Ideality is a stubborn force. It uses supposed impossiblity to say logic (telos in this case) sits above the world and governs it. Ethics is no different. A world without telos, well, it simply couldn't have moral significance.

If it weren't human nature to necessarily act in a particular way, then only moral nihlism could obtain. Or so the story goes.

But humans don't have a necessary nature. Part of the significance of ethics is that we enact one possibility over another. A nature such that we necessarily behave (a telos) a certain way is impossible. Moral value is expressed despite the absence of telos. The world has moral significance, even though there is no necessity we will behave ethically.

I think the only moral fact is freedom, our ability to choose what we feel we ought to do; and what we feel we ought to do is to follow the correct means to reach the desired ends. The 'correct means' must be rational if it is to be objective maxim.

To take the mechanistic stance on human behaviour is to remove any talk of reasons and purposes, which means that insofar as there are facts about human beings, they cannot involve reasons and purposes, thus they cannot be about morality as traditionally understood. — jamalrob

This particularly points out what I am talking about. If moral value obtains regardless of whether people respect it, how can it be a "reason" or a "purpose?" A murder certainly doesn't have any sort of "reason" or "purpose" to not kill their victim, their intent is the exact opposite, yet their act is immoral. Without reference to their "reason" or "purpose," it's still true they are immoral.

Moral significance has nothing to with a reason or purpose. It's a logical expression of states themselves-- the murder isn't wrong for some reason or purpose, it's just wrong to kill this person. They ought not die. There is no separation between the world and its moral significance.

We find that Aristotle's account of morality is a distant ad hoc justification of ethics. Why is the murder wrong? "It's against human nature" he says, as if being an unjustified killing was somehow not enough to define its immorality. Ideality-- it's only so if formalised and grounded on some particular experience.

Hume's is/ought distinction is a great, possibly the greatest, meta-ethical insight. It draws philosophy away from throwing out "justification" which supposedly derive moral value, turning our understanding to moral value itself. We no longer make the embarrassing argument that killing someone is wrong because "it's against nature" or "God said so."

It is known to be wrong itself-- the death is harm on the world. Our ethics philosophy becomes about actions and their significance, not defending some idea held be the source of moral value.

I don't know if I have the energy or ability to mount a critique of your posts, because I can't see how to do so without the hard job of correcting what appears to me to be your mis-characterization of virtue ethics and teleology, and without the even harder job of arguing fully for virtue ethics (or some kind of virtue ethics). On the one hand I agree that "there is no separation between the world and its moral significance", but on the other hand I disagree that virtue ethics is or must be contrary to this. Generally you seem to view telos as akin to Kantian duty or an appeal to God standing over us and outside us. This is not how I understand it at all. Maybe you're equating virtue ethics with its Thomist version?

And I'm saying Hume can't have it both ways.... either you can get an Ought from an is, or you can't. — anonymous66

If you can't have it both ways, then that just means that only the "is" part of the statement is true and not the "ought" part.

Or are you suggesting that there is some greater contradiction inherent in the is/ought problem?

Hume said "you can't get an Ought from an is, so that means...."
If you're right, what does it mean?

Hume said "you can't get an Ought from an is, so that means...."
If you're right, what does it mean? — anonymous66

Maybe you can get ought from is?

It looks to me like we have no other options. Now that I've read Holbo, I see "Oughts" all over the place.

It looks to me like we have no other options. Now that I've read Holbo, I see "Oughts" all over the place. — anonymous66

What do you think is an example of a moral fact?

I think there are some tautological moral facts.
For example "There is such thing as morals" might be a moral fact.

And I'm saying Hume can't have it both ways.... either you can get an Ought from an is, or you can't. — anonymous66

You cannot. It is a matter of logic. However, this does not preclude telling folks what they ought to do, fortunately. It merely precludes telling them that the facts (the is-ness of things) prove it.

His 'ought' here is a recommendation in order to avoid error. If one is in the business of proving conclusions from premises, one cannot get an 'ought' conclusion from 'is' premises. If one is in the bullshit trade, other considerations apply.

You cannot. It is a matter of logic. However, this does not preclude telling folks what they ought to do, fortunately. It merely precludes telling them that the facts (the is-ness of things) prove it.

