Yes sure, a discrete entity can be composed of smaller discrete entities. The point is that if a discrete entity is active then that activity can only be understood to consist in relations between further entities (activity cannot be understood otherwise or it would not be coherently thought as being activity at all). The point is that this is an infinite regress unless there are fundamental discrete entities which are not active.

my argument was designated as 'gobbledegook' on Physics Forum. — Wayfarer

All that glisters is not gold.
Physics forum proves only one thing:
that much of academic physics is lower than
the lowest fundamentalist pseudo-religion.

So much of academia is just a mindless regurgitation of sophistry and jargon.

Yes sure, a discrete entity can be composed of smaller discrete entities. The point is that if a discrete entity is active then that activity can only be understood to consist in relations between further entities — Janus

If the entity is composed of parts, then the activity which it is involved in may be an activity of the eternal parts. The activity of the entity is understood without relating the entity to further entities.

The point is that this is an infinite regress unless there are fundamental discrete entities which are not active. — Janus

I don't see the relevance of any claim to infinite regress. If each "frame" consists of activity which is composed of parts which are active, why is there a need to worry about infinite regress? The source of activity may remain an unknown factor.

I think they can be trivial universes on their own. Does x=1 mean anything that just '1' doesn't? — noAxioms

Yes, I was meaning the equation for a line. In this case, would the line have an infinite number of points or would it be discrete? And if both a line and a number (a point on the line?) can be a universe, does that mean that there are universes within universes?

Well, I'd have to say two kinds of ontology: The structures themselves, which have no ontology, and the things in it (galaxies, cups, photons, gliders) which have a relationship to the structure as a whole. — noAxioms

My main objection is that you seem to be making a distinction between things in a universe, which are physical, and the universe itself which is not physical. But aren't the things in the universe themselves mathematical on your view? In which case, isn't the term "physical" merely human "baggage", to use Tegmark's term?

Well, the relational approach is very interesting in this issue. But again, the outcomes of choices are either random or deterministic (in the "reference frames" of the various agents) and randomness cannot explain free will. — boundless

Instead of random, I would say Alice's choice is determined by her (i.e., self-determined) in her reference frame, whereas the outcome can be predicted with certainty in Bob's reference frame.

On a relational approach, no contradiction arises since Alice and Bob haven't interacted and jointly considered the specific predicted outcome. But if they did, then Bob's prediction would no longer be certain, since he can only predict the outcomes of isolated systems, not outcomes of the (Alice + Bob) system he is now a part of. So Alice is free to reject that outcome. But Carol, an observer of the isolated (Alice + Bob) system, could still predict the outcome of Alice's choice.

On the other hand, if we allow the existence of libertarian free will in the case of Alice, maybe we can still assume that in Bob's "reference frame" the choice was inevitable. I wonder if this makes sense (if it does we actually solved the problem of "free will" and omniscence using an interpretation of QM :wink: Sometimes life can be very surprising :rofl: ) — boundless

Yes. Though it's worth noting that Bob can only predict the outcome of Alice's choice on the condition that he doesn't interact with Alice (perhaps itself a choice).

Yes, I was meaning the equation for a line. In this case, would the line have an infinite number of points or would it be discrete? — Andrew M

x=1 then means that for any x, the value is 1. So x can be a continuous line, an infinite series like the integers, or maybe a finite segment, discreet or not. It works for all of them. They’re all valid mathematical structures, and thus can be designated as a universe if you like.

And if both a line and a number (a point on the line?) can be a universe, does that mean that there are universes within universes?

There can be, sure. Our universe might be defined as our own chunk of spacetime as we know it, but inflation theory says that we are but one bubble condensed from inflation stuff, each of which is a non-interacting universe on its own, some as trivial as x=1. That bubble-space might be considered to be a larger universe that contains ours. In that view, our bubble is not a universe, just a bubble among others in this container.

My main objection is that you seem to be making a distinction between things in a universe, which are physical, and the universe itself which is not physical. But aren't the things in the universe themselves mathematical on your view? In which case, isn't the term "physical" merely human "baggage", to use Tegmark's term?

I like the term ‘human baggage’. I’m not calling contained objects ‘physical’, but in the example of CgoL, similarities can be drawn. In other ways, the similarity are thinner. CgoL has no concept of inertia or force for instance. Time has an arrow at the quantum level, not just at the entropy level.
Another mathematical structure example is the set of all valid chess states. This is a finite set (there is a maximum possible chess game of around 5000 moves), and there is time, entropy, and the possibility for the addition of dualism to the universe to allow ‘players’ which designate which of the states are real (in relation to the player) compared to the other states. But sans-player, the states as a universe unto itself is all equally real.

I think it's worth considering something like Rovelli's (and Bitbol's) relational approach here. Bob may be able to secretly predict the outcome of Alice's choice with certainty, per Bob's deterministic theory. But there is no specific outcome that Alice should regard as certain, since she can always reject that outcome and choose differently. — Andrew M

Wanted to comment on this. Where is Bob in relation to Alice? If outside (non-interacting) with closed Alice system, and if hard single-outcome determinism is true and Bob has access to full state and the resources to make the prediction, then yes, Alice, in the deterministic contained system, can be perfectly predicted and has no ‘predicted outcome’ to reject. Bob cannot divulge the prediction to Alice as that would be interacting, making the system not closed.

OK, so if Bob is within the closed system, there are several reasons, determinism or not, that he cannot make such a prediction. 1: State cannot be known, per Heisenberg uncertainty. 2: Bob cannot predict himself, even if he had this unobtainable state. It would require a mechanism to simulate itself faster than real time. Alice of course would just be waiting for Bob’s prediction, at which point Alice will choose the opposite thing. I can make a small mechanical device with only a couple parts that does that, and Bob will fail to predict its behavior. That doesn’t demonstrate that the device has free will, however you might define it.

Instead of random, I would say Alice's choice is determined by her (i.e., self-determined) in her reference frame, whereas the outcome can be predicted with certainty in Bob's reference frame. — Andrew M

Well I kind of agree with you. But you have to accept that Alice in her reference frame has "libertarian" free will, which is not strictly speaking allowed by the known theories of physics. But that's exactly is the problem. How can it "emerge" from either random or deterministic processes?

On a relational approach, no contradiction arises since Alice and Bob haven't interacted and jointly considered the specific predicted outcome. But if they did, then Bob's prediction would no longer be certain, since he can only predict the outcomes of isolated systems, not outcomes of the (Alice + Bob) system he is now a part of. So Alice is free to reject that outcome. But Carol, an observer of the isolated (Alice + Bob) system, could still predict the outcome of Alice's choice. — Andrew M

Excellent point, indeed!

Yes. Though it's worth noting that Bob can only predict the outcome of Alice's choice on the condition that he doesn't interact with Alice (perhaps itself a choice). — Andrew M

Agreed! :wink:

I wouldn't go so far as to say that "space" is simply a backdrop for Newton because I think he looked at space in different ways, depending on the purpose of his inquiry. For the purpose of describing the motions of physical objects, space is just a backdrop. But Newton was one of the pioneers in the experimentation with optics, and he proceeded to speculate into the nature of light itself. In this more metaphysical speculation it is evident that Newton believed space to be more than just a backdrop for physics. Although he put forth a corpuscular theory of light, Newton did extensive experimentation with refraction, and I believe he attributed the wave properties of light to something other than the light itself, but to its interactions with an aetheral space. Also, if I remember correctly he posits a type of spatial inversion between matter and light which he claims to occur within the sun. — Metaphysician Undercover

Good point!

