So it's not a fact that I'm standing here right now? What's happening right now hasn't already happened. That would be absurd. So it can't be a fact under your ill-considered definition. But that's also absurd, because it is a fact. — S

Bewitched by language use much?

There's a period of time between your report and what your reporting upon(what happened). I wouldn't expect one who has not acknowledged the inherent untenability of Heraclitus' river to understand...

Horses and rivers...

Could it not be the case that we truly feel wrongly about a moral issue, though? Or no? — Moliere

All you'd need to do is point out what the truthmaker would be. Where is it located, what is it a property of, etc. However you need to specify it.

I wanted to clarify something with you, since you mentioned it more than just once.

"It is raining outside" does not mean the same thing as "I think/believe it is raining outside" in every case. The latter use of "I think" or "I believe" could indicate uncertainty.

However, I think that you're saying the former is about something other than thought/belief, whereas the latter is about thought/belief.

I wouldn't entirely disagree. It could be the case, but not always.

I'm keeping in mind that a sincere speaker believes what they say, and that all sincere statements are statements of belief, including "It is raining outside". I think that your approach neglects to keep that in mind.

Yeah, I see language as attaching to the world in some way. It's not all in our head; so to speak is to speak in a world, of a world, and about a world and not about belief.

A sincere speaking saying "It is raining" implies that said speaker believes it is raining -- but they are talking about the rain, and not their belief.

Bewitched by language use much?

There's a period of time between your report and what your reporting upon(what happened). I wouldn't expect one who has not acknowledged the inherent untenability of Heraclitus' river to understand...

Horses and rivers... — creativesoul

Evasive much:

So it's not a fact that I'm standing here right now? — S

Please answer the question directly. Is it a fact? Yes, no, or don't know?

Could it not be the case that we truly feel wrongly about a moral issue, though? Or no? — Moliere

Of course, in a relative sense. The puppy kicker's feelings are wrong relative to my standard of judgement, and probably your standard of judgement, and probably Banno's standard of judgement.

Who here amongst us judges it to be morally acceptable to kick a puppy? @Hanover, put your hand down.

In hindsight, some of my past feelings on matters relevant to ethics are wrong relative to how I now feel about it.

What is truly feeling, as opposed to feeling? Or do you mean that we can be deceptive to what we feel, and thus there is what we truly feel and what is only ephemeral or false? — Moliere

I just meant that we can make true statements about how we feel.

In what way does that differ from approval? As you say just above I am misunderstanding you when I say that Bob's action is moral because he approves of it, so truly feeling cannot be the same thing as approval.

What is truly feeling? — Moliere

It's a misunderstanding of moral relativism because it leaves out the relativism part! Moral relative to who or what? Not to me. To him. I don't approve of his approval. Approval in this context comes under the broader category of moral feeling. Here are some more examples of words which can indicate moral feeling: disapproval, guilt, shame, outrage, condemnation, righteousness, vindication, and forgiveness.

It's a misunderstanding of moral relativism because it leaves out the relativism part! Approval relative to who or what? I don't approve. He does. I don't approve of his approval. Approval in this context comes under the broader category of moral feeling. Examples of other moral feelings are guilt, shame, outrage, righteousness, vindication, and forgiveness. — S

If all the world believes it proper to kill all the blond haired babies, is it wrong? In this hypothetical, you too believe it's proper.

If all the world believes it proper to kill all the blond haired babies, is it wrong? In this hypothetical, you too believe it's proper. — Hanover

There is no absolute wrong and proper, only relative wrong and proper. In the hypothetical, it would be proper relative to everyone - myself included, given that you've stipulated that as part of the hypothetical - and wrong relative to no one.

But obviously that's merely a hypothetical, and one which doesn't reflect my actual moral judgement about killing blond haired babies.

Here's a question for you: if it was proper to kill all the blond haired babies, would you go along with that?

Of course, in a relative sense. The puppy kicker's feelings are wrong relative to my standard of judgement, and probably your standard of judgement, and probably Banno's standard of judgement.

Who here amongst us judges it to be morally acceptable to kick a puppy? Hanover, put your hand down.

In hindsight, some of my past feelings on matters relevant to ethics are wrong relative to how I now feel about it. — S

I just meant that we can make true statements about how we feel. — S

It's a misunderstanding of moral relativism because it leaves out the relativism part! Approval relative to who or what? I don't approve. He does. I don't approve of his approval. Approval in this context comes under the broader category of moral feeling. Here are some more examples of words which can indicate moral feeling: disapproval, guilt, shame, outrage, condemnation, righteousness, vindication, and forgiveness. — S

Hrmm, well for me at least, then, this still leaves out the sorts of sentences we say that are ethical, yet mean there is a fact to the matter in the sense that an action has the property of wrongness or something along those lines.

I wouldn't dispute that we can say true statements about our feelings. But I wouldn't say that a speaker who says:

"Kicking a puppy is wrong" is true

means

In accord with my feelings, "kicking a puppy is wrong" is true

If they wanted to say that they'd just say "I feel that kicking a puppy is wrong" -- but, instead, they use the gerund and form what appears to be a proposition.