His 'ought' here is a recommendation in order to avoid error. If one is in the business of proving conclusions from premises, one cannot get an 'ought' conclusion from 'is' premises. If one is in the bullshit trade, other considerations apply. — unenlightened

Consider the counter example anonymous66 made.

The fact that "logic is a slave to passion" is not contradicted by the ought of "logic ought to be passion's slave."

If it is a fact that logic is the slave of passion why is it not a fact that logic ought to be passion's slave?

Looks to me that no one can really state anything without using some kind of "Ought".

If you want to be logical, then you ought to follow the dictates of logic. This is an unproblematical conditional ought precisely because it is conditional on a passion - the passion for logic. The appropriate passions obligate (motivate) virtues.

The passion to flourish obligates one to have a passion for correct reasoning, because it helps one to flourish, by avoiding superstition, reaching true conclusions etc. To the extent that such passions are ubiquitous, moral obligations become universal.

I'm not sure if this answers your question, as you have not in fact provided a counter example by way of an argument...

I'm not sure if this answers your question, as you have not in fact provided a counter example by way of an argument... — unenlightened

Maybe I am not wording it very well.

I was not making an argument, I was asking a question.

Why does the is statement "logic is a slave to passion" qualify as a fact, whereas the statement "logic ought to be a slave to passion" is not a fact? Why does the is/ought problem apply here.

To me it is interesting, because in order for the ought statement in this example to be a fact. then the is statement would also have to be a fact.

That, to me at least, seems to imply there is some connection between the is and ought statements.I thought it might be a counter example in the sense that in some cases, this example, there is a clear connection between is and ought.

One might argue that the is statement is not a fact and that therefore the ought statement is not a fact either, but that would also imply that the ought statement is dependent upon the is statement.

Or one might argue that the is statement is a fact, but the ought statement is not fact. And to me, that is the most curious option, for there seems to be no reason why the ought statement should not be a fact as well, again implying a connection between is and ought. This is also the question I am asking: if the is statement is fact, then why is the ought statement not also a fact?

The last option is to argue that the is statement is not a fact, but the ought statement is a fact. That is probably an example of when the is/ought problem is deployed and argued that there is no readily apparent explanation as how the ought was derived from the is.

I hope that makes more sense.

That, to me at least, seems to imply there is some connection between the is and ought statements. — m-theory

Well of course there is a connection. There is a connection between a prediction and a fact too, despite that one cannot derive a will-be from a has-been. Hume does not present an argument, but merely declares that it ''ought to be'. There is a deal of evidence presented that 'it is'.

You ought to think this through. If you do, then the facts will be identical with your obligation just declared.

But if you don't, then they won't, and that is why your obligation is not a fact, but an admonition.

I don't get it?

I am not sure what you are saying here.

Are ought statements moral statements, and if they are, does that mean that ought statements that are facts are moral facts?

Commonly, if something is claimed to be objectively so, that is to be a fact, this means that it is inter-subjectively verifiable, most satisfactorily by direct observation. — John

And math fits that paradigm? And you know morality doesn't? It seems to me that just as other facts are not decided by consensus, they are objective in that way, then morality could also be universal, and discovered, not created. I'm not sure how to prove it either way, though.. I'm just pointing out that all facts seem odd. Math certainly has an oddness about it . Numbers not even existing in the real world, and all. — anonymous66

I don't know if you read the rest of the post where I gave some examples of common claims that are usually considered to be facts, but are not susceptible of easy verification by observation?

Simple math like 2+2=4 is easily verifiable by observation. More complex math consists in formal proofs of theorems; so again it is unlike moral claims because in the latter there is no question of proof being involved.

I would say that instantiations of number exist everywhere in the real world; the difficulties arise since numbers are understood to be independent of their instantiations, and are thus generalities and are not particulars; and it is not clear how generalities or universals "exist"; or indeed if it appropriate to speak of them in terms of existing.

