What counts as being moral in kind — creativesoul

It's an opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette.

What counts as being moral in kind
— creativesoul

It's an opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette. — Terrapin Station

So, if person A has an opinion that they must act in whatever way it takes to acquire tremendous wealth and they feel that this is more significant than table manners, whatever they do is moral?

What counts as being moral in kind
— creativesoul

It's an opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette. — Terrapin Station

Opinions can be true/false.

Saying that one ought keep their promise is about what has not happened. — creativesoul

True enough. But a thing has happened. Would you concur with my description, or conceptual itemization, of the existential dependency of the promise itself?

Otherwise....d’accord.

I wouldn’t even make a promise, given a certain set of conditions, unless I knew beforehand I would keep it, within that same set of conditions. My contention would be, the fact I am relieved of my moral obligation immediately upon discovery of false representation of the predicate under which the promissory proposition was made, is insufficient to relieve me of my moral obligation otherwise. — Mww

So, on your view, no matter what unforeseen circumstances may arise, no matter what false pretense led to the promise... if one promises to do something, then they ought do it out of moral obligation alone.

If keeping a promise would knowingly cause unnecessary harm, and that consequence was unforeseen at the time the promise was made...

Promises to cause harm...

I think that there are a number of different situations/circumstances in which I would not say that one ought keep one's promise.

Opinions can be true/false. — creativesoul

Not in the relevant sense of "opinion."

So, if person A has an opinion that they must act in whatever way it takes to acquire tremendous wealth and they feel that this is more significant than table manners, whatever they do is moral? — creativesoul

Yes, relative to them. In other words, to that particular person, it's moral to act in whatever way it takes to acquire tremendous wealth.

Would you concur with my description, or conceptual itemization, of the existential dependency of the promise itself?

Otherwise....d’accord. — Mww

If you mean this...

Promise is existentially dependent on some a priori abstract concepts the understanding thinks as belonging to it necessarily, re: in descending order of power, obligation, duty, respect. No promise as the meaningful subject of a synthetic proposition is possible without these a priori conditions.

We don’t think a promise to ourselves alone. Knowledge of those necessary fundamentals is given a priori in a subject, therefore he has no need to represent them to himself in the form of a promise. Thus, promise has the existential dependency of being represented in the world by the subject who understands the a priori conditions for it.

I'm uncertain whether or not I understand.

I'd be interested in your setting out of the a priori concepts...

What counts as being moral in kind
— creativesoul

It's an opinion about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette. — Terrapin Station

Opinions can be true/false.
— creativesoul

Not in the relevant sense of "opinion." — Terrapin Station

So, if person A has an opinion that they must act in whatever way it takes to acquire tremendous wealth and they feel that this is more significant than table manners, whatever they do is moral?
— creativesoul

Yes, relative to them. — Terrapin Station

So, it would follow that all opinions about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral.

:brow:

Opinions can be true/false.
— creativesoul

Not in the relevant sense of "opinion." — Terrapin Station

Relevant because???

What counts as being moral in kind, such that all things satisfying the criterion are sensibly and rightfully called "moral" things as compared/contrasted to things that are not? — creativesoul

What counts as being moral is the tripartite correspondence between that which is freely determined as good in itself, the will which authorizes an action in accordance with it, and the duty to execute that action.

What counts as not moral is everything else. The metaphysical description might read....that which has freedom as its causality is moral, that which does not invoke freedom as its causality is merely rational.

I like how ants and bees both take care of their queen and they both have very small brains. It just goes to show you that alot of processing power can be packed into a small space. I do believe complex morality in combination with people having their own personalities does require a highly evolved creature or at the very least a very complex creator and i add that last part because i have a religion.

I'd be interested in your setting out of the a priori concepts... — creativesoul

From deontological metaphysics, the key is understanding there is a freely determinant will that both prescribes a law and subjects itself to it. For that to have any sustainable power, a moral agent must hold with respect for law in itself. Otherwise, morality can never be grounded in that which is universal and necessary, which are the criteria of law, and our private conduct would know no ground. Duty is the consciousness of respect for law, and consciousness of the will that determines it. Obligation is acknowledgement of duty in the form of judgement, when it comes to acting in conformity to an imperative.

