I have wondered whether the whole universe is like a hologram. One particle but creating almost infinate wave patterns.

Our brains are very good at joining up gaps too.

Who cares, it's still fun...

But the idea of the 'independently existing material object' - that is surely what has been called into question by science itself. That is what Hoffman alludes to in that quotation above - he's referring to the observer problem, which is exactly that the purported 'mind-independent' sub-atomic particles, only exist as a kind of distribution of probabilities, up until the moment that a measurement is taken. Of course this fact has triggered enormous volumes of debate and theory, and I'm not wanting to open that can of worms here. But it is precisely the notion of the 'mind independent reality' that has been called into question by that. — Wayfarer

I don't know; for whatever reason I can't see why fundamental particles as energized fields could not explain the existence of more or less (but never entirely) self-contained energetic aggregates that could be reliably perceived as individual objects and entities. Of course this wouldn't explain the mystery of perception itself; the mystery of how mere energetic movements in space-time can become experience. So, I don't for a moment believe that something like what is presented in the matter/energy story is all that is going on; that is I do think it might be a sufficient explanation for material things, but I don't believe it could ever explain how those things come to perceive and be perceptible.

Perhaps the idea that those external objects, the external world we find ourselves in, is itself beings, or monads, but of a different order to us.

Or from another perspective the human race could be viewed as a closely related family of beings, it's only natural that they would experience things similarly, then. But this could also be viewed as humanity is one being, explaining the common experiences. Also all the other animals and plants may be our "brothers" and "sisters". So the biosphere is privy to one global sphere of experience via the planet which is a more distant relative. The kingdoms of nature. This perspective allows for an external reality, which may also be mentally generated. Somewhere in between the two opposite views(poles) of mind or matter.

There's a book about that, called The Holographic Universe, Michael Talbot, it's around as a .PDF. Holographic analogies are quite popular in current science.

'Energised fields' and 'fundamental particles' are different things. As I understand it (which is not much) you can describe the relationships between particles and fields very precisely using field equations - but what is 'a field'? And where does mind come into the picture?

The usual explanation nowadays is that this has occurred through the processes described by evolution. But the philosophical issue of the nature of mind and matter are barely touched by those explanations (which is what Nagel's Mind and Cosmos is about.)

But this could also be viewed as humanity is one being, explaining the common experiences. — Punshhh

One of the things that keeps Leibniz's view from being a variation of Spinoza's is his insistence on moral agency. Ironically, the way it works out is that every victim is basically waltzing with the villain. For L, the victim is not powerless. That's just an appearance, as in a play. In fact L's view is very much in line with the notion that life is a stage and monads are merely actors upon it..

Leibniz is an idealist. A monad is basically a mind. It's a "windowless container", accessible only by the outside by a special monad known as God. God's creation act, according to Leibniz, was that of forming all the monads.

Yea. How do the monads see one another if they're windowless?

His mill story is interesting. He proposes a machine that can think. He says if we enlarged it to the point that we could walk into it, all we'd see is mechanical stuff. We'd see nothing that accounts for perception.

I think he's probably right about that.

They don't see each other. That's why they're 'windowless'. They/we all see the same things, which makes it seem that we see each other, but whatever we think we see is in our minds.

His mill analogy is frequently cited in support of the 'hard problem of consciousness'.

Yea. How do the monads see one another if they're windowless? — Mongrel

The way I interpret Leibniz, the monads do not really see each other, they only see each other's physical forms, and the physical forms are not themselves monads; and they are not real, since only monads are real. The physical form 'belonging' to each monad is associated most strongly (apart from its association in God) with that monad in the internal story of its life. The story of the life of each monad is entirely 'inner', there is no externality. So the physical body associated with monad-me also appears in the internal story of the life of monad-you and vice versa ( if our life stories are appropriately coordinated). The analogy is with clocks that all tell the same time, but do not affect (see or know of) one another. We know of other monads but we do not know them, or see them, since they are not physical objects that could ever be seen.

Well, so Leibniz thought Locke was shallow. What did he think Locke was? Another monad? Or just a fixture in his own private Idaho?

