I’m mainly wanting to see the extent to which there’s common ground so far as concerns understandings of what trust is. — javra

Can one trust prior to being able to doubt?

Here you've invoked the need for trust/belief prior to associations between things. I replace trust/belief with presupposing the existence thereof. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content regardless of subsequent further qualification(s). That would be the presupposition of correspondence to fact/reality inherent to all belief.
— creativesoul

To me, this very presupposition you address is one of maintained trust that, namely trust that there is a "correspondence to fact/reality". And here, I'd uphold this to be an innate (or genetically inherited) trust. — javra

Seems to me that a maintained trust that there is a "correspondence to fact/reality" requires understanding the notion in quotes. I do not see how a non linguistic creature can have a maintained trust based upon understanding a linguistic conception of "truth".

I do, have, and would continue to argue that correspondence is prior to language, and thus prior to conceptions thereof.

Can one trust prior to being able to doubt? — creativesoul

My answer is an unequivocal "yes". To doubt one must first hold a trust for that which is accurate, for one example. Since we were talking about non-linguistic creatures, were a dog or a chimp capable of doubting something, it would first need to trust that there is a distinction between what we term right/true/correct and wrong/false/incorrect (they each point to something held in common). Addressed otherwise, doubt always is contingent upon a preexisting certainty, i.e. on something which we trust to be.

Seems to me that a maintained trust that there is a "correspondence to fact/reality" requires understanding the notion in quotes. — creativesoul

Ah. I can see how that could be inferred. But no. What I want to address is not something which is because it takes the form of a thought which we can manipulate via the act of thinking. I instead was here addressing what to me are inherent aspects of awareness. For example: To be aware of anything, I argue, presupposes a trust that that which one is aware of is as one interprets it to be. [It would be a long list, but, for example: an imagined ghost is trusted to so be imagined; a so called real apparition of a ghost is trusted to be real by those who "see" the ghost. Thoughts and justifications as to what was and was not real that occur after the fact here placed aside; though these too are likewise trusted to be as one apprehends them to be ... and so forth.]

Hence, I was not addressing this as an acquired trust. For example, we instinctively trust that that which we see is as we see it to be; as do animals; we humans can, however, come to no longer trust our eyes in certain situations due learned trust: such as when where sticks get seemingly bent when submerged in water. But this is built up over our innate trust in what we see being as we see it to be. BTW, I gather that some presume human infants acquire all such trust. I disagree with this. As an example: an infant trusts the stimuli of a nipple to be as it anticipates it to be and acts accordingly, without having learned how to do so or consciously holding conceptual understandings of what it's doing and interacting with. Nevertheless, in so doing, it innately trusts its impressions (not very visual, but consisting of many tactile perceptions) to "correspond to reality". Not reality as a conceived of ontology; rather, reality as that which is real.

I'm curious. Do you uphold a "blank slate" notion of mind?

Can one trust prior to being able to doubt?
— creativesoul

My answer is an unequivocal "yes". To doubt one must first hold a trust for that which is accurate, for one example. Since we were talking about non-linguistic creatures, were a dog or a chimp capable of doubting something, it would first need to trust that there is a distinction between what we term right/true/correct and wrong/false/incorrect (they each point to something held in common). Addressed otherwise, doubt always is contingent upon a preexisting certainty, i.e. on something which we trust to be. — javra

I think we agree that all (reasonable/justifiable)doubt is belief-based(trust-based on your framework). It seems you've also implied that doubt is dependent upon a creature's awareness of falsity/mistake?

Seems to me that a maintained trust that there is a "correspondence to fact/reality" requires understanding the notion in quotes.
— creativesoul

Ah. I can see how that could be inferred. But no. What I want to address is not something which is because it takes the form of a thought which we can manipulate via the act of thinking. I instead was here addressing what to me are inherent aspects of awareness. For example: To be aware of anything, I argue, presupposes a trust that that which one is aware of is as one interprets it to be.

Hence, I was not addressing this as an acquired trust. For example, we instinctively trust that that which we see is as we see it to be; as do animals; we humans can, however, come to no longer trust our eyes in certain situations due learned trust: such as when where sticks get seemingly bent when submerged in water. But this is built up over our innate trust in what we see being as we see it to be. BTW, I gather that some presume human infants acquire all such trust. I disagree with this. As an example: an infant trusts the stimuli of a nipple to be as it anticipates it to be and acts accordingly, without having learned how to do so or consciously holding conceptual understandings of what it's doing and interacting with. Nevertheless, in so doing, it innately trusts its impressions (not very visual, but consisting of many tactile perceptions) to "correspond to reality". Not reality as a conceived of ontology; rather, reality as that which is real. — javra

I agree with the overall sentiment.

