To me it's just metaphysics masked as science to twist science beyond its proper realm. In free societies, individuals are more or less expected to work out their own salvation in the usual ways. Science creates tools for the pursuit of goals that are synthesized with politics, religion, art, etc.

I want science for its neutrality (as something that gives me just the facts), because I want to decide what to make of them (perhaps or rather always with help from non-scientific culture.) — foo

Agree with every word.

For me there's a tension in your writing between the cultural critic and the metaphysician, which I may be mistakenly projecting. Do you understand yourself to be stating preferences? Doing politics at an abstract level? 'Our culture would be better if...X' Or are you ultimately saying that science is blind to an important objective truth. 'This or that non-scientific approach nevertheless offers us objective truth, not just preference or opinion.' — foo

Perceptive observation. My approach has always been the quest for enlightenment, commencing with the 60's counter-culture. (Speaking of which, one of the seminal writers for me was Theodore Roszak, who coined the term itself in his book 'Making of a Counter-Culture'). So there's a strong element of protest in that - the sense that normal society - 'the straights' - are caught up in an illusory 'consensus reality' and it's the task of the individual