Seriously - have you ever tried that on this forum? — T Clark

I am new here, relatively speaking.

I'm just pointing out that that something has to be included in our starting assumptions because it can never be rationally established. — T Clark

I can't help but wonder whether there is something controversial being built into the notion of "rationally established" here, but that's probably off topic.

Good talking to you. Hope I helped in some small way.

I can't help but wonder whether there is something controversial being built into the notion of "rationally established" here, but that's probably off topic. — PossibleAaran

I don't think it's off topic. To me it's the whole point of this discussion. Let me reword to see if that works better.

I make the distinction between questions of fact that can be answered yes/no, true/false and epistemological/ontological questions that cannot and which are decided by preference or agreement and which are then included as assumptions, whether or not they are recognized as such.

Example 1 - A belief in an objective morality can lead people to focus more on blame than on solving the problem. — T Clark

Hmm...the thesis of moral realism is more a matter for (meta-)ethics, rather than metaphysics, it seems to me.

Example 2 - Belief in objective reality is very useful, indispensable, for most of physics. On the other hand, it can lead to an overly reductionist approach that doesn't work well in other areas such as biology. Take a look at StreetLightX's discussion - "More Is Different."

I take it you are here using "objective" to mean something like "mind independent"? I have not seen StreetLightX's thread that you reference here. I am curious as to why biologists shouldn't assume that the phenomena which they study are mind-independent (that is, independent of their minds). I am also curious as to how, say, a solipsistic physicist would go about his work as compared to the physicist who held a realist position. (Again, this assumes that I have sufficiently understood the sense in which you mean "objective.")

I am curious as to why biologists shouldn't assume that the phenomena which they study are mind-independent (that is, independent of their minds). — Arkady

They should assume that. Biologists are very successful operating under the assumption that biology is a branch of physics. I think it's purely a philosophical issue that the distinction between living and non-living is not in the realm of empirical discovery, but rather in our perspective on causation.

I have not seen StreetLightX's thread that you reference here. — Arkady

I suggest you look at it.

Biologists are very successful operating under the assumption that biology is a branch of physics. — frank

I doubt any biologist thinks of herself as practicing a branch of physics.

I doubt any biologist thinks of herself as practicing a branch of physics. — T Clark

Yes and no. Biology is my training. And I've seen it become normal to think of life as an essentially thermodynamic phenomenon.

So back in the 1960s, life would have been seen as a chemical phenomenon. There was a reason organic chemistry was pretty mandatory. Biology 101 focused rather a lot on metabolic equations.

Schrodinger's What is Life? was famous for spelling out that biology was in fact really about dissipative structure. The duo of negentropic order and the entropy it can produce.

And this was good for the biologist's ego. It said not only was biology well-founded on deep cosmic principles, but biology was showing physics needed re-writing in a substantial fashion. Biology - because it understood this new nexus of information and dynamics - was the "larger view".

So physics was really a simpler and less complex branch of biology, if you like. ;)

Why wouldn't she?

Yes and no. Biology is my training. And I've seen it become normal to think of life as an essentially thermodynamic phenomenon. — apokrisis

This point came up a few posts ago when I said reductionist science that might work for a lot of physics can lead you astray in other branches, e.g. biology. From past posts, I think of you as pretty anti-reductionist, in particular in your discussions of how life develops out of non-living matter.

Why wouldn't she? — frank

This is a quote from P.W. Anderson StreetlightX used in his "More is Different" discussion.

"The main fallacy in this kind of thinking is that the reductionist hypothesis does not by any means imply a 'constructionist' one: The ability to reduce everything to simple fundamental laws does not imply the ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe. In fact, the more elementary particle physicists tell us about the nature of the fundamental laws, the less relevance they seem to have to the very real problems of the science, much less to those of societies". (Anderson, "More Is Different").

I just started looking at the article. If you've already read it, we could discuss why LaPlace's Demon would have a problem reconstructing the universe from fundamental laws. What are your thoughts on that?

But in regard to whether biologists think of biology as a branch of physics, the opening lines of the article confirm that. The article is suggesting reasons they might question that assumption.

As I continue reading that article, it appears the author is firmly reductionist.

I just started looking at the article. If you've already read it, we could discuss why LaPlace's Demon would have a problem reconstructing the universe from fundamental laws. What are your thoughts on that? — frank

I started this thread because I wanted to get some ideas straight in my own head, not to talk in-depth about specific scientific issues. The threads I've referenced are better places to have the discussion you are talking about.

OK. :)

D'oh. Can't keep myself away. The link between the European Enlightenment and scientific reductionism needs to be noted. Basically Comte (who invented both 'social science' and the term 'positivism') saw culture evolving from primitive religion through the metaphysical phase to finally emerging blinking into the sunlit uplands of Science. Measurable, predictable, certain, progressive - Steve Pinker's vision of Progress. Everything would eventually yield to an understanding in terms of simple principles, of which Newton's laws were, at that stage, the paradigmatic example. That's where you're 'reductionism' had its heyday - the vision of simple, universal laws in terms of which everything could be understood. Science could be omniscient.