I'm curious. Do you uphold a "blank slate" notion of mind? — javra

No.

Non-linguistic creatures have no choice but to 'trust' physiological sensory perception. They also 'trust' the correlations, associations, connections drawn between different 'objects' thereof and/or themselves. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content...

There is no ability to doubt it for pre-linguistic creatures.

I think we agree that all (reasonable/justifiable)doubt is belief-based(trust-based on your framework). It seems you've also implied that doubt is dependent upon a creature's awareness of falsity/mistake? — creativesoul

Well, again, for me to believe is to trust that; and a belief is the contents of that which is trusted.

If to doubt is to presume some preestablished certainty as possibly being wrong, then yes, for a creature to doubt (themselves or others) they’d need to be capable of holding some innate understanding of falsity/mistake. I’m thinking of a dog that wants to traverse some narrow bridge, for example, but doubts whether or not it can do it via some sensed fear or anxiety (i.e., holds some trepidation about it). It would need to be aware that there is a possibility of being mistaken in trusting that it could traverse the bridge. Because of this, it would need to hold some notion of falsity/mistake—obviously not linguistic or linguistically conceptual.

No. — creativesoul

Cool.

Non-linguistic creatures have no choice but to 'trust' physiological sensory perception. They also 'trust' the correlations, associations, connections drawn between different 'objects' thereof and/or themselves. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content...

There is no ability to doubt it for pre-linguistic creatures. — creativesoul

Even if so, we maybe agree that one does not need to doubt in order to trust? So we may hold beliefs that are justifiable and true without needing to doubt/question ourselves about them, for example.

I’m thinking of a dog that wants to traverse some narrow bridge, for example, but doubts whether or not it can do it via some sensed fear or anxiety (i.e., holds some trepidation about it). It would need to be aware that there is a possibility of being mistaken in trusting that it could traverse the bridge. Because of this, it would need to hold some notion of falsity/mistake—obviously not linguistic or linguistically conceptua — javra

I disagree here. You've presupposed what needs argued for, and arrived at the realization that the account needs some unaccounted for notion of falsity/mistake. We could do away with the need for a non-linguistic notion of being mistaken. On my view, that is not even possible. Dog's can be uncertain about what may happen as a result of having unexpected consequences result from their actions in past. This doesn't require a non linguistic notion of being mistaken.

Even if so, we maybe agree that one does not need to doubt in order to trust? So we may hold beliefs that are justifiable and true without needing to doubt/question ourselves about them, for example. — javra

Yes. Let's not conflate that which is prior to language with that which is not though.

If we set out trust in a minimalist fashion, in order to trust without the ability to doubt, we would lose sight of all of the different situations where one deliberately does not doubt... that is... where one intentionally places confidence in the truthfulness and/or reliability of something or someone else... usually a source. I'm reminded of Russel here...

I disagree here. You've presupposed what needs argued for, and arrived at the realization that the account needs some unaccounted for notion of falsity/mistake. We could do away with the need for a non-linguistic notion of being mistaken. On my view, that is not even possible. Dog's can be uncertain about what may happen as a result of having unexpected consequences result from their actions in past. This doesn't require a non linguistic notion of being mistaken. — creativesoul

I don’t follow. Here, written hastily enough, a more formal argument:

-- Premise 1: If there is uncertainty of any form, there will be uncertainty about something (there is no such thing as a context-devoid, free-floating, uncertainty).
-- Premise 2: If there is uncertainty about something, there will minimally be two competing alternatives regarding that something: that that something is (else should be, or can be done) and that the same something is not (else shouldn’t be, or can’t be done).
-- Premise 3: Uncertainty holds the potential to cease so being.
--Premise 4: The potential of uncertainty being resolved entails the following: Whichever former alternative remains at expense of all others, this now resulting singular possibility/decision will signify that—to the mind of that which was formerly uncertain—all former alternatives other than the possibility which remains where wrong (if addressing something of fact, a belief-that).
-- Premise 5: In order for premise 4 to hold any validity, there must be some sense of wrongness/mistakenness v. rightness/correctness on the part of the mind involved.
-- Conclusion: The presence of uncertainty entails an awareness of the capacity to be wrong/mistaken as well as of the capacity to be right/correct as pertains to some specific given.

