Oh, and I can't read either. Mind you, I suppose if I can't speak it pretty much follows...

How can this even be a question at this point? — Wayfarer

I hadn't followed the entire thread, and this is the first time I've spoken with Pseudo.

What I object to is the insulting suggesting that it is not even 'allowed' for someone to hold those beliefs. — Pseudonym

I don't intend to ban your view from Philosophy. It seems to me pointless to just ban discussion of unpopular views. I'd be interested to see, though, any convincing example of science answering traditional philosophical questions. By this, I don't mean merely an example in which science is relevant. I don't want to be shown merely that scientific results can sometimes be used to criticize a philosophical view (and/or method). I agree with that. I don't want an example in which science is used to work out the details of a foregone philosophical conclusion. I agree that this can be done (for example, I agree that science can tell you a lot about how humans can be physically and psychologically well). What I'd really be interested to see is a much more ambitious sort of example - a case in which scientific theory and experiment straightforwardly answers a philosophical question.

I don't think that's a bad thing, but it seems pointless to me unless there is some conclusion at the end of the process, and presuming there is, some of the things thus examined must end up passing the test. — Pseudonym

The authority of science (in certain areas) might well be one of those things that pass the test surely? — Pseudonym

Of course I think there must be some conclusion to the examination. Does the authority of science 'pass the test'? Well it all depends on what exactly we are asking here, but painting with a broad stroke, there are at least some philosophers who have denied any substantive authority to science - Rorty, Feyarabend, Kuhn (well, not Kuhn, but followers who interpreted his work a certain way) to give a few examples. I'm not sure about that particular issue myself. I mentioned it just as an example of the sort of thing I consider Philosophy, and the sort of thing which you can't answer by doing more scientific experiments and theorizing. Even Kuhn's work, which is primarily historical and sociological, has to be conjoined with other philosophical claims to settle the issue about the authority of science.

I don't know if you've read Harris, but his work is built upon quite a firm foundation of Ethical Naturalism that goes all the way back to Aristotle (in some form). It's really not just 'assuming 'consequentialism', it's building on the work of those who have argued in favour of it quite persuasively, which is surely all any philosophy can do. Also, I agree with most of what Harris has to say, except that I'm broadly a virtue ethicist. I don't really find the consequensialism necessary to the point he's making about science and morality. It could equally be applied, as Phillipa Foot does, to which virtues it is necessary to cultivate. — Pseudonym

I've read his Moral Landscape. I don't know if he wrote anything else after that. When you say "Ethical Naturalism", what exactly do you mean? There are several things which go under that name. None of the views I associate with that label are ones which can be established by scientific experiment. They are all argued for Philosophically, and so it may be that this debate about Harris is a distraction from the main topic.

So the only place where we can differ is that you want to treat the private ineffable experience of the individual as some kind of reliable interior evidence - for a communally-defined externalist methodology. — apokrisis

Well, no I don't think what you are calling "private ineffable experience" is really in every sense private or ineffable. I mean, all experiences are culturally mediated, and all can be, on account of the commonalities of human experience, communicated to some degree.

Which would be Romanticism in a nutshell. It's art if I think it is art ... even if the whole notion of "art" is a form of life, a language game. — apokrisis

Yes, of course art is a "form of life", and as I have said, what art is cannot be precisely defined. It cannot be as precisely defined as science can, because it has no overarching methodological principle. We can speak about "the scientific method" but we cannot speak about "the artistic method". Art consists in saying something in a suggestive or evocative way, or in a metaphorical or allegorical way, rather than in a logically rigorous way, about the human situation, about the aspects of being that we care about. This is not an exclusively Romantic notion of art; it is an acknowledgement of the shared and yet imprecise character of human concern, feeling and motivation, which is the primary interest and involvement of the arts.

It's just like science in other words. Though science pretends to be much more democratic in its admission criteria - and indeed, it often is.

The difference is that with science what is being shared is information that is much more precise, quantifiable, and capable of being corroborated by observation, and mathematical, statistical or logical analysis.

You say - "Corroboration would consist in universal agreement; the inability of any suitably good-willed and unbiased observer to disagree once they have been presented with, and understood, the evidence."

You must know that the art world doesn't operate with this kind of open-minded good will and lack of bias. And the art world justifies that by saying it is all subjective in the end anyway.

It's not a matter of "open-minded good will and lack of bias" (although these of course are in play too as in all human affairs) as it is difference of taste and critical acumen. In the arts critical acumen is important, of course, but the level of an individual's critical acumen is not as precisely determinable as the level of one's mathematical ability, or skill in statistical analysis, or the extent of one's accumulated factual knowledge, and so on.

So the human artistic impulse is a bad example for your case.

I agree we certainly do feel something when we approach a great work of art with a correctly cultivated mindset. It is not as if we can get eliminativist about that aesthetic response.

But feeling an aesthetic delight at clever solutions to difficult problems is something all our creative endeavours share in common. It is as true of science and maths.

Nothing you have said demonstrates that "the human artistic impulse is a bad example for my case", or even that my case was specifically concerned with that. I was not so much talking about the artistic impulse, which is a matter for psychology, as I was pointing out the differences between the arts and the sciences in terms of the ability to achieve, or at least approach, universal consensus. Nothing you have said touches on that point in any way signifiant enough to refute it, as far as I can tell.