Right, so in the space of potentialities, negative space, we cannot accurately say that particles are real. We have to look at positive space to find actual particles. And a real particle will occupy space, and have mass. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, it seems the necessary conclusion of the theory :wink:

I wouldn't go so far as to make this conclusion either. The problem which I alluded to in the last post is with the definition of "light". It is defined in the mathematics of physics as energy, meaning the capacity to do work, and therefore it is necessarily, by definition, a potentiality. But since it actually does work, then it must get related to physical objects in the cases that it actually does work, and so it must be described in an actual form which can relate to physical objects. This is the photon. — Metaphysician Undercover

Another very interesting point, indeed! to tell the truth I find the usual interpretation of E = mc^2 a bit "wrong". Strictly speaking it does not say that energy and mass are the same, but only that there is an associated quantity of energy to the mass of an object. And in fact, as you say the basic definition of energy is after all "the ability to produce work" - we can say the ability to cause some kind of change - and it is a potentiality. If we take the usual interpretation then everything is a potentiality and nothing is actual. The usual solution of this is to "actualize" energy, while in fact "our" model is maintaining the idea that energy is a potentiality and that mass is an actuality. This is indeed a very interesting point!

Do you agree that an electron has mass, and that it has a variable velocity? Having a variable velocity is directly related to having mass. A photon cannot have a variable velocity, nor can it have mass, due to conventional definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes! There is a qualitative difference between massless and massive particles in relativity. In fact a conosequence of that difference is exactly this different behaviour you are pointing at here!

Interaction is not a problem, because at the far right of the orthogonal lines, all existence must come from the negative space (potentiality). So in this zone, of the very beginning of the present moment, where even massive particles are in the form of potential, interaction occurs. Massive particles are compelled by the forces described by inertia, so they are not very susceptible to interference. However, changes to electrons can affect more massive particles, and electrons can be changed by photons. Even things at the low end of the scale (photons) can interfere with determined massive existence through the medium of electrons and existing instability. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok... I also had in mind a solution like that in mind. Interaction is between fields. This determines the outcome in the "positive" space. An objection might be made on the fact that photons interact with protons, too. But at the same time protons are made of quarks. So the interaction with the proton is an effective explanation of the phenomenon.


For now I stop here. I know it is an incomplete response. But I need some more time to think about the other things you wrote. Anyway it is a very interesting theory :wink:

Another very interesting point, indeed! to tell the truth I find the usual interpretation of E = mc^2 a bit "wrong". Strictly speaking it does not say that energy and mass are the same, but only that there is an associated quantity of energy to the mass of an object. — boundless

Right, and this association is made through the constant called the speed of light. That is why "length contraction" is such a counter-intuitive concept. Mass is related to density. But under the concept of length contraction an extremely fast moving object would appear to be contracted and therefore more dense, the same mass in a smaller area. What happens to the mass if the object reaches the boundary, the speed of light? I think it's more intuitive to think of an extremely fast moving object as covering more area in the same period of time required for measurement, and therefore being less dense. If a tiny object, such as an electron, or even a photon, actually has some mass, that mass might be spread out over a large area due to the velocity it has.

And in fact, as you say the basic definition of energy is after all "the ability to produce work" - we can say the ability to cause some kind of change - and it is a potentiality. If we take the usual interpretation then everything is a potentiality and nothing is actual. The usual solution of this is to "actualize" energy, while in fact "our" model is maintaining the idea that energy is a potentiality and that mass is an actuality. This is indeed a very interesting point! — boundless

The concept of energy is actual quite complex. It is defined as the capacity to do work, so it is inherently a potential. A potential must always be attributed to something actual in the form of a property of that thing, or else nothing substantiates, or grounds that potential. That's what differentiates a logical possibility, as imaginary and fictional, from an actual possibility. In the case of energy, the potential is attributed to the activity of an object, as kinetic energy. So activity is a potential, called energy. Beyond this we have potential energy, and this is the potential for a potential. If I understand correctly, potential energy is modeled by fields, so in this case the field mathematics represents the potential for a potential.

As you say, the usual approach is to simply actualize energy, but this is not to stay true to the conceptual foundations and the result is misunderstanding. The problem being that energy was conceptualized as the property moving mass. A moving object has energy, mv^2. When the speed of light was introduced as the limit to velocity, in the way that it was, then energy became simply the property of motion. With the transmission of electromagnetic energy, it is not possible that there is any "thing" which is moving from A to B, there is simply energy that is transmitted. But logically, conceptually, energy is the property of motion, and if there is motion from A to B there must be something moving from A to B. So we say that it's "energy" which moves from A to B, making the predicate into the subject. That is of course, circular logic. If energy gets from A to B, it must be the property of something which moves from A to B. What moves from A to B? Energy. The concept of energy is not really designed for describing what is transmitted by wave impulses.

Another example of the qualitative difference is this: In relativity we can always find a rest reference frame for massive particles, but for massless particles the concept of "rest frame" becomes meaningless. I find this point under-emphasized by physicists. In fact it means that - ultimately - we can speak about "flow of time" thanks to mass. If there were no mass, then temporal measurements could not be made (this is why it is said that photons are "timeless"...).

Remember, the speed of light is currently measured as a phenomenon in the negative space, related to objects in the positive space. On the orthogonal lines, the nature of space is actually changing. So if we give more time on the orthogonal line, beyond the range of human perception, to allow light to come into positive space, we ought to allow that distances would change due to the changing space, the distance between the same massive particles would increase. This seems to imply that the actual velocity of a photon would be greater than the recorded speed of light. If we do not allow light into the positive space of actuality, it becomes the infinite possibility, which feeds the notion of time travel. But that's just a basic idea, there are different things to sort out, such as the relationship between different frequencies... — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, but there is no problem now to have a faster than light photon. In fact the reason why there are no tachyons is not simply because they are "faster than light" but because in relativity information cannot travel faster than light. But, if we consider that space is changing etc, then there is no problem with this. Time travel is still avoided due to the fact that space changes. So I prefer the first idea here since time travel is illogical.

Human beings have come to notice temporal extension of being, of objects. This is the continuity of sameness across the orthogonal lines, along the traditional timeline, existence. The continuity of sameness is attributed to mass, and inertia, and this is what we attribute to the determinateness provided by coming to be in the past. As something comes to be in the past its spatial position is fixed and it is passive. So from our perspective, massive objects come to be on the right side of our perspective of the orthogonal timelines, so we see them as passive matter with mass and inertia. They are always on the past side of the zero line present, from our perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, this explains that the "two natures" of particles (waves/fields vs particles) is due to the dual nature of space. Inertia therefore is related to the persistence of particles in time. It is their "substance".