Please explain what you disagree with and why in the just given generality—so that I may better understand what you have in mind. If you answer than only humans can understand the concepts to any of these words, you’d be completely missing the intended point of the argument—which aims at universals regarding how the mind works (in this case, as pertains to the presence of uncertainty). In which case, without getting into philosophy of mind or that of metaphysics—which I don’t care to do presently—we’d at best end up running in circles, something that I don’t want to do.

If we set out trust in a minimalist fashion, in order to trust without the ability to doubt, we would lose sight of all of the different situations where one deliberately does not doubt — creativesoul

Only if one were to take an either/or approach to it, which I’ve already explained is not my take. To me, we all have innate “minimalist” trust/beliefs and our more complex beliefs are built up on top of them.

But this is all deviating from the issue of belief.

How do you go about conceptualizing non-linguistic belief?

Also, can you provide any example of a belief whose contents are not trusted to be by the respective being? Else, can you explain where the difference lies between trusting that something is and believing that sometimes is?

BTW, if you’d like to mutually agree to disagree and be done with the discussion, I’d be onboard.

BTW, if you’d like to mutually agree to disagree and be done with the discussion, I’d be onboard. — javra

I appreciate the offer, and you're more than welcome to end this discussion if you so choose. For me though, you're one of very few people that I've debated or had discussion with on any philosophy forum who seemed like they a)had an interest in non-linguistic thought and/or belief and b)had some well thought out notion of what that was.

I'd rather flesh out our agreements as well as our disagreements, with the main focus being upon the agreements. I'm about to work on a reply to the rest of the last post, paying particular attention to the question regarding how I conceptualize non-linguistic belief, because that method is pivotal to arriving at a convincing criterion for what counts as being such.

I disagree here. You've presupposed what needs argued for, and arrived at the realization that the account needs some unaccounted for notion of falsity/mistake. We could do away with the need for a non-linguistic notion of being mistaken. On my view, that is not even possible. Dog's can be uncertain about what may happen as a result of having unexpected consequences result from their actions in past. This doesn't require a non linguistic notion of being mistaken.
— creativesoul

I don’t follow. Here, written hastily enough, a more formal argument:

-- Premise 1: If there is uncertainty of any form, there will be uncertainty about something (there is no such thing as a context-devoid, free-floating, uncertainty).
-- Premise 2: If there is uncertainty about something, there will minimally be two competing alternatives regarding that something: that that something is (else should be, or can be done) and that the same something is not (else shouldn’t be, or can’t be done).
-- Premise 3: Uncertainty holds the potential to cease so being.
--Premise 4: The potential of uncertainty being resolved entails the following: Whichever former alternative remains at expense of all others, this now resulting singular possibility/decision will signify that—to the mind of that which was formerly uncertain—all former alternatives other than the possibility which remains where wrong (if addressing something of fact, a belief-that).
-- Premise 5: In order for premise 4 to hold any validity, there must be some sense of wrongness/mistakenness v. rightness/correctness on the part of the mind involved.
-- Conclusion: The presence of uncertainty entails an awareness of the capacity to be wrong/mistaken as well as of the capacity to be right/correct as pertains to some specific given.

Please explain what you disagree with and why in the just given generality—so that I may better understand what you have in mind. If you answer than only humans can understand the concepts to any of these words, you’d be completely missing the intended point of the argument—which aims at universals regarding how the mind works (in this case, as pertains to the presence of uncertainty). In which case, without getting into philosophy of mind or that of metaphysics—which I don’t care to do presently—we’d at best end up running in circles, something that I don’t want to do. — javra

We differ remarkably regarding what an awareness of being wrong/right requires.

Premiss 2 presupposes that the creature experiencing uncertainty understands a plurality of possible outcomes. I find that presupposition dubious for a language less creature.

Here's why/how I've arrived at my own understanding of the matter...

An awareness for the capacity to be right/wrong requires thinking about one's own thought and belief. Thinking about one's own thought and belief requires the ability to become aware of, isolate/identify, and subsequently further consider one's own pre-existing thought and belief. That requires written language. Thus, an awareness of the capacity to be wrong/mistaken as well as an awareness of the capacity to be right/correct requires written language.