I think the difference is that what you think of as "higher knowledge" I think of as "heightened consciousness" or "elevated feeling". And I do see this as knowledge in a very specific sense, the primary kind of knowledge of familiarity (expressed in the Biblical sense of knowledge " a man shall know his wife") but not as any form of discursive knowledge. I just want to say that religious or mystical experience does not tell us anything determinate about anything; it is not propositional in character.That is the distinction I want to draw.

The notion that religious or mystical experience, or religion and revelation, tells us anything of a propositional nature about reality just is fundamentalism, as I see it. And fundamentalism, in any of its forms, whether religious or scientific, is bad and even dangerous. Now the subtle point here is that I do think the fact of there being mystical and religious experience does tell us something propositional about the nature of reality (well, human reality, at least).

So how does one critique a philosophy then? — Pseudonym

Philosophies are critiqued by other philosophies. If you are looking for an absolute standard of critique such as the scientific method (enshrined in the peer review process) then you will be disappointed.

Where in that question is any instruction about what philosophy 'should' demonstrate? I'm just asking if it can. — Pseudonym

Your asking, your question, reads as rhetorical. It is obvious that it cannot demonstrate in the way you are asking, and I believe you already know this (or should if you have read much philosophy). So, it seems that your critique of philosophy is that it cannot demonstrate (and hence progress) in the way science or mathematics can, and this critique only holds under the assumption that it should be able to so demonstrate and progress the way science and mathematics do. Anybody who knows much about philosophy knows that it is not, and cannot be, the same as science, and critiquing it for this amounts to a demand that it should be; and this demand just is an expression of scientism.

Well, a fair point and am glad we have gotten to it. As I’ve said previously I’ve always understood my ‘search’ in terms of the understanding of enlightenment. And that goes back to the initial encounters I had with Eastern philosophy, and through the experience of altered states. At that time, I didn’t even think of this as being about religion (and maybe it’s not - I’ll come back to that).

The idea I had was that religious types simply repeated the dogma and believed as they were told. ‘Pie in the sky when you die’, I would say, dismissively. But through spiritual experience you could see for yourself.

But as life went on, it turned out that the revolutionary spiritual experience which makes all things clear turns out to be quite elusive. One can get glimpses of it through entheogens but the wise will quickly understand the downside of that approach (notably, dependence). And reality has a way of asserting itself. So looking around for analogies or cultural maps that might accomodate the idea of ‘spiritual experience’ - what was available? It seemed to me that the only feasible approach was that of the patient discipline of meditation. And Buddhism seemed to have the best ‘product offering’ - pragmatic, not bogged down in dogma, experiential, and aesthetically satisfactory. And along the way there have been spiritual experiences, (although it turns out that realisation and experience are actually different.)

But a lot of what I’ve been working on is evaluating various aspects of philosophy and religion in these terms. I now realise that the sort of books I was reading back then are what gave rise to my interest in Platonism, for example; as the Christian mystics, notably Eckhardt, were steeped in Neoplatonic Christianity.

So some of these streams of thought have preserved the understanding of a ‘revolution in consciousness’ whilst others have ossified into dogma. And in many places, it’s been lost altogether, completely forgotten - which is how you end up in the flatland of scientific materialism.

Life goes on.

I was pointing out the differences between the arts and the sciences in terms of the ability to achieve, or at least approach, universal consensus. Nothing you have said touches on that point in any way signifiant enough to refute it, as far as I can tell. — Janus

I’m surprised that you would even target universal consensus so strongly here. In another era, there might simply be a notion of good taste or artistic perfection towards which all creative endeavour would want to aim. This led to the familiar art teachings about proportion and symmetry, the Greek ideal of beauty, etc.

But today - art still being the social technology for inventing the self - the whole point that art would want to teach is the modern cultural ideal. Which is that we are all actually individual and so will show that in our aesthetic responses. The new ideal is the destruction of the old, rather Platonic, notion of a universal consensus. Art has to be challenging, weird, transgressive.

So Romanticism treats selfhood as an inward act of discovery. Artistic practice has evolved as an expression of that metaphysics.

Speaking for the scientistic Enlightenment, I would point out the psychological facts. This self of which Romanticism speaks is a social construction, a linguistic structure. It is not some foundational essence - a soul or spirit - but the very thing that the cultural activity of art is there to manufacture.

So science here explains art in terms of the facts of the world. It provides the larger view of what is really going on.

Alternatively, if there were a soul for creative training to discover, then science would give the evidence for that theory of the wider reality. Science wouldn’t rule the possibility out. But it would be - philosophically - the way we would decide the question as best we can.

Art consists in saying something in a suggestive or evocative way, or in a metaphorical or allegorical way, rather than in a logically rigorous way, about the human situation, about the aspects of being that we care about. — Janus

Yes. So there is here the possibility of another way of doing philosophy - one that claims an evidential basis in the subjective, as opposed to the objective.

It is a familiar argument. Perhaps it is right that there are truths that are best accessed by evocative language rather that direct language. Perhaps there are things we think and feel that are so vague or ephemeral that they break apart if we try to grasp them in a firm and frontal assault.

Yet still, what works will reveal itself to us. We can allow this as an alternative, or even complementary, approach to philosophy, and then judge the results. Science - as epistemic method - doesn’t rule this out. Science here only represents the pragmatic maxim that the approach have some generally agreed social utility as the evidence it is a worthwhile thing to believe.

But if you accept that essentially scientistic view - that a general consensus on pragmatic utility is the epistemic foundation - then that would seem to be at odds with your other desire to treat the subjective as spiritually real rather than collectively constructed.

