No, it’s not anything complicated. I just think Sam Harris is a phony. The question of whether neuroscience has anything remotely relevant to say about philosophy and religion is another matter altogether.

If you have an actual line of argument then lay it out and defend it, — Pseudonym

I don't think you've responded to anything in the OP, and I can't see anything in any of what you say that amounts to anything more than basic scientism. Done talking to you.

There are evidence-based theories which suggest that free-will and the self are both illusory and are not what we think they are. — Pseudonym

OK, then give an account of such a theory and the evidence that purportedly supports it.

There are evidence-based theories which suggest that free-will and the self are both illusory and are not what we think they are. — Pseudonym

If free will and self are illusory, so are all scientists and everything they comment on.

OK, then give an account of such a theory and the evidence that purportedly supports it. — Janus

I obviously can't give an account of an entire neuroscientific theory and all the evidence used to back it up on a philosophy forum. Unlike the bullshit that's often peddled here there is a vast weight of experimental evidence which supports the argument, far more than would fit in one post.

If you actually want an account (I'm guessing you don't and you're just being rhetorical for effect), then I suggest you read 'The Self Illusion' by Bruce Hood, which is a good approachable introduction to the subject.

For a brief introduction, there's a slideshare of Rick Hanson's talk on the subject https://www.slideshare.net/drrickhanson/notself-in-the-brain-rick-hanson-phd

If you want a more philosophical approach you could try 'The Ego Tunnel: The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self' by Thomas Metzinger.

Susan Blackmore has written extensively about the illusions of both self and conciousness, the argument is laid out in 'Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction'.

Patricia Churchland's “Touching A Nerve: The Self As Brain.” also gives a good account.

The argument is, in it's most basic form, that a wide range of studies such as these (just to give you an example) https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S001002770400099X https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/jocn.2006.18.9.1586 show that what we talk about when we describe our 'selves' in neither consistent, nor reflected in our actions. Something which does not have an effect on the real world (the 'self' that we describe does not affect our actions), and changes it's properties entirely based on a subjective feeling, is not real. If it were, then Jabberwockies would be real too.

The reality of the subject is a different matter to that of the self. Whilst it might be true, as Hume opined, that when you seek for a self, you can never apprehend it, the question still remains - what seeks? What judges? What decides what is 'self' and what is not? All of those activities are undeniably the conscious actions of a subject, whether you call it 'self' or not. (And as Descartes said: you can't deny it without affirming it.)

The materialists, such as Churchlands, trivialise the question by insisting that decisions are the actions of neurons, of synapses, of biochemical reactions. However, you can never find anything corresponding to 'judgement' or 'meaning' or 'decisions' in the data of the neurosciences. If you wish to find it, you must immediately embark on a process of judgement as to what the data means. 'See this area of the brain here', you might say. 'It means such and such'. But to do so requires reasoned inference, the supposition that 'this' means 'that', that 'this data' signifies 'this meaning'. And that act, that supposition, is never in the data itself. It is always internal to the operation of thought, as logic is found in the relationship of ideas, not of objects as such.

'Brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, the motion of water molecules, electrical current, and any other physical phenomenon you can think of, are devoid of any inherent meaning [as materialists never tire of telling us]. By themselves they are simply meaningless patterns of electrochemical activity. Yet our thoughts do have inherent meaning – that’s how they are able to impart it to otherwise meaningless ink marks, sound waves, etc. In that case, though, it seems that our thoughts cannot possibly be identified with any physical processes in the brain. In short: Thoughts and the like possess inherent meaning or intentionality; brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, and the like, are utterly devoid of any inherent meaning or intentionality; so thoughts and the like cannot possibly be identified with brain processes.'

~ Feser.

No. Meaning resides in the relationship between cause and effect -which is to say that meaning can reside externally to minds. Minds merely try to get at and simulate that relationship in order to make predictions. What someone means when they write or speak, is what they intend to say. Other minds try to get at the intent (the cause) when reading or listening to their words (the effect).

Thanks for the references, but I'm already well familiar with the arguments. I've read The Ego Tunnel and quite a bit of the Churchlands and some Blackmore. I just don't find those kinds of arguments for the epiphenomenality of consciousness convincing. Also, no amount of neuroscientific research can show that consciousness is an epiphenomenon; that will always be merely one among other possible interpretations of the results.