And what they mean is that this statement about goodness is true.

Here's a question for you: if it was proper to kill all the blond haired babies, would you go along with that? — S

Sure, if hypothetically 1+1=3, then it does. You've stipulated the impossible, so the impossible occurred.

But obviously that's merely a hypothetical, and one which doesn't reflect my actual moral judgement about killing blond haired babies. — S

I get it, but why give your moral judgements higher regard than mine?

You have the idealism disease, too? Or are you just pretending to for "fun"? — Terrapin Station

Not I. You said:

it's a phenomenon that occurs outside of our minds. — Terrapin Station

(My bolding)

Phenomena, in phenomenological parlance, has the particular tone of being in one's mind - roughly the same as qualia. So phenomena could not occur outside one's mind.

It seems you were not using the term in this way,

Hrmm, well for me at least, then, this still leaves out the sorts of sentences we say that are ethical, yet mean there is a fact to the matter in the sense that an action has the property of wrongness or something along those lines. — Moliere

What more is there to say about them? They're false, and they're false partly because of the way that they're interpreted. It's not a good way to interpret them, because it sets itself up for failure, which seems fallacious.

I wouldn't dispute that we can say true statements about our feelings. But I wouldn't say that a speaker who says:

"Kicking a puppy is wrong" is true

means

In accord with my feelings, "kicking a puppy is wrong" is true

If they wanted to say that they'd just say "I feel that kicking a puppy is wrong" -- but, instead, they use the gerund and form what appears to be a proposition.

And what they mean is that this statement about goodness is true. — Moliere

I agree, but that's no big problem for me. I've moved past that. I never said or implied that what I'm presenting as a way forward is what people mean by such statements. I'm just saying that it's better to think about it in this way.

Sure, if hypothetically 1+1=3, then it does. You've stipulated the impossible, so the impossible occurred. — Hanover

That's fucked up. I certainly wouldn't go along with killing all the blond haired babies. Proper be damned.

I get it, but why give your moral judgements higher regard than mine? — Hanover

Because I trust my moral judgement more than yours. You would have to give me greater reason to trust your moral judgement over mine. Good luck with that.

Yes, so we have two different models for using moral terms. On my model, whether or not Bob's action is moral is independent of whether anyone approves of it or thinks it is moral - which is what makes it a realist model. — Andrew M

Is not Bob's action moral or immoral on account of what would be the normal, or the most common, human attitude to it? It seems to me the most common human attitude is based on the most common human feeling, and that an attitude of approval or disapproval is as equally a feeling of approval or disapproval, as it is an idea of approval or disapproval.

Why wouldn't that be an argumentum ad populum?

That's fucked up. I certainly wouldn't go along with killing all the blond haired babies. Proper be damned. — S

You hypothesized that killing blonde haired babies was moral, so therefore it is.

It's like if I asked you if you would say it was moral to kill blonde haired babies if you subjectively thought it was moral.

You would, you just don't because the hypo is contrary to fact.

Because I trust my moral judgement more than yours. You would have to give me greater reason to trust your moral judgement over mine. Good luck with that. — S

Is it based on reason?

Why would it? I'm simply trying to define what it means to say that something is moral or immoral, as opposed to saying that some individual thinks that something is moral or immoral. It is a fact that there are general moral prescriptions and proscriptions, but from that fact it doesn't follow that an individual must agree with them. General moral principles would seem to be mostly based and dependent upon what is generally approved of; otherwise they would not survive.

But I wouldn't say that a speaker who says:

"Kicking a puppy is wrong" is true

means

In accord with my feelings, "kicking a puppy is wrong" is true — Moliere

I think the implied premise is "in accord with the most common feelings".

Because I trust my moral judgement more than yours. You would have to give me greater reason to trust your moral judgement over mine. Good luck with that.
— S

Is it based on reason? — Hanover

It's an interesting issue. If @S decides that your moral judgement is superior to his own, he makes a moral judgement. Deciding to let someone else choose for you is a choice.

Now, if @Hanover comes back and says that S ought not trust him...

:lol:

You hypothesized that killing blonde haired babies was moral, so therefore it is. — Hanover

And therefore I would reject that morality. Is there anything which you wouldn't go along with on this basis? Raping your mother? Setting your children on fire? Exterminating a minority? :brow:

It's like if I asked you if you would say it was moral to kill blonde haired babies if you subjectively thought it was moral. — Hanover

No, there's an important difference here. Why wouldn't I say so, if that's what I thought? In your case, you don't have to go along with it. You would be deciding to do so. And as for the question of why you should decide any differently, I shouldn't even have to explain. Just think about how it would make you feel. Would you feel good about it?

Is it based on reason? — Hanover

Yes, but not just reason, as that's impossible.

What has happened and what is happening are one in the same by the time you've spoken about it.

What has happened/what is happening... these are facts on my view. These sort of semantic quibbles aren't helpful. Your objection was misplaced.

As it pertains to whether or not moral claims can be true...