Again, in appealing to any notion of a universal consensus, you are setting your own argument against itself in contradicting fashion. Evidence that is private is evidence that is not corrobable. And so in that direction you can only wind up with a philosophical method that is solipsistic and completely personal. It’s evidential basis is simply revelation backed by faith.

So yes, philosophy could well entertain two complementary approaches to truth - the objective and the subjective, the real and the ideal, the factual and the poetic. It is a simple fact of metaphysical logic itself that two paths must exist for there to be any path at all. So the fact that philosophy is home to its own counter-impulses is not a surprise but a necessity.

And we can even say both flourish in their different spheres. Science is the branch of philosophy that went off and perfected a method of inquiry into the metaphysically foundational. Art is the branch of philosophy that went off and perfected its own inquiry into the subjective and aesthetic.

Yet science is then the larger exercise - if we agree that it has dispelled a theistic worldview and replaced that with a naturalistic one.

I can see that is still a big “if” for some. But that is what all this comes down to.

And I would note that a defence of an evocative and poetic approach to evidence gathering and consensus corroboration building looks quite carefully a socially constructed position.

In the good old days, God and his supernatural world, just simply existed in a direct graspable way for folk. You could paint God’s picture on a church ceiling. And now to argue we must use the most evanenscent and allusive methods to grasp that same truth seems pretty telling.

The evidence has evaporated before our eyes - our scientistic eyes. At some point you really need to consider the alternative that when it comes to a subjective essence, there was never anything really there beyond a utilitarian social construction.

What’s happened is that we have become self-conscious in a novel way - we’re aware of ourselves as individuals in a way that wasn’t possible in earlier times. (I think that might have been foreshadowed by Julian Jaynes’ book on the bicameral mind.) So whereas for the pre-modern mind the world was an enchanted garden, or a theatre in which the drama of life was enacted, now the universe is seen as it physically is - mainly empty space, rocks, dust, gas, and stars. Enchanted no more. This is Weber’s ‘disenchantment’:

...the cultural rationalization and devaluation of the mystical apparent in modern society. The concept was borrowed from Friedrich Schiller[1] by Max Weber to describe the character of modernized, bureaucratic, secularized Western society, where scientific understanding is more highly valued than belief, and where processes are oriented toward rational goals, as opposed to traditional society, where for Weber, "the world remains a great enchanted garden".

So within that ‘enchanted garden’, art evokes the archetypes and mythological re-enactments of the great themes and tragedies of culture.

Now we have television.

As for the notion of ‘collective construction’ - it’s certainly true that most of us inhabit a kind of ‘consensus realiity’ which is precisely that. But what that doesn’t accomodate is ‘the boundless’ - the unconditioned, the immeasurable. That is outside of the ‘constructed’ worldview (symbolised in Oriental culture as renunciation, ‘the forest’.) Probably rather too ‘religious’ for your liking but ought to be said, nonetheless.

So within that ‘enchanted garden’, art evokes the archetypes and mythological re-enactments of the great themes and tragedies of culture. — Wayfarer

So was the pre-modern mind actually an enchanted garden or is that the Rousseauian myth of the noble savage?

Do these archetypes actually reside in the collective Jungian unconscious or does structuralist anthropology explain why certain themes repeat as the rational expression of being social creatures creating social organisation?

In a nutshell, is the foundation of our philosophising the coherence of the Enlightenment or the incoherence of Romanticism?

As for the notion of ‘collective construction’ - it’s certainly true that most of us inhabit a kind of ‘consensus realiity’ which is precisely that. But what that doesn’t accomodate is ‘the boundless’ - the unconditioned, the immeasurable. That is outside of the ‘constructed’ worldview (symbolised in Oriental culture as renunciation, ‘the forest’.) Probably rather too ‘religious’ for your liking but ought to be said, nonetheless. — Wayfarer

OK. But then I approach the "other" of the boundless from a rationalist's point of view. As a systems scientist and natural philosopher, I would talk about it as the Apeiron of Anaximander, the Firstness of Peirce.

Maths and science would be the suitable path, not art or mediation.

I'm simply agreeing with Janus - that art has more than simply or only a social dimension, even though it does have a social dimension. The social dimension of art or religion for that matter does not exhaust the subject.

I'm simply agreeing with Janus - that art has more than simply or only a social dimension, even though it does have a social dimension. — Wayfarer

Dimensions are things that imply measurements. Do you mean to make that kind of scientistic claim here?

Great if you do, but you then need to spell out the kind of measurements we could make to cash out whatever conception the dimension entails.

So what is the nature of this further dimension such that we can quantify it in the name of philosophic intelligibility?

I think my personal line would, however, be crossed by 'purpose'. The trouble with 'purpose' is it is future-set and that opens up too much possibility for excuse; "your reward's in heaven, don't worry about the state of things now", "yes, the revolution/war will bring death and destruction, but it's all for a grander purpose". I can see the benefits, but the risks are too great for my liking. — Pseudonym

I can see that that particular type of purpose is risky. There are other sorts of purpose one can adopt through philosophy that are less harmful though. I had in mind things like Sartre's use of the absolute existential freedom that is imposed upon us to create one's own authentic self, or Camus's rebellion against the absurdity of the world, or a Bentham-inspired drive to do what one can to reduce the suffering in the world. Perhaps, like the philosophies themselves, there are some that are helpful and some that are harmful to the world at large, and it behoves (sp?) others to try to talk people out of adherence to purposes that are harmful.