Also, no amount of neuroscientific research can show that consciousness is an epiphenomenon; that will always be merely one among other possible interpretations of the results. — Janus

Absolutely, that;s why I am always (well...usually) careful to make the claim that "There are evidence-based theories which suggest that free-will and the self are both illusory and are not what we think they are". Suggest, not prove.

What I objected to was your trying to claim that it was "not knowledge". I honestly know of no better description for knowledge than a falsifiable theory which is based on existing justified beliefs and against which there is no overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

Such is the theory that free-will and conciousness are illusions.

Absolutely, that;s why I am always (well...usually) careful to make the claim that "There are evidence-based theories which suggest that free-will and the self are both illusory and are not what we think they are". Suggest, not prove.

What I objected to was your trying to claim that it was "not knowledge". I honestly know of no better description for knowledge than a falsifiable theory which is based on existing justified beliefs and against which there is no overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

Such is the theory that free-will and conciousness are illusions. — Pseudonym

To say "there are evidence-based theories which suggest..." doesn't seem right. Theories don't suggest, they posit. Perhaps you mean 'there is evidence that suggests...'?

For me, scientific theories are knowledge only in the sense of knowing how, not in the sense of knowing that. The observations that underpin a theory are knowings that, and the actualities that are observed in experiments designed to test the predictions of a theory are knowings that.

So. experiments like Libet's, for example, do not demonstrate that free will is an illusion, but that is one possible way of interpreting the results. I can't think of any experiments which even purport to demonstrate that consciousness is an illusion. Do you know of any?

It suggests it, but you have to decide whether it’s true. But then, if is true, your decision to accept it is immaterial.

What is knowledge, belief, or anything, if everything is determined and there are no choices? Knowledge disintegrates into a totally meaningless concept concocted by what? The Laws of Physics? Determinists are walking contradictions. Whatever they say it's simply concocted by whatever governs determinism, so who cares? It has zero meaning about anything.

To say "there are evidence-based theories which suggest..." doesn't seem right. Theories don't suggest, they posit. Perhaps you mean 'there is evidence that suggests...'? — Janus

'Suggest' is listed in my thesaurus as a synonym for 'posit', so I'm not sure what the distinction is you're making here, perhaps you could clarify what the difference is, philosophically.

For me, scientific theories are knowledge only in the sense of knowing how, not in the sense of knowing that. The observations that underpin a theory are knowings that, and the actualities that are observed in experiments designed to test the predictions of a theory are knowings that. — Janus

Knowledge how X comes to be the case, is just knowledge that Y causes X. Again, I'm not sure I see the distinction. We might have degrees of certainty about our knowledge. We might be certain that the Earth orbits the Sun, but there are remaining uncertainties about the theory of gravity that is how the Earth orbits the Sun. That doesn't mean, by any standard use of the word, that the theory of gravity is not 'knowledge'. We cannot, after all, be certain the Earth orbits the Sun, it might be an illusion.

Knowledge is just justified belief. A theory which, when applied to some circumstance, reliably produces the expected results and is useful.

The theory that we have no unified 'self', nor 'free-will' would predict that in certain cases of brain damage, changes would take place to what we call a person's 'self', and they do. A theory that we have no free-will would expect to see something like the results in Libet's experiments, and it does. It would expect to see ad hoc rationalisations of sub-concious actions, and it does. It would expect to see strong links between environment and behaviour, and it does. It would expect to find no central brain activity associated with conciousness, and it doesn't. It's a good theory.

This doesn't mean it's true, or that it won't be replaced by a better theory. It may well be that dualism is right, it may well be that some mysterious aspect of quantum indeterminacy somehow allows for free-will, but none of those possibilities make it a poor theory, it's doing what good theories do. It's making predictions which turn out to be the case.

What alternative theory of free-will and conciousness can make predictions which turn out to be the case?

I was just watching a news broadcast which involved a crime for which the alleged offender is to plead ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’. If, however, it was demonstrable that this offender had no free will, then that plea wouldn’t even be required. Nobody would be responsible for anything.