Locke appears as a character in the life stories of all those monads that know of him (i.e. those monads whose own stories are sufficiently coordinated with the Locke-story. Some of those monads may think the Locke character is shallow.

Didn't Leibniz think that the life story/experience associated with each monad is a unique expression of the nature of that monad? Remember, Locke's body is not a monad, for Leibniz, so is it the behavior or the productions (the philosophy for instance) of the Locke-body which are shallow, or is it that the productions are an expression of the shallowness of the Locke-monad?

That makes sense. He said rational creatures are like little divinities, lol. I guess he thought Locke's mind imperfectly reflected the divine mind. He figured his own reflection was a little clearer, I guess.

Yes, I think that's exactly it for Leibniz; the degree to which the mind reflects the divine mind indicates its profundity/ shallowness.

Leibniz would have thought Locke was just plain wrong insofar as he thought that all knowledge comes not from the soul, that is not from within, but from the senses, from without. For knowledge to come from without would mean that what is known, the essential nature of things, must itself be perceptible, which is absurd.

Yea. It drove Leibniz bananas that Locke suggested that matter might think. I think Locke just meant we don't know if it does or not.

Aristotle, in De Anima, argued that thinking in general (which includes knowledge as one kind of thinking) cannot be a property of a body; it cannot, as he put it, 'be blended with a body'. This is because in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.

….the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too. — Lloyd Gerson

Yes. Cool.

To expand on what John was saying, what a monad can see of another monad is bits and pieces of its complete concept. For instance, we all know Locke was English. To know the complete concept of Locke is to know how the whole universe is expressed as Locke (or perhaps how the whole universe from beginning to end is implied by him.)

Actually I think it is more radical than that, from our vantage point. I think the key here is that we're dealing with a metaphysic which is based on the distinguishing of reality and appearance. We appear to be material bodies, but maybe in reality, to quote esteemed philosopher Sting, 'we are spirits in a material world' (hum whilst reading.)

//edit// hey that tune was the first on the Police's 1981 album, which was called (this is so cool) 'Ghost in the Machine'. //

No, there's definitely a world, and it's the best of all possible worlds.

He did say that, didn't he? I always want to agree with that, but can never understand quite why he said it. Must read again.

Leibniz was plagued by the problem of evil, otherwise known as the Atheist Argument.

Actually I just briefly scanned the Wikipedia entry on Leibniz' Best of all Worlds argument, and something about struck me. Leibniz argues that God could have created an infinite number of worlds, but, as only one could be created, then the one that He created, must be the best of all possible worlds; God would know this, of course, because he would know what is best.

But the thing which struck me, is that the common atheist response to the 'fine-tunning of the Universe' argument, is to argue that there really might be an infinite number of worlds (universes or multi-verses) and that we just happen to be in the one makes intelligent life possible. For that, among other reasons, quite a few cosmologists now routinely refer to the purported 'multiverse' as a postulate, even though there isn't, and can never be, any evidence for the reality of it.

Of course they're very different arguments, given by very different kinds of thinkers, but couldn't help but notice the convergences.

That's a good encapsulation of dualism's inability to take the existence of experience seriously. The notion that experiences and thoughts exist, not blended with a body, but as their own states is rejected without consideration. One can only not think in materialism if thoughts are mistaken as bodies and for the form the express.

Thinking might a universalising activity, but that doesn't make my thoughts universal.

The form of my thought is not limited to my thought. It's true regardless of whether I'm thinking it or not. To avoid the destruction of the universal, my thought's existence must also be distinct from their form, else I'm reducing the form to my existence.

Gerson is right about the distinction between form and existence. He's just left two important instances of existence off the list: thoughts and experiences.

In fact L's view is very much in line with the notion that life is a stage and monads are merely actors upon

So black boxes jigging about on a stage, perhaps the box is an atom, a special atom with a smidgeon of God in it, just jigging around with all the normal atoms. Maybe the're so special they are allowed to wear rose tinted glasses and see all the other atoms jigging about around them.

