Relevant because???
— creativesoul
Because it's the sense of opinion that's appropriate for the discussion. It's the sense pertinent to the subject matter, to the phenomena in question. — Terrapin Station
So, it would follow that all opinions about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral.
— creativesoul
Yes. Hence why I wrote that. — Terrapin Station
So, on your view, no matter what unforeseen circumstances may arise, no matter what false pretense led to the promise... if one promises to do something, then they ought do it out of moral obligation alone.
— creativesoul
I did say I am relieved of my moral obligation immediately upon discovery of false representation of the predicate under which the promissory proposition was made. Otherwise, yes, to be morally worthy one ought to act in accord with his moral obligation, in this case do what he promised. Won’t be long before he becomes quite careful in what he promises. — Mww
I think that there are a number of different situations/circumstances in which I would not say that one ought keep one's promise.
— creativesoul
Then he has no business making one. Remember, you said....voluntarily obligates himself. A guy promising to commit murder, again, as you say, hasn’t actually done it, so he is just speaking threateningly. — Mww
To me a promise is something you sincerely state and sincerely intend to act upon... — Janus
As is a threat.
— creativesoul
No, it is not inherent in a threat that it is something you sincerely state and sincerely intend to act upon. That condition is inherent in a promise, though, because a statement of intention that does embody sincerity it is not a promise, but a false promise. — Janus
A promise to cause bodily harm is a threat, there can be no doubt. It is still a promise none-the-less. Clearly. Some promises are a kind of threat.
All promises understood and believed by the listener create and build the listener's expectation that the world will be made to match the words. That holds good from promising to plant a rose garden to promising to cause harm. All expectation about what will one day happen is thought/belief about what has not happened but is expected to. Knowing what a promise means in addition to believing that it was sincerely uttered(or not) is more than sufficient/adequate reason to believe that it will be kept(or not).
I cannot agree with saying that all promises ought be kept.
— creativesoul
A threat may be thought to be a "promise to cause bodily harm" according to a certain definition of 'promise' or even according to the ostensible 'bare bones' conventional definition of the word; but the point at issue as I see it is whether such a definition is really apt. I say it isn't because promises, as they are most commonly and appropriately understood, are made in the context of mutual trust and concern. If you promise to harm me, then not only do I not care if you keep your promise, I positively wish you not to keep it! — Janus
I think any sensible definition of 'promise' necessarily includes the idea that the person to whom the promise is made wishes, or at least acknowledges, that it should be honoured. Why try to incorporate threats with promises, rather than adhering to the very clear moral distinction between them? What would be gained by a blurring of these distinctions? — Janus
So this "All promises understood and believed by the listener create and build the listener's expectation that the world will be made to match the words. That holds good from promising to plant a rose garden to promising to cause harm. " I see as completely wrongheaded because the sincerity involved in trusting that someone will keep a promise to do something for you that you desire is completely lacking in the case of a threat. — Janus
The threatened person may or may not believe that the threatener will carry out the threat, but they do not want to enter into any kind of pact of mutual trust with them. The only circumstance in which a threat could be a promise in the sense I mean is if two people entered into a freely chosen, that is uncoerced, pact of mutual trust from the very beginning. Promises are primarily understood, I maintain, as pacts of mutual trust. — Janus
If they do not believe that they will do what they say, then sincerity is lacking. Insincerity is not equivalent to falsehood. On my view a promise is not the sort of utterance that can be true/false. — creativesoul
I'd be interested in your setting out of the a priori concepts...
— creativesoul
From deontological metaphysics, the key is understanding there is a freely determinant will that both prescribes a law and subjects itself to it. For that to have any sustainable power, a moral agent must hold with respect for law in itself. Otherwise, morality can never be grounded in that which is universal and necessary, which are the criteria of law, and our private conduct would know no ground. Duty is the consciousness of respect for law, and consciousness of the will that determines it. Obligation is acknowledgement of duty in the form of judgement, when it comes to acting in conformity to an imperative. — Mww
As an aside; if lying is always wrong as Kant asserts, then if I have threatened to beat the shit out of you if you don't give me a hundred dollars, I am morally obligated to beat the shit out of you. This just cannot work with the C.I. — Janus
For example if I threaten to beat the shit out of you if you don't give me a hundred dollars without having any intention of actually beating the shit out of you, it is still a threat which is designed to intimidate you into giving me the money. In fact if you give me the money I would not have beaten the shit out of you regardless of whether I really intended to or not; which means my intentions are irrelevant to the efficacy of the threat. — Janus
On the other hand if I promise to give you my old guitar if you give me a hundred dollars, then it will be apparent whether it was a true promise or not when you discover after giving me the hundred dollars that I do or do not give you the guitar. So my intentions are not irrelevant to promises as they to threats.There is a different logic in threats and promises: can you see the difference now? — Janus
Of course I will agree that the way you want to frame the terminology is in broad accordance with some ordinary usage, but I am trying to get at something deeper; a moral dimension in promises that threats do not partake of. If you still want to insist on your terminology, that's fine, you are entitled to use whatever terminology you like, but I remain convinced that mine is more useful because it incorporates a valuable distinction between acts (promises) which involve virtue and honour and acts (threats) which do not. — Janus
Is moral judgement founded in those 'moral emotions' or are those emotions occasioned by moral judgements? — Janus
You haven't said yet what "more" than personal preference moral judgements are according to your understanding. I could also ask what more than personal preference, according to you, are the 'moral emotions" you cited here. — Janus
So, according to this terminological framework(conceptual scheme) one who has yet to have begun to question his/her own worldview does not - dare I say cannot - have moral duty and/or obligation. — creativesoul
As an aside; if lying is always wrong as Kant asserts, then if I have threatened to beat the shit out of you if you don't give me a hundred dollars, I am morally obligated to beat the shit out of you. This just cannot work with the C.I. — Janus
The 'quality' of changes that are specifically promised varies tremendously but does not bear upon the fact that one can sincerely promise to cause harm... — creativesoul
Not all promise making is good. — creativesoul
Some opinion can be true/false though. — creativesoul
Can moral opinions be true/false? — creativesoul
<sigh> as we laboriously lay down some kindergarten-level material: There are different senses of the term opinion. — Terrapin Station
tim wood- Forgive me for being blunt, — Maureen
And I think you've got me crossed-up with terrapin and S. They believe, and have made plain in this thread, that all moral judgments are strictly, merely, relative, matters of personal preference. — tim wood
It is rather insurmountable to act in accordance with a universal law, when there’s no such thing.
— Mww
About this no argument from me! — Janus
That's the way it is. — creativesoul
So, according to this terminological framework(conceptual scheme) one who has yet to have begun to question his/her own worldview does not - dare I say cannot - have moral duty and/or obligation.
— creativesoul
What you mean is, one not cognizant of these a priori conceptions probably isn’t a deontological moral agent. There is nothing herein to say he may not be some other kind of moral agent. — Mww
Maybe if you spent less time and effort on "correcting" and more on being correct, or at least clear, I wouldn't be revisiting this. Terrapin has been clear. I attempted to ask a simple question; he got it and answered, which I appreciate. From him, clarity and communication. From you, same old same old. Failure to answer and engage; indeed you seem to be careful not to. But much admonishment, mock, and all the time hand-waving to the effect that whatever is asked of you has always already been answered. In my post above I wrote, "Let's see what we get." And from you I got what I expected, which is nothing enlightening, really nothing at all. Thank you, then, for your nothing. — tim wood
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