You're making the mistake of thinking your cultivated nature is some determinate thing that you could conceptualize. It isn't, and you can't; all you can do is intuit in accordance with it, and try to cultivate it further in what your already more or less cultivated instincts tell you to be the right direction. And that 'right direction" is not any externally imposed imperative.

You are limited to your nature for the simple reason that you cannot be more than you are (and just in case you misunderstand this, that does not mean that you cannot in the future be more than you are now).

I might even be wrong in my own appraisal of myself (I'm not, but it's possible) — TheWillowOfDarkness

This is a downright contradiction; if you might be wrong about yourself then you have no warrant to say that you are not wrong about yourself.

You are limited to your nature for the simple reason that you cannot be more than you are (and just in case you misunderstand this, that does not mean that you cannot in the future be more than you are now). — John

This is correct-- but it's merely descriptive. It has nothing to with ethics or virtue. All your doing is saying there is now way I act. As a description of ethics of virtue is useless-- if I were to attack or my friends, eat nothing but lollies, throw other people's possession off a cliff without their permission-- it would merely say "That was my direction." Aristotle has more than this in mind when he refer to nature.

This is a downright contradiction; if you might be wrong about yourself then you have no warrant to say that you are not wrong about yourself. — John

Only if you are confused about the relationship of possibility and actuality. Just because something might be, doesn't mean it is or isn't. Knowledge isn't always about showing something is logically necessary. Most of the time it's about what isn't logically necessary. Every morning the sun rises without it being necessary. Each morning is merely one possibility amongst many actualised.

For something to be possible, it doesn't mean it's incorrect or untrue. Indeed, it has no impact on it. The sun this morning is no less actual becasue it was a possible outcome.

The warrant for saying I'm not mistaken about myself does not come from an outside logical idea, such as possibility, but rather from awareness of my what I am. Even though it possible I could be a moral naturalist, I know I'm not. I'm aware of what moral naturalism and that it's not what my ethical philosophy means.

Willow, nothing you are saying seems relevant to anything I have said, so I am afraid I am giving up on this exchange.

It's not really apt to say that I have "admitted that maths is intuitive" since I never claimed otherwise. — John

My mistake, I must have misunderstood. Can something be intuitive and falsifiable?

but that it is, within the limits of our definitions, (and what else do we have to work with?) verifiable as I described. — John

How are you describing "verifiable" in that case? It looks like you must mean, "it agrees with my intuition."

I think the swan analogy does work.
Q: How do you know all swans are white? A:We checked them all.
Q: How do you know that 2+2=4? A:Every time I perform the calculation, I get the same answer.

The first question is an example of inductive logic.
The second is an example of deductive or a priori logic.
It's a textbook example. You could perform the calculation until the heat death of the universe and get the same answer, which is why it is called a priori.

Ought from is:

She is a firefighter.
Therefore she ought to do whatever a firefighter ought to do.

This works because a firefighter is defined functionally. There is a function characteristic of a firefighter, and this is what it is to be a firefighter (telos and nature are one).

Or does it work? Discuss... — jamalrob

She is a firefighter.
Therefore she does whatever a firefighter does.

This works. But the obligation only has meaning when there is the possibility of not 'following one's function/nature.

And your example seems to have force because we do not define firefighters functionally. I have fought a fire, but I have never been a firefighter, because that is a matter of uniform, training, qualification, etc. And because one can wear the uniform and ride on the fire-engine and not do what one ought to do, the conclusion has moral force and does not follow from the premise.

She is a firefighter who broke her leg yesterday.
Therefore she ought not to do what a firefighter does for the next few weeks.

Hume's dictum saves obligation from becoming identical with logical/physical necessity.

How you describing "verifiable" in that case? It looks like you must mean, "it agrees with my intuition."

I think the swan analogy does work.
Q: How do you know all swans are white? A:We checked them all.
Q: How do you know that 2+2=4? A:Every time I perform the calculation, I get the same answer. — anonymous66

No, it agrees with our observations and how we define them. If I place two objects, and then add another two objects; what other possible outcome could there be but to end up with four objects? If, for example I ended up with five objects what could I conclude about that? That I had been wrong about placing two objects each time and actually placed three there one time? Or that an extra object appeared out of nowhere, or someone put it there when I wasn't looking, or what?

That's why I said the swan analogy doesn't work, because the observation part of the verification is only a matter of checking to make sure that objects don't appear out of nowhere. But actually even they did that would not change the fact that I had placed two objects each time, and so 2+2=4 would not be falsified even in that case. As I said before it's easy to falsify the swan claim, but what could possibly falsify the math claim? I bet you cannot come up with any hypothetical scenario that could falsify it.

