• noAxioms
    555
    If it is a description, it relies on an ontology, because the description must claim to describe something. Maybe you're just trying to deny that your description relies on an ontology.Metaphysician Undercover
    Yes, I think I'm denying that. I can describe the even numbers without the necessity of them having an ontology. 12 is even regardless of whether numbers have some sort of Platonic existence. It is even because there exists some other integer (6) that yields 12 when added to itself. That is the sort of existence that we require if the universe is a mathematical structure.

    As for MDR (which does not assert this mathematical reality), that is another view that makes reality a relation, not an objective state, known or not. A thing is real to something else. I think perhaps the view denies an objective correct answer as to which model is in fact correct, be it proposed somewhere or not.

    I'm, not questioning your viewMetaphysician Undercover
    I am. I don't really hold to a specific view. I'm just exploring in this area lately, and looking for inconsistencies.

    The quest comes from all the unsatisfactory answers typically offered for the "Why is there something, not nothing?" question. Taking a step back and noticing the biases in the asking of that question sheds a lot of light on a suggested solution.
  • Pierre-Normand
    1.1k
    I've been following this thread with interest over the last few days, and read most of the messages. I've only been lurking because I've been quite busy with my readings. Some of my readings, though, may interest some of you.

    Michel Bitbol, Relations physiques ou relations fonctionnelles
    (In this paper, Bitbol compares his own pragmatist interpretation to Rovelli's relational interpretation, and he compares the latter to both Bohr's and Everett's. It's the fourth paper by Bitbol that I read on the topic of the intepretation of quantum mechanics.)

    Michel Bitbol, De l'intérieur du monde : Pour une philosophie et une science des relations
    (This is a fascinating 720 pages book. I've only read a few dozen pages. It appears to have much affinities with my own neo-Kantian pragmatist proclivities in metaphysics and epistemology.)

    Manuel Bächtold, Interpreting Quantum Mechanics according to a Pragmatist Approcach
    (This is a summary of Bächtold pragmatist interpretation, which he developed more fully in his thesis, written under the supervision of Michel Bitbol)

    Manuel Bächtold, Le Possible, l'actuel et l'événement en mécanique quantique : Une approche pragmatiste
    (This is Bächtold's thesis. I am currently reading section 3.8 Les interprétations everettiennes, and section 3.9 L’interprétation en termes de corrélations)
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    3.9k
    Yes, I think I'm denying that. I can describe the even numbers without the necessity of them having an ontology. 12 is even regardless of whether numbers have some sort of Platonic existence. It is even because there exists some other integer (6) that yields 12 when added to itself. That is the sort of existence that we require if the universe is a mathematical structure.noAxioms

    So you assume that 12 and 6 exist. You don't think that this presupposes an ontology? If you can't say what you mean by "6 exists", then how are you using that word "exists"?

    As for MDR (which does not assert this mathematical reality), that is another view that makes reality a relation, not an objective state, known or not. A thing is real to something else. I think perhaps the view denies an objective correct answer as to which model is in fact correct, be it proposed somewhere or not.noAxioms

    Do you recognize that "a relation" requires things which are related? When you say that reality is a relation, don't you think that the things which are related are at least as real as the relation itself? What do you think it means to say "a thing is real to something else"? Does this mean that reality consists of at least two things?

    The quest comes from all the unsatisfactory answers typically offered for the "Why is there something, not nothing?" question. Taking a step back and noticing the biases in the asking of that question sheds a lot of light on a suggested solution.noAxioms

    Here's a suggestion. Forget about the question of why there is something rather than nothing because you will never find a satisfactory answer. Instead, ask why there is what there is, rather than something else. Suppose you answer this with "there is what there is, instead of something else, because of the particular relations which exist". We still have to ask what does it mean to occupy the position of being related to something else.
  • boundless
    57
    OK, but that would seem to require giving up realism. Physics World has a good analysis of the current thinking on psi-epistemic theories (quote below):Andrew M

    Hi, interesting. Have to think about it. This seems interesting: https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/is-the-pbr-theorem-valid.924718/ . <a href="https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/the-quantum-state-cannot-be-interpreted-statistically.551554/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/the-quantum-state-cannot-be-interpreted-statistically.551554/</a>

    I will read these threads...

    Tank you for the objection!

    Yes, it would be a natural fissioning process (like amoeba fissioning). Merging can also potentially occur (i.e., interference). While it's admittedly a problem for people's preconceptions, it's not a problem for MWI.Andrew M

    Agreed!

