They don’t. They can’t. That which does, is anthropological whatevers.

No judgement whatsoever, whether puppies, tea cups, hot stoves, love and marriage, Ford or Chevy, or moral predicates, is non-mental. The will, the freedom it may or may not have, the imperative whether hypothetical or categorical, assertorial or pragmatic, the volition whatever it may be and the relation to its value whatever its form.......are all necessarily obtained in a mental location.

Whatever action derived from moral judgement is certainly non-mental, but that action is not itself moral. It is merely a physical representation of the willful volition that spawns it.

Wait, so then why would there be no need of the binary approach?

@Terrapin Station

Ok, so what you're looking for is the 'that' in 'that's morality', right? And for you, it's what? A brain state? Can you be very specific in pointing to the 'that' you think is morality and then maybe we can get to the bottom of our difference.

Ok, so what you're looking for is the 'that' in 'that's morality', right? And for you, it's what? A brain state? Can you be very specific in pointing to the 'that' you think is morality and then maybe we can get to the bottom of our difference. — Baden

Yes, it's a brain state. That's the only place where moral whatevers occur (I don't want to call them judgments because I don't want to be seen as stacking the deck--we can use whatever term someone thinks makes their case best.)

The binary approach in question here, is the subjective/objective dichotomy, which is not required for *obtaining* individual morality. It is required to *demonstrate* the morality already obtained.

I understand subjective to mean in me, objective to be outside me. If that’s a misunderstanding, or inappropriate, somebody outta tell me.

The binary approach in question here, is the subjective/objective dichotomy, which is not required for *obtaining* individual morality. It is required to *demonstrate* the morality already obtained.

I understand subjective to mean in me, objective to be outside me. If that’s a misunderstanding, or inappropriate, somebody outta tell me. — Mww

First, I use "subjective" to refer to mental phenomena, and "objective" to refer to the complement--"nonmental phenomena" so to speak. My mental phenomena are mental phenomena, and your mental phenomena are mental phenomena, and Ned Block's mental phenomena are mental phenomena, and so on. So that's subjective stuff. Ned Block's television, and the Hudson River, and a dead body (just to bring this back to something we make moral judgments about) and so on are not mental phenomena.

So if morality is necessarily a type of mental judgment that we make, then it would seem that the subjective realm is necessary for obtaining morality. Morality doesn't occur elsewhere, in the objective realm.

For example, if fighting over access to the puppy reduces the amount of time that they would otherwise spend kicking it, then aggression for puppy control can be framed as an objectively immoral act in that situation because it directly disservices their moral values. — VagabondSpectre

From that framework, it can be noted that "immoral" is determined conditionally, not unconditionally; and also that it's relative, not absolute. That framework makes more sense than one which has the opposite requirements.

I acknowledge the objectivity there, but I don't think that it's necessarily right to call that "immoral". If I am one of those people, and I inadvertently act contrary to my aim of kicking the puppy, then I'm just being unreasonable. But if I have a principle which says that that behaviour is immoral, then sure, it would be immoral accordingly, but only relative to my principle, and only relative to my thoughts and feelings about its application. It wouldn't apply universally, even if I thought and felt that it should. If other people reject that principle, because they think and feel differently, then I can't demonstrate that they're objectively wrong, since our thoughts and feelings are inherently subjective, and there's no warrant for a transcendent standard to override one of us.

You can get some objective truth in moral subjectivism. That I have never denied. It is objectively true that I feel that kicking puppies is wrong, for example. But the moral subjectivist would be like, so what?

As is hopefully clear from the puppy example, the point I'm making is indeed a meta-ethical one (which may or may not relate to yours and Baden's disagreement or miscommunication). The truth of specific normative content is transitory, like the next optimal move in a given chess game, but the relationship between our desires and our lousy environment is not: achieving our own goals in a populated environment means considering the goals of others along with the environment we are in. In other words, morality isn't just and greedy hedonism, it's socially responsible hedonism in a world where intentions, methods,and outcomes can be fact-checked. (We could split semantic hairs regarding the "consideration" component, but when individuals extend no moral consideration whatsoever, no useful moral discussion with them can take place (they're a moot point). I prefer to describe the failure (or inability) to consider the needs of others as a breakdown of morality. Informally, it's as if morality itself is an ad hoc system of categorizing the various ways in which we might fail to consider the needs/values/goals/desires of others). — VagabondSpectre

This seems trivial to me in this context. Are you basically just saying what @Banno said, namely that despite differences in meta-ethics, normative ethics matters? And then you go on to make some normative points, like that the way that you judge it, we shouldn't be greedy, and we should be considerate of others. Maybe, like Banno, you judge that morality should be about everyone, about how "one" or "we all" should behave, and not particular, like how I should behave. Why should I care in this context, whether I agree or disagree? That does not seem to have any relevance, meta-ethically. It seems beside the point.

Yes, it's a brain state. — Terrapin Station

Ok, and the 'that' in 'that's morality' for me would consist in interactions / behaviours.