I guess so, since I don't see how math could be falsifiable. Of course particular theorems are falsifiable; but that is an entirely different matter. And math, or at least counting, is only verifiable empirically insofar as objects don't spontaneously pop into and out of existence mucking up our calculations. If, for example I counted out ten ten dollar notes and gave you the hundred dollars I owed you and asked you to confirm that it was indeed ten ten dollar notes by counting it again twice, and you confirmed it, but then later found that there were eleven ten dollar notes there; what would that show? Would it falsify 10x 10 = 100?

She is a firefighter.
Therefore she ought to do whatever a firefighter ought to do.

This works because a firefighter is defined functionally. There is a function characteristic of a firefighter, and this is what it is to be a firefighter (telos and nature are one). — Unenlightened

Quite right! But imagine this scenario: before becoming a firefighter, there was another choice. Her father was a firefighter, and had impressed on her the worthiness of the occupation and the rewards of public service. But her father's brother - the black sheep of the family! - had gone off and started a very lucrative casino. And he had offered her the chance of working as a croupier, but with a fast track to management. So she had to make a decision between money and glamour, and duty and public service.

Which of those ought she to do?

And your example seems to have force because we do not define firefighters functionally. I have fought a fire, but I have never been a firefighter, because that is a matter of uniform, training, qualification, etc. And because one can wear the uniform and ride on the fire-engine and not do what one ought to do, the conclusion has moral force and does not follow from the premise. — unenlightened

Yeah, I guess it only works insofar as the ought is understood non-morally.

Immediately what sprang to mind was the passage from A Treatise of Human Nature (which I have marked so it was easy to pop to):

From "3.1.1.27"

I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings on observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason shou'd be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the reader; and am perswaded, that this small attention wou'd subvert all the vulgar system of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason.

Ought from is:

She is a firefighter.
Therefore she ought to do whatever a firefighter ought to do.

This works because a firefighter is defined functionally. There is a function characteristic of a firefighter, and this is what it is to be a firefighter (telos and nature are one).

Or does it work? Discuss... — jamalrob

Even defined functionally it would seem to me that we can only get from the first to the second proposition by means of the conditional.

If she is a firefighter then she ought to do whatever a firefighter ought to do.

At least here we're following a logical form commonly accepted. But here the Humean point isn't against plugging in words or definitions as much as it is saying that the relation of the verb "ought" is of an entirely different kind from the relation of the copula -- and specifically that the latter is settled by means of founding the relations of objects or perceiving it by reason. (and said conditional's acceptance, pace Hume, is "derived" from the passions)


Saying that I would also say that moral realism could still be argued for using your approach. But I think that by pursuing the ought/is distinction you'd also be handicapping your account. Working from memory here I thought that was exactly what was so strong about After Virtue; he was calling into question the whole distinction by means of going back to Aristotle and pointing out that our concepts don't need to have this distinction, that it is, after all, a distinction (as opposed to a reality).

One could almost say that we understand "fact" in relation to our understanding of "value" -- that the latter defines the former, and the former the latter. So to speak of moral facts is to smash these together, but by using the language of the very distinction which is being put into question.

8-)

Saying that I would also say that moral realism could still be argued for using your approach. But I think that by pursuing the ought/is distinction you'd also be handicapping your account. Working from memory here I thought that was exactly what was so strong about After Virtue; he was calling into question the whole distinction by means of going back to Aristotle and pointing out that our concepts don't need to have this distinction, that it is, after all, a distinction (as opposed to a reality).

One could almost say that we understand "fact" in relation to our understanding of "value" -- that the latter defines the former, and the former the latter. So to speak of moral facts is to smash these together, but by using the language of the very distinction which is being put into question. — Moliere

Yes. I was just playing with the is-ought thing to see what happened.

Fair enough.

It was a good opportunity to try to make my point clearer :D.

It's actually an example that MacIntyre uses in After Virtue to make the point about function (he uses a sea captain). I'll have to read that bit again to see what he gets from it, but I seem to remember it was kind of in passing.

Normativity conjures a possible world and calls it the ideal. The actual world is weighed against this ideal. Ancients cast this story in the heavens. We find it in an inner sanctum.

Anyway. Facts are true statements. Moral statements are treated as if they are truth apt.

For all practical purposes, true moral statements are facts.

Anyway. Facts are true statements. Moral statements are treated as if they are truth apt.

For all practical purposes, true moral statements are facts. — Mongrel

From where I'm sitting, I'm continually being told we can be sure there are no moral facts, that it's actually all "preferences". Why? Because, the argument goes, moral facts are too weird to be true.

