I explained this earlier, by the way. When i talk about moral judgments, I'm talking about making an evaluation a la good/bad, permissible/impermissible, etc. It's like voting for or against something, approving or disapproving, yaying or booing.

Using "judgment" for saying "that's blue," as if it's the same sense of the term, is a conflation. Re "that's blue," we're not approving or disapproving, we're just identifying.

There would be no dispute re identifying "that's a broken pup." Just a difference re approving or disapproving of it.

You could claim that we're just identifying the moral approval or disapproval if you like, but hence me asking for evidence of what the moral approval or disapproval is nonmentally.

Going around and around is not much fun.

Going around and around is not much fun. — Banno

Yeah, it's a consequence of your transmission failing to engage.

I did. All conceptions are linguistic. Not everything conceived of is. Goodness is one such thing. — creativesoul

I don't think you did, but never mind. So you're saying that goodness is a thing that's conceived of that's not linguistic? I have said that it's a concept. Unless you claim that a concept is a conception, then, based on what we've explicitly said, there's no contradiction between our respective claims to be found here; and I don't find your claim that goodness is a thing that's conceived of that's not linguistic disagreeable enough to pursue an argument against it.

So, the trick is as old as many a historical debate. How do we distinguish between our conceptions and what we're conceiving of? If you cannot answer the question, then you cannot know how to acquire knowledge of that which existed in it's entirety prior to our naming and describing it.

How do we know if or that something exists in it's entirety prior to our naming it? — creativesoul

I asked you to give me an example of what you meant when you said that "not all conceptions of goodness can account for that which exists prior to our conceptions" to help me understand what you're getting at. I brought up a rock, but that didn't seem relevant. You still don't seem to have provided an example. You instead seem to want to skip ahead and pursue your own agenda, turning this back around on me, responding to a question with another question which redirects, which I find quite annoying.

So the question is, what's your favourite goldfish?

I have an old bathtub out the back. Several generations of goldfish have lived their lives out there.

Every now and then a Grey ibis comes to visit and wipes out the larger fish. It will catch fish larger than it can eat, and leave them next to the pool to die.

The result seems to be a diminution in the colour of the fish over time, to a sort of muddy-gold colour.

I rather like it. — Banno

And what did you have for breakfast today? Eggy weggs? What I had for breakfast was a nice bowl of the original topic is meta-ethics and we hadn't properly finished with it before you inappropriately changed the subject, accompanied with a cup of coffee. It was lovely.

but as if one did not have anything to say about the other...

No. Meta ethics feeds on, and shits into, ethics. — Banno

Then tie them together for me. I'm not seeing how this is supposed to tie together and lead somewhere relevant.

Here's a reminder of how our discussion went:

Your conclusion is simply about kicking puppies and stuff like that being not good. Yes? Well, that doesn't do anything for all of us who agree that it's not good, which is all of us besides moral nihilists (who deny good and bad) and sickos (who disagree because they'd say that it's good).

We disagree over other issues, like the issue of how moral statements should be interpreted. — S

Sure. But it seems that we agree, at least most of the time, as to what we ought do.

And isn't working out what to do the point of ethics?

We blow our points of disagreement out of all proportion. — Banno

That's the point of normative ethics. This discussion is about meta-ethics. You should know, you created it. — S

Indeed, you have.

This is why I found one of S's recent threads ironically amusing.

So here is my reply, yet again.

Consider: goodness is what accords with the most common, cross-cultural human feelings of communal life.

Now the Open Question Argument would have us look to this and consider, could something be what accords with the most common, cross-cultural human feelings of communal life, and yet not be good?

And the answer, it seems to me, is yes.

So I conclude that this part of what you are asserting is not right.

And I don't think that this part of my argument has been responded too. I may have missed it. — Banno

I don't recall defining goodness. At least not in any way relevant to Moore's argument. Someone will have to show me where I've allegedly done that. I did recently say that it's a concept used for moral judgement, but that's not defining it in a way relevant to Moore's argument, and I've said stuff about morality, moral judgement, moral statements, and so on, but that's not the same thing.