If we go to the other end of the human perspective, we'll find the energy of light. It is always on the future side of the present, from our perspective so we define it in terms of potentialities. Notice that the electron would be in between, and could be viewed in both ways. But let me get to the issue with the current theories involving the speed of light. An object, or particle, must have a fixed place on each orthogonal line in order that it may be engaged in locomotion. Locomotion is the particle's relative position from one orthogonal line to the next. If the particle has mass its position from one line to the next will be orderly according to laws of inertia. And, to fix the particle's position on the orthogonal lines is to give it mass. If it had a position without inertia, its relative position from one line to the next would be random and there would be no way of knowing its position. This is what happens to the photon under current definitions of light. Because the velocity of light is fixed, constant, and it is fixed in the position of negative space, potential, the photon cannot have a position on the orthogonal line. Not only is its position forced to be beyond the realm of human perspective, it is forced right off the end of the orthogonal line. By definition, the photon is not allowed to be apprehended as a determinate passive object, with a fixed spot on the orthogonal lines. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, this part is interesting. If this is true then the dualism quantum-classical world can be explained by the mass of the object. In fact we can imagine a mass-limit where all "quantum weirdness" disappears. Actually a drawback of "Copenaghism" is that it assumes this dualism but cannot explain why our world is classical. This is the main reason why MWI and the relational approaches are very popular: QM, for that approaches, is a complete theory at all massive scales.

Anyway there is a deep connection between energy/momenta and space/time. In physics courses it is often stressed that as we study small scales energy becomes gradually greater. Also in the De-Broglie wave-matter theory the higher is the mass, the lower wave-lenght we have. This strong bond between cinematic and dynamical quantities is therefore present both in current theories and this model.

It would not be correct therefore to describe any such interaction as within the positive space. In relation to "real change", activity takes place only within negative space, as negative space moves to become positive. In positive space, the position of things is fixed, as in the past, and the only change is locomotion, which is the fixed position of objects from one moment to the next. So a massive atom may move in relation to another, but this is strictly the locomotion of the massive nucleus. The electron however has an obscured motion because its locomotion (activity as an actual massive particle in positive space) is conflated with its real change (activity as potential within negative space). From one perspective, the electron has a potential position in its relations to the coming into being of massive nucleus, but from another perspective it has an actual position in relation to the coming into being of the photon. From the human perspective, the electron may be described as existing in negative space relative to the nucleus, or as in positive space relative to the photon. We model all real things as changing from potential to actual at each moment in time. This means we must adjust the constancy of the speed of light to allow that photons have actual existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok... but IMO we can think it in gradual terms. The electron has a "fuzzier" location because it is less massive than the nucleus. This gradation leads us to a quantitative dependance and in principle this dependance can be observed by experiments.

Right, and this association is made through the constant called the speed of light. That is why "length contraction" is such a counter-intuitive concept. Mass is related to density. But under the concept of length contraction an extremely fast moving object would appear to be contracted and therefore more dense, the same mass in a smaller area. What happens to the mass if the object reaches the boundary, the speed of light? I think it's more intuitive to think of an extremely fast moving object as covering more area in the same period of time required for measurement, and therefore being less dense. If a tiny object, such as an electron, or even a photon, actually has some mass, that mass might be spread out over a large area due to the velocity it has. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, this "conflict" might not be a problem for this theory if the experimental results are "saved". In fact that lenght contraction is derived by measurement of distances in SR (and based on the "speed of light" constancy that you discussed earler). This theory instead is quite different from SR in the explanation of the nature of space and time. So again "lenght contraction" is explained as a sort of illusion due to the fact that we do not use the orthogonal timelines.

The concept of energy is actual quite complex. It is defined as the capacity to do work, so it is inherently a potential. A potential must always be attributed to something actual in the form of a property of that thing, or else nothing substantiates, or grounds that potential. That's what differentiates a logical possibility, as imaginary and fictional, from an actual possibility. In the case of energy, the potential is attributed to the activity of an object, as kinetic energy. So activity is a potential, called energy. Beyond this we have potential energy, and this is the potential for a potential. If I understand correctly, potential energy is modeled by fields, so in this case the field mathematics represents the potential for a potential. — Metaphysician Undercover

In a sense I think you are right. While kinetic and rest energy can be thought as the potential of particles (and therefore it is a property of particles in the "actual" space), the potential energy in fact can be thought as a potential of that potential and therefore it can be thought to "exist" in the negative space. Before an apple falls from a tree the apple has (circa, in our frame etc) zero kinetic energy. Once it begins to fall it acquires kinetic energy and once it hits the ground it loses its kinetic energy. We can in fact think that potential energy and kinetic energy are two different concepts. They are both potentials but of different types. Today we tend to think them as more or less "the same" but this tendency might be due to the "craving for generality" to use an expression of Wittgenstein. In fact there are many "types" of energy and each should be distinguished. The conservation of "energy" is in fact a conservation of the "sum" of many different (but very similar) quantities, not the conservation of the same "thing".

As you say, the usual approach is to simply actualize energy, but this is not to stay true to the conceptual foundations and the result is misunderstanding. The problem being that energy was conceptualized as the property moving mass. A moving object has energy, mv^2. When the speed of light was introduced as the limit to velocity, in the way that it was, then energy became simply the property of motion. With the transmission of electromagnetic energy, it is not possible that there is any "thing" which is moving from A to B, there is simply energy that is transmitted. But logically, conceptually, energy is the property of motion, and if there is motion from A to B there must be something moving from A to B. So we say that it's "energy" which moves from A to B, making the predicate into the subject. That is of course, circular logic. If energy gets from A to B, it must be the property of something which moves from A to B. What moves from A to B? Energy. The concept of energy is not really designed for describing what is transmitted by wave impulses. — Metaphysician Undercover

IMO this objection maybe is solved by the reasoning above, i.e. that the different kinds of energy are different concepts that should be distinguished. Therefore "what" is transmitted by wave impulse is different by "what" is transmitted by a moving particle, but we need to count both of them to make a conservation law.

We seem to be going down an irrelevant tangent.

And if both a line and a number (a point on the line?) can be a universe, does that mean that there are universes within universes? — Andrew M

I think the use of the word 'universe' is about as much loaded human baggage as the term 'physical'. The (our) universe could be a mathematical structure, but to call any mathematical structure a universe is to load it with meaning unintended.
The point I wanted to discuss is that IF our universe is such a structure, it need not be instantiated in some larger context to explain empirical experience. It needs to be instantiated in said larger context only in order for something in that larger context to examine it. I've given examples.

The point I wanted to discuss is that IF our universe is such a structure, it need not be instantiated in some larger context to explain empirical experience. — noAxioms

I agree that it doesn't need to be instantiated in some larger context (since there may be no larger context), but I would argue that it still needs to be concrete, not merely abstract. I'd like to highlight this part of Tegmark's (shorter) explanation of the MUH:

Before discussing whether the mathematical universe hypothesis is correct, however, there is a more urgent question: what does it actually mean? To understand this, it helps to distinguish between two ways of viewing our external physical reality. One is the outside overview of a physicist studying its mathematical structure, like a bird surveying a landscape from high above; the other is the inside view of an observer living in the world described by the structure, like a frog living in the landscape surveyed by the bird. — Shut up and calculate - Max Tegmark

So I don't agree that there is a bird's eye view of the universe (i.e., a view from nowhere). We never directly observe numbers or mathematical structures, only concrete things that we can then describe in abstract terms. Mathematical equations ultimately derive their meaning from those concrete things, they aren't dispensable "human baggage". So a complete mathematical description of the universe would need to be in human-observer terms (i.e., a view from somewhere).

