What counts as being moral in kind — creativesoul
What counts as being moral in kind
— creativesoul
It's an opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette. — Terrapin Station
What counts as being moral in kind
— creativesoul
It's an opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette. — Terrapin Station
Saying that one ought keep their promise is about what has not happened. — creativesoul
I wouldn’t even make a promise, given a certain set of conditions, unless I knew beforehand I would keep it, within that same set of conditions. My contention would be, the fact I am relieved of my moral obligation immediately upon discovery of false representation of the predicate under which the promissory proposition was made, is insufficient to relieve me of my moral obligation otherwise. — Mww
Opinions can be true/false. — creativesoul
So, if person A has an opinion that they must act in whatever way it takes to acquire tremendous wealth and they feel that this is more significant than table manners, whatever they do is moral? — creativesoul
Would you concur with my description, or conceptual itemization, of the existential dependency of the promise itself?
Otherwise....d’accord. — Mww
Promise is existentially dependent on some a priori abstract concepts the understanding thinks as belonging to it necessarily, re: in descending order of power, obligation, duty, respect. No promise as the meaningful subject of a synthetic proposition is possible without these a priori conditions.
We don’t think a promise to ourselves alone. Knowledge of those necessary fundamentals is given a priori in a subject, therefore he has no need to represent them to himself in the form of a promise. Thus, promise has the existential dependency of being represented in the world by the subject who understands the a priori conditions for it.
What counts as being moral in kind
— creativesoul
It's an opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette. — Terrapin Station
Opinions can be true/false.
— creativesoul
Not in the relevant sense of "opinion." — Terrapin Station
So, if person A has an opinion that they must act in whatever way it takes to acquire tremendous wealth and they feel that this is more significant than table manners, whatever they do is moral?
— creativesoul
Yes, relative to them. — Terrapin Station
Opinions can be true/false.
— creativesoul
Not in the relevant sense of "opinion." — Terrapin Station
What counts as being moral in kind, such that all things satisfying the criterion are sensibly and rightfully called "moral" things as compared/contrasted to things that are not? — creativesoul
I'd be interested in your setting out of the a priori concepts... — creativesoul
Relevant because??? — creativesoul
So, it would follow that all opinions about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral. — creativesoul
I was thinking more along the lines of existential dependency.
— creativesoul
Ok. Promise has it, sure. Promise is existentially dependent on some a priori abstract concepts the understanding thinks as belonging to it necessarily, re: in descending order of power, obligation, duty, respect. No promise as the meaningful subject of a synthetic proposition is possible without these a priori conditions.
We don’t think a promise to ourselves alone. Knowledge of those necessary fundamentals is given a priori in a subject, therefore he has no need to represent them to himself in the form of a promise. Thus, promise has the existential dependency of being represented in the world by the subject who understands the a priori conditions for it.
What does existential dependency mean to you?
— Mww
Existential dependency is a relationship between different things. When something is existentially dependent upon something else it cannot exist prior to that something else. When something exists in it's entirety prior to something else, it cannot be existentially dependent upon that something else. That's a rough basis/outline of the paradigm. The simplicity is remarkable. The scope of rightful application... quite broad.
In the context of this conversation...
There is an actual distinction between making a promise and making a statement about that promise. A difference that can only be discovered by understanding existential dependency. The latter is existentially dependent upon the former. The former existed in it's entirety prior to the latter.
Voluntarily entering into an obligation to make the world match one's words is what one does when making a promise. That is determined wholly by a community of language speakers who understand the crucial importance of the role that trust and truth play in interdependence. The preceding two statements report upon and/or take account of that which existed in it's entirety prior to my account of it. It is about promise making. It is a report about what has happened, what is happening, and barring an extinction event of humankind, will continue happening.
Saying that one ought keep their promise is about what has not happened.
It's not about approval/disapproval of how the world was promised to be changed, or what was promised to be done. Rather, saying that one ought keep their promise is about the reliability, dependability, and/or trustworthiness of the speaker. Such character traits are crucial for the survival and over-all well-being of interdependent groups.
A complete lack of trust is unsustainable. — creativesoul
So, on your view, no matter what unforeseen circumstances may arise, no matter what false pretense led to the promise... if one promises to do something, then they ought do it out of moral obligation alone. — creativesoul
I think that there are a number of different situations/circumstances in which I would not say that one ought keep one's promise. — creativesoul
So-called relativists... — tim wood
(Why or how they severally arrive at that is an interesting question, but I am not here asking that question.) — tim wood
So the question: is this a fair summary of the relativists' view on this thread? — tim wood
So, if person A has an opinion that they must act in whatever way it takes to acquire tremendous wealth and they feel that this is more significant than table manners, whatever they do is moral? — creativesoul
That has been the case since its inception, and the literature is abundant both pro and con. Skipping all the theoretics, the bottom line is.....the second formulation of the C.I. we all know and love in effect says never treat another rational agent as a means to your own ends, whereas the G.R. explicitly requires a rational agent to do just that. In addition, by that same requirement, the other person is relieved of both his freely autonomous will, and his duty.
On the other hand, there’s nothing untoward in treating someone a certain way for no other reason than it would be good for you to be treated that way. Problem is of course, this system only works with non-deviant rationalities. I mean, you wouldn’t gain much if you went around robbing people because you want them to rob you.
But no, the C.I. prime doesn’t relate to the G.R. It doesn’t obligate anyone to treat you any way at all. It only obligates individual agents to act as if everyone else was obligated the same way. — Mww
That's the gist of it, although if you read and take in what I say in discussions like this, you should know that I don't even use terms like "personal preference". I would say "individual moral judgement". — S
So, it would follow that all opinions about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral [RELATIVE TO THEM] — creativesoul
:brow: — creativesoul
Do unto others as they would have you do unto them" — Janus
Terrapin uses the term "personal preference". Are you prepared to say that 'individual moral judgement' is anything more than personal preference? Terrapin apparently doesn't believe it is anything more. If you think it is more, then what does that "more" consist in? — Janus
To me a promise is something you sincerely state and sincerely intend to act upon... — Janus
As is a threat. — creativesoul
A promise to cause bodily harm is a threat, there can be no doubt. It is still a promise none-the-less. Clearly. Some promises are a kind of threat.
All promises understood and believed by the listener create and build the listener's expectation that the world will be made to match the words. That holds good from promising to plant a rose garden to promising to cause harm. All expectation about what will one day happen is thought/belief about what has not happened but is expected to. Knowing what a promise means in addition to believing that it was sincerely uttered(or not) is more than sufficient/adequate reason to believe that it will be kept(or not).
I cannot agree with saying that all promises ought be kept. — creativesoul
And moral judgement itself is founded in the moral emotions, like sympathy, guilt, approval, disapproval, outrage, righteousness, and so on. — S
This presupposes you know how they want you to treat them. Be ok after you get to know them, but beforehand, you could be all kinds of embarrassed.
Do you think Eisenstein’s rendition is right?
Agreed...no formulation can cover all the bases. That’s exactly why the C.I. is only the form a command would have, if it was possible in reality. Hypothetic imperatives cover the others; one can make those up as he goes along, depending on the circumstance.
More art than science....hell yeah. More fun too. Unless you’re a hard scientist. — Mww
So, I remain unconvinced that the C.I. is the "only form a command could have" because there are insurmountable problems with it — Janus
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