Dimensions are things that imply measurements. Do you mean to make that kind of scientistic claim here? — apokrisis

‘Dimension’ in the sense of ‘an aspect or mode of existence or lived reality’.

I've reviewed this thread, and have belatedely added some further responses to questions about the Steve Pinker essay, Science is not the enemy of the humanities which I had drawn attention to.

I've read the article, still not seeing the "science, and only science, describes the world as it is in itself, independent of perspective"

Pinker says;

"An appreciation of the particulars of a work can co-exist with explanations at many other levels, from the personality of an author to the cultural milieu, the faculties of human nature, and the laws governing social beings."

...and...

"No sane thinker would try to explain World War I in the language of physics, chemistry, and biology as opposed to the more perspicuous language of the perceptions and goals of leaders in 1914 Europe.

...and he describes positions that “science is all that matters” as "lunatic"

So I'm struggling to see this as an example of someone claiming that only science can describe the world.

He even specifically states "... the scientific facts do not by themselves dictate values," which doesn't provide a very good example of your definition of "treating science as a source of values" — Pseudonym

The key passage is this:

the worldview that guides the moral and spiritual values of an educated person today is the worldview given to us by science. Though the scientific facts do not by themselves dictate values, they certainly hem in the possibilities. By stripping ecclesiastical authority of its credibility on factual matters, they cast doubt on its claims to certitude in matters of morality. The scientific refutation of the theory of vengeful gods and occult forces undermines practices such as human sacrifice, witch hunts, faith healing, trial by ordeal, and the persecution of heretics. The facts of science, by exposing the absence of purpose in the laws governing the universe, force us to take responsibility for the welfare of ourselves, our species, and our planet. For the same reason, they undercut any moral or political system based on mystical forces, quests, destinies, dialectics, struggles, or messianic ages.

The claim that science 'refutes' the 'theory' of 'vengeful gods and occult forces' which support practices such as 'witch hunts, faith healing, trial by ordeal' is a straw man, as nobody that is seriously engaged in the discussion of the relationship of science and religious values would defend such practices (well, other than faith healing, which I believe has reasonable proponents). The assertion that the Universe is 'devoid of purpose' is not a scientific claim at all, but the extension of methodological naturalism to a metaphysical conclusion.

Other examples:

Art, culture, and society are products of human brains. They originate in our faculties of perception, thought, and emotion, and they cumulate and spread through the epidemiological dynamics by which one person affects others.

Which is biological reductionism, the assumption that all of these can be understood in terms of evolutionary neurobiology.

He says:

The moral worldview of any scientifically literate person—one who is not blinkered by fundamentalism—requires a radical break from religious conceptions of meaning and value.

There are many scientists who still practice or observe a religion in their private or even public lives and who see no conflict between their faith and their scientific practice (there's even a Wikipedia list of Christians who are scientists.)

What I'm questioning is the coherence of the notion of 'a scientific worldview' as the basis for such judgements. Science is a methodology, an attitude, and it indeed requires the suspension of judgement about many things which we would normally take for granted. But arriving at a grand judgement about the nature of the cosmos, or of 'meaning' in a general sense, and declaring on this basis, like Steven Weinberg also did, that 'the more it seems intelligible, the more it seems pointless' is not a scientific judgement at all, but pop philosophy. So that is where I found fault with Pinker's essay and why I regard it as example of 'scientism'.

‘Dimension’ in the sense of ‘an aspect or mode of existence or lived reality’. — Wayfarer

It literally means to measure. So I am pointing out the irony of you using such a scientistic term to lend prestige to your argument against Scientism.

It sounds precise, doesn’t it. So I’m asking, what is precise about your use of it?

It literally means to measure — apokrisis

"Dimension" also has a figurative meaning.

Previously, we have discussed whether religions are purely or only meaningful in a social or cultural sense, which I believe you had asserted. So my response to that is that there is also a soteriological dimension which is separate to the social function it performs. In fact I would say that adherents of religion would claim that the soteriological function is the only real reason for its existence, but that the cultural forms that religion takes provide support to that.

"Dimension" also has a figurative meaning. — Wayfarer

We don't even need to go to Google. Both Merriam-Webster and Oxford give a meaning of 'dimension' quite early in their lists of possible meanings, that has nothing to do with measurement. 'An aspect or feature of a situation'.

:ok:

I don't intend to ban your view from Philosophy. — PossibleAaran

No, I wouldn't want you to think that I thought that of you personally, I'm just arguing against the pejorative use of the term which seems to me to be aimed at dismissing the position by means other than mature argument. I hope that's clear.

I'd be interested to see, though, any convincing example of science answering traditional philosophical questions. — PossibleAaran

OK, so we need some definitions and caveats first.

1. Some philosophical positions are belief statements, not questions. So when I say science can answer the questions of philosophy, I am making that claim on the presumption that if you keep asking 'why?' somewhen you will end up just making a statement of belief. I don't think science can solve that problem, nor do I think philosophy can. I've yet to hear a convincing argument that such a problem can ever be solved by any means. What I believe science can do, is push back the amount of belief statements which need to be made.

2. There does seem to be some issue with the idea that 'science' is just a method (the scientific method), and this leads to all sorts of problems with the argument. Science is clearly not just a method otherwise there could be no possibility of understanding analytical works like those of Kuhn. Science is clearly a thing that people do such that it's practise can be investigated,but philosophically we need to define it. So when I say science, I mean the scientific method as defined by Popper, and its close relatives.