A promise is, as you say, when one enters himself into an obligation. If one obliges himself, in this case oblige himself with making the world conform to his word, he has already done his duty out of respect for the law which says it is never a moral interest to issue false intent.

Metaphysics. Where one is allowed to theorize without having to actually prove anything, while still maintaining internal consistency.

Relevant because??? — creativesoul

Because it's the sense of opinion that's appropriate for the discussion. It's the sense pertinent to the subject matter, to the phenomena in question.

So, it would follow that all opinions about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral. — creativesoul

Yes. Hence why I wrote that.

I was thinking more along the lines of existential dependency.
— creativesoul

Ok. Promise has it, sure. Promise is existentially dependent on some a priori abstract concepts the understanding thinks as belonging to it necessarily, re: in descending order of power, obligation, duty, respect. No promise as the meaningful subject of a synthetic proposition is possible without these a priori conditions.

We don’t think a promise to ourselves alone. Knowledge of those necessary fundamentals is given a priori in a subject, therefore he has no need to represent them to himself in the form of a promise. Thus, promise has the existential dependency of being represented in the world by the subject who understands the a priori conditions for it.

What does existential dependency mean to you?
— Mww

Existential dependency is a relationship between different things. When something is existentially dependent upon something else it cannot exist prior to that something else. When something exists in it's entirety prior to something else, it cannot be existentially dependent upon that something else. That's a rough basis/outline of the paradigm. The simplicity is remarkable. The scope of rightful application... quite broad.

In the context of this conversation...

There is an actual distinction between making a promise and making a statement about that promise. A difference that can only be discovered by understanding existential dependency. The latter is existentially dependent upon the former. The former existed in it's entirety prior to the latter.

Voluntarily entering into an obligation to make the world match one's words is what one does when making a promise. That is determined wholly by a community of language speakers who understand the crucial importance of the role that trust and truth play in interdependence. The preceding two statements report upon and/or take account of that which existed in it's entirety prior to my account of it. It is about promise making. It is a report about what has happened, what is happening, and barring an extinction event of humankind, will continue happening.

Saying that one ought keep their promise is about what has not happened.

It's not about approval/disapproval of how the world was promised to be changed, or what was promised to be done. Rather, saying that one ought keep their promise is about the reliability, dependability, and/or trustworthiness of the speaker. Such character traits are crucial for the survival and over-all well-being of interdependent groups.

A complete lack of trust is unsustainable. — creativesoul

That has got to be one of the worst conversations I have ever read in my life. Two people going on an irrelevant and badly written tangent.

So, on your view, no matter what unforeseen circumstances may arise, no matter what false pretense led to the promise... if one promises to do something, then they ought do it out of moral obligation alone. — creativesoul

I did say I am relieved of my moral obligation immediately upon discovery of false representation of the predicate under which the promissory proposition was made. Otherwise, yes, to be morally worthy one ought to act in accord with his moral obligation, in this case do what he promised. Won’t be long before he becomes quite careful in what he promises.
—————————

I think that there are a number of different situations/circumstances in which I would not say that one ought keep one's promise. — creativesoul

Then he has no business making one. Remember, you said....voluntarily obligates himself. A guy promising to commit murder, again, as you say, hasn’t actually done it, so he is just speaking threateningly.

So-called relativists... — tim wood

Moral relativists. And why "so-called"? There's nothing inappropriate about that name.

(Why or how they severally arrive at that is an interesting question, but I am not here asking that question.) — tim wood

It's not interesting and has already been answered.

So the question: is this a fair summary of the relativists' view on this thread? — tim wood

That's the gist of it, although if you read and take in what I say in discussions like this, you should know that I don't even use terms like "personal preference". I would say "individual moral judgement".

So, if person A has an opinion that they must act in whatever way it takes to acquire tremendous wealth and they feel that this is more significant than table manners, whatever they do is moral? — creativesoul

Moral relative to who's judgement? If you had any real understanding of moral relativism, then one would expect that to be reflected in the wording of your question. Yet it isn't.

And what's the point in begging the question?

That has been the case since its inception, and the literature is abundant both pro and con. Skipping all the theoretics, the bottom line is.....the second formulation of the C.I. we all know and love in effect says never treat another rational agent as a means to your own ends, whereas the G.R. explicitly requires a rational agent to do just that. In addition, by that same requirement, the other person is relieved of both his freely autonomous will, and his duty.