In other words, if an alien came to earth and asked me what morality is, I would point to instances of moral behaviours / interactions rather than brain states to explain it.

So, there's a fundamental difference of approach. Going a little further, would you say brain states can be moral / immoral?

I acknowledge the objectivity there, but I don't think that it's necessarily right to call that "immoral". — S

I don't, because it actually requires a bunch of additional "shoulds." "One should act in accord with one's moral views." "One should act in the most direct, efficient manner." Etc. There's nothing objective about any of that.

Absolutely. I can dig it.

Still, as written, it is all hypothetical. What needs to be done now is turn that into a theory. Nobody’s gonna give a crap about a theory without sustainable grounds for it. In natural science, sustainable grounds are the natural laws; it follows that a possible moral science should have moral laws.

A law is that of which the negation is impossible or self-contradictory. What, with respect to morality, is indisputable such that it could be a law, or the basis for a law?

In other words, if an alien came to earth and asked me what morality is, I would point to instances of moral behaviours / interactions rather than brain states to explain it. — Baden

Okay, but how would that work. We can point to someone helping a little old lady across the street. We can point to someone giving food to someone who is hungry. We can point to someone groping someone else in the subway. We can point to someone shooting someone else, etc. It's a fact that all of those behaviors occur as we point to them. Where is "murder is bad" etc. in those actions?

would you say brain states can be moral / immoral? — Baden

I'd not call them moral/immoral. Morality is judgments we make about (usually) interpersonal behavior that we consider to be more significant than etiquette.

Still, as written, it is all hypothetical. What needs to be done now is turn that into a theory. Nobody’s gonna give a crap about a theory without sustainable grounds for it. In science, sustainable grounds are the natural laws; it follows that a possible moral science should have laws. — Mww

I'm not sure I understand what you're getting at there. A theory or a law that morality only occurs in a particular location?

I've been around philosophy long enough to never assume that anyone might not be claiming something that seems insane to me. — Terrapin Station

:100:

So in your view nonmental things can treat something with attention and kindness? — Terrapin Station

:lol:

The bright pixels of my monitor aren't treating my eyes very kindly right now.

Not very kindly at all...

Bed time for me! — VagabondSpectre

Just a thought: maybe it would be helpful if you scrapped the figurative lingo? Is it necessary? Is it a hindrance to understanding?

Nahhh... the easy stuff is done; morality is subjective, mentally located, if that is how one thinks of it. Philosophy, never one to leave well enough alone, still wants to ask, how is it that it is (However it is thought) and why should it be that way.

Otherwise, we talk about what we accept without sufficient explanation as to why we accept it the way we do.

I don't, because it actually requires a bunch of additional "shoulds." "One should act in accord with one's moral views." "One should act in the most direct, efficient manner." Etc. There's nothing objective about an of that. — Terrapin Station

I made that same point about the requirement of an additional principle as well, and that its application is a subjective matter.

The objectivity I referred to acknowledging would boil down to something like: (the fact that) I feel this way about it. Or, like I said, something along the lines that acting contrary to your goals is detrimental to achieving those goals. These are not relevant for moral subjectivism in the context that matters.

That I feel this way about it is only objective in the sense of being a fact which doesn't depend on the subjective whatevers of anyone else, or even some if not all of my own subjective whatevers, like what I think. All that would matter is how I feel, which is both subjective and objective in different senses.

Ok, so what you're looking for is the 'that' in 'that's morality', right? And for you, it's what? A brain state? — Baden

Yes, it's a brain state. — Terrapin Station

would you say brain states can be moral / immoral? — Baden

I'd not call them moral/immoral. — Terrapin Station

So, the brain state is morality but there is no moral / immoral to brain states? Where can you find the moral / immoral then?

Just trying to clarify here.

And in your conception, is a brain state a subject or an object?

Okay, maybe @Terrapin Station has gone too far. I don't find it necessary to make his argument about brain states and locations. Morality is what's right and wrong. It doesn't make sense, at least to me, to ask where that's located, only where related things are located. Moral agents are located on Earth, along with broken puppies, the act of kicking them, and our moral judgements about them. We can sort that out into what's subjective and objective, and what's more or less relevant in certain contexts. There's no problem with this useful distinction between subjective and objective. It doesn't "fail".

Nahhh... the easy stuff is done; morality is subjective, mentally located, if that is how one thinks of it. Philosophy, never one to leave well enough alone, still wants to ask, how is it that it is (However it is thought) and why should it be that way.

Otherwise, we talk about what we accept without sufficient explanation as to why we accept it the way we do. — Mww

Ah--yeah, that makes sense, but I'd say it's another topic from what I've been focusing on.

I like to do one small step at a time . . . especially because, as we've seen, it can be like pulling teeth even to get that done. :razz:

Ok, so what you're looking for is the 'that' in 'that's morality', right? And for you, it's what? A brain state? — Baden


Yes, it's a brain state. — Terrapin Station


would you say brain states can be moral / immoral? — Baden


I'd not call them moral/immoral. — Terrapin Station


So, the brain state is morality but there is no moral / immoral to brain states? Where can you find the moral / immoral then?

