply that life is suffering, then indeed it would be pessimistic philosophy, but it says there is an end to suffering. You're assuming that the goal of the path is non-existence, which it isn't; it is said to be a state of utmost bliss. — Wayfarer

On my reading of the suttas, I fail to see how there is any functional difference between Buddhist parinibbana and the atheist materialist conception of death?

“Suppose, bhikkhus, a man would remove a hot clay pot from a potter’s kiln and set it on smooth ground: its heat would be dissipated right there and potsherds would be left. So too, when he feels a feeling terminating with the body … terminating with life…. He understands: ‘With the breakup of the body, following the exhaustion of life, all that is felt, not being delighted in, will become cool right here; mere bodily remains will be left.’ “What do you think, bhikkhus, can a bhikkhu whose taints are destroyed generate a meritorious volitional formation, or a demeritorious volitional formation, or an imperturbable volitional formation?”

“No, venerable sir.”

“When there are utterly no volitional formations, with the cessation of volitional formations, would consciousness be discerned?” “No, venerable sir.”

“When there is utterly no consciousness, with the cessation of consciousness, would name-and-form be discerned?”

“No, venerable sir.”

“When there is utterly no name-and-form … no six sense bases … … no contact … no feeling … no craving … no clinging … no existence … no birth, with the cessation of birth, would aging-and-death be discerned?”

“No, venerable sir.”

“Good, good, bhikkhus! It is exactly so and not otherwise! Place faith in me about this, bhikkhus, resolve on this. Be free from perplexity and doubt about this. Just this is the end of suffering.” — SN 12.51

You can call this end of suffering "the highest bliss", "the deathless", "the unconditioned", or what have you (as some suttas do), and say Buddhism is therefore not pessimistic because it offers a solution to the dissatisfaction of our lives. But I think that's skewing the definition of what it means for something to be a solution. Simply negating a problem is not solving it. Suicide doesn't solve the suffering that brings about the act.

Samsara is seen as so undesirable that the highest we can aim is to merely uproot the conditions that bring further life about. I see this as very pessimistic. It is in the same way that antinatalism is still pessimistic, even though it offers a "solution" to life's suffering (i.e. to turn the earths crust into nothing more than lifeless dust). At least the antinatalist has only the suffering of this earth to uproot, rather than the endless lifetimes through hell, ghost, animal, deva, etc, realms.

Just my two cents.

At least the antinatalist has only the suffering of this earth to uproot, rather than the endless lifetimes through hell, ghost, animal, deva, etc, realms. — Inyenzi

Good point, which is why I claimed that it is actually Nietzsche who is the most pessmistic philosopher (contra almost everyone else's interpretation). The Eternal Recurrence/Return idea of life simply repeating over and over, similar to the Buddhist/Hindu reincarnation story, seems pretty hellish. The problem is that Nietzsche tries to "abundance the hell" out of life.. by embracing the tragedy and having unbridled enthusiasm for life, we can somehow overcome it, and become some sort of ubermensch. This all rings hollow- I likened it to someone who is on a cocaine bender of some sort.

I liken most philosophies about life/existence as either rebellious or conforming. Nietzsche, pretended to be rebellious with his uber life-affirming message, but ends up being simply the most conforming of all. The quietude of antinatalism, the rebellion against furthering the objectives of foisting more challenges on yet more people, is the rebellious stance against existence itself.

The problem is that Nietzsche tries to "abundance the hell" out of life.. by embracing the tragedy and having unbridled enthusiasm for life, we can somehow overcome it, and become some sort of ubermensch. This all rings hollow- — schopenhauer1

Yeah, you also find the same hollowness and conformity in this sort of drivel:

"I leave Sisyphus at the foot of the mountain! One always finds one's burden again. But Sisyphus teaches the higher fidelity that negates the gods and raises rocks. He too concludes that all is well. This universe henceforth without a master seems to him neither sterile nor futile. Each atom of that stone, each mineral flake of that night-filled mountain, in itself forms a world. The struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy." — Albert Camus

:vomit:

The quietude of antinatalism, the rebellion against furthering the objectives of foisting more challenges on yet more people, is the rebellious stance against existence itself. — schopenhauer1

But perhaps here you are giving only two choices. Either there is an embracing of the conditions of this life and world (and therefore a continuance of it), or there is a total rebellion against and rejection of it (and therefore, it's cessation). But is there not a third, in-between option - that of changing the conditions of our existence (or future existences)? Where one does not embrace the conditions of this life, and yet doesn't totally rebel against all possible conditions. The antinatalist is saying, "the conditions of my existence, and the existence of all beings are such that no lives are worth starting. Life is not good enough for my standards, and therefore shouldn't exist at all." But instead of dissolving the entire human project into quietude because of this, why not instead bring the world (and the lives that begin in it) up to your standards? Is the task really so utterly hopeless?