Go figure.

That doesn't mean, by any standard use of the word, that the theory of gravity is not 'knowledge'. — Pseudonym

I didn't say theories are not knowledge; I said they are knowledge-how. They give us knowledge of how to make predictions and construct experiments to test them.

What you refer to is not knowledge — Janus

I didn't say theories are not knowledge — Janus

So now I'm confused. Are you saying the the idea we do not have free-will or that the 'self' is an illusion is not a theory?

What is knowledge, belief, or anything, if everything is determined and there are no choices? Knowledge disintegrates into a totally meaningless concept concocted by what? The Laws of Physics? Determinists are walking contradictions. Whatever they say it's simply concocted by whatever governs determinism, so who cares? It has zero meaning about anything. — Rich

Let's say that everything is determined, for the sake of argument. What now? The mere assumed fact that the future already exists in a certain sense doesn't give us access to that predetermined future. We still wrestle the experience that we'll continue to call 'choice' or 'free will.' We might joke that we are 'suffering from the illusion of choice' again, but this is the same kind of suffering. It involves an ignorance of what we will do ahead of time (in borderline situations especially.) That's my attempt to demonstrate that the mere abstract truth of determinism doesn't have much weight.

My second point is that we are all already soft determinists. We reason about how others may or may not react to different requests, provocations, seductions, etc. We reason about what they will do in terms of what they in particular have done and what humans in general have done in similar situations.
What would truly be freaky here is the kind of perfect free will that was utterly unpredictable. How would behavioral science be possible in the context of this radical free will? Would this not imply that any inferred patterns are a matter of chance? That all scientific results on human behavior are null and void? This is similar to denying that nature is lawlike because we can not ground induction in deduction without an axiom that dodges the issue.

In short, hard determinism is trivial without access to the future. [Such access might not even make sense, for sci-fi movie reasons.] Also soft determinism suffuses our ordinary activity and thought in the world.

The theory that we have no unified 'self', nor 'free-will' would predict that in certain cases of brain damage, changes would take place to what we call a person's 'self', and they do. A theory that we have no free-will would expect to see something like the results in Libet's experiments, and it does. It would expect to see ad hoc rationalisations of sub-concious actions, and it does. It would expect to see strong links between environment and behaviour, and it does. It would expect to find no central brain activity associated with conciousness, and it doesn't. It's a good theory. — Pseudonym

Hi. I haven't looked into this deeply (disclaimer), but I'm surprised if it's the case that scientific theories include terms like 'self' and 'free will.' And what is it that we call a person's 'self'? Can we pin down the word? Do we want to?

I can understand theories as prediction functions from observable brain states to behavior, or from one kind of behavior to another. But I can't make sense of 'we have no free will.' That's because I can't make sense of 'free will.' Sure, it has a vague meaning.

On the other hand, I do see how a tendency toward ad hoc rationalizations of subconscious actions could be framed as support for the vague and metaphysical theory that we have no free will.

If, however, it was demonstrable that this offender had no free will, then that plea wouldn’t even be required. Nobody would be responsible for anything. — Wayfarer

I think you are forcing a particular meaning on the word 'responsible' here. It seems to me that it wouldn't matter that we were all (under the assumption of determinism) ideally irresponsible. We still as individuals and societies have to deal with violation of taboos, crimes, etc. We would still hold people responsible in the weightiest sense of the word. True, a shared belief in determinism might change the way we make and enforce laws, but we would still reward and punish.

Hi. I haven't looked into this deeply (disclaimer), but I'm surprised if it's the case that scientific theories include terms like 'self' and 'free will.' — mrcoffee

I don't think I referred to either as 'scientific' theories. Although I'm not sure that would matter. I have quite a broad definition of what constitutes science, but I know others don't so I try to avoid ambiguous uses of the term.

And what is it that we call a person's 'self'? Can we pin down the word? Do we want to? — mrcoffee

We use the term all the time. "He wasn't himself", "self-confidence", "self-awareness". They all imply that there is a constant and unified thing such that a person could act in such a way as to be contrary, or untrue, to it. The psychological theory is that no such thing exists, that we are just a collection of contradictory impulses. The evidence seems to support such a theory.