Just trying to clarify here. — Baden

In other words, "It is morally wrong to murder," ontologically, is a brain state.

"It is morally wrong to have the brain state that it's wrong to murder" is not what I'd call a moral stance, since morality is about interpersonal behavior and having a brain state isn't interpersonal behavior. While someone could feel some way about brain states qua brain states re whether they're moral or not, I wouldn't call that morality, and it would be very unusual. We don't usually make moral judgments about brain states. We usually make moral judgments about interpersonal behavior.

And in your conception, is a brain state a subject or an object? — Baden

I use subjective to refer to mental phenomena. Mental phenomena are a subset of brain states. There are brain states that don't amount to mental phenomena. An obvious example is the brain of a dead person. But there are states of living persons that don't amount to mental phenomena, too.

But there are states of living persons that don't amount to mental phenomena, too. — Terrapin Station

Like New York? That's a state of living persons, and I know where it's located. It's in Russia. You know, the other Russia. Not the Russia with a balding dictator, the Russia with a balding would-be dictator who is orange.

It's now a game of Posts Most Wins.

Nice diagram.

Nice diagram. — Banno

Cheers, I thought we might have some visual learners among the critics here, but...

The last point that we got to was trying to make sense of his assertion that the objective/subjective dichotomy "fails" — S


Not trying to speak for Banno, but absolutely agree with him it fails. If the moral subject is both constituted of/by social relations and embedded in social relations, and the term 'objective' in terms of morality is that which applies equally to all moral subjects i.e. the complete world, or set of worlds, of social relations then the dichotomy fails. The 'objective' is in the 'subjective' as much as the 'subjective' is in the 'objective'. i.e. For the subject to function as moral agent, it is necessarily a socially constituted entity, in some sense both 'objective' and 'subjective'. — Baden

I'm with @S here, because I can't see any sense in the idea that the objective/ subjective distinction "fails". As I see it, in the moral context the distinction is merely between what pertains to subjects; i.e. intentionality, self-awareness, a sense of personal responsibility, and so on, in other words, thoughts and feelings, and what does not, in other words what is just the general objective (physical) conditions and constraints on events.

Also, I think too much is often made of the social-constructedness of subjects; I prefer to think of subjects as socially mediated, as well as biologically mediated and physically constrained. So, yes, of course subjects are more or less subject to objective constraints and conditions, but it is the subjective dimension of thinking and feeling which is the one defining attribute of a moral subject. It is thinking in terms of this subjective dimension that allows us to make sense of moral behavior. If all you want to say is that there is no hermetic separation between the subjective and objective then I would agree with that; but that would be to agree to something which seems trivially obvious.

Cheers, I thought we might have some visual learners among the critics here, but... — Baden

Wait, I think I get it. Morality is a badly drawn cone?

I couldn’t help myself. First thing I thought was, time-like and space-like morality? Whaaaa???

Sorry. I’m all better now.

I'll try a poem next time. Anything to alleviate the boredom of watching a bunch of folks make desperate efforts to not think in a remotely interesting way.

It's at least amusing that the two criticisms of the idea of problematizing the subject(ive)/object(ive) distinction re morality are:

1) That's ridiculous!
2) That's trivially obvious!

You are hopelessly befuddled*. Morality is not reducible to biology any more than concepts like 'marriage', 'money' etc, or more to the point, "beauty", "virtue", "the good" and so on. (Speaking of the trivially obvious... )

*Exhibit A in subject(ive)/object(ive) befuddlement:

First, I use "subjective" to refer to mental phenomena, and "objective" to refer to the complement--"nonmental phenomena" so to speak. — Terrapin Station

The complement nonmental phenomena to subjective experiences are brain states, which are physical configurations of a biological brain. i.e. We can observe/measure brain states with instruments. They are in that sense part of the 'objective' realm.

But:

Ok, so what you're looking for is the 'that' in 'that's morality', right? And for you, it's what? A brain state? — Baden

Yes, it's a brain state — Terrapin Station

And:

Morality doesn't occur elsewhere, in the objective realm. — Terrapin Station

Not to mention:

In other words, "It is morally wrong to murder," ontologically, is a brain state. — Terrapin Station

(!)

I'll try a poem next time. Anything to alleviate the boredom of watching a bunch of folks make desperate efforts to not think in a remotely interesting way.

It's at least amusing that the two criticisms of the idea of problematizing the subject(ive)/object(ive) distinction re morality are:

1) That's ridiculous!
2) That's trivially obvious! — Baden

Ah, I see what you're doing. This is "payback". I made fun of your diagram by purposefully acting as though I had grossly misunderstood it, and you're now doing the same thing with my criticism of your criticism of the subjective-objective distinction.

Do you genuinely disagree with me, though? And if so, what's the significance of our disagreement? Earlier, you said that we were talking past each other. And I said that you were missing the point. Are you sure that we can't come to a reasonable agreement about the subjective-objective distinction?

Do you accept that some "things" are subjective and some "things" are objective? Like, say, judgement and rocks?