On the other hand, there’s nothing untoward in treating someone a certain way for no other reason than it would be good for you to be treated that way. Problem is of course, this system only works with non-deviant rationalities. I mean, you wouldn’t gain much if you went around robbing people because you want them to rob you.

But no, the C.I. prime doesn’t relate to the G.R. It doesn’t obligate anyone to treat you any way at all. It only obligates individual agents to act as if everyone else was obligated the same way. — Mww

Serendipitously, just this morning I read a passage in Sacred Economics by Charles Eisenstein which says "Jesus's Golden Rule has been misconstrued and should read. "As you do unto others, so also you do unto yourself". I made a similar point to @S earlier in this thread when I said that if you exploit another you also exploit yourself. I think this speaks to a commonality, an integrality, a communality in and between human beings. And as I see it it is this that motivates the idea of universalizing moral maxims.

I would paraphrase the Golden Rule in another way also, which brings out the inevitably reciprocal, as opposed to calculative, nature of ethics and moral thought and feeling: "Do unto others as they would have you do unto them". I don't think examples like robbing people because you would like to be robbed are apposite to the intent of the Golden Rule. No one wants to be robbed unless they are mentally ill and totally confused.

The salient point would be similar to the salient point of the C.I.: that the universalization requirement for any maxim will show you if an act contradicts the general moral requirements for harmonious human community.

So per the example of lying: it is wrong because if you universalized it as a maxim "Everyone should lie" it would contradict and render meaningless the notion and requirement of trust which is so essential to human life. If humans had been creatures who preferred to live in a context of universal distrust, a hard thing to imagine to be sure, but not logically impossible, lying would then be a good thing. In this context of universally desired universal distrust regarding the conventional formulation, Eisenstein's and my own reformulations of the G.R. lying would then be in accordance.

On the other hand, no formulation can, when considered as the letter, rather than the spirit, of the law, cover all cases; and that is just where intention, conscience, good will, come into play as criteria of what counts as moral (as opposed to immoral and amoral) thought and action. So, as I said earlier I conclude that ethics and moral philosophy is more of an art than it is a precise science.

That's the gist of it, although if you read and take in what I say in discussions like this, you should know that I don't even use terms like "personal preference". I would say "individual moral judgement". — S

Terrapin uses the term "personal preference". Are you prepared to say that 'individual moral judgement' is anything more than personal preference? Terrapin apparently doesn't believe it is anything more. If you think it is more, then what does that "more" consist in?

So, it would follow that all opinions about the relative permissibility or recommendability or obligatoriness of interpersonal behavior that the person in question feels is more significant than etiquette are moral [RELATIVE TO THEM] — creativesoul

Yes, given the implicit bracketed part you choose to deliberately ignore.

:brow: — creativesoul

Don't raise your eyebrow when you're the one begging the question by deliberately leaving out the essential bracketed part and assuming your own interpretation which the moral relativist doesn't accept.

Do unto others as they would have you do unto them" — Janus

This presupposes you know how they want you to treat them. Be ok after you get to know them, but beforehand, you could be all kinds of embarrassed.

Do you think Eisenstein’s rendition is right?

Agreed...no formulation can cover all the bases. That’s exactly why the C.I. is only the form a command would have, if it was possible in reality. Hypothetic imperatives cover the others; one can make those up as he goes along, depending on the circumstance.

More art than science....hell yeah. More fun too. Unless you’re a hard scientist.

Terrapin uses the term "personal preference". Are you prepared to say that 'individual moral judgement' is anything more than personal preference? Terrapin apparently doesn't believe it is anything more. If you think it is more, then what does that "more" consist in? — Janus

I don't use that term at all because it isn't as accurate as the terms I use, and it adds fuel to the fire of misunderstanding. It has connotations of triviality and arbitrariness, and this is exploited. It plays into the hands of some of those against it. It is not a simple matter of liking or preferring. It is ultimately a matter of individual moral judgement. That we can speak of groups of individuals, instead of any individual in that group directly, doesn't change that. And moral judgement itself is founded in the moral emotions, like sympathy, guilt, approval, disapproval, outrage, righteousness, and so on.