We use the term all the time. "He wasn't himself", "self-confidence", "self-awareness". They all imply that there is a constant and unified thing such that a person could act in such a way as to be contrary, or untrue, to it. The psychological theory is that no such thing exists, that we are just a collection of contradictory impulses. The evidence seems to support such a theory. — Pseudonym

As I argued above, I can only understand the a science of behavior in terms of the prediction and control of said behavior. But what are we modeling if not the entity that behaves? This entity is the unified thing that can be 'untrue' to our current model of it. As I suggested to Rich above, we all do folk-psychology (which seems to me to be implicitly deterministic, if 'only' probabilistically). We'd be surprised if a person yawned when his hair was on fire. That would be part of our general idea of the human. Then we specialize with individuals. Cathy over there is a little bit different from every other human who has ever lived, probably. Some sequence of stimuli would generated different 'output.' Language is probably the easiest manifestation of this uniqueness. How many sentences are still out there that have never been uttered?

I probably agree with you in spirit if not in letter, though. For one thing, I don't think there's a 'thine own self' to which we can be virtuously true.

I just think the self of ordinary language exists more than it doesn't exist, to the degree that it is worth the trouble to pick sides about the use of a decontextualized word. I don't think we know exactly what we mean by 'self' in most cases (if ever), but that may apply to every word. How exactly can we say what 'mean' means? It's as if we find ourselves in a basic competence, perhaps because our self-for-ourselves is mostly made of words? I view philosophy as (among other things) this kind of identity construction.

Let's say that everything is determined, for the sake of argument. What now? The mere assumed fact that the future already exists in a certain sense doesn't give us access to that predetermined future. We still wrestle the experience that we'll continue to call 'choice' or 'free will.' We might joke that we are 'suffering from the illusion of choice' again, but this is the same kind of suffering. It involves an ignorance of what we will do ahead of time (in borderline situations especially.) That's my attempt to demonstrate that the mere abstract truth of determinism doesn't have much weight. — mrcoffee

But if the future already exists, in a hard determinist way, we wouldn't have any incentive to attempt to influence what we apprehend may or may not occur, because it's already determined. Whether or not I'm getting the job I want is already determined, so I don't need to send a resume.

We still wrestle the experience that we'll continue to call 'choice' or 'free will.' — mrcoffee

I have no idea what the concept of "we" or "wrestle" means under determinism. Nothing has any meaning with determinism. There is no reason to even take discussion of meaning seriously since whatever we utter has already been determined. Do we even have can choice about taking anything seriously? Of course not. It is a chasm of meaningless existence.

There is no Free Will. There is only the ability to choose a direction of action. We have habits, sometimes very addictive ones, such as believing in determinism, which we have a choice to try to change.

I think you are forcing a particular meaning on the word 'responsible' here — mrcoffee

No particular meaning. If humans don’t freely act as agents by making decisions and carrying them out, then they’re not responsible for their actions. Justice can’t be carried out on the basis that it’s just ‘as if’ they’re responsible.

The nature of the self, whether the self is unitary, and so on - these are no doubt deep philosophical questions, but the materialist view that humans are ‘only’ or ‘simply’ a ‘bundle’ of autonomic actions and reflexes undoubtedly undermines any notion of agency or personal responsibility. No amount of sophistry about ‘idealised definitioins’ will get around that. (However, this is another topic altogether from the OP.)

For one thing, I don't think there's a 'thine own self' to which we can be virtuously true. — mrcoffee

There is a confusion in modern cultur,e owing to the prestige accorded to scientific objectivity. According to some, only what can be objectively validated in scientific terms can be considered real. But the self as ‘subject of experience’ is never among the objects of scientific analysis.

There are various ways of dealing with this. One road was taken by Husserl and later phenomenology generally, which methodologically criticised the attempt to ‘naturalise’ the mind, by arguing that mind in an important and real sense, precedes any naturalistic explanation. Husserl criticised Descartes for treating res cognitans in a naturalistic manner i.e. by positing it as an objective reality, which has had many profound consequences in later philosophy.