    Yes, but only if it is possible according to MWI, i.e., only if such a possibility hinges on a quantum event. Whereas I think a person's intentional choices demonstrably resolve at a higher level than quantum events. For example, I don't find myself inexplicably drinking coffee instead of tea half the time even though the choice to drink coffee is an ostensive possibility. So what we would regard as possible outcomes and what quantum outcomes actually occur are very different things.Andrew M

    Good point!

    In fact what MWI says is that all the possible outcomes occur and at the classical level there is determinism, so IMO it has the same problem of "classical determinism" if what you say is right ;)

    I think your analysis here assumes that choices under MWI result in branching. But our ordinary experiences with making choices don't exhibit the uncertain outcomes that one would expect if branching did occur. Consider the MZI experiment where, on a classical understanding, the photons should have a 50/50 chance of ending up at either detector. Yet the experiment can be setup such that all the photons end up at only one of the detectors. I think this is analogous to the single outcome that reasoning and intentional choice converge on and so the outcomes of our choices aren't actually probabilistic or random. To get multiple outcomes, we would instead need to make the choice contingent on a quantum event (e.g., if spin-up is detected, drink tea; if spin-down is detected, drink coffee).Andrew M

    Well yes, I admit you are right and I am defeated :lol: but at the same time the unitary evolution of the Schroedinger equation implies that "all possibilities occur". So FW is incompatilble with MWI (well for that matter is incompatible with all theories in science)... IMO this is one of the reasons why I do not think reality is (only) mathematical, like MWI esplictly holds. At least other interpretations do not go so far.

    Thank you for the insights!

    Epistemic, not ontic, yes. I find that ontic makes no difference to anything, and ontology itself is perhaps a relation and nothing more than that. It is meaningless to say something exists. It always exists in relation to something else, and there is perhaps no objective base to act as a foundation for relation-independent ontology. This is just a proposal of mine, not an assertion, but it does away with a whole lot of problems.noAxioms

    Hi, I need a clarification. Do you think that our experience is totally illusory?

    They can both be correct. The wave function in its simplest form exists in relation to the whole structure of the Schroedinger equation for any closed system, but it exists in collapsed form for any isolated quantum state such as the point of view a human subjective view. These are just different relations, not mutually exclusive interpretations, at least one of which is necessarily wrong.noAxioms

    Mmm, do you follow Rovelli's interpretation?


    Yes, it is this unnecessary breathing of fire that I'm talking about. Is such a structure real, in that Platonic sense? Turns out it doesn't matter. The human in the mathematical structure will behave identically, asking the same questions about the same experience, whether or not there is some ontological status to the structure itself. That designation does not in any way alter the structure.

    In a way I find myself to be a reverse Platonist. I believed numbers to be real for a while, but now I favor a view that ontic structural realism, where yes, we perhaps share the same ontology as those numbers, not that the numbers must exist, but that the existence of our universe is required much in the same way that numbers don't need it. OSR says we're made of the same stuff, so it presumes the two have the same ontology, but it doesn't presume that shared status must be some kind of objective existence.
    noAxioms

    Well this seems a "relational ontology", i.e. that everything exist in virtue of relation with something else. Nothing exist independently. Well, this is really a fascinating idea to me!
  • noAxioms
    555
    So you assume that 12 and 6 exist. You don't think that this presupposes an ontology?Metaphysician Undercover
    No, I don't think 6 needs to have platonic reality for 12 to be even.
    If you can't say what you mean by "6 exists", then how are you using that word "exists"?
    I think the term is 'existential quantification'.

    Do you recognize that "a relation" requires things which are related? When you say that reality is a relation, don't you think that the things which are related are at least as real as the relation itself?Metaphysician Undercover
    Yes to both questions. The reality of both things is probably the same.

    Instead, ask why there is what there is, rather than something else.Metaphysician Undercover
    There are biases in the asking of this. I wanted to get below that. So wrong question.
  • noAxioms
    555
    Hi, I need a clarification. Do you think that our experience is totally illusory?boundless
    No, not at all. I perceive the cup. It is as real as I am probably. If it were an illusion, it would have a different reality-status from me. Can't rule that out, but not where I'm investigating. Just saying that it is a real part of this world in which I'm also a real part. It is a relation of reality to the world. If reality is related to my direct experience, then the cup is real only when experiencing it, and not otherwise. That's idealism of sorts, but still no illusion. The view is not in conflict with the former, just a relation to a different definition of reality. None of it requires objective (relation-independent) ontology. I guess there is still ontology, but only as a relation.