I think there are worthwhile, meaningful, and positively good experiences in this life - I'm sure you've had them. Perhaps humour, romantic partnership, music, just the sheer awe (or is that, horror?) over existing at all. Although rare, and containing downsides, is there not a sense in which the antinatalist is throwing these babies (among others) out with the bathwater (or rather, out with the ocean of suffering they drown in)? I don't ask these questions rhetorically by the way. It could very well be that the Buddhists are right in that,

Just as a tiny bit of faeces has a bad smell, so I do not recommend even a tiny bit of existence, not even for so long as a fingersnap. — AN 1, 18

But maybe this line of thought is just defeatism under the guise of rebellion. Maybe not.

Yeah, you also find the same hollowness and conformity in this sort of drivel:

"I leave Sisyphus at the foot of the mountain! One always finds one's burden again. But Sisyphus teaches the higher fidelity that negates the gods and raises rocks. He too concludes that all is well. This universe henceforth without a master seems to him neither sterile nor futile. Each atom of that stone, each mineral flake of that night-filled mountain, in itself forms a world. The struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy."
— Albert Camus — Inyenzi

Yep, very Nietzschean to me.

But perhaps here you are giving only two choices. Either there is an embracing of the conditions of this life and world (and therefore a continuance of it), or there is a total rebellion against and rejection of it (and therefore, it's cessation). But is there not a third, in-between option - that of changing the conditions of our existence (or future existences)? Where one does not embrace the conditions of this life, and yet doesn't totally rebel against all possible conditions. The antinatalist is saying, "the conditions of my existence, and the existence of all beings are such that no lives are worth starting. Life is not good enough for my standards, and therefore shouldn't exist at all." But instead of dissolving the entire human project into quietude because of this, why not instead bring the world (and the lives that begin in it) up to your standards? Is the task really so utterly hopeless?

I think there are worthwhile, meaningful, and positively good experiences in this life - I'm sure you've had them. Perhaps humour, romantic partnership, music, just the sheer awe (or is that, horror?) over existing at all. Although rare, and containing downsides, is there not a sense in which the antinatalist is throwing these babies (among others) out with the bathwater (or rather, out with the ocean of suffering they drown in)? I don't ask these questions rhetorically by the way. It could very well be that the Buddhists are right in that, — Inyenzi

Yes, we've discussed this idea that there are absolute good experiences in the world. I mentioned there being six or seven categories I can think of that these goods can fall within. So, I recognize these exist. There are a couple points here though.

1) Bringing more people into the world to "bring the world up to my/your standards" is using them as a means to this end. This I do not believe to be good to enact on someone as their burden to bear for some idea of progress or future betterment. Using individual lives, who must endure X suffering/adversity/challenges for some abstract notion of betterment, or even for personal betterment, makes no sense and is circular reasoning, in the light of not existing in the first place.

2) Similarly, bringing new people into the world is presenting them with known and unknown sets of challenges. Foisting challenges on someone's behalf, whether that new person identifies with the challenges or not, in an inescapable game, is wrong to do, period. The more so if there is undue suffering for that individual as collateral damage above and beyond the "known" adversities a person might face and have to endure or overcome.

3) There is the negative nature of existence itself. In another thread there was the idea of Adam and Eve eating the apple in the Garden of Eden. Why did they eat the apple when they already had paradise? Because there is a kernel within the human species that is dissatisfied no matter what. This dissatisfaction cannot be taken out of the equation. Bear in mind, I am using this myth as metaphor.