3. What constitutes 'The questions of philosophy', is obviously arguable and I don't think anyone has made the claim that science can answer absolutely any question you throw at it with a yes/no answer. I think we have to accept that some questions don't have an answer. Obviously science cannot answer those, but I do think a scientific approach can determine which questions are of this sort.

3. The argument is that science can answer the questions of philosophy, not that it already has. I will give you some examples of the sort of thing I think used to be philosophical questions which science has answered, but I really think the interest now is in questions which remain unanswered, should we investigate those by the scientific method or not?

That being said, one simple example of science answering a question of philosophy is the question of what the universe is made of. This used to be very firmly in the realm of philosophy. Anaxagoras, Aristotle, Democritus... All had theories about what the universe is made of. Science has models which make accurate predictions about what the universe is made of, and it is making progress in refining and expanding those models.

When you say "Ethical Naturalism", what exactly do you mean? There are several things which go under that name. None of the views I associate with that label are ones which can be established by scientific experiment. They are all argued for Philosophically, and so it may be that this debate about Harris is a distraction from the main topic. — PossibleAaran

The argument for ethical naturalism and the moral arguments presuming ethical naturalism are two entirely different things. Harris focuses mainly on the latter, although he does briefly allude to the former. I should say, at this stage that I'm basically a deconstructionist when it comes to author intent. I'm only interested in what the ideas within a text could mean, not what the author actually intended them to mean, so I'm not claiming here to represent Harris's view, only to present a view I think derives from what he has written.

Im guessing that once ethical naturalism is presumed, the reason why science can determine moral actions is pretty obvious and so the sticking point will be how science argue for ethical naturalism in the first place.

There are several different ways, but a full exposition of each would be of topic. This is supposed to be about why people are derogatory to those who think science can answer philosophical questions. That fact that I'm already being asked to rigorously defend any claims scientists make to that effect is indicative of this attitude. Idealism might, for example, be rigorously interrogated before any philosophers consider agreeing with it. It is not rigorously interrogated just to justify its right to be considered a valid theory. Within the scope of this discussion, all I have an obligation to do is demonstrate the idea of science answering philosophical questions is valid, not that it's right.

That being said, the idea, with ethical naturalism, is that it can be demonstrated by falsifiable theory, that most humans simply are the way ethical naturalists describe them. Of course there are exceptions, but there are exceptions to the rule that animals eat in response to hunger, but that doesn't prevent it from being a scientific theory.

I just heard an interesting interview with Alex Rosenburg (professor of philosophy at Duke University) in which he says that he's decided to start accepting the term 'scientism' to describe his naturalistic philosophy in the same way that the homosexual community accepted the pejorative term 'queer' to take away its power to insult. Seems to me to be a good way to handle such prejudice.

No, I wouldn't want you to think that I thought that of you personally, I'm just arguing against the pejorative use of the term which seems to me to be aimed at dismissing the position by means other than mature argument. I hope that's clear. — Pseudonym

Well, I can't say that I'm sure what the position really is yet, so it would be unwise at this stage for me to throw around pejoratives. I thought initially that your position was that Science can answer all questions of Philosophy, but your recent post seems to contradict this.

You begin by discussing (I think?) a question of great interest to me - is there any way to answer all "why" questions about our beliefs, and hence is there any way to provide a non-question begging reason for everything that we believe? This is what you say:

So when I say science can answer the questions of philosophy, I am making that claim on the presumption that if you keep asking 'why?' somewhen you will end up just making a statement of belief. — Pseudonym

This presumption of yours is itself a philosophical position, and one which many philosophers of the past would have disagreed with you (these days I think your view is much more popular). If you hold that science can answer all Philosophical questions, one might expect you to claim that this position of yours is at least testable by scientific method. But you don't cite any scientific paper or experiment in which this is shown. It is tempting to think that this is because no such paper or experiment exists and even that no such thing is really possible, but let's not get ahead of ourselves. What you do say here is this:

I don't think science can solve that problem, nor do I think philosophy can. I've yet to hear a convincing argument that such a problem can ever be solved by any means. — Pseudonym

The "problem" here, as you are thinking of it, is that we cannot answer every "why" question with non-question begging reasons. You think that science cannot provide such reasons, and that Philosophy can't either. As I pointed out above, this is itself a Philosophical position, and so, unless it is one you arrive at by "the method of science", whatever that turns out to be, then your claim that science can answer every philosophical question turns out to be in conflict with other views of yours.

What I believe science can do, is push back the amount of belief statements which need to be made. — Pseudonym

I think that's right, but I'd also insist that Philosophy can do that too if Philosophers set their minds to do it. What normally happens, however, is Philosophers decide quickly that you can't answer every "why" question and then they give up on the whole business and don't try to answer any of them - a very hasty step!

I agree with your thoughts on the constitution of the world. It used to be a philosophical question, and now it's a scientific one.

but I really think the interest now is in questions which remain unanswered, should we investigate those by the scientific method or not? — Pseudonym

Here it depends which questions are at issue. Which contemporary philosophical questions can be answered by scientific methods? All of them? All of the ones that can be answered at all? You tell me. It sounds like you think Ethical Naturalism is itself a scientific theory:

That being said, the idea, with ethical naturalism, is that it can be demonstrated by falsifiable theory, that most humans simply are the way ethical naturalists describe them. — Pseudonym

I'm still not sure what you mean by "Ethical Naturalism" and so I have no idea whether it can really be tested by scientific theory. One view going under that label today is the view that the phrase "morally good" ordinarily means something like "maximizes well-being". Vague as this still is, it would be empirically testable. Ask people what they mean by "morally good" and see what they say. Since a large part of the world is still religious, however, I greatly doubt that they mean anything like this by "morally good". But I don't think this view about the meaning of words is what you meant to defend.