    Mmm, do you follow Rovelli's interpretation?boundless
    Have to look it up.
    Meta pointed me to MDR (model dependent reality), which I had not seen either. I find no references to Rovelli in it. His work is more on the QM level than just, um..., I guess macroscopic metaphysics.

    I'm sometimes pretty slow to respond. Plenty of new things to read are being suggested.
  • Pierre-Normand
    1.1k
    Have to look it up.noAxioms

    Rovelli's paper on relational quantum mechanics is available here.
    He also discusses his idea of relationality in non technical terms in his popular book Reality Is Not What It Seems: The Journey to Quantum Gravity.
    He also has co-written with Federico Laudisa the entry on Relational Quantum Mechanics in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

    As I mentioned above, Bitbol's paper Relations physiques ou relations fonctionnelles ? Une lecture non-métaphysique de l’interprétation relationnelle de la mécanique quantique de Rovelli is excellent. It's a pity that it's only available in French. Bitbol has written a bunch of papers in English about his favored interpretation of quantum mechanics, though. Most are available on his web-page. I recommend especially:

    Quantum Mechanics as Generalised Theory of Probabilities and
    Reflective Metaphysics: Understanding Quantum Mechanics for a Kantian Standpoint.
  • boundless
    57
    No, not at all. I perceive the cup. It is as real as I am probably. If it were an illusion, it would have a different reality-status from me. Can't rule that out, but not where I'm investigating. Just saying that it is a real part of this world in which I'm also a real part. It is a relation of reality to the world. If reality is related to my direct experience, then the cup is real only when experiencing it, and not otherwise. That's idealism of sorts, but still no illusion. The view is not in conflict with the former, just a relation to a different definition of reality. None of it requires objective (relation-independent) ontology. I guess there is still ontology, but only as a relation.noAxioms

    Sorry for the misunderstanding. Anyway, I suggest you to check Rovelli's ideas and similar. (for a start you might enjoy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relational_quantum_mechanics and https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-relational/)

    Have to look it up.
    Meta pointed me to MDR (model dependent reality), which I had not seen either. I find no references to Rovelli in it. His work is more on the QM level than just, um..., I guess macroscopic metaphysics.

    I'm sometimes pretty slow to respond. Plenty of new things to read are being suggested.
    noAxioms


    Yeah, MDR is very nice too (If I recall correctly, it has also a more "epistemological" streak, so to speak, rather than an "ontological" one. By this I mean that MDR is more interested on what we can know about reality, rather than what "is" reality. However I might be wrong :wink: ).

    Well I am quite slow, too. So it is not a problem for me :wink:
  • Janus
    5.2k
    So even this way of looking at motion requires a second dimension of time. There is the time that we know, which consists of the series of still frames, but there is a second time which we could call "real time", which is the time passing in between the still frames.Metaphysician Undercover

    Why must there be "time passing between still frames"?
  • Wayfarer
    6k
    this is already stepping into interpretation territorynoAxioms

    It would have been far preferable if in fact 'the atom' was discovered as this would have dispensed with 'the problems of metaphysics'. Then, existence = 1, non existence = 0 - atoms and the void. What a perfect model.


    Didn't work out, though. Hence the problems of interpretation.

    Meta pointed me to MDRnoAxioms

    Model-dependent realism is a fancy name for relativism.
  • boundless
    57
    Model-dependent realism is a fancy name for relativism.Wayfarer

    Hi Wayfarer,

    I think that it is more a "perspectivism" of sorts. I mean it says that there is an objective reality but there are multiple descriptions possible. Whereas "relativism" denies that there are universal truths.

    In some sense it is similar to "realistic pluralism" by Putnam.

    But as I said to noAxioms I might recollect badly.
  • Pierre-Normand
    1.1k
    Hi Wayfarer,

    I think that it is more a "perspectivism" of sorts. I mean it says that there is an objective reality but there are multiple descriptions possible. Whereas "relativism" denies that there are universal truths.

    In some sense it is similar to "realistic pluralism" by Putnam.