Another route, which a few here seem to be favouring, is the behaviourist, which declares that the self/mind/subject is actually non-existent, or at any rate ought not to be considered as part of any ‘truly scientific’ analysis but is an artefact of ‘folk psychology’. Daniel Dennett and the other eliminaitve materialists are arguably all fundamentally behaviourist in their outlook. (I have no wish to discuss or indulge behaviourism or scientific materialism other than to note its fundamentally self-contradictory nature.)

But if the future already exists, in a hard determinist way, we wouldn't have any incentive to attempt to influence what we apprehend may or may not occur, because it's already determined. Whether or not I'm getting the job I want is already determined, so I don't need to send a resume. — Metaphysician Undercover

Interesting point. The way our knowledge of hard determinism would affect our actions which in turn would affect this future would have to be already baked in to that future. Some of the problems in sci-fi movie plots start to manifest.

For me the issue is a probabilistic determinism that, in my view, we already believe in in terms of practice. (Of course QM is probabilistic and our knowledge of human behavior is fuzzy). I plan my interactions with others according to an image of what they are more or less likely to do in response to this or that prompt. I don't suggest to an alcoholic that we go out for a drink, secure in the radical freedom of the alcoholic to decide a new. (With 'hard free will' there would not be alcoholics, since past behavior would give no information about future behavior.)I get to know myself this way too. Maybe I don't buy ice cream at the grocery store, because I tend to eat too much of it once I start. Finally, we hate abuses of children not only for the immediate trauma of the abuse but also because we think of the damage to the child's personality that might resonate for decades or a lifetime.

(With 'hard free will' there would not be alcoholics, since past behavior would give no information about future behavior.) — mrcoffee

I've never heard of "hard free will", would that be like every decision is a completely random decision?

I have no idea what the concept of "we" or "wrestle" means under determinism. — Rich

Let's imagine an extra-terrestial with a superior brain and/or technology who can calculate future individual human behavior with pretty good reliability. Just as humans calculate the weather a few days in advance, our alien friend can calculate your behavior a few days in advance, at least in broad strokes. But here's the twist: she doesn't tell you what her algorithm gives (what you are most likely to do). Yet you believe that her algorithm exists and that it works well enough.

Does that keep you from struggling with decisions? Admittedly, it may creep you out to think of her knowing what you'll do (with some possibility of error) sooner than you will. Her machine will have to take your knowledge of its existence into account. (If she tells you its predictions, you might intentionally try to violate them, which you presumably could. The machine's accuracy might depend on your ignorance of its specific output.)

Nothing has any meaning with determinism. There is no reason to even take discussion of meaning seriously since whatever we utter has already been determined. — Rich

Hard determinism is problematic, but (as I have suggested) soft determinism is the common position in practice if not in theory.

I've never heard of "hard free will", would that be like every decision is a completely random decision? — Metaphysician Undercover

I made it up, and, yes, a 'completely random decision' is about all the sense I can make of free will. (Randomness is its own fascinating concept. Incompressible information is one interpretation of what we mean by 'random.')

I'm not using any particular philosopher's terminology here when I say this, but the 'essence' of an entity (seems to me) is the 'law' of that entity's interactions. A perfectly free entity would be vacuous. Of course with humans and free will there is still the belief in the laws of the human body and the world it exists in. The freedom is constrained by physical limitations, but not (as I understand it) by psychological limitations. Indeed, free will understood in a hard or radical sense would seem to destroy the possibility of psychology (understood as a search for regularities or patterns in behavior.)

Let's imagine an extra-terrestial with a superior brain and/or technology who can calculate future individual human behavior with pretty good reliability. — mrcoffee

Let's not. This is what had turned philosophy and demonstrably science into fantasy and sci fi (e.g. time travel, and humans are computers). Let's just stick with what we actually observe and the fantastical possibilities. I admit that fantasy is fun, exciting, creative, and amusing but way too much philosophy and science is fantasy nowadays.

Now, the story you told is quite creative and interesting, but it had nothing to do but with the nature of nature and the nature of life. Why not just talk about what we actually experience everyday in our lives - choices.

I have no idea what soft determinism is or how it is defined. If there is a single instance of choice or random/unpredictable event, no matter how small, then determinism is demolished. What's left had nothing to do with determinism other than the word.