This presumption of yours is itself a philosophical position, and one which many philosophers of the past would have disagreed with you (these days I think your view is much more popular). If you hold that science can answer all Philosophical questions, one might expect you to claim that this position of yours is at least testable by scientific method. — PossibleAaran

No, not quite. It's a philosophical position, but it does not follow that saying science can answer all the questions of philosophy requires me to show scientific proof that it is right to hold this belief. I just do hold it, it is a brute fact that I find myself faced with. I haven't decided to believe this, it was never a question, any more than "what's the best colour in the world?" whilst technically phrased as a question, is a meaningless one.

That's what I mean by saying that all philosophical questions ultimately end up with a statement of belief, rather than an unequivocal answer. That assertion I do have scientific evidence for - My hypothesis is that all philosophical questions end up requiring a fundamental statement of belief, my test is to look through all the philosophical questions that have ever been asked, my hypothesis has yet to be falsified because I have yet to find a philosophical question which has an unequivocal answer not requiring some belief statement. It's not the best theory in the world, and it needs a lot more testing, but it is definitely scientific, by the definition I'm using.

You think that science cannot provide such reasons, and that Philosophy can't either. As I pointed out above, this is itself a Philosophical position, and so, unless it is one you arrive at by "the method of science", whatever that turns out to be, then your claim that science can answer every philosophical question turns out to be in conflict with other views of yours. — PossibleAaran

As above, It's a perfectly legitimate scientific theory which is falsifiable (the presentation of a scientific or philosophical 'answer' that is objectively agreed upon) and yet to be falsified (there is no such answer). Questions such as whether objectivity means anything are themselves philosophical question which themselves cannot be answered and again, my proof of this is simply that they have not been answered.

I think that's right, but I'd also insist that Philosophy can do that too if Philosophers set their minds to do it. — PossibleAaran

This is the really interesting bit, completely off topic, but I'd love to hear how you think this would happen, are you just hopeful, or do you have a theory as to how? Don't worry about the off-topicness, I don't think anyone's reading this any more.

Which contemporary philosophical questions can be answered by scientific methods? All of them? All of the ones that can be answered at all? You tell me. — PossibleAaran

Yes to "All the ones that can be answered at all". I'm Paraphrasing from Alex Rosenburg's book here; Why are we here? - No reason, What is the nature of reality? - What physics says it is, Is there free-will? - Not a chance, Why should I be moral? - Because it makes you feel better than being Immoral. He's deliberately being glib, but the idea expounded in the rest of the book, is that these positions can be supported, either by scientific theories, or by fundamental beliefs which simply occur to us as brute facts and over which we have no control.

I'm still not sure what you mean by "Ethical Naturalism" and so I have no idea whether it can really be tested by scientific theory. One view going under that label today is the view that the phrase "morally good" ordinarily means something like "maximizes well-being". Vague as this still is, it would be empirically testable. Ask people what they mean by "morally good" and see what they say. Since a large part of the world is still religious, however, I greatly doubt that they mean anything like this by "morally good". But I don't think this view about the meaning of words is what you meant to defend. — PossibleAaran

Absolutely, you're getting the idea, although I sense you're just being charitable and don't actually agree with it. The sort of thing you're suggesting is exactly the way naturalists think that science can answer these questions. The only refinement I would make is that we all know people lie through their teeth when asked about personal matters like morality. I would design the experiment to see how people behave in controlled situations designed such as to best elucidate what they really believe, not just what they say they do.

Whether to give a tithe to the poor might be an example, I'm not sure where this is leading, obviously you're not thinking I'd be unable to come up with a moral dilemma, so maybe I'm missing your point here? — Pseudonym

Heh, yeah you're missing the point because you're jumping ahead of it. Be patient. How is tithing a moral issue? Why would you choose to tithe, or not?

Now the issue is, can you have both? Can you maximise the satisfaction of your desires. again this is not the objective because it 'should' be, it simply is, like it or not, you're a biological machine and you're going to do what you're going to do. Again, the theory is that science can (eventually) answer that question. If we know what sorts of thing really satisfy the desires we seem to have, the extent to which they do so, how long such satisfaction lasts etc. then we can derive strategies which maximise satisfaction. — Pseudonym

I'm not sure that I'm following you. Natural selection "selected" the traits in organisms that maximizes procreation and survival. Each organism has it's own goals and because it shares its genes with other members of its species, it will share many goals with its members. It is when the individual goal comes into conflict with the goals of another that a moral issue arises, or when you are deciding which path to take that will maximize your happiness. Our actions can have an effect on others and the consequences may not be conductive to happiness in the long-run as opposed to the short-run. So it is a matter of choosing the right path to achieve happiness for yourself, not others.

Our genes are the governing factor in making any moral decision. As a matter of fact, the organism counts as almost nothing in the grand scheme of things. What matters is the survival and propagation of the genes within the gene pool and we behave in social ways in order to maximize that. This means that while altruistic actions can diminish the chances of the individual getting what they want, their actions improve the conditions of others that share their genes. This is also why we are more altruistic with family members as opposed to strangers. If you find a stranger drowning at the same time as a family member, and you could only save one, who would you save and why?