A language less creature does not have what it takes to be aware of the capacity to be wrong/mistaken or right/correct.

How do you go about conceptualizing non-linguistic belief?

Also, can you provide any example of a belief whose contents are not trusted to be by the respective being? Else, can you explain where the difference lies between trusting that something is and believing that sometimes is? — javra

Next post...

...we all have innate “minimalist” trust/beliefs and our more complex beliefs are built up on top of them. — javra

Much to agree with here...

There is plenty of evidence to support the conclusion that, while in utero, humans are drawing correlations between auditory sensations and their own level of comfort/discomfort. That satisfies my own minimalist criterion for what counts as rudimentary thought and belief formation.

Those innate beliefs(a creature's thought or belief at the moment of birth) would have to consist of correlations drawn between things that exist, in their entirety, prior to being a part of the correlation. Drawing the correlation is belief formation. The correlation itself is the belief. The content of the correlation is the belief content.

Also, can you provide any example of a belief whose contents are not trusted to be by the respective being? Else, can you explain where the difference lies between trusting that something is and believing that sometimes is?

I'm still wrapping my head around your framework...

Good question! Lol

Good question! — Blue Lux

How do you go about conceptualizing non-linguistic belief? — javra

The best one yet! I've been wanting and waiting for this one for a while.

Good question! Lol — Blue Lux

:grin: I know; I know ... :cool:

@javraQ nonlinguistic belief can be captured in art, music, poetry and metaphor.
@creativesoul

We differ remarkably regarding what an awareness of being wrong/right requires.

[...]

An awareness for the capacity to be right/wrong requires thinking about one's own thought and belief. Thinking about one's own thought and belief requires the ability to become aware of, isolate/identify, and subsequently further consider one's own pre-existing thought and belief. That requires written language. Thus, an awareness of the capacity to be wrong/mistaken as well as an awareness of the capacity to be right/correct requires written language.

A language less creature does not have what it takes to be aware of the capacity to be wrong/mistaken or right/correct. — creativesoul

I find that you’re thinking of right/wrong in too abstract a manner—as only relatively mature humans can do. Yet very young children sense when they do wrong things (cheat, act aggressively, etc.) just as much as when they do good things (overlooking the more fuzzy grey areas). What’s more, so do dogs.

Though I’d like to avoid metaphysical issues, I find I can’t address this properly without eventually mentioning something of metaphysics. To be relatively informal about it, there are metaphysics of sharp and absolute division pertaining to different life forms’ abilities and, on the other side, there are metaphysics of gradations. Doesn’t matter if its Richard Dawkins or many, but not all, Abrahamic fundamentalists, here there is a metaphysical divide between man and beast. I take the latter metaphysical position, one of gradation which, when sufficiently extended, results in sometimes expansive leaps of ability. I also don’t approach things from a physicalist account; pertinent here is that to me there is a non-subjective objectivity at play in reality at large: justness—this just as much as the laws of thought—is to me an aspect of this non-subjective reality which is equally impartial to all discrete givens. Why this is important: in the latter position, we do not learn of justness conceptually in order to sense right and wrong, no more than we learn of formal laws of thought in order to operate via laws of thought. It is not something acquired from language but, instead, it is a universal facet of mind which language expresses, however imperfectly. Here there is no absolute metaphysical division between man and beast; both are, in a very trivial way, equal facets and constituents of nature. It is not that a less intelligent being is metaphysically apart from the laws of thought, or from the universal of justness. It is only that less intelligent beings are in due measure that much less capable of forming abstractions about these universals—which, as metaphysical universals, concretely dwell within all of us (with or without our conscious understanding of them) as innate aspects of what, or who, we are as sentient beings.

So, potential debates galore on this issue—and the issue can sprawl in myriad directions. I’ve highlighted some of my beliefs, though, only to better present my disposition.