Regarding your question, I can't answer it, because it needs clarification. In hindsight, maybe I don't entirely agree with Moore here. I think it can be unwise to define goodness in the way that Moore talks about, but unless the sense in which you're using "good" in that context is clarified, then I can't give an answer, except "It depends". It could be a "yes" or a "no" depending on the interpretation. I think that you only say "yes" because of the way that you're interpreting the question, which you've conveniently left implicit.

You do remember that there are people here of a position which doesn't accept a simplistic, objective, non-relative, "good", don't you? That's what @Janus was just trying to explain to you, and others have made this point also, myself included. This seems to be your interpretation, and you seem to want to hide it, because it is inconvenient for your argument.

Good good. I had poached eggs on smashed avo and toast.

I don't think your suggestion to chat about goldfish is going to take off.

What I denied was that this made it subjective - somehow hidden; or simply a question of feeling.

I say one thing is not the case, and folk think that implies I must think that the extreme opposite is the case. — Banno

If goodness is not subjective, which you're using here to mean hidden, or a question of feeling, then it must be objective, which would be public, or not a question of feeling, since it can't be both or neither. So please explain why you believe that to be the case.

I don't think your suggestion to chat about goldfish is going to take off. — Banno

Shame. It would've made for a nice bit of collective humour with a moral to the story.

since it can't be both or neither. — S

Why not both?

Why not both? — Banno

It can't be both simultaneously, in the same sense, and in the same respect. That's what I meant. Do you doubt that?

Yep. The dichotomy fails. Think I mentioned that.

Yep. The dichotomy fails. Think I mentioned that. — Banno

Mentioning something isn't sufficient. Where's your demonstration of that conclusion?

Let's take my feeling that kicking puppies is wrong. It can't be both hidden to everyone else, and public to everyone else, at the same time, and in the same sense, and in the same respect.

It doesn't follow from this that the subjective/objective dichotomy "fails". There can't be a contradiction, and there isn't one - at least not going by my model - so that's not a problem - at least not for me.

Mentioning something isn't sufficient. Where's your demonstration of that conclusion? — S

It's there, in most of the stuff I've writ over the last ten years. Or ask me next week. I might care about you by then.

It's there, in most of the stuff I've writ over the last ten years. Or ask me next week. I might care about you by then. — Banno

There's that typical unhelpful Banno one-liner for which you've become notorious. — S

Actually, calling them one-liners might be a mistake. I don't mean by that term to suggest that you're being witty. I just mean by that term to suggest that you're making a very short remark, typically just one or two lines.

Then stop looking to me for help.

Then stop looking to me for help. — Banno

Really? That's the lesson you're taking from this? Not that you ought to be more helpful, but that it's my fault for trying to get you to be more helpful? You're a bad student.

Yes. My view is something like the first schema. I see @Terrapin Station's as something like the second. I don't think his works.

Allow me to insert my own ideas here on Janus' behalf (he is circling a point that I'm partial to).

I think we both agree that there is necessarily a relative or subjective component of moral truth (concerning the moral values or principles we use as ethical foundations).

On the whole, this idea of ultimate, universal, and objective moral truth is nonsensical given the breakdown of exclusive/competing values, but when two or more moral agents are trapped in a room together, it does not make sense to talk about the moral implications of the values which they do happen to share? Within that room, they can come to sound moral agreements even if everyone outside of it doesn't share their values.

As we're all somewhat trapped together in our respective families, cities, and nations (and ultimately the planet), the strength and consensus of the moral agreements/statements we can make depend on what values are most prevalent within the relevant sphere of moral consideration. If there are indeed some values which are nearly universally present among all individuals and groups, then they tend to make the most functional and persuasive moral/ethical starting points.

Is this helpful at all? — VagabondSpectre

So, because lots of people share moral feelings, and thus moral judgement, on certain issues, then if we stick two people in a room together, then they'll probably agree over these issues, in a normative sense. They'll probably agree, for example, that kicking puppies is wrong, and that you shouldn't rape babies.

So what's the problem, right? Well, the problem is that this is supposed to be a discussion about meta-ethics, not a discussion about normative ethics. It's no different, in principle, than if I turned up to a discussion about Donald Trump and started talking about goldfish. Maybe there's a relevant link, but if so, I'm not seeing it. (Actually, with the latter, the link is probably that a goldfish would make a better president than Donald Trump).