When you say that "facts are not decided by consensus" you are thinking about ostensive facts, and it is true that these are not thought to be decided by consensus, but on the contrary are the very things that drive consensus. But there are also discursive facts, which are decided by consensus. So, the question seems to become about whether purportedly objective moral facts are analogous to ostensive (objective) facts or to discursive (inter-subjective) facts. I'm sure this is a very complex question about which books could potentially be written (and probably have been), so I don't think there's much chance that we'll be answering it satisfactorily here today.

Consider two examples I gave of the kinds of claims that might be taken to support the idea of an objective morality: that people are almost universally social beings that desire to live harmoniously with others and that living with, but having no concern for others, and exploiting them for one's own ends creates disharmony. If these claims are accepted as being objectively true, then it would seem to follow that it is morally wrong to seek to live with others, and yet to, quite deliberately refuse (as opposed to psycho-pathologically fail) to have any concern for them, and to coldly consider them to be merely means to the achievement of one's own ends. But this would seem to be an inter-subjective moral truth, since the exploiter would not be compelled to agree with the majority, because she may have no desire to live truly harmoniously with others, but only to preserve the appearance to the extent that is required to serve her intentions to deliberately and deviously exploit them.

I should clarify then. My argument is not against virtue ethics as a concept, just Aristotle's (and any set of ethics which relies on telos). They misunderstanding virtue.

It treats virtue as if it is an outside rule, a logical nature we must necessarily live up to by our existence as humans. Like Kant's duty( "nature" is basically Aristotle's CI), moral value is about living up to a grand outside rule, rather than the moral significance of our lives.

I don't think this is right at all. Kants CI is a purely rational imperative; whereas Aristotle's notion of virtue is bound with the idea of the soul, with the form of the human. This form, for Aristotle, determines the nature of what is it to be human and what it is to flourish as human, It involves the physical, the instinctive, the affective, the volitional, the rational and the spiritual, all of which must function harmoniously within themselves and with the others; for virtue to obtain.

Required for this is phronesis (practical wisdom). Aristotle's conception of practical wisdom could not be more different than Kant's idea of practical reason. The latter is utterly rule-based, whereas the former operates independently of any and all imposed rules and consists in a kind of immediate intuition as to how to act, an ability which cannot be directly taught like a set of rules may be, but develops naturally in those who by nature possess the right qualities (think of athletic ability as an analogy) and receive a proper education.

When it comes to moral behavior there is an unlimited (within the requirement for harmonious function) potential for flexibility in Aristotle's idea of virtue; whereas as Kant's CI is a paragon of rigidity. For Kant the kinds of acts that are wrong are always and in every circumstance wrong; the word 'imperative' says it all!

My point is a meta-ethical one of how moral value is understood. It's not that Aristotle's virtue and CI are the same in their normative prescriptions or even in their understanding of what constitutes are normative prescription. They are vastly different. (though less different than one might initially think too. The CI makes comment about the world too. After all, it used to judge acts and sates of the world. It's not "rational" vs the "non-rational" world).

The point is that they share the same logic of understanding moral value based off a source idea rather than itself. Kant uses the CI as a foundation for ethical value-- moral value is determined by whether it fits with that idea. Aristotle uses nature in the same way. How do we know what is ethical? Not by knowing what is ethical, but rather by understanding this foundational idea of "nature."

Aristotle uses nature in the same way. How do we know what is ethical? Not by knowing what is ethical, but rather by understanding this foundational idea of "nature." — TheWillowOfDarkness

But the idea for Aristotle is not that we use a rational principle 'nature', and draw out it's logical, ethical entailments. It is, instead, that we intuitively grasp the form of the human, in ourselves and others, and and then become harmonious to what is intuitively known to us; then we will naturally act in accordance with, and refine our natural capacity for, that kind of intuition or phronesis. The idea is that any purely static, rule based imperative, if followed, would be the death of our natural capacity to have a dynamically alive grasp of virtue.

For sure, but in doing so, Aristotle is ignoring that he's actually relying on rationality. Humans will, supposedly, intuitively grasp the form of the human ("nature" ), in ourselves and others, such that the we will then know how to behave virtuously. Moral value is defined through the idea of nature.

But this is not true. Not only to we frequently not intuitively grasp ethical action, but we don't grasp it on the basis of "nature."