If we are discussing contingent/relative amounts of suffering (not ones intractable but probable),the Nietzschean crowd will simply say that the unknown amounts of adversity, that we call "the real", is what makes it interesting. If we put this into an ethical stance towards procreation, it is saying that people should experience the unknown amounts of suffering, adversity, tribulations that existence offers. Something about the "game" or the "challenges" of existence itself, is worth it. Again, I don't see in the light of non-existence how making someone go through the challenges of "the real" is worth it, in the light of no one needed anything before being born into it in the first place. What about foisting the challenges of the real matters? There is a self-perpetuating scheme going on here. The scheme is that goods are good, but only worth it, at the cost of the negative. This is "real life" and it is somehow "good" for someone to endure. Again, this is just the status quo. Rather, no one needs to endure anything. Nothingness is not deprived of anything, nor has it ever hurt anyone.

To sum this up, to make new people overcome challenges, and experience undue suffering for the sake of the "goods" of life, is again using people. The hope is the goods are enough to entice them that the endeavor is worth it or that the challenges are necessary. There is a reason why the "real" is the "real". Some things cannot be taken away. This is it. This is reality. Technology might change, but the basic conditions of how we relate to the world, each other, and obtaining the absolute goods that we instinctively seek, are not going to change much, nor would it be good to force people into existence to figure out a solution to this at some future point.

Just my two cents. — Inyenzi

However, you’re not seeing the whole point of the very verse you quote. The deathless, the imperturbable, is not simply ‘as some suttas say’ but the central point. The Buddha is not indicating mere non-existence.

Śāriputra, foolish ordinary beings do not have the wisdom that comes from hearing the Dharma. When they hear about a Tathāgata’s entering nirvāṇa, they take the wrong view of cessation or extinction. Because of their perception of cessation or extinction, they claim that the realm of sentient beings decreases. Their claim constitutes an enormously wrong view and an extremely grave, evil karma. 1

The meaning of the last statement is that you’re not able to discern the ‘deathless state’ then the reality of that is ‘what has to be taken on faith’. In other words:

On my reading of the suttas, I fail to see how there is any functional difference between Buddhist parinibbana and the atheist materialist conception of death? — Inyenzi

You’re not correctly interpreting the meaning. But I do understand how in the modern world we’ve been ‘inoculated against the spiritual’ so that it means nothing.

The Eternal Recurrence/Return idea of life simply repeating over and over, similar to the Buddhist/Hindu reincarnation story, seems pretty hellish. The problem is that Nietzsche tries to "abundance the hell" out of life.. — schopenhauer1

I accept that Nietzsche's narrative has much of that quality of seeing everything on the brink in order to goad the reader to leave their point of view to take another. But I am not sure what is being presented is a replacement of a view.

He keeps speaking of the next generations as the ones who have to find alternatives.

The Eternal Recurrence is presented as a way to experience the present moment in a different way than the "Christian" preparation for the next phase/life model. The view is not integrated with the "gay science" criteria of health.

It does not look like a system to me. There are these frames of reference and there is an anti-Hegelian taunt to deal with the regions described. He leaves his notebook attempts to piece it all together out of his published writings.

Why should he help his readers? Ecce Homo asks that question over and over again and laughs at their suffering.

I just take it as a metaphor that we should embrace life fully and our fate. I'm more of the opposite variety- that is to say the Schopenhaurean perspective. Life is an imposition, imposed on the individual. It is to be endured. Nietzsche's implication is that we can't do anything about it, so fully embrace it. I take the stance of rebellion against it. That is to say, recognize it for what it is (pessimism), and turn against its tyranny (antinatalism). Meanwhile we will minutia monger our way through our survival, comfort-seeking, and entertainment motivations. As I've said before:

Each action we take, is a decision we have to make and choose within the motivational constraints of survival, comfort-seeking, and entertainment mediated by genetically and environmentally created personality filters, that is itself carried out and partially informed from a broader socio-cultural context with a historically-developed set of institutions.

Nietzsche's implication is that we can't do anything about it, so fully embrace it. — schopenhauer1

I am not sure about the inescapable quality. Your point of view is an interesting contrast to the many who have complained that our circumstances are not as changeable as Nietzsche intimated.

Degrees of freedom are the most not integrated things in his writings. The inheritance that cannot be denied is placed side by side with choices an individual can make.

Nietzsche aside, I am not a suitable evaluator of the "antinatalist" position. Being a parent comes with certain presuppositions.

Your Mom!

I'm going to go a bit left field and say that the most depressing philosopher is Australian bioethicist Peter Singer; making animals have so many rights that they could get medical treatment ahead of me is a depressing thought!