The idea that there are pure abstractions or a view from nowhere seem to be claims without an empirical basis.

Wanted to comment on this. Where is Bob in relation to Alice? If outside (non-interacting) with closed Alice system, and if hard single-outcome determinism is true and Bob has access to full state and the resources to make the prediction, then yes, Alice, in the deterministic contained system, can be perfectly predicted and has no ‘predicted outcome’ to reject. Bob cannot divulge the prediction to Alice as that would be interacting, making the system not closed. — noAxioms

Yes.

OK, so if Bob is within the closed system, there are several reasons, determinism or not, that he cannot make such a prediction. 1: State cannot be known, per Heisenberg uncertainty. 2: Bob cannot predict himself, even if he had this unobtainable state. It would require a mechanism to simulate itself faster than real time. Alice of course would just be waiting for Bob’s prediction, at which point Alice will choose the opposite thing. I can make a small mechanical device with only a couple parts that does that, and Bob will fail to predict its behavior. That doesn’t demonstrate that the device has free will, however you might define it. — noAxioms

It doesn't. But I don't define free will as implying unpredictability (nor predictability as implying its absence), but as choosing what one wants. The point is that there is no outcome that Alice must accept if she doesn't want to.

Well I kind of agree with you. But you have to accept that Alice in her reference frame has "libertarian" free will, which is not strictly speaking allowed by the known theories of physics. But that's exactly is the problem. How can it "emerge" from either random or deterministic processes? — boundless

The free will here is that Alice can choose the outcome she wants (and the outcome she wants can change as new information is brought to her attention). I don't see that known (deterministic) theories of physics disallow that, though I would agree they don't explain it either.

The free will here is that Alice can choose the outcome she wants (and the outcome she wants can change as new information is brought to her attention). I don't see that known (deterministic) theories of physics disallow that, though I would agree they don't explain it either. — Andrew M

To clarify what I meant with the problem of "free will":

I think that the problem with compatibilism is that in fact we do not have a "libertarian" free will which is neither compatible with determinism nor with "randomism" (and I think, neither with a combination of the two, if such a combination is possible). The "effective" free will advocated by compatibilism in fact is not a "real" free will, but simply it is a statement of "unpredictability". If our choices are due to deterministic processes then they are inevitable and ideally even predictable. If our choices are in part due to quantum phenomena then (if Pilot-Wave Theory is wrong, of course) there is a random component but still there is no real "libertarian" free will. Therefore if all phenomena, including our mental processes, volitions etc, are either deterministic or random then "libertarian" free will is impossible. If we allow that instead there is some real free agency then, as I discussed with Janus last week in this very thread (see the end of page 12 onwards), it seems that either free agency has no "physical explanation" or that there are some aspects of reality that cannot be treated mathematically (in its known form) in a coherent and complete way.

Anyway, you seem to agree with me on this point :wink: :

... though I would agree they don't explain it either — Andrew M

P.S.
likely unrelated note, but might be of interest: if I do not err, Max Tegmark suggested that to avoid the constraints of Goedel theorem his "mathematical universe hypothesis" should be modified into the restricted version "computable universe hypothesis". This (and similar things I read some time ago but unfortunately I cannot remeber now), seem to suggest that if there is a "theory of everything" then "physical laws" are computable. And therefore there is not "libertarian" free will of course. Hence "free will", if it exists, seems to imply that we cannot produce a coherent and complete "theory of everyting".

Another example of the qualitative difference is this: In relativity we can always find a rest reference frame for massive particles, but for massless particles the concept of "rest frame" becomes meaningless. I find this point under-emphasized by physicists. In fact it means that - ultimately - we can speak about "flow of time" thanks to mass. If there were no mass, then temporal measurements could not be made (this is why it is said that photons are "timeless"...). — boundless

I think that this is the most important aspect of the subject, how we relate to temporal continuity. We see that mass has a tendency to persist, to continue its existence in time, and this is what inspired Newton's laws regarding mass and inertia. But how we actually understand the temporal continuity of existence is not so straight forward. It's best to go right back to Aristotle's hylomorphism to get a firm understanding of these principles.

Plato had exposed the difference between those who believe in the logical principles of being and not being as fundamental to reality, and those who believe in becoming as fundamental. According to Aristotle, sophists could argue that becoming, and change, are not real. What is real is describable by "what is", and when change occurs, there is a new "what is". But Aristotle demonstrated how this leads to infinite regress. If "what is" at one moment is other than "what it was" at the last moment, then to account for the change between them, we must posit an intermediate "what is". This would create an infinite regress of always needing to posit an intermediate "what is" between any two different states to account for the change which occurs between them. This is similar to Zeno's paradoxes. So Aristotle allowed for a special category of "potential", to account for becoming and change, and "potential" was designated as having exclusion from the law of excluded middle. He also used "potential" to refer to future things which may or may not occur, and said that it is incorrect to say that there is truth or untruth concerning these things.

In his physics, he describes a world of changing forms (what is), and posits matter as the underlying potential for change. Matter, having the character of potential, is what persists, or remains the same, when change occurs. So matter is what gives reality to temporal continuity between one state and the next changed state, as that which persists through change. Without matter, change becomes unintelligible, due to the infinite regress described, as one state distinct from another changed state, with no connection of "becoming" between them. But "matter" is just assumed, and the term may be applied to whatever is observed to be unchanging in the changing world, to account for temporal continuity. So if we take a tree, and describe the different things we can do with the wood, in this case, "wood" is the unchanging thing, the matter. But we could break the wood down to molecules and in this case the molecules would be the matter. And so we can go further, to atoms, fundamental particles, or energy, and these would be "the matter". "Matter" signifies a concept which accounts for what persists, unchanged, as time passes.

Newton attempts to attribute fundamental properties to matter, like mass and inertia, but this is problematic, because it is to say that matter has some necessary form, mass, and inertia. That matter has a necessary form is contrary to the conception. So even though mass and inertia are the fundamental principles by which we observe temporal continuity, these concepts are not necessarily representative of the reality of temporal continuity. They represent how we observe temporal continuity. And observations are of forms, while temporal continuity is represented by "matter". With the current conception of energy, based in Einsteinian physics, physicists deny mass and inertia as the necessary properties of matter, attempting to strip it down to its true conception of simple temporal continuity.

Now we have the issue of formless matter, pure energy. But this is strictly denied by Aristotelian metaphysics as inherently unintelligible, because the form which matter has is what is apprehended by us. So our observations of temporal continuity is what is provided for by the concept of matter, but if we remove all form from matter, then temporal continuity becomes unintelligible because it's unrelatable to any observations. As much as "matter" represents temporal continuity, and is apprehended by us as such, without a particular form, (what it is), it becomes unintelligible to us. Now under the precepts of special relativity theory we get the claim "time is just an illusion". The problem though is that time is very real, so if we're working under a theory which renders it as an illusion, this will only hinder the progress.