That's what I mean by saying that all philosophical questions ultimately end up with a statement of belief, rather than an unequivocal answer. That assertion I do have scientific evidence for - My hypothesis is that all philosophical questions end up requiring a fundamental statement of belief, my test is to look through all the philosophical questions that have ever been asked, my hypothesis has yet to be falsified because I have yet to find a philosophical question which has an unequivocal answer not requiring some belief statement. — Pseudonym

I admit that I've not read every page in this discussion, so forgive me if this point has been addressed. I've heard scientists such as Lawrence Krauss say things along the lines of "I don't believe that P, I know that P." However, if knowledge is justified true belief (or something in that neighborhood), to know that P entails that one believes that P. Thus, all knowledge statements are statements of belief. It is a different matter, of course, to claim "I don't merely believe that P, I know that P."

Additionally, it seems at least prima facie dubious to me that any affirmative claim at all is not a statement of belief on the part of the agent making the affirmation. No matter our level of justification or certitude in making an affirmative claim, our statement boils down to saying (even if only tacitly) "I believe such-and-such."

(I am using the somewhat clunky phrase "affirmative claim" to denote those utterances of ours which are (1) truth-apt, and (2) which express something we think is true. This would set such claims apart from non-truth-apt utterances and from truth-apt statements which we utter but do not believe, e.g. because we are lying, positing a hypothetical, etc.)

Be patient. — Harry Hindu

Sorry.

How is tithing a moral issue? Why would you choose to tithe, or not? — Harry Hindu

Tithing is a moral issue because it is an example of that class of decisions most people agree to label 'moral'. What I'm interested in as an ethicist, is what properties the members of that class share. It the same as the class 'animal' is that class of object which have a non-walled cell. A zoologist studies the things in this class. We could argue about what 'should' be in and out of each class by means of similarity, and that argument will never be conclusive, but the decision we make in moot cases does not tell us anything about the class, only language. The thing is, despite this ambiguity no-one thinks choosing the colour of my new hat is a moral decision and no-one thinks a table is an animal, so we usually have enough agreement on terms to be going on with.

So, how would I choose?

1. I want to maximise the feeling of well-being I get from living in a mutually supportive society. This is not something I've decided to want, I just find I do. I also find others feel this way too, so any conclusions I draw from my investigation of the best way to achieve this might be useful to others. On examination, I can see how such a feeling could have evolved (mutually supportive communities would out compete those with in-fighting), so I'm happy that this feeling is not something superficially conditioned into me. (I can explain why this matters if necessary).

2. Given that I want what I want, I then have to employ rational thought to the evidence that I have to arrive at a solution. This is where science helps.

It is when the individual goal comes into conflict with the goals of another that a moral issue arises, or when you are deciding which path to take that will maximize your happiness. — Harry Hindu

Yes, that's one way of looking at it.

It is a different matter, of course, to claim "I don't merely believe that P, I know that P." — Arkady

I expect that's what he meant. He's a good physicist, but he's not a very good philosopher (in my opinion). I don't think he's got used to how careful one needs to be with words when answering philosophical questions.

No matter our level of justification or certitude in making an affirmative claim, our statement boils down to saying (even if only tacitly) "I believe such-and-such." — Arkady

Absolutely, I really can't see any other answer, but that doesn't make all claims equal, not does it rule out fair use of the word 'know', it's just a word after all, like any other word it describes a collection of things similar enough that we can mostly agree they can be denoted by a single term. We don't need to all agree, nor do we need to have the answer to every borderline case in order to use the term.

I think the models that are most successful in science are squarely in the middle of the class of beliefs we call 'knowledge'.

Where's this line of questioning going? It seems a bit random, some insight into where you're heading might help. — Pseudonym

It's really simple. You right away defended the following quote by Putnam:

"science, and only science, describes the world as it is in itself, independent of perspective" — Pseudonym

as merely Realism, without providing an argument that the line points to Realism. And that makes it okay to say? Not quite. This is a philosophy thread. You need to explain why you think that's just realism.

Then, I asked you to think about your first experience, and the time when you were able (at an age that you could articulate or communicate it). You admitted under those conditions that not only you've had experience, but you could articulate it or communicate it. Did you have to wait for science to explain it to you and for you?
You should be critical about the quotes you read.

Tithing is a moral issue because it is an example of that class of decisions most people agree to label 'moral'. What I'm interested in as an ethicist, is what properties the members of that class share. It the same as the class 'animal' is that class of object which have a non-walled cell. A zoologist studies the things in this class. We could argue about what 'should' be in and out of each class by means of similarity, and that argument will never be conclusive, but the decision we make in moot cases does not tell us anything about the class, only language. — Pseudonym

So you're saying that tithing is a moral issue because others say so? It's arbitrary? That doesn't seem to help your argument much.

The thing is, despite this ambiguity no-one thinks choosing the colour of my new hat is a moral decision and no-one thinks a table is an animal, so we usually have enough agreement on terms to be going on with. — Pseudonym

Exactly. No one's goals are affected by your choice of color of hat. If it did affect others goals, then it would be a moral issue. That is my point - that organisms have goals. Tables and hats do not.