If we switch back to meta-ethics, then I stand by my position, which I get to in part by rejecting moral objectivism as unwarranted, and I wonder why @Banno just kind of wondered off from that discussion, figuratively speaking. I know that he denies that he is a moral objectivist, but that doesn't mean that he isn't one. He seems to be one in spite of all that he has said. The last point that we got to was trying to make sense of his assertion that the objective/subjective dichotomy "fails", but he decided to be uncooperative. (Big surprise).

Of course.

I agree with you, i think; although I might summarise it somewhat briefly as that in the end, it's what we do that counts. And it is "we" not "I". — Banno

Okay. So it's not relevant that I am killing a puppy for fun as we speak? After all, what I do doesn't count.

And you don't need to worry: no term has been lost. — Janus

Indeed. I thought that meaning is use. I'm pretty sure that plenty of people are still using that phrase in the technical sense. Sounds like melodrama to me. :lol:

Is it good to turn away asylum seekers? To build walls against immigrants? To fuck your economy? On at least one of these things, you might agree that it isn't, but is considered by at least a large number of folk to be worth doing. If so, we could move on to considering the difference between the most common, cross-cultural human feelings of communal life, and the good.

But what the open question shows, and the point being made, is that good is different from whatever naturalistic qualities you might claim are good. — Banno

Easily explainable under subjective moral relativism. Firstly, reject "good" except as relative to a subjective standard of judgement, since "good" in any alternative sense is unwarranted. That can be examined if need be. Any difference in judgement under this position would just mean that it's not good relative to my standard of judgement, but is good relative to other people's standard of judgement, and that's that. There is nothing more to it, or at least, nothing more has been warranted. Are you ever going to attempt to justify the transcendent sense of goodness that you keep seeming to suggest without explicitly stating? Or will you concede that it's unjustifiable, and should therefore be rejected?

The last point that we got to was trying to make sense of his assertion that the objective/subjective dichotomy "fails" — S

Not trying to speak for @Banno, but absolutely agree with him it fails. If the moral subject is both constituted of/by social relations and embedded in social relations, and the term 'objective' in terms of morality is that which applies equally to all moral subjects i.e. the complete world, or set of worlds, of social relations then the dichotomy fails. The 'objective' is in the 'subjective' as much as the 'subjective' is in the 'objective'. i.e. For the subject to function as moral agent, it is necessarily a socially constituted entity, in some sense both 'objective' and 'subjective'.

I think it boils down more to finding a better way to talk about morality than fundamental disagreements about what it is.

Yeah, but I have; the broken pup. — Banno

So we have the blue cup and the broken pup. The blue cup is blue, and the broken pup is broken. I accept that, and so does everyone else.

Now, how is this evidence of anything relevant?

Well, go on, then. But do so with an eye on my reply, which will be to take your explanation and paraphrase it into the discussion of the pup - again.

If someone looks at the cup and says it is not blue, then they are what we in the trade call wrong.

If someone looks at the broken pup and says this is permissible, then they are what we in the trade call wrong. — Banno

Yes, and with the latter, you're ignoring - perhaps deliberately - the importance of the sense in which different people use "wrong" in that context. Wrong absolutely, relative to nothing and no one? Wrong relative to a subjective standard of judgement? Surely you can see that these interpretations are not identical. Why are you hiding your interpretation? Don't you want to be exposed?

And how is this different from how we judge the cup to be blue? — Banno

Already been answered. Banno is making an argument from repetition fallacy.

My view is about the physical location(s) where moral whatever-one-wants-to-call-thems occur.

I'm in no way saying that moral views aren't influenced by social interactions, that we can't agree with each other and cooperate, or that we can't think about any moral utterances as inviolable commands.

There are upshots to where, in terms of physical location, moral whatevers occur, but I just want us to first get straight where the phenomena occur.

I think it boils down more to finding a better way to talk about morality than fundamental disagreements about what it is. — Baden

This is where the upshots become important. There are implications to moral whatevers being located in one place versus another. And those implications often factor into normative talk about morality. So we can't just ignore what morality is.