Whereas traditional philosophy was created around myths of 'the fall' whereby the origin or 'ground of being' was not material or physical at all, but The One, which was then hybridised with the Christian God and biblical mythology but which in the Greek understanding was much less a 'sky-father' type of deity. Aristotle's original metaphysics was much nearer to that vision, partially for historical reasons, but also because of the stage of cultural development of which they were a part. Aristotle is sometimes said to be atheist, but he did recognise a kind of cosmological intelligence, the Prime Mover or First Cause, which later became incorporated in scholastic philosophy.

So there's a collision between the traditionalist understanding and the Enlightenment mentality - this is what arguably underlies the 'culture wars'. There doesn't have to be - there are people who embody and understand both scientific and religious perspectives (such as various Catholic scientists and philosophers.) But as far as the Pinkers of the world go, 'to be scientific' means rejecting anything that sounds religious - which covers a lot of territory.

I think there is a wholly novel kind of metaphysic emerging, which is neither materialistic in the old sense, nor necessarily theistic in any obvious way. Have a look at this old David Brooks column, The Neural Buddhists.

So there's a collision between the traditionalist understanding and the Enlightenment mentality - this is what arguably underlies the 'culture wars'. — Wayfarer

So Aristotle did argue against atomism and in favour of a full "four causes" systems ontology. And atomism then made its roaring return as Enlightenment science.

In terms of metaphysics, that was its own culture war. And Newtonian physics was seen to defeat Aristotelian physics - for the time being at least.

But theistic metaphysics was its own dualistic thing. It stood against Aristotelian hylomorphism and immanence to bring in a transcendent and immaterial "mind". It was Platonic. So that led to the culture war that was not holism vs reductionism, but the Enlightenment vs Romanticism.

Of course, if we are talking "traditional", then animism would be the original generic metaphysics. And the general materialism of Ancient Greek philosophy - coupled in uncertain fashion to the shock that mathematics could have an axiomatic basis - was the initial culture war against that.

Step back and you can see the bigger story is of metaphysics finding it always wants to split in two. Some, indeed most, then take this as a sign it should be utterly split - resulting in a war. Some, always a minority, see that the split itself is what the holism of the metaphysics needs to embrace.

So that is where the "meta-cultural war" takes place. Between the reductionists who are happy with opposed worlds, and their opposing world-views, and the holists who see division or symmetry-breaking as the creative step that produces a world in the first place. It takes yin and yang to tango. :)

I started this thread because I wanted to get some ideas straight in my own head, not to talk in-depth about specific scientific issues. The threads I've referenced are better places to have the discussion you are talking about. — T Clark

Finished the article. Its conclusion is not anti-reductionist.

Finished the article. Its conclusion is not anti-reductionist. — frank

Ok.

Finished the article. Its conclusion is not anti-reductionist. — frank

I just read it too. Anderson doesn't define very clearly what he takes reductionism to amount to, or what analysis is. His examples illuminate what he seemingly thinks (without making it explicit), and his main goal seems to be to refute the unwarranted inference from reduction (defined as the possibility of successful analysis) to constructionism (defined as the ability to come up with the high-level laws deductively on the basis of the low level ones). He is really setting the stage for what have been more recently advanced as anti-reductionist and strong emergentist arguments by some of his colleagues.

A weird moment occurs when Anderson sets up two columns listing sciences that have increasingly complex objects, with each one having the objects from the previous science as its immediate constituents, and he asserts that the objects of science X obey the law of science Y (where science Y is dealing with the constituents of the objects of science X). This is supposed to cash out the idea of reduction qua analysis, I think. But then, immediately after that, he claims that each new stage of complexity brings up entirely new laws. And he proceeds to argue for this claim over the rest of the paper (quite successfully). So, if there are emergent laws, that are new to X, how do those laws relate to the laws of Y? Anderson doesn't say.

More recent philosophers of emergence, such a Karen Crowther, and physicists like George Ellis, argue that the higher level laws (of science X) can be strongly emergent from the lower level laws (of science Y) because, as a result of symmetry breaking, the very constituents of the objects of X don't exist at all under the conditions (such as higher energy conditions) where the objects of Y are typically (and exclusively) manifested. Furthermore, the emergent laws of X are complete in the sense that they fully govern the objects of X in a manner that is, to a large degree, insensitive to the laws that govern the objects of X and to the properties of those 'constituent' objects.

I make the distinction between questions of fact that can be answered yes/no, true/false and epistemological/ontological questions that cannot and which are decided by preference or agreement and which are then included as assumptions, whether or not they are recognized as such. — T Clark

Maybe it will be helpful to start over like you suggest. Let me just try to clarify your distinction by asking some questions. When you say that there are questions which "can be answered yes/no, true/false", do you mean that there is a fact of the matter about these questions or do you mean more strongly that there is a fact of the matter and[\i] that fact can be "rationally established"?

I suggest you look at it. — T Clark

Perhaps I will. However, in the meantime, you might address my questions, above, regarding how belief in "objective reality" (vs. the alternatives) would be useful in physics.