The point I wanted to discuss is that IF our universe is such a structure, it need not be instantiated in some larger context to explain empirical experience.
— noAxioms

I agree that it doesn't need to be instantiated in some larger context (since there may be no larger context), but I would argue that it still needs to be concrete, not merely abstract. — Andrew M

Being concrete would be an objective context, the larger context of all things that actually exist, not in relation to anything. I guess I’m trying to argue against your point, that concreteness is necessary.
What do you mean by ‘abstract’? Just not-concrete? The word has connotations of being a mental construct (thought or idea), which is not the direction I’m going. Our universe is not necessarily conceived of by something not part of the structure.

I'd like to highlight this part of Tegmark's (shorter) explanation of the MUH:

“Before discussing whether the mathematical universe hypothesis is correct, however, there is a more urgent question: what does it actually mean? To understand this, it helps to distinguish between two ways of viewing our external physical reality. One is the outside overview of a physicist studying its mathematical structure, like a bird surveying a landscape from high above; the other is the inside view of an observer living in the world described by the structure, like a frog living in the landscape surveyed by the bird.”
— Shut up and calculate - Max Tegmark

So I don't agree that there is a bird's eye view of the universe (i.e., a view from nowhere). We never directly observe numbers or mathematical structures, only concrete things that we can then describe in abstract terms.

Agree. Tegmark is speaking of an objective description of the universe, not a relational one. There is indeed no nowhere from which there is such a view. I find his bird analogy a poor one, since it is only panning back to a larger picture, but not one from outside. Telescopes and microscopes are both still subjective views.

One can consider the universe in objective terms, but it is not an actual ‘view’. At best, the structure can be simulated, and the simulation viewed. The simulation serves no purpose to the thing simulated. It only serves a purpose to the runner of the simulation, allowing examination. The fact that it does not server a purpose to the structure simulated is a primary motivation for realization that the structure being concrete is not a requirement.

Mathematical equations ultimately derive their meaning from those concrete things, they aren't dispensable "human baggage". So a complete mathematical description of the universe would need to be in human-observer terms (i.e., a view from somewhere).

The meaning might be indispensible human baggage, but the structure itself (not necessarily any ‘equation’ that describes it to an observer for whom it means something) seems not to require said observer. OK, ours comes with humans built in, so it seems to be a structure that finds meaning in itself, but that’s an internal relation, not ontology.

We seem to just be asserting opposite views. I don’t see either of us making good justification of our positions. Doing my best. I don’t claim that there is no ontology, just that it is not necessary. To me, that seems to put at least some burden on you to show (not just assert) that it is necessary. The humans in the uninstantiated universe would have the exact same observations and thoughts as the humans in the instantiated universe. Do you disagree? It seems to assume that humans are part of said universe, and not external experiencers of it, so kind of discarding dualist biases, which is hard to do.

The idea that there are pure abstractions or a view from nowhere seem to be claims without an empirical basis.

Not claiming this, so agree. From nowhere, there is no view at all.


I may comment on the free will thing separately. Doesn’t belong in this post.

I may comment on the free will thing separately. Doesn’t belong in this post. — noAxioms

I disagree. How one views free will is a reflection on how one views the passing of time. And that is central to this issue.

"Bob cannot predict himself, even if he had this unobtainable state. It would require a mechanism to simulate itself faster than real time. Alice of course would just be waiting for Bob’s prediction, at which point Alice will choose the opposite thing. I can make a small mechanical device with only a couple parts that does that, and Bob will fail to predict its behavior. That doesn’t demonstrate that the device has free will, however you might define it."
— noAxioms

It doesn't. But I don't define free will as implying unpredictability (nor predictability as implying its absence), but as choosing what one wants. The point is that there is no outcome that Alice must accept if she doesn't want to. — Andrew M

I agree that your definition is enough to assign responsibility for one's actions. The average argument defines free will differently, but then incorrectly concludes that I should not be held responsible (on Earth) for my actions. "You shouldn't jail me, physics made me do it!". This is bunk. Physics will also toss your sorry posterior in the clink, and by the same argument, is not wrong for doing so.

So the question seems to break down into the nature of self (am I a soul or a physical construct?), and the thing which is holding you responsible for your actions. I think of three primary cases, and the definition of free will seems to apply differently to each of them, making it a mistake to apply one argument to all the cases.

Case 1: Physicalism: Your definition works fine here. Alice definitely can choose as she wills, and held responsible for her actions by physical society. Not completely. Alice wills to fly, and physics prevents that. Alice cannot be held responsible for failing to fly.
Free will is rarely defined your way. The argument typically points out that Alice's will is determined as well, being a causal effect of prior state, which makes it not free. I have no idea why it would be a bad thing for my will to be based on prior state. Example: Alice sees a person cross the road in front of her car. She's more responsible for her actions if she ignores that state? Physics says Alice sees the person and wills to hit the brakes because of that input, but a free willed person will base the decision on something other than the detection of a person crossing in front of her. This makes no sense. Why is that a better thing?

Case 2: Non-physical interactive soul: The analogy here is Tomb Raider. The player is the spirit soul, and Lara is the physical avatar. Lara is not responsible for her mistakes, you are. You are punished (in the spirit realm) for screwing up by not finishing the game.
The soul is not part of the physical system, and can be held responsible by some similar non-physical entity, typically a deity. Most proponents of free will assume biases for case 2, but fail to understand that the logic only applies to case 2.
Alice (spirit soul) again can do what she wants since her soul is supposedly in charge. It means that physics must must include a mechanism for introduction of external change, else the actions of Alice's physical person do indeed come from physics, fully determined or not. I agree, determinism or predictability is irrelevant. It just makes the analysis easier, but doesn't change the answer.
Absurdly, the physical Alice in the case 2 scenario is considered to be free willed precisely because she's not able to choose for herself, but lets her actions be determined via remote control. "You can't jail me you honor, my soul made me do it!".

Case 3: Epiphenomenal soul: This one is dualism with no violation of physics. The analogy this time is Harry Potter being held responsible for wandering the grounds after hours. You are the spirit soul experiencing Harry. Harry can be held responsible by Snape, who is also part of the physics, but you the epiphenomenal experiencer cannot be held responsible for Harry's actions either by Snape nor by your society since you lack the ability to choose. Again, I like your definition. The viewer and Harry are two separate entities, not one with a agent/avatar relationship.

- - -

I may comment on the free will thing separately. Doesn’t belong in this post.
— noAxioms

I disagree. How one views free will is a reflection on how one views the passing of time. And that is central to this issue. — Metaphysician Undercover

That post was not about the passage of time. Neither is this one, but I agree that interpretation of time is relevant to the issue.

Dare I join the debate having also sensed the danger of treading in the philosophical waters of the physics forum....I am interested in observation and see a bridge between the view of something has to be this or that rather than potentially something..esse est percipe arguably bishop berkeley unintentionally anticipates shrodinger in his views about observation being the determining factor..potential dead cats collapse of wave function and as knox said "that is why the tree continues to be since observed by yours faithfully God. " As a historian the issue of any reality indepe dent of the observer is always on my mind. Thank you if you have taken the time to read this.
Ed

.I am interested in observation and see a bridge between the view of something has to be this or that rather than potentially something..esse est percipe arguably bishop berkeley unintentionally anticipates shrodinger in his views about observation being the determining factor. — Edmund

It is well-known that Schrodinger was a lifelong fan of Schopenhauer, more than Berkeley. and also expressed an interest in Vedanta. I referred to this article earlier in this thread but you might have missed it, having just joined (and welcome, by the way) - Quantum Mysticism: Gone but Not Forgotten.