    But as I said to noAxioms I might recollect badly.
    boundless

    If I am to believe the Wikipedia entry on Model-dependent realism, it rather looks like a half-baked mixture of pragmatism and Popperian falsificationism. Putnam's mature pragmatic pluralism also is a form of realism, which he distinguishes from metaphysical realism. It is a realism that is essentially relational. It dispenses entirely with the idea of the world as it is in itself, which our models would only convey incomplete understandings or representations of. It is thus neo-Kantian and, likewise, not any more relativistic than Kantian epistemology is. While the elements of the open ended plurality of objective empirical domains, in Putnam's view, each are essentially related to definite sets of pragmatic considerations (or to ways of being-in-the-world), they don't constitute relative points of view on some fundamental reality that grounds them all.
  • noAxioms
    555
    Everyone has been pointing to the paper on relational quantum mechanics, which I read from the Stamford entry.
    [Rovelli] also has co-written with Federico Laudisa the entry on Relational Quantum Mechanics in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Pierre-Normand
    While I actually agree with the paper, it seems to relate measurement event outcomes to observers, and not the more general case of relating is-real as opposed to property of is-real. So to illustrate, take something not part of quantum mechanics: 5 exists in the set of integers (existential quantification). That's a relation, not an ontological assertion. Do the integers exist? Two ways to answer: Existential: Sure, they exist in the set of rational numbers for instance. Ontological: The have (or do not have) platonic reality. I find that a meaningless distinction, lacking a relation. They exist to or in something, but that just defers the ontological question to the something, adding another turtle to the pile. There seems to be no need for there to be a bottom turtle (an objective set of all things that actually are).

    As for relational quantum mechanics, they point out something I've always noticed: There is a quantum measurement that triggers the poison release that kills Schrodinger's cat. Surely the cat counts as having measured the sample. If not, put Schrodinger's underpaid lab assistant in the box. The wave function of the measurement collapses to the observer in the box, but not to the observer outside. Doesn't copenhagen interpretation (and any of the others) already say that? And there's always a larger box, so the outside observer peeks in and sees both a dead and live lab assistant. In what way does copenhagen interpretation allow for the cat to be both dead and alive without asserting that it does not count as a measurement?
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    3.9k
    Why must there be "time passing between still frames"?Janus

    If they are "still" frames, then no time is passing within them. And time must pass sometime, so it must be between the still frames.
  • Janus
    5.2k


    Each frame must have some duration or it could not exist.
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    3.9k
    Each frame must have some duration or it could not exist.Janus

    If the frame has duration, then it cannot be a still frame. I already discussed this problem with boundless. The human mind is inclined to give the soul an immaterial perspective. This perspective is supposed to be the point of the now, which is neither past nor future. There is no temporal duration in this point, because all temporal duration must be either in the past or in the future, so the "now" is eternal, outside of time. It is simply a boundary which separates two contiguous durations of time. We assume this artificial point and project it to separate different periods of time. Noon is the point which separates morning from afternoon. Furthermore, we describe what exists, as a state, at any artificial point in time, and this forms the basis for deductive logic, what is and is not.

    The problem is that this point in time is artificial. It is assumed in order to give us the perspective we need, to understand things. But as you claim, it is most likely that such a point could not exist. So I presented boundless with the tinted glass analogy. If the glass you are observing reality through is tinted, then the tint gives something to your observations. If you do not know that the glass is tinted, then you will not account for the tint in your observations, and your observations will be tainted. The tinted glass analogy was used in the past to indicate why the soul must be given a completely immaterial perspective in order to understand all of material existence. As I argued, that perspective has been assumed as the point of "now", where there can be no temporal extension, and no temporal existence. The point of "now" has been assumed in the past, in order for the soul to have its immaterial perspective.

    If we now come to the conclusion that this point in time cannot be real, then we assume that the glass through which we observe the world, is necessarily tinted. There is no such thing as the non-temporal point of division between past and future, and no completely immaterial perspective from which the soul could observe reality. Now the task is to determine the nature of the tint, so that we can separate what is proper to the tint, from what is proper to the thing being observed. My argument is that the tint is the thickness, "breadth" of the present, "now".
  • Janus
    5.2k


    What if each frame persists for a while without change? This is the case with projected moving films. Then the present is not 'dimensionless', but still there is no past or future within it because of the lack of change.
  • Andrew M
    400
    Wait, how is a collapse-interpretation not unitary? Unitary seems to mean that probabilities of various outcomes of measurements add up to 1.noAxioms

    Collapse doesn't preserve the norm of the state vector so it's a non-unitary transformation. It reduces the superposition state to just one of the relative states which had a probability less than 1.