A dog doesn’t hold a conscious understanding of “alternatives” regarding some given nor of “right and wrong”. Nevertheless, to the extent that intelligent creatures, dogs included, can become uncertain of givens, they will actively experience competing alternatives which they must choose between so as to resolve the uncertainty. Not all of our uncertainty—as adult humans—consists of consciously appraised alternatives; arguably, most of our uncertainties do not. They instead consist of competing gut-feelings, intuitions which we do not during the even take time to linguistically quality (never mind contemplate), and we as conscious awareness choose, or decide upon, one—thereby forsaking all others once the decision has been (often) unthinkingly made. Arguably, this can easily be complicated by some of these uncertainties taking place in the unconscious mind—such that they bring about states of anxiety, disquiet, of fear … else, equally applicable, states of wonder, curiosity, awe, and sometimes even beauty (such that these states would not occur were we to be fully certain of all relevant aspects of that regarded). I’ll also add that not all forms of uncertainty equate to doubt: e.g., we can be, and most often are, uncertain about any number of future events without in any way doubting them. Yet, if there is uncertainty about something, what other mechanism can be at play other than that of competing alternatives for what in fact is?

I doubt this will resolve the given disagreement, but think of it this way. Were language mandatory for sensations of right/correctitude and wrong/mistakenness, Helen Keller could not then have made any non-stochastic choice in her life during her first seven years (I’ve checked with Wikipedia and Helen only began learning language at about seven-years-old). For she then could not have had any sense of mistakenness v. correctness via which to so make (non-stochastic) choices (I grant that stochastic choices is a contradiction in terms … but since I’m in a bit of rush) … and choices are always made between alternatives.

Well, this better expresses some aspects of my worldview. But I’m skirting around issues which underlie it: those of metaphysics and of philosophy of mind. And I understand if there will be plenty of disagreement throughout the aforementioned.

I’ll likely get around to the rest over the weekend (bit short on time for now).

But to better understand: with the process of thinking in mind: can a thought, of itself, be defined as not necessarily consisting of a consciously understood abstraction (regardless of the degree of abstraction)? For instance, could we settle on correlations between percepts being an act of thinking? This would not require language nor consciously appraised abstractions. Still, the implications of so defining thought would then be fairly expansive (e.g., if an ameba can make correlations between its percepts than it would be engaged in an act of thought while eluding predators (e.g. bigger amebas) or while searching for prey. Amebas can easily be discerned to elude predators and search for prey—which takes a bit of autonomous order within an environmental uncertainty to accomplish—but I mention them because, obviously, they are rather “primitive” lifeforms.). I lean toward a more inclusive understanding/definition of thought and, therefore, thinking—again, favoring the outlook of gradation rather than that of division. But I’d like to know your general position as regards the nature of thought before I reply.

I'm still wrapping my head around your framework... — creativesoul

No problem.

nonlinguistic belief can be captured in art, music, poetry and metaphor. — Blue Lux

Of course. Very good points. I thing think both me and creativesoul were limiting ourselves to how it might pertain to lesser animals. Feel free to complicate things, though.

(I'm a typo-holic. Can't help it. :roll: )

I find that you’re thinking of right/wrong in too abstract a manner—as only relatively mature humans can do. Yet very young children sense when they do wrong things (cheat, act aggressively, etc.) just as much as when they do good things (overlooking the more fuzzy grey areas). What’s more, so do dogs. — javra

Nah. I'm talking about what a language less creature is capable of. With regard to a language less creature's thought and belief, they are rudimentary, very basic level simple correlations drawn between things that exist in their entirety prior to being a part of the correlation. Then there are the more complex products of the correlations themselves(when they become part of another correlation).

A sure sign that we've gotten something wrong here - when discussing non linguistic thought and belief - is if and when it is too complicated. Simply put, non linguistic thought and belief cannot be that complicated.

Regarding my earlier criticism that you're referring to in the above quote...

I'm talking very specifically - as precisely as possible - about what it takes to become aware of one's own fallibility, which is a much 'cleaner' way to say "become aware of one's capacity to be right/wrong". I offered an argument for the position I hold. It's been sorely neglected. That argument is based upon something very important. The distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief that the whole of philosophy has neglected to draw and maintain...

Regarding the bit about morality. Morality is all about what counts as acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. Right and wrong in a moral/immoral sense as compared contrasted to a true/false sense.

The children you speak of are in the process of acquiring moral belief. Dogs do no such thing. The commonality between the two is that both dogs and young children will draw correlations between what they do and what happens afterwards.

I'm going to take that last post in chunks...

nonlinguistic belief can be captured in art, music, poetry and metaphor.
— Blue Lux

Of course. Very good points — javra

Come on javra. Those points miss the point entirely. Non linguistic here means thought and belief that exists in it's entirety prior to language. It does not mean unspoken thought and belief after language acquisition...