My considered view after many years of study is that the assumption of 'mind independence' arises from methodological naturalism. It is not an explicitly metaphysical attitude, but it is one that has deep metaphysical consequences.

Oh, sorry noAxioms, my mistake. I somehow misread your comment as saying that such a discussion doesn't belong in this thread. Read too fast sometimes, and miss some words.

I am interested in observation and see a bridge between the view of something has to be this or that rather than potentially something.. — Edmund

This is the age old difference between being and becoming. Parmenides and the Eleatics insisted reality is described by being, and not being, what is and what is not. The natural philosophers of ancient Greece, like Heraclitus claimed that all is flux, and described reality in terms of becoming. Plato exposed a deep chasm separating these two world views. Aristotle demonstrated that being and becoming are fundamentally incompatible, and suggested an exception to the law of excluded middle to allow for the reality of becoming, under the concept of potential, in relation to the logical categories of being and not being. He insisted that the law of non-contradiction be upheld, but some modern schools such as dialectical materialism, adopting the principles of Hegelian dialectics, promote dialetheism which allows the law of non-contradiction to be violated.

It is not an explicitly metaphysical attitude, but it is one that has deep metaphysical consequences. — Wayfarer

Metaphysical differences produce epistemological consequences.

The "effective" free will advocated by compatibilism in fact is not a "real" free will, but simply it is a statement of "unpredictability". — boundless

Alice could choose tea over coffee all her life and everyone who knows her could predict this. But I don't think this demonstrates that it wasn't really her choice.

I think conceiving of determinism in an absolute sense (the view from nowhere) does seem to negate agent causality, as you indicate. However my argument is that deterministic theories are only applicable within a context (the view from somewhere). So, for Alice, the context includes her ability to make choices, her perceptual capabilities, her knowledge and so on. She can then use deterministic theories to predict what external physical systems will do. But those theories can't circumvent or undermine the intentional context that they are empirically grounded in. And so we see that when Bob interacts with Alice, his prediction about her choice breaks down and Alice's intentional choice prevails.

This (and similar things I read some time ago but unfortunately I cannot remeber now), seem to suggest that if there is a "theory of everything" then "physical laws" are computable. — boundless

Yes, I agree with the computability thesis (though not with Tegmark's Platonism).

Being concrete would be an objective context, the larger context of all things that actually exist, not in relation to anything. I guess I’m trying to argue against your point, that concreteness is necessary.
What do you mean by ‘abstract’? Just not-concrete? The word has connotations of being a mental construct (thought or idea), which is not the direction I’m going. Our universe is not necessarily conceived of by something not part of the structure. — noAxioms

As an example, I see two apples on the table but I don't see the number two. The apples are concrete particulars, the number two is an abstract quantity.

On the problem of universals, my position is Aristotelian realism. So I regard the universe as concrete and observable. Also the universe has a mathematical structure, but that structure is not separable from matter.

The meaning might be indispensible human baggage, but the structure itself (not necessarily any ‘equation’ that describes it to an observer for whom it means something) seems not to require said observer. OK, ours comes with humans built in, so it seems to be a structure that finds meaning in itself, but that’s an internal relation, not ontology. — noAxioms

I agree that the universe doesn't need an observer. But given that we are observing it, it follows that it is concrete (since we can't observe universals). Just as the apples must be concrete in order to observe them.

Now your claim seems to be that that is just us humans talking about the universe in our human way - the universe could really be something else in itself. But my argument is that abstractions (and representations) have an essential logical dependency on concrete particulars in our language use. So we can't then just posit something as being purely abstract (which we never observe) and expect that to be a meaningful statement.

We seem to just be asserting opposite views. I don’t see either of us making good justification of our positions. Doing my best. I don’t claim that there is no ontology, just that it is not necessary. To me, that seems to put at least some burden on you to show (not just assert) that it is necessary. The humans in the uninstantiated universe would have the exact same observations and thoughts as the humans in the instantiated universe. Do you disagree? It seems to assume that humans are part of said universe, and not external experiencers of it, so kind of discarding dualist biases, which is hard to do. — noAxioms

I do disagree since, on my view, an uninstantiated (purely abstract) universe would be just nothing. But I do also agree that we are internal experiencers of the universe and that dualism is mistaken. While my specific arguments are the observation and coherency arguments above, generally speaking it's really just the philosophical question of the problem of universals.

I agree that your definition is enough to assign responsibility for one's actions. The average argument defines free will differently, but then incorrectly concludes that I should not be held responsible (on Earth) for my actions. "You shouldn't jail me, physics made me do it!". This is bunk. Physics will also toss your sorry posterior in the clink, and by the same argument, is not wrong for doing so. — noAxioms

Exactly.

I agree with your analysis in the rest of your post and your analogies are great. My general thought is that a pragmatic definition is an abstraction that enables different people to fill in the details according to their own preferred philosophical views. But, being pragmatic, everyone understands how it is used and so communication remains possible despite those different philosophies. We see this in a striking way with the different QM interpretations despite there being broad methodological agreement on how to use the math to solve practical problems.

Wayfarer
Just read the article on quantum mysticism that you directed me to...excellent. my linking berkeley and schrodinger was not to claim the influence of the former on the latter but rather as an example of the fermat solution issue which it seems involves aspects of geometry inaccessible to fermat so in a sense is another solution to his alluded to in his marginal note. I am fascinated by how early thinkers often prefigure/frame debates furthered later in contexts alien to them but which arguably subjectify their initial thoughts. The quantum article suggests the shift of thinking research to an anglo american context demystified it. I read all the contributions in this thread with great interest. Thanks all.

Plato had exposed the difference between those who believe in the logical principles of being and not being as fundamental to reality, and those who believe in becoming as fundamental. According to Aristotle, sophists could argue that becoming, and change, are not real. What is real is describable by "what is", and when change occurs, there is a new "what is". But Aristotle demonstrated how this leads to infinite regress. If "what is" at one moment is other than "what it was" at the last moment, then to account for the change between them, we must posit an intermediate "what is". This would create an infinite regress of always needing to posit an intermediate "what is" between any two different states to account for the change which occurs between them. This is similar to Zeno's paradoxes. So Aristotle allowed for a special category of "potential", to account for becoming and change, and "potential" was designated as having exclusion from the law of excluded middle. He also used "potential" to refer to future things which may or may not occur, and said that it is incorrect to say that there is truth or untruth concerning these things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Thank you for this explanation! Unfortunately I do not know much of Aristotle, and in fact I am discovering that what I thought to know about him was very incorrect.

But "potential" has some causal role in change or is merely a substratum? I mean, we observe acts, i.e. changing forms. We assume that there is a "potential" to take into account change to avoid the intermediate "what is" paradox and we call "matter" this "potential".
So, the above question can be rephrased as: are "changing forms" simply an "expression" of "what persists", i.e. matter? If this is true, then I agree with you that this "matter" must be something that in itself has almost no "properties" - hence it is "formless". The property it has is that it can be actualized in all possible "forms".