    I always wondered how they detect superposition of say macroscopic states. They put some object (a small bar just large enough to see unaided) into a superposition of vibrating and not. I didn't get from the article how they knew this state had been achieved.noAxioms

    One way is to look for interference effects (as in the double-slit and Mach-Zehnder interferometer experiments). Another way is to do repeated measurements and see if the results conform to the probabilities predicted by QM for measuring each relative state in superposition. That's the case here - they repeatedly put the metal bar into an excited state that decays as a superposition into the ground state and measured the state after different delay times.

    The interpretations with which I am familiar say the photons are both there, in superposition, so long as they've not been measured. It is only after measurement where they differ. Mostly talking about collapse or not interpretations. Copenhagen is mutually exclusive with MWI only in its choice of reality against which the state is defined. If reality is a relation, this is no more contradictory than my location being both north-of and south-of something. Just different things.noAxioms

    Actually Copenhagen takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function and so denies there is ever more than one photon. And Bohm says that there is only ever one photon whether measured or not (the photon rides the wave, so to speak).

    Defining reality as a relation only shifts the basic claim. The claim now is whether there is one measured outcome or whether there is a measured outcome for each relative state. Copenhagen and Bohm (and most other interpretations) deny the latter, contrary to MWI.

    If the physical universe is a mathematical structure, and humans are part of it, and not something separate from it but interacting, then humans are 'in' the structure, just like my engine is in my car. How is that a category mistake?noAxioms

    A mathematical structure is a formal construct not a physical thing. The analogy is saying that your engine is in an equation. Of course we could, in principal, describe your car with a formal equation. But the form of the car is not the car. The car has materiality and substance that the equation does not.
  • boundless
    57
    You'll find a two dimensional time in Itzhak Bars "Two-Time Physics". But mostly the idea is developed by presentist philosophers who see the need for a wide present to account for human experience. How much time does the present consist of? Check out J.W Dunne, An experiment with Time. And in Jack Meiland's "A two dimensional Passage model of Time for Time travel", you'll find a diagram. I just got these names from google searches when I started realizing the need for two dimensions of time.Metaphysician Undercover

    Thank you for the reference :smile:

    The more difficult question is what is that "something" which is occurring at 'the present", and is represented as happening along the lines of t1, t2, t3, etc.. This is the coming into existence of the physical world at each moment of the present. It is represented in cosmology as the expansion of space, the discrepancy of a long time line, crossing many t lines . As I said in an earlier post, large things, the massive objects which we see, must come into existence first, and these are represented in quantum physics as fields, they appear as the background continuity and exist along the line of P1. At the other extreme of human experience, is the tiny objects, coming into existence last, their existence is represented by P2. So you see that there is the entire width of the human "present" separating the fields from the particles, and this is why quantum mechanics is so difficult to understand. This temporal breadth represents a vast unknown area between the mathematical fields, based in the observation of massive objects, and the observations of tiny particles. This allows for theories about strings and loops.Metaphysician Undercover

    If this is the case, we can also think that there is a qualitative change in behaviour between various scales. So, quantum weirdeness might originate from the properties of time (and space) at those scales.

    (As a side note, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penrose_interpretation the famed mathematical physicist Sir Roger Penrose held the view that gravity/space time curvature has a special role in the collapse of the wavefunction. I shared this because there is the idea of a "connection" between QM and the properties of spacetime...)


    Yes, so we can speculate as to how we create "objects". Let's start with the assumption that what we observe with our eyes, "see", is as close a representation to the continuous existence represented by mathematics as possible. This is what is at the right hand side of the lines of t1, t2, etc., what I represent as P1. The key is that these are not really physical objects, but more like Rich's hologram. Way back in history they would have represent these images as physical objects, drawing them on paper, and producing a concept of space between them, allowing for them to move in time. But there's no real "space" between these objects, because they are all united as the "One", the whole continuous universe. However, it was assumed that they were real physical objects with separate existence, even though they are not.Metaphysician Undercover

    This reminds me strongly of the "Implicate and Explicate Order" by Bohm (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Implicate_and_explicate_order): I discussed (maily) with Rich about it some time ago in this thread.
    But also of "Advaita Vedanta" and Neoplatonism. Also this article https://phys.org/news/2015-05-spacetime-built-quantum-entanglement.html may be of interest.

    In this view plurality arises in the "representations" rather than in "reality". In fact, the notion of "reality" itself is challenged. Time and space exist only in the representation. And outside it these concepts do not apply: "reality" is neither spatial nor temporal. And so since discernible objects are possible if and only if there is space, then if space is a representation, then objects must exist only as a construction (like in a "hologram").



