Axiom 6 (On Reason and Teleology):

In the process of thinking and acting, the reason for our thinking and acting, which is to obtain our intended conceptual destination in thought or action, is determined prior to or at the moment of, the substantiation of our will to think or act, that is to say that the final cause of our thinking, which is, as previously mentioned, the reason and intended conceptual destination of our thinking or acting, is conceptually contained as a subset within its first cause [1], our will to think or act (final cause ∈ first cause). In essence, that which has a final cause necessarily has a first cause [2], and that which has a first cause isn’t bounded by or contingent upon any prior material cause, thus the mere existence of a single first cause guarantees that first causes exist, absolutely, for it is impossible to conceive of a first cause coming into being in-between two purely physical material causes in an infinite and deterministic chain of material causes and effects. Fundamentally speaking, the universe has a beginning and a sufficiently reasoned reason for existing as opposed to not existing, and a sufficiently reasoned reason for existing in one form as opposed to another [3]; and nothing comes into existence without there being a greater reason for its existence than for its non-existence. [4] And anyone who asserts that there is no reason or cause for the existence of things either has no cause or reason for asserting this, or he has. In the first case, his assertion is no truer than its converse; and in the second, he establishes by his very assertion the fact that there are causes or reasons for the existences of things. [5]

Footnotes:

[1] Definition first cause: I define a first cause as the reason for the existence of a thing. A first cause is a cause which has the cause or reason for its existence in the set which immediately precedes it and is thus directly related to it in its set Holarchy, and not in something external to itself, or rather, disjunctively related to it. All first causes have their origin in something both existent and non-physical (i.e. non-localized and unchanging potentiality), and not in something physical (i.e. a changing, localized actuality), which is the case for all physical material causes; that is to say that all first causes are born of memory by means of will and imagination, and that the beginning and end of all causal chains lies in memory. Furthermore, the mere existence of a single first cause guarantees that the eternal chain of physical causation which supports materialism and determinism as logical metaphysical constructs, is non-existent, because not only is the deterministic chain of causality not eternal, but is broken all the time by all beings that possess a subjective will, and therefore must be non-existent in the absolute sense of the word. That is to say that there can exist material causes, but that those material causes necessarily bridge first and final causes and there is no such thing as a blind change or motion which is happening for no reason whatsoever because all changes in some way or another, serve subjects.

[2] Note: That which has a final cause necessarily has a first cause because all final causes are necessarily subsets of their first cause (final cause ∈ first cause), meaning that, by the Ontological Principle of Precedence, a final cause cannot exist without a first cause because all first causes necessarily precede their associated final causes in time, and also that, by the Ontological Principle of Duration, so long as the internal changes (material causes) which exist for the purpose of actualizing the final cause of a thing in relative space and time, exist, the concept of the final cause exists as well, and so does the concept of the first cause, that is, the reason for its existence, that is, the first set which distinguishes that thing from other things.

[3] Leibniz's Principle of Sufficient Reason:
-For every entity X, if X exists, then there is a sufficient explanation for why X exists.
-For every event E, if E occurs, then there is a sufficient explanation for why E occurs.
-For every proposition P, if P is true, then there is a sufficient explanation for why P is true.

[4] Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, G.W. Leibniz’ Philosophical Essays, On Contingency, p. 29.
[5] Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Physicos, p. 204.