Now we have the issue of formless matter, pure energy. But this is strictly denied by Aristotelian metaphysics as inherently unintelligible, because the form which matter has is what is apprehended by us. So our observations of temporal continuity is what is provided for by the concept of matter, but if we remove all form from matter, then temporal continuity becomes unintelligible because it's unrelatable to any observations. As much as "matter" represents temporal continuity, and is apprehended by us as such, without a particular form, (what it is), it becomes unintelligible to us. Now under the precepts of special relativity theory we get the claim "time is just an illusion". The problem though is that time is very real, so if we're working under a theory which renders it as an illusion, this will only hinder the progress. — Metaphysician Undercover

...And therefore we need to introduce the distinction between the "potential" and the "actual" into two dfferent spaces. So, in fact, maybe it can be said that SR tends to consider only an aspect of reality, i.e. "pure energy". But in fact if we want to really understand the nature of time, we need to consider both "aspects".

So, if we do not consider the "positive" space then we will conclude that "time does not exist". But, time in fact, contrary to what many physicists think, might be real, after all :cool:

Alice could choose tea over coffee all her life and everyone who knows her could predict this. But I don't think this demonstrates that it wasn't really her choice. — Andrew M

Agreed!

I think conceiving of determinism in an absolute sense (the view from nowhere) does seem to negate agent causality, as you indicate. However my argument is that deterministic theories are only applicable within a context (the view from somewhere). So, for Alice, the context includes her ability to make choices, her perceptual capabilities, her knowledge and so on. She can then use deterministic theories to predict what external physical systems will do. But those theories can't circumvent or undermine the intentional context that they are empirically grounded in. And so we see that when Bob interacts with Alice, his prediction about her choice breaks down and Alice's intentional choice prevails. — Andrew M

I agree that deterministic theories are context-dependent.

What I do not understand however is how can something like "free agency" arise from deterministic processes (or a combination between deterministic and random processes). But as you said, this is normal since no theory has ever explained it :wink:

Yes, I agree with the computability thesis (though not with Tegmark's Platonism). — Andrew M

I, too, disagree with Tegmark's Platonism. But I disagree with computabilism because I think that, for example, the "workings" of our minds cannot be explained in computabilistic terms. At the same time however our theories to be both consistent and complete must be computable. This shows, however, the limits of physics IMO. (and of course I did not mean to "lower" the importance of it with this observation :wink: )

As an example, I see two apples on the table but I don't see the number two. The apples are concrete particulars, the number two is an abstract quantity. — Andrew M

Because you share the same structure as the apples, and not with the number two. It is abstract to you (and you to it), a weaker or at least different relation than the one you have with the apples.

I agree that the universe doesn't need an observer. But given that we are observing it, it follows that it is concrete (since we can't observe universals). Just as the apples must be concrete in order to observe them.

You’d observe them the same if they were not concrete. The exact same relations would exist, just between two things (observer/apple) in the same structure that happens to not be concrete. If the empirical experience is different because of this, the relations would be different, meaning it was not the same structure. I’m assuming a closed structure here, but I think no more.

Now your claim seems to be that that is just us humans talking about the universe in our human way - the universe could really be something else in itself. But my argument is that abstractions (and representations) have an essential logical dependency on concrete particulars in our language use. So we can't then just posit something as being purely abstract (which we never observe) and expect that to be a meaningful statement.

I observe it, being part of it. Indeed, I could not observe it from outside, lacking a particular ‘it’ to observe. It could be simulated, but then it is the simulation being observed, not the structure itself.
Again, I reach for the simplest cases like 2+2=4, which has no particular, but the relation between 2+2 and 4 exists, particular or not. I can simulate (perform the addition) to observe this, but doing so is just for the benefit of the performer of the operation and has no effect on the truth of the relation.

I do disagree since, on my view, an uninstantiated (purely abstract) universe would be just nothing.

It would not be at all, which is different from being nothing.

But I do also agree that we are internal experiencers of the universe and that dualism is mistaken. While my specific arguments are the observation and coherency arguments above, generally speaking it's really just the philosophical question of the problem of universals.

I don’t really claim anything one way or the other on universals. I need to see how this fits in, since you seem to lean on the problem of universals as a counter-argument to my idea here.

But "potential" has some causal role in change or is merely a substratum? I mean, we observe acts, i.e. changing forms. We assume that there is a "potential" to take into account change to avoid the intermediate "what is" paradox and we call "matter" this "potential".
So, the above question can be rephrased as: are "changing forms" simply an "expression" of "what persists", i.e. matter? If this is true, then I agree with you that this "matter" must be something that in itself has almost no "properties" - hence it is "formless". The property it has is that it can be actualized in all possible "forms". — boundless

The issue with "potential" gets more complicated with Aristotle's cosmological argument. The argument is that no potential can be eternal, therefore there must be an actuality which is prior to all potential. This is how Aristotle denies the reality of "prime matter", potentiality without any actuality (what is sometimes called the eternal flux of the infinite apeiron). A boundless potential denies any actuality, and therefore could not actualize itself. If such an infinite potential ever existed, it would always exist, and therefore there could not ever be anything actually existing. But this is contrary to what we observe, which is the actual existence of forms. So we must deny the reality of infinite potential, assuming that there is always actuality which is prior to and therefore limits any potential.

Understanding this cosmological argument can have a great influence over the way that one understands time. Suppose that the passage of time is understood by us through the analysis of changing forms. The passage of time, in conception, is tied to and bound by the changes in actually existing forms. But we also learn from our understanding of free will and such things that the potential for any actual form precedes its actual existence. This is how ethical determinism is denied, we allow that a form of actual existence comes from the potential for that existence. So any actual state of existence, at a particular point in time, doesn't necessitate the next state, there is the potential for a multiplicity of next states.

If we apply this to our understanding of time, we see that this understanding is incomplete because the conception of time is produced from the changing forms, but we have determined the logical necessity for a "potential" which is "prior to" the changing forms. Our concept of time cannot grasp this potential, because it is prior to the changing forms, upon which the concept of time is based. The idea of something prior to time is irrational and contradictory. Now we bring in the cosmological argument which states that this "potential" cannot refer to anything real and therefore cannot account for the real existence of the changing forms, unless it is soundly based in something actual. So we must find the means to give actual existence to the potential, in order to bring it into the realm of intelligibility (potential, as it is, defies the fundamental principles of logic).

What I infer from this is that we need to extend our concept of time, to establish a relationship between the actuality of changing forms, and the actuality which is prior to the potential for changing forms. Our concept of time stymies us because the idea of something prior to time is contradictory. But the concept of time doesn't extend beyond the changing forms, and this is what is necessary to allow for the potential for change. The potential for change is prior to the changing forms, and therefore outside of "time" as presently conceived. So we must extend "recreate" the concept of time to allow for the potential for change, which is now outside of time. "Potential" itself doesn't give us anything to base a concept of time in, because it can refer only to the passing of time which is the potential for change, and this produces nothing but infinite possibility. So we must turn to the actuality which is behind this potential, to restrict what appears as infinite potential, determine what the passing of time actually is, in order to relate the changing forms to the underlying actuality, thereby expanding the conception of time in a real way.

...And therefore we need to introduce the distinction between the "potential" and the "actual" into two dfferent spaces. So, in fact, maybe it can be said that SR tends to consider only an aspect of reality, i.e. "pure energy". But in fact if we want to really understand the nature of time, we need to consider both "aspects".