Besides that, music is language, poetry is language, metaphor is language, art... well who determines what counts as art? Does that determination require language in order for it to happen?

Surely.

None of that is language less... None.

Though I’d like to avoid metaphysical issues, I find I can’t address this properly without eventually mentioning something of metaphysics. To be relatively informal about it, there are metaphysics of sharp and absolute division pertaining to different life forms’ abilities and, on the other side, there are metaphysics of gradations. Doesn’t matter if its Richard Dawkins or many, but not all, Abrahamic fundamentalists, here there is a metaphysical divide between man and beast. I take the latter metaphysical position, one of gradation which, when sufficiently extended, results in sometimes expansive leaps of ability. I also don’t approach things from a physicalist account; pertinent here is that to me there is a non-subjective objectivity at play in reality at large: justness—this just as much as the laws of thought—is to me an aspect of this non-subjective reality which is equally impartial to all discrete givens. Why this is important: in the latter position, we do not learn of justness conceptually in order to sense right and wrong, no more than we learn of formal laws of thought in order to operate via laws of thought. It is not something acquired from language but, instead, it is a universal facet of mind which language expresses, however imperfectly. Here there is no absolute metaphysical division between man and beast; both are, in a very trivial way, equal facets and constituents of nature. It is not that a less intelligent being is metaphysically apart from the laws of thought, or from the universal of justness. It is only that less intelligent beings are in due measure that much less capable of forming abstractions about these universals—which, as metaphysical universals, concretely dwell within all of us (with or without our conscious understanding of them) as innate aspects of what, or who, we are as sentient beings.

So, potential debates galore on this issue—and the issue can sprawl in myriad directions. I’ve highlighted some of my beliefs, though, only to better present my disposition. — javra

All good.

Differences are certainly between our views. However, I'm not interested in fleshing those out unless they matter directly to the topic at hand. While I do often enjoy argument for it's own sake, not here, not now, and not with you about this topic. That said, we are much more alike than unalike here.

You may want to know that I reject many an inadequate historical dichotomy. The objective/subjective one notwithstanding. All those that I reject I do so on the same ground. They cannot take account of that which is both and/or neither...

To be blunt about it, I've no interest in metaphysics for it's own sake. None whatsoever.

A dog doesn’t hold a conscious understanding of “alternatives” regarding some given nor of “right and wrong”. Nevertheless, to the extent that intelligent creatures, dogs included, can become uncertain of givens, they will actively experience competing alternatives which they must choose between so as to resolve the uncertainty. — javra

To me, that's contradictory on it's face, therefore unacceptable. Choosing between competing alternatives is existentially dependent upon knowing of them. Knowing of competing alternatives is existentially dependent upon understanding them. To be more precise, this bit began with claims about a non linguistic creature being aware of it's own fallibility. That cannot happen.

Becoming aware of one's own fallibility is to become aware that one has false belief. Becoming aware that one has false belief requires one knowing that one has belief to begin with. Knowing that one has belief requires being able to think about one's own belief. Thinking about one's own belief requires identifying it and isolating it for further contemplation. Identifying, isolating, and further contemplating one's own belief requires written language.

Becoming aware of one's own fallibility is existentially dependent upon written language. A language less creature has none.

...if there is uncertainty about something, what other mechanism can be at play other than that of competing alternatives for what in fact is?

Uncertainty is the mechanism. It is fear based. A dog can have expectations. Those expectations can be jolted into fearful uncertainty(anxiety) about what's happening or what may be about to happen, by the unexpected happening and negatively affecting the 'sense' of familiarity that the dog had until then.

There is no need here for the dog to be aware that it had false belief, nor is it even possible.

But to better understand: with the process of thinking in mind: can a thought, of itself, be defined as not necessarily consisting of a consciously understood abstraction (regardless of the degree of abstraction)? For instance, could we settle on correlations between percepts being an act of thinking? This would not require language nor consciously appraised abstractions. Still, the implications of so defining thought would then be fairly expansive (e.g., if an ameba can make correlations between its percepts than it would be engaged in an act of thought while eluding predators (e.g. bigger amebas) or while searching for prey. Amebas can easily be discerned to elude predators and search for prey—which takes a bit of autonomous order within an environmental uncertainty to accomplish—but I mention them because, obviously, they are rather “primitive” lifeforms.). I lean toward a more inclusive understanding/definition of thought and, therefore, thinking—again, favoring the outlook of gradation rather than that of division. But I’d like to know your general position as regards the nature of thought before I reply. — javra

We agree regarding the gradation aspect. That is particularly amenable for me with regard to initial thought formation and it's successive continuation all the way through the transformative correlations that only spoken language, written language, and then again, metacognition have the goods to deliver...