So there's a collision between the traditionalist understanding and the Enlightenment mentality - this is what arguably underlies the 'culture wars'. — Wayfarer

Um, no. The "culture wars" (at least as generally defined in the U.S. - perhaps it's different in Australia) usually refers to the political struggle between the progressive and the regressive in shaping public policy and direction of society. The regressive side in the U.S. is the one generally aligned with evangelical or fundamentalist Protestants, as well as conservative Catholics. It has little, if anything, to do with debates over "the One" or the "ground of all being", or other metaphysical abstracta.

Science could be omniscient. — Wayfarer

Sorry, but it's the religious people who claim to have all of the answers. Please stop projecting.

Maybe it will be helpful to start over like you suggest. Let me just try to clarify your distinction by asking some questions. When you say that there are questions which "can be answered yes/no, true/false", do you mean that there is a fact of the matter about these questions or do you mean more strongly that there is a fact of the matter and[\i] that fact can be "rationally established"? — PossibleAaran

Well... I'm talking about your standard type question. Matters of fact. Is the capital of France Bucharest? Are neutrons and protons made up of smaller particles? Did the universe begin with the big bang?

This is a quote from earlier in this thread about the other, non-yes/no, kind of question.

I very much want there to be a place to go to discuss the underpinnings of reason. Where we can agree on the rules, or at least argue about the rules, before we start the substantive discussion. The closest thing we have to that place I can think of is what we call metaphysics. If that's not what metaphysics is, then what is it - seems to me it's just a junk drawer where we throw unrelated stuff we can't figure out how to resolve. — T Clark

j

D'oh. — Wayfarer

I like it when posters go back to the great philosophers for their inspiration.

So there's a collision between the traditionalist understanding and the Enlightenment mentality - this is what arguably underlies the 'culture wars'. There doesn't have to be - there are people who embody and understand both scientific and religious perspectives (such as various Catholic scientists and philosophers.) But as far as the Pinkers of the world go, 'to be scientific' means rejecting anything that sounds religious - which covers a lot of territory. — Wayfarer

Does enlightenment = reductionism?

So that is where the "meta-cultural war" takes place. Between the reductionists who are happy with opposed worlds, and their opposing world-views, and the holists who see division or symmetry-breaking as the creative step that produces a world in the first place. It takes yin and yang to tango. — apokrisis

You, StreetlightX, and fdrake have set me thinking about these issues a lot recently. I think you can see me thrashing about in various discussions trying to get my arms around it. It's a lot of fun.

Anderson doesn't define very clearly what he takes reductionism to amount to, or what analysis is. His examples illuminate what he seemingly thinks (without making it explicit), and his main goal seems to be to refute the unwarranted inference from reduction (defined as the possibility of successful analysis) to constructionism (defined as the ability to come up with the high-level laws deductively on the basis of the low level ones). — Pierre-Normand

This is what really helped me in the Anderson paper - the discussion of reductionist vs. constructionist views. It clarified for me how the magical, arm-waving, gee whiz presentation of chaos and complexity theories can be replaced by an understanding that provides insight into how the world works in a practical, concrete way.

Karen Crowther, and physicists like George Ellis, — Pierre-Normand

First of all, I want to make sure the Karen Crowther you're referencing is not the outrigger canoe racer from Maui. Is that correct?

I'm looking on the web for articles. Any specific references would be helpful.

Perhaps I will. However, in the meantime, you might address my questions, above, regarding how belief in "objective reality" (vs. the alternatives) would be useful in physics. — Arkady

Perhaps I will. However, in the meantime, you might look at StreetlightX's thread.

I very much want there to be a place to go to discuss the underpinnings of reason. — T Clark

A possible fruitful avenue: to what extent is the world itself reasonable? Is it possible that it isn't? If it is, what does that imply?

Background: the ancient word for immanent logic was Logos (although some question whether immanent is the right word.) The stoics, who were physicalists, thought the Logos is hot air.

Just a suggestion. :)

First of all, I want to make sure the Karen Crowther you're referencing is not the outrigger canoe racer from Maui. Is that correct?

I'm looking on the web for articles. Any specific references would be helpful. — T Clark

She is the one. Her only paper that I read is Decoupling Emergence and Reduction in Physics, but it has been extremely enlightening. I've mentioned her a few times in this older thread where I had been discussing Weinberg's reductionism.

By the way, @StreetlightX also had referenced the excellent paper The Theory of Everything by R. B. Laughlin and David Pines. This paper pursued some of Anderson's earlier insights and developed a view a emergence that struck me as having many commonalities with Crowther's own. So, I searched the content of Crowther's new book -- Effective Spacetime: Understanding Emergence in Effective Field Theory and Quantum Gravity, Springer Publishing (2016) -- and found out that she indeed refers several times to Laughlin and Pines. (This book has a whole chapter devoted to discussing the issue of the emergence of classical spacetime in the context of Quantum Loop Theory, which is a theory of quantum gravity developed by Ashtekar, Smolin and Rovelli as an alternative to sting theory.)

A possible fruitful avenue: to what extent is the world itself reasonable? Is it possible that it isn't? If it is, what does that imply? — frank

This is exactly the kind of question I was talking about. Why don't you start a new thread. I'll participate.