If we are to be virtuous, we grasp it in the act of being so and know it on those terms-- "nature" is irrelevant. The virtue of action is all that matters. "Nature" is doing no work in the role of understanding ethics. It just an ad hoc justification given to ground ethics, to give the illusion moral value is logically derived-- which is why Aristotle comes into such conflict with modern moral philosophy (i.e. anything that understands the is/ought distinction), despite its individualistic worldly concerns that would seem to fit with modern culture.

The point is that although we must be rational creatures in order to exercise such intuitive judgement; it does not follow from that that the acts of exercising the intuitive judgement, or the intuitive judgements themselves, must be either direct results of processes of reasoning, or actual processes of reasoning.

In an analogous way one must be a rational being in order to exercise aesthetic judgement but this does not entail that all, or even any, aesthetic judgements must themselves be processes of, or the results of processes of, reasoning.

But that's wrong-- such rational reasoning isn't required for virtue. Someone just needs to understand what is virtuous. Rather than some stuffy step through "rational steps," being virtuous is intuitive. We understand action is virtuous(or not).

Indeed, we can say such knowledge is never a result the process of reasoning because making such an argument requires that knowledge to be acquired. What is "nature?" We can't present this as a pointer to ethical action, unless we already know virtuous action. It fails to "derive" what is virtuous.

One does not have to be a "rational being (whatever that's supposed to mean)" to exercise aesthetic judgement. They just need to feel/think something is beautiful/ugly. It's worldly-- a being exists with (an) understanding of beautiful/ugly-- not ideal.

I don't understand why you are agreeing with me and yet writing as though you think you are disagreeing. In the case of Kant's CI reasoning is certainly involved, practical reasoning, so what you write is certainly wrong in that context.

A 'rational being' is a being that is capable of reasoning about the nature of itself, others and the world. Do you think animals are capable of making ethical or aesthetical judgements?

There's certainly reasoning involved in that statement of the philosophy. I never said that Kant did not use raining in his philosophy. That's just not what I'm talking about. Talking and reasoning about the CI isn't knowledge of virtue or ethical action. It's presence has no impact on my argument about knowing virtue.

More than that: animals make ethical and aesthetic judgements all the time. At least the ones who understand some is ethical/unethical or beautiful/ugly. No doubt some animals would seem to lack such understanding or feelings, but that's no issue for my argument. Then they just aren't aware of ethical or aesthetic significance.

"Rationality" has nothing to do with it. Understanding ethics or aesthetics is a question of existence, not an idea.

I don't know if you read the rest of the post where I gave some examples of common claims that are usually considered to be facts, but are not susceptible of easy verification by observation? — John

I think the question is, which facts are facts even though they can't be verified? The point of this thread is that facts are odd things. And I don't think the statement "you can't get an ought from an is" stands up to scrutiny. An obvious question is "why not?" I'm starting to wonder why Hume didn't notice his own contradiction (he said "you can't" and then he went and did it himself).

Simple math like 2+2=4 is easily verifiable by observation.

I think you must have a different understanding of math than I do. I think you actually just know that 2+2=4.

I'd be very impressed if you could find a way to explain how to falsify mathematical claims (have you never heard the story of how it took Russell and Whitehead 300 pages to show why 1+1=2?). And then you'd have to explain just why it is that falsification itself is important. And after that, you'd have to explain how to falsify the claim "claims must be falsifiable". I think I see a conundrum.

The point of my thread is to suggest that the claim, "you can't get an ought from an is" may not actually be binding. I don't think we can say much without resorting to ought claims.

And I wanted to point out that facts are odd things. I'm not convinced that moral facts would be any more odd than "just plain old regular facts".

But, I don't know. These are just thoughts I have after reading/listening to John Holbo.

It's not ethically binding. "You can't get an ought form an is" is a an "is statement." Hume is stating a logical truth.

Whether it is ethical to state or believe that logical truth is a different question. In an ethical sense, we can't state anything without resorting to an ought. If I think we ought to understand , "you can't get an ought from an is," then I have to argue that in terms of an ought. I have to be bound by an ought.

The truth "You can't get an ought form an is" is unaffected by this thought. It's still true even is everyone believes you can get an ought from an is.