Thought, belief, and statements thereof are the sort of things that can be true. True statements correspond to what has happened. False statements do not. Moral statements are no different.

A sincere speaking saying "It is raining" implies that said speaker believes it is raining -- but they are talking about the rain, and not their belief. — Moliere

Indeed. Unless they're talking about the statement itself.

When a sincere speaker says "It's raining outside", unless they're mistaken, it ought be raining outside. If they're mistaken, it ought not be.

When a sincere speaker says "I promise to plant you a rose garden on Sunday", unless they're mistaken, there ought be a rose garden planted on Sunday. If they're mistaken, there ought not.

When a sincere speaker says "There's a beer in the fridge", unless they're mistaken, there ought be a beer in the fridge. If they're mistaken, there ought not.

When a sincere speaker says "The cat is on the mat", unless they're mistaken, there ought be a cat on the mat. If they're mistaken, there ought not.

We all know that this is true. That's how language, talking about the world and/or ourselves, works.

When a sincere speaker says "The cat is on the mat", unless they're mistaken, there ought be a cat on the mat. If they're mistaken, there ought not. — creativesoul

No quiet. When a sincere speaker says "The cat is on the mat", unless they're mistaken, there is a cat on the mat. If they're mistaken, there is not.

Using ought to mean is is obtuse.

I'm not presenting a model per se. I'm describing what's really going on ontologically. Are you simply avoiding claims about what's really going on ontologically? — Terrapin Station

No, the moral realist is representing what is going on ontologically. The Alice and Bob cliff scenario shows two different kinds of action that is important for human beings to recognize and distinguish between - hence the creation of moral language to do so.

Your usage does not make that distinction - it instead redefines moral terms to express one's approval. But approval (or disapproval) is one's response to an action (which is something additional that is going on ontologically), it does not represent the nature of the action itself (which is itself right or wrong).

Part of the reason I'm focusing on what's really going on ontologically is that it's necessary for epistemological purposes here, especially when there's a disagreement and anyone is claiming that someone else is simply wrong a la getting something incorrect/inaccurate. — Terrapin Station

Just as with any non-normative disagreement, one would argue by appealing to what is observed and any relevant implications related to that. That may result in minds being changed in some situations, as occurred with attitudes to slavery.

Is not Bob's action moral or immoral on account of what would be the normal, or the most common, human attitude to it? — Janus

No, per realism, that would merely be the common attitude or feeling about what was moral. A case in point is human slavery which common attitudes and feelings have progressed on. But it was always wrong irrespective of the common feelings, ideas or attitudes at the time. Conceivably in the future some of our own common attitudes might also be shown to be wrong.

It's a common misunderstanding. You aren't the first, and you won't be the last. Even a dinosaur like Banno has these kind of misunderstandings. — S

:-) It's hard to keep up. Back in the day, what was real was real and what was moral was moral!

No quiet. When a sincere speaker says "The cat is on the mat", unless they're mistaken, there is a cat on the mat. If they're mistaken, there is not.

Using ought to mean is is obtuse. — Banno

I agree. Good that I'm not.

The substitution doesn't work Banno for it cannot be made without losing crucial meaning. I do not mean what is the case by using "ought". Aside from that... I do not disagree with what you've said here. It's just that it's not so simple.

When a sincere speaker says "The cat is on the mat", unless they're mistaken, there is a cat on the mat.

I didn't write that, because I wasn't talking solely about what it takes for a speaker to be mistaken(for their belief statements to be false). I was also talking about what it takes for their statement to be meaningful and sincere as well.

Being meaningful takes much more than the cat being on the mat. When an insincere speaker says "The cat is on the mat", unless they are mistaken, there is not a cat on the mat. So, at times when we think that we may just have such a situation, there ought not be a cat on the mat.

We're talking about the meaning of moral statements, as well as the truth conditions of such statements... aren't we? I'm arguing that thought, belief, and statements thereof can be true. I'm further arguing that all true statements are so by virtue of correspondence to what has happened. True moral statements are no different.

One who knows what a statement means also knows what ought to be the case(what ought be discovered) when we check. That is... when one knows what a statement means, then one knows what must have happened; one knows what it takes in order for it to be true.

When an insincere speaker says "I promise to plant you a rose garden", unless s/he is mistaken, there ought not be a rose garden planted. If they are, there will be.

When an insincere speaker says "The cat is on the mat", unless s/he is mistaken, there ought not be a cat on the mat. If they are mistaken, there will be.

It's about both, belief and truth.

"There ought not be a rose garden planted" is true when an insincere speaker promises to plant one.

That report(that utterance of ought) corresponds to what happened.

When a sincere speaker says "The cat is on the mat", unless they're mistaken, there is a cat on the mat.

I didn't write that, because I wasn't talking solely about what it takes for a speaker to be mistaken(for their belief statements to be false). I was also talking about what it takes for their statement to be meaningful and sincere as well. — creativesoul

You might be interested in Grice's conversational maxims which cover this sort of thing. In particular the maxim of quality is that you should not say what you believe is false or lack adequate evidence for.