To me a promise is something you sincerely state and sincerely intend to act upon... — Janus


As is a threat. — creativesoul

No, it is not inherent in a threat that it is something you sincerely state and sincerely intend to act upon. That condition is inherent in a promise, though, because a statement of intention that does embody sincerity it is not a promise, but a false promise.

A promise to cause bodily harm is a threat, there can be no doubt. It is still a promise none-the-less. Clearly. Some promises are a kind of threat.

All promises understood and believed by the listener create and build the listener's expectation that the world will be made to match the words. That holds good from promising to plant a rose garden to promising to cause harm. All expectation about what will one day happen is thought/belief about what has not happened but is expected to. Knowing what a promise means in addition to believing that it was sincerely uttered(or not) is more than sufficient/adequate reason to believe that it will be kept(or not).

I cannot agree with saying that all promises ought be kept. — creativesoul

A threat may be thought to be a "promise to cause bodily harm" according to a certain definition of 'promise' or even according to the ostensible 'bare bones' conventional definition of the word; but the point at issue as I see it is whether such a definition is really apt. I say it isn't because promises, as they are most commonly and appropriately understood, are made in the context of mutual trust and concern. If you promise to harm me, then not only do I not care if you keep your promise, I positively wish you not to keep it!

I think any sensible definition of 'promise' necessarily includes the idea that the person to whom the promise is made wishes, or at least acknowledges, that it should be honoured. Why try to incorporate threats with promises, rather than adhering to the very clear moral distinction between them? What would be gained by a blurring of these distinctions?

So this "All promises understood and believed by the listener create and build the listener's expectation that the world will be made to match the words. That holds good from promising to plant a rose garden to promising to cause harm. " I see as completely wrongheaded because the sincerity involved in trusting that someone will keep a promise to do something for you that you desire is completely lacking in the case of a threat. The threatened person may or may not believe that the threatener will carry out the threat, but they do not want to enter into any kind of pact of mutual trust with them. The only circumstance in which a threat could be a promise in the sense I mean is if two people entered into a freely chosen, that is uncoerced, pact of mutual trust from the very beginning. Promises are primarily understood, I maintain, as pacts of mutual trust.

And moral judgement itself is founded in the moral emotions, like sympathy, guilt, approval, disapproval, outrage, righteousness, and so on. — S

Is moral judgement founded in those 'moral emotions' or are those emotions occasioned by moral judgements? You haven't said yet what "more" than personal preference moral judgements are according to your understanding. I could also ask what more than personal preference, according to you, are the 'moral emotions" you cited here.

This presupposes you know how they want you to treat them. Be ok after you get to know them, but beforehand, you could be all kinds of embarrassed.

Do you think Eisenstein’s rendition is right?

Agreed...no formulation can cover all the bases. That’s exactly why the C.I. is only the form a command would have, if it was possible in reality. Hypothetic imperatives cover the others; one can make those up as he goes along, depending on the circumstance.

More art than science....hell yeah. More fun too. Unless you’re a hard scientist. — Mww

True, but I don't see that formulation so much in relation to particular instances " He wants me to make him feel the lick of leather" or "she wants me to go to bed with her", as in relation to generalized human wishes like "People generally do not want to be deceived, robbed, raped, murdered, tortured, exploited, humiliated, beaten, and so on".

So, I remain unconvinced that there can be a truly universal command or that the C.I. in particular is the "only form a command could have" because there are insurmountable problems with it as I pointed out much earlier in this thread in relation to lying to protect the innocent.

This has become a very long thread, which would seem to indicate just how important ethics are to people (at least those who are not participating merely to "win" the argument, anyway; and thankfully there are not many of those!).

So, I remain unconvinced that the C.I. is the "only form a command could have" because there are insurmountable problems with it — Janus

It could be the only possible form and have insurmountable problems. It is rather insurmountable to act in accordance with a universal law, when there’s no such thing. It’s merely a guide, how to be the most morally worthy, even though nobody ever really is.

Being moral and being kind,in my opinion are mutually exclusive.

It is rather insurmountable to act in accordance with a universal law, when there’s no such thing. — Mww

About this no argument from me!

A kind person has no moral disposition? And a morally inclined person is unkind?

How would that work?