That sounds like an interesting art installation. Maybe film the black boxes wearing pink sunglasses? And have some boxes jiggling here and there while they appear to be making pancakes or mowing the lawn. And please don't have a bunch of blood and guts on the film. That's so freakin' lame.

Anyway, I'm making my way back to the OP. Nicholas Jolley affirms that though Leibniz did say throughout his life that his scheme solved the Cartesian mind-body problem with the pre-established harmony bit, we're not sure why he advertised that since he denies substance-hood to bodies. He doesn't have any mind-body problem to solve.

So what were his thoughts on bodies? Two parts:

1. Recalling that each monad expresses the universe:

Each substance is like a whole world, and like a mirror of God, or indeed of the whole universe, which each one expresses in its own fashion – rather as the same city is differently represented according to the different situations of the person who looks at it. In a way, then, the universe is multiplied as many times as there are substances, and in the same way the glory of God is redoubled by so many quite different representations of his work. In fact we can say that each substance carries the imprint of the infinite wisdom and omnipotence of God, and imitates them as far as it is capable of it. (DM 9 WF 61) — Discourse on Metaphysics 1686

Your body is part of that which you are expressing, and for rational monads, there's a closer kinship found in ideas a monad has about its body.

2. I'm having trouble with this one.

But Leibniz does not stop here, as he might have done; he further claims that the human mind expresses its body by perceiving it, perception being a species of expression.

Jolley, Nicholas. Leibniz (The Routledge Philosophers) (p. 103). Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition.

Next: innate ideas

Each substance is like a whole world, and like a mirror of God, or indeed of the whole universe, which each one expresses in its own fashion.... — Leibniz

That is a recapitulation of an ancient idea of 'man as microcosm'. And if you use the word 'subject' instead of 'substance' it makes a lot more sense to modern ears.

Yes, this rings true. I had this insight once when the guru turned to glimpse at me during Puga. For I noticed in that glimpse that we were worlds apart, that our comfortable physical world of people in that room etc was just one frequency of interaction between us, tuned in like a radio station. While if you turned the dial to another frequency you would see stars and planets. And for a moment we were two stars glinting in the firmament. Light years apart and yet by some means of nature interacting as though standing side by side.

2. I'm having trouble with this one.
But Leibniz does not stop here, as he might have done; he further claims that the human mind expresses its body by perceiving it, perception being a species of expression.

For me this reads as some kind of feedback loop. Whereby in perceiving of one's expression, one expresses something more. Then one might percieve this extra expression and express something more again and this process of reflections of feedback becomes an expression itself. An interactive expression.

I'm having trouble with this one.

But Leibniz does not stop here, as he might have done; he further claims that the human mind expresses its body by perceiving it, perception being a species of expression. — Mongrel

Except there is no stage, except for all the coordinated stages inside the black boxes. Well... actually.. there are no black boxes either...except for the coordinated black boxes inside the...black boxes???

Reminds me of something I read ages ago in a philosophy book called, if I remember right, What We Can Never Know. The jist of it was something like "look at those distant mountains rising up to meet the great blue dome of sky, and think about your eyes, looking out of your skull, your skull which is right here in the middle of the great vista, if you turn around, of 360 degrees out to the far horizons. Now realize that your real skull is out there somewhere beyond the horizon, forever imperceptible, and that the skull you feel and could see if you had a mirror, along with the vast landscape are images inside the brain which is inside your skull, which is inside the real landscape."

Sounds just like naive, or is it representational, realism...not that there's anything wrong with that.

I guess "every soul is a world apart", if you will, because self-awareness is sort of private?
I don't experience your self-awareness, you don't experience mine, we can't (unless we become the other) - we're apart (in that respect).
Self-awareness is essentially indexical, a kind of self-knowledge, and bound by ontological self-identity, like a kind of noumena.
Perhaps, by Leibniz, self-awareness is (implicitly or explicitly) integral to "soul", and thus inherently private (in part)?
As to phenomenological experiences, is your red my red, as it were?

This seems somewhat related to @Mongrel's angle #1.

Yes, I don't use the idea of black boxes myself. I prefer a scenario where there is some direct realism, but rather than boxes, veils, which in various ways obscure reality on ocassion.