So, if we do not consider the "positive" space then we will conclude that "time does not exist". But, time in fact, contrary to what many physicists think, might be real, after all — boundless

Right, the two different spaces account for the two distinct actualities. Without distinguishing between them they are conflated and produce the appearance of infinite possibility, or potential. There is nothing actual which "the passing of time" refers to, so it appears as infinite potential. What the cosmological argument teaches us is that "infinite potential" is an unintelligible concept which renders metaphysics and ontology as incomprehensible. Idealists and materialists alike get drawn into the trap of infinite potential as Aristotle demonstrated. The cosmological argument refutes Pythagorean (Platonic) Idealism, in which human ideas are said to be eternal, by showing the true nature of these ideas as having the characteristic of potential, and it also refutes Anaximander's materialism which refers to an eternal chaos, or "aperion", which is matter, or potential.

The issue with "potential" gets more complicated with Aristotle's cosmological argument. The argument is that no potential can be eternal, therefore there must be an actuality which is prior to all potential. This is how Aristotle denies the reality of "prime matter", potentiality without any actuality (what is sometimes called the eternal flux of the infinite apeiron). A boundless potential denies any actuality, and therefore could not actualize itself. If such an infinite potential ever existed, it would always exist, and therefore there could not ever be anything actually existing. But this is contrary to what we observe, which is the actual existence of forms. So we must deny the reality of infinite potential, assuming that there is always actuality which is prior to and therefore limits any potential. — Metaphysician Undercover

Interestingly, both "idealist" and "materialist" philosophies tend to say that the "first cause" (or "first principle") is something that is "simple", has infinite potentialities etc. While I do respect these philosophies (well, after all my username is "boundless", apeiron in Greek), I saw no convincing explanation on how the "world" could arise from this "primordial potentiality". As I said, I know almost nothing about Aristotle, but interestingly here he criticizes exaclty this point.

Anyway, Aristotle's argument is sound. If it is true, then a "double-aspect" is heavily implied.

Understanding this cosmological argument can have a great influence over the way that one understands time. Suppose that the passage of time is understood by us through the analysis of changing forms. The passage of time, in conception, is tied to and bound by the changes in actually existing forms. But we also learn from our understanding of free will and such things that the potential for any actual form precedes its actual existence. This is how ethical determinism is denied, we allow that a form of actual existence comes from the potential for that existence. So any actual state of existence, at a particular point in time, doesn't necessitate the next state, there is the potential for a multiplicity of next states. — Metaphysician Undercover

This could solve the problem that Janus posited, before. From a purely "naturalistic" (in our langauge if we consider only the "changng forms") reasoning free-will is literally impossible. If we accept the view that we are completely "natural" phenomena then free-will is simply illusory (or it is taken as an emergent phenomenon, in a way that is not very convincing).

In this theory, free-will seems well explained.

If we apply this to our understanding of time, we see that this understanding is incomplete because the conception of time is produced from the changing forms, but we have determined the logical necessity for a "potential" which is "prior to" the changing forms. Our concept of time cannot grasp this potential, because it is prior to the changing forms, upon which the concept of time is based. The idea of something prior to time is irrational and contradictory. Now we bring in the cosmological argument which states that this "potential" cannot refer to anything real and therefore cannot account for the real existence of the changing forms, unless it is soundly based in something actual. So we must find the means to give actual existence to the potential, in order to bring it into the realm of intelligibility (potential, as it is, defies the fundamental principles of logic). — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, I agree that in this "dual-aspects" (potentialities and actualities) model, our concept of time needs redefinition. If we think about measurements, clearly we measure "time" in relation to the changing form. Hence we need a redefinition.

In your view the universe had a beginning? I agree that speaking about something "before time" is illogical ("before" is a temporal relation and outside time speaking of "before" or "after" is meaningless), but at the same time, to me it seems that this model requires that time had no "beginning" due to the fact that potentialities and actualities cannot be separated.

Right, the two different spaces account for the two distinct actualities. Without distinguishing between them they are conflated and produce the appearance of infinite possibility, or potential. There is nothing actual which "the passing of time" refers to, so it appears as infinite potential. What the cosmological argument teaches us is that "infinite potential" is an unintelligible concept which renders metaphysics and ontology as incomprehensible. Idealists and materialists alike get drawn into the trap of infinite potential as Aristotle demonstrated. The cosmological argument refutes Pythagorean (Platonic) Idealism, in which human ideas are said to be eternal, by showing the true nature of these ideas as having the characteristic of potential, and it also refutes Anaximander's materialism which refers to an eternal chaos, or "aperion", which is matter, or potential. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that their system have an inconsistency (or at least a "non-sequitur"). Ideas are not separable from changing forms and also changing forms are not enough to explain reality. The undeniable merit of this metaphysics is that it accepts both levels. It might be very difficult (or even impossible...) to make a scientific theory from it (although there are some attempts as you remarked earlier) but philosophically has a very good point: the two "aspects" of reality need each other. This explains nicely the difficulties of both "materialism" and "idealism".

Just for curiosity: do you know online sources that explain well the cosmological argument of Aristotle? I am very curious to learn about his philosophy after this discussion :grin:

Unfortunately I will probably be very busy in the following days, so I will likely have a hard time in keeping up with the conversation. Even this answer is somewhat lacking and I am quite sorry for this :sad:

Anyway, thank you very much for the interesting discussion we had so far :blush: ... and thanks in advance for the reply!

A relevant review from Peter Woit.

A relevant review from Peter Woit. — Wayfarer

Interesting review. Voit ends up with acknowledging the relevance of Zurek's work on decoherence for the measurement problem in QM. Coincidentally, I had just been reading today the section discussing decoherence theories in Manuel Bächtold's voluminous dissertation Le possible, l’actuel et l’événement en mécanique quantique, une approche pragmatiste (which he wrote under the supervision of Michel Bitbol). And I had been re-reading yesterday what Bitbol himself had to say about decoherence theories in a couple of his papers on the interpretation of quantum mechanics.

Browsing the comment section I saw one commentator alluding to Rovelli's relational interpretation and declaring himself unsatisfied with it because it is "obviously instrumentalist and can’t answer our burning questions about how nature actually does that". Voit answers thus:

"I’d rather do almost anything with my time than try and moderate a discussion of what is “real” and what isn’t.

Any further discussion of ontology will be ruthlessly suppressed."

In a recent interview Rovelli complained that this sort of agressive and dogmatic anti-philosophical stance being adopted by most of his colleagues might be in part responsible for the stagnation of the field.

Here is the Rovelli interview that I was thinking of.
While searching for it I also happened on this.

I like Jim Baggott's comment:

I’m just disappointed (and rather frustrated) by the apparent rise of a new breed of Many Worlds Taliban who claim – quite without any scientific justification – that the MWI is the only way and the one true faith.

David Deutsch the cult leader, and the Quantum Computer the cargo. :cool:

David Deutsch the cult leader, and the Quantum Computer the cargo. — Wayfarer

When I was a physics student, in the mid 90s, I had been quite seduced by Deutsch's arguments in favor the MWI interpretation of QM. That was before he was a popular figure. I also attended a seminar on quantum algorithmic with Gilles Brassard. Later, I was much impressed with his book The Fabric of Reality. And then I discovered philosophy.