And, the reasoning goes, you can't say, "because ___ is true, then you Ought to X",if X concerns morality, because we know there are no moral facts. But, you can say, because ______ is true, then reason Ought to be slave to the passions.

That just doesn't look like it's consistent to me.

I'm saying that I'm not so sure that moral facts are too weird to be true.

She is a firefighter.
Therefore she ought to do whatever a firefighter ought to do.

This works because a firefighter is defined functionally. There is a function characteristic of a firefighter, and this is what it is to be a firefighter (telos and nature are one).

Or does it work? Discuss... — jamalrob

That's basically the reasoning that ancient philosophers used to argue for virtue (moral excellence). Man ought to do what is characteristic of a man. Man is rational, wisdom is the good, wisdom is that which makes man morally excellent. Why? Just look at nature...

I was out mowing my lawn and thought of something I wanted to get down before I forgot. Maybe Ought Is just always the wrong word to use. No one uses "Ought" when they're doing math. In the same we don't have to use "Ought" when we're "doing ethics". If X is immoral, then when one does X, one is being immoral (like when one adds incorrectly, one is not following the rules of mathematics). Of course, that doesn't work in societies when we're trying to create laws, unless there is agreement about what is immoral, and that it is a good thing to be moral. And like I said before, even if moral facts, then it doesn't necessarily follow that they are easy to determine (how long to figure out math? How long to figure out diameter of earth?).

I'm saying that I'm not so sure that moral facts are too weird to be true. — anonymous66

Predictions are truth apt. Sometimes they turn out to be true. But they are not facts. I buy a lottery ticket; I predict that I will not win anything, but it is not a fact that I will not win anything.

You ought to understand that not all statements are 'is' statements, but this does not entail that they are not true or false. So it is true that a firefighter ought to fight fires (in given circumstances), but it is not true that a slave ought to slave.

Now folks are likely to ask me to justify this pronouncement, and I am going to have to disappoint them. However, Hume tells me that any justification must begin with a moral premise that will commend itself to these folks as in some sense foundational - love thy neighbour, or whatever.

I used to think that morality is post event... looking back. Prior to that there's nothing to judge. I thought pre event is amorality. Nietzsche changed my mind about that. It's different kinds of morality.

I bet you cannot come up with any hypothetical scenario that could falsify it. — John

if I recall correctly, what I argued for earlier in the thread, is that math can't be falsified. I did point out that some philosophers claim it can be done.

Perhaps Hume's reasoning for claiming that reason is and ought to be slave to the passions is that he thinks there is no way that pure reason can justify any moral approbation or disapprobation.He believes it is only the passions that can cause us to disapprove of those acts which cause social disharmony. I would say it is moral intuition that leads us to approve or disapprove; but then perhaps that is what Hume means by passion. Haven't read him much, so I can't say...

No matter the specifics, I think we all agree that Hume was arguing against an objective morality, don't we? I think we can say he definitely rejected the possibility of moral facts.

There are more and less rational ways of building concentration camps, executing people and selling insurance. Reason and morality are not good bedfellows. That's how I take Hume's meaning. Reason is a method to apply to premisses, deriving from 'passions'.

I wonder if Hume would approve of Sam Harris' attempt to combine science and ethics? (I have very little respect for Harris).

Hrmm. I don't know. But that would be an interpretive question more than the problem you pose, I'd say. He's a good spring-board (and a genius to boot), but we don't need to be confined to what Hume said, per se.

There may be facts about what is universally approved and disapproved of by humans; well, at least by those humans that are motivated by social considerations and 'normal' levels of concern for others.

Would you call those 'moral facts'?

I also want to add that, as I think I already said, mathematical theorems can certainly be falsified. But it seems to be true that simple counting cannot be falsified. If I pick some number, say 1,379,289,463,826 and claim that it is a prime number; then you would agree, would you not, that that claim may be falsified (or verified)?

I also want to add that, as I think I already said, mathematical theorems can certainly be falsified. — John

Hmmm. I don't know. Aren't you put in the position of just saying, "every time we test it, it works?" But, I haven't read anything by Imre Lakatos.

Seems to me that if moral facts, and if mathematical theorems are falsifiable, then moral facts would be, too.

I'm just repeating myself now. But the main points are, 1. is the possibility of moral facts all that strange? 2. Is the statement "you can't get an Ought from an Is", a universal, or does it only apply in certain cases? 3. Why falsifiability/verification? (and how to argue in it's defense?) 4.Is math itself even falsifiable?