1. I want to maximise the feeling of well-being I get from living in a mutually supportive society. This is not something I've decided to want, I just find I do. I also find others feel this way too, so any conclusions I draw from my investigation of the best way to achieve this might be useful to others. — Pseudonym

Yes, because you were designed that way by natural selection. You are a social animal among other social animals.

On examination, I can see how such a feeling could have evolved (mutually supportive communities would out compete those with in-fighting), so I'm happy that this feeling is not something superficially conditioned into me. (I can explain why this matters if necessary). — Pseudonym

There are plenty of other species that have in-fighting and they have been around longer than humans. Males in many species fight (sometimes to the death) for territory and mates.

2. Given that I want what I want, I then have to employ rational thought to the evidence that I have to arrive at a solution. This is where science helps. — Pseudonym

Well yes, you use logic to determine the best course of action. This is done for any kind of decision - moral or not. You use reason to make any decision whether it be which ice cream flavor to eat, or who to save when you find more than one person drowning and can only save one. The other person drowning that you are not saving wishes that you would save them. In other words, moral dilemmas arise out of a conflict of interests. There is no scientific theory that tells us which person you should save. There are only theories that explain why you saved one over another (you share more of your genes with the person you saved as they are a family member, or if they are both strangers, you save the one with the least amount of risk to yourself).

It's really simple. You right away defended the following quote by Putnam: — Caldwell

Putnam was arguing against Scientism, I wasn't defending his quote I was arguing that it was unfair of him to characterise the definition he gave in a pejorative way. The entire exercise of this post is one of being critical of quotes I read.

You right away defended the following quote by Putnam:

"science, and only science, describes the world as it is in itself, independent of perspective" — Pseudonym

as merely Realism, without providing an argument that the line points to Realism. And that makes it okay to say? Not quite. This is a philosophy thread. You need to explain why you think that's just realism. — Caldwell

Again, if you actually read the whole post rather than just picking a fight, you'll read that just two paragraphs later, the summary of the post is to ask the question - "How does Scientism differ from either Physicalism or Positivism such that it deserves it's own name?", not to make the claim that it doesn't, which is just how it seems to me, not a philosophical claim. The entire post is a question, not a claim.

Since you're enquiring though, to me the idea that science is the only method that can give knowledge is simply a methodological, pragmatic, tool that the Physicalist will want to use. Physicalism infers objective reality, and science investigates objective facts. The fact that, for the Physicalist, other metaphysical assertions can be made, doesn't alter the conclusion that none of them could constitute objective knowledge without falling into the realm of science. But that's just the way I see it. As I said, the post is a question, not a claim. If you think that there are ways of holding a physicalist position but which don't imply that science is the only route to actual knowledge, then I'd love to hear them, that's the point of the post.

You admitted under those conditions that not only you've had experience, but you could articulate it or communicate it. Did you have to wait for science to explain it to you and for you? — Caldwell

I don't understand this point at all, are you seeing 'Science' as men in white lab coats with bunsen burners? I held theories when I was a child, theories which I tested against the real world. Most of them turned out to be wrong on testing. What's not scientific about that? In so far as an 'explanation' is not the same a s a description, then yes, I did have to wait for science to explain my experiences, until then they were just experiences with no objectively verifiable cause.

So you're saying that tithing is a moral issue because others say so? It's arbitrary? That doesn't seem to help your argument much. — Harry Hindu

How so? I'm arguing that science can determine the answer to moral problems, not that science can decide what words we use to describe what type of thing. Science doesn't decide that the tall thing with leaves on is going to be called a 'tree', but neither does philosophy, it's just the evolution of language. The fact is that some decision has to me made about tithing because the issue exists. What we call it is irrelevant, we could call it a 'fligitybit' issue, if you like.

Exactly. No one's goals are affected by your choice of color of hat. If it did affect others goals, then it would be a moral issue. That is my point - that organisms have goals. Tables and hats do not. — Harry Hindu

Fine, moral issues are those types of decision which might affect another organism's goals. I have no problem with that definition, we're still on language here though, you're still just describing the family resemblance that groups together all the types of decision we call Moral. We could take your word for it, or we could ask everyone in the world what types of decision they would use the word 'moral' to cover and use some sort of standard deviation around the mean for our definition. None of this has the slightest impact on how we actually make such decisions (ethics).

There are plenty of other species that have in-fighting and they have been around longer than humans. Males in many species fight (sometimes to the death) for territory and mates. — Harry Hindu

Yes, but I'm not one of them (or at least my current theory is that I'm not, and said theory has yet to be falsified), so I don't see how this is relevant. I'm not trying to claim that the answers science would give us to moral dilemmas would also apply to Lions.

There is no scientific theory that tells us which person you should save. — Harry Hindu

There absolutely is, that's the point of ethical naturalism (or at least my specific brand). The way we want to feel after certain decisions is a natural fact determined by evolution, and the means to obtain that feeling is a logical cause/effect system which scientific experiment can determine the probable relations wthin. Therefore science absolutely can tell us which person to save, the one which experiments have shown will provide us with the feeling which experiments have shown we are bound to want.

There are only theories that explain why you saved one over another (you share more of your genes with the person you saved as they are a family member, or if they are both strangers, you save the one with the least amount of risk to yourself). — Harry Hindu

No, there are not only theories why, there are theories about what the consequences will be and how we will feel about those consequences. There are also theories demonstrating what feelings we wish to obtain and which we wish to avoid, thus we can determine which action's consequences produce the feelings we wish to obtain.