In order to remain sensible and have the strongest possible justificatory ground, all that we call "non linguistic thought and/or belief" must share the same basic elemental constituents with conventional notions of thought and/or belief statements. The groundwork is imperative.

All examples of thought and belief are existentially dependent upon predication. All predication is existentially dependent upon drawing correlations between different things. All examples of thought and belief are existentially dependent upon drawing correlations between different things.

Given that all thought and belief is meaningful and presupposes truth(as correspondence) somewhere along the line, the presupposition of truth(as correspondence) and the attribution of meaning(being meaningful) seem to be irrevocable. They ought be considered as part of an adequate minimum, and thus need to be part of the criterion for thought and belief.

So, that's three different elemental constituents that have been identified. Namely... 1.being existentially dependent upon drawing correlations between things, 2.being meaningful, and 3.presupposing it's own correspondence.

All attribution of meaning is existentially dependent upon the existence of something to become a sign or symbol, something to become significant/symbolized and a creature capable of drawing a mental correlation between the two. All such correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content(regardless of subsequent qualification).

Pavlovs dog was clearly proven to have made a connection between the sound of a bell and satisfying innate hunger. Involuntary salivation. He drew a correlation and/or association between hearing a bell and what happened afterwards. That bell became significant to the dog solely by virtue of the attribution of meaning which led to clearly held belief about what may come... expectation.

An amoeba...

Mmmmm....

Have not gained enough confidence to clearly draw a line in the sand. However...

It does not seem to have the physiological makeup. Stimulus response satisfies the avoidance of danger and the gathering of resources. I've no supporting evidence nor argument for granting meaningful mental correlations that presuppose their own correspondence.

A furthered honing for the criterion could and ought be had by virtue of setting out the things between which the creature makes the connections...

Adequacy matters.

A complete aside...

But if this minimalist notion of thought and belief sets out what is the case prior to our setting it out, then the rightful application of it will produce consequences decimating many a philosophical 'problem' across a very broad scope/range...

Music and poetry, art and metaphor is not conventional language. There are aspects that are expressed in these things that transcend a linguistic expression, thus they become poetry. Poetry is not language. Lots of poetry, grammatically and with regard to standards of language in an essay for instance, is completely nonsensical if viewed this way. One can say that these things express a communicability, but definitely not a language, for a language has an organized structure of sign and meaning, including bits of an organized method. This is nonexistent in poetry, art and music. There is music theory... But you won't find Beethoven in music theory.

All examples of thought and belief are existentially dependent upon predication. All predication is existentially dependent upon drawing correlations between different things. All examples of thought and belief are existentially dependent upon drawing correlations between different things. — creativesoul

I don't know that I agree with this. For instance, in Kant's contention that existence is not a predicate.

All examples of thought and belief are existentially dependent upon predication. All predication is existentially dependent upon drawing correlations between different things. All examples of thought and belief are existentially dependent upon drawing correlations between different things.
— creativesoul

I don't know that I agree with this. For instance, in Kant's contention that existence is not a predicate. — Blue Lux

Make the argument, we'll discuss it further. Otherwise... hand-waving and gratuitous assertions won't do here.

Music and poetry, art and metaphor is not conventional language. There are aspects that are expressed in these things that transcend a linguistic expression, thus they become poetry. Poetry is not language. Lots of poetry, grammatically and with regard to standards of language in an essay for instance, is completely nonsensical if viewed this way. One can say that these things express a communicability, but definitely not a language, for a language has an organized structure of sign and meaning, including bits of an organized method. This is nonexistent in poetry, art and music. There is music theory... But you won't find Beethoven in music theory. — Blue Lux

Music, poetry, and metaphor are definitely language. Saying otherwise is just plain asinine. Art is a social construct that is existentially dependent upon language.

None of these things contradict what I've claimed, nor negate it. If you believe otherwise, then that alone is adequate evidence to conclude that you've not quite understood the position I'm arguing for.