    Now let's assume that we hear waves in a physical medium, sound. This assumes that there are real physical particles, vibrating in relation to each other. Lets say that this is P2, the existence of a real physical medium, particles vibrating in space. At P1 there are no existing particles, and at P2 there are existing particles. So on each line of t1, t2, etc., there is particles coming into existence, and these particles allow for the existence of sound.


    Here is the difficult part. Between P1 and P2 we have an inversion between what is possible and what is actual, the possibility for particles, and actual particles. The inversion is not merely epistemic, because it must be ontological to allow for freedom of choice represented in the actual coming into existence of particles. The inversion is represented epistemically in QM by the distinction between the wave function and particular existence. But each line of t1, t2, t3, extends indefinitely, beyond P2, which represents the human perception particular existence. We have created our conception of "objects in space", from the P1 side of the present, as what we see, along with the possibilities for motion. But there are no real objects at the P1 side, only the potential for particles. The real "objects in space", need to be represented from what is on the P2 side of the present. So to produce a real concept of "objects in space", we must ignore all the visual observations, which are not of actual objects, but of the potential for objects, and produce a conception of "objects in space", particles, which is based only on other senses such as hearing. This is where we find real objects in space, on the past side of our experience of the present, P2, where we cannot see because our visual image is of P2 where there is not yet any real particles. Our current conception of "space" is produced from these visual observations, assuming that what we see is objects, when it is really not what we see, and this does not provide us with a representation of the real space which particles exist in. We cannot see the real particles, so we can only get an idea of how they behave in real space through the senses of hearing, touching, smelling, tasting. And from these senses we can produce a concept of "space" which allows for the real existence of objects, particles moving in space, this "space' being on the P2 side of the present. Our current representation, based in visual observation doesn't allow for the real existence of "objects in space", it is just based in the determining factors which we see at P1, prior to the coming into existence of real particles at P2.
    Metaphysician Undercover

    And here with other senses "objects" return. So, we "see" the potentiality and with other senses we "feel" actual, existing objects. If this is true then our concept of "space" is mistaken because it is really the "space" of potentialities, rather than actualities. So "reality", thanks to the "two dimensional time" is both a sort of hologram of "potentialities" and a world of real objects. It is not that one is "more or less" real than the other but simply if we consider the totality of our sensations we see both "aspects" of reality. Very nice (I hope to not have misunderstood something... in that case, I am sorry). But...
    I might wonder however to what "happens" if there is no "perciever". If all what we said is right then objects, time and space are all real if there is a subject (in some sense this is reminiscent of trascendental idealism, especially the version of Schopenhauer). But if this is true, then the "object is always in relation with a subject", therefore if we remove the "subject", the object too "disappears". Well, this reminds me of "neither one nor many" of Mahayana Buddhism (also for that matter Schopenhauer noted a common ground here) :wink:


    If I am to believe the Wikipedia entry on Model-dependent realism, it rather looks like a half-baked mixture of pragmatism and Popperian falsificationism. Putnam's mature pragmatic pluralism also is a form of realism, which he distinguishes from metaphysical realism. It is a realism that is essentially relational. It dispenses entirely with the idea of the world as it is in itself, which our models would only convey incomplete understandings or representations of. It is thus neo-Kantian and, likewise, not any more relativistic than Kantian epistemology is. While the elements of the open ended plurality of objective empirical domains, in Putnam's view, each are essentially related to definite sets of pragmatic considerations (or to ways of being-in-the-world), they don't constitute relative points of view on some fundamental reality that grounds them all.Pierre-Normand

    Thank you for the elucidation.
  • Andrew M
    400
    In fact what MWI says is that all the possible outcomes occur and at the classical level there is determinism, so IMO it has the same problem of "classical determinism" if what you say is right ;)boundless

    MWI says that the quantum states with non-zero amplitude all occur, so that is the level that is deterministic. As I've argued, our everyday ostensive possibilities don't all occur.

    Well yes, I admit you are right and I am defeated :lol: but at the same time the unitary evolution of the Schroedinger equation implies that "all possibilities occur". So FW is incompatilble with MWI (well for that matter is incompatible with all theories in science)... IMO this is one of the reasons why I do not think reality is (only) mathematical, like MWI esplictly holds. At least other interpretations do not go so far.boundless

    Free will isn't incompatible with MWI (or deterministic theories in general). It is the dynamic systems themselves that are driving things, not the equations. The equations merely describe and predict (rightly or wrongly) what the systems will do.

    Thank you for the insights!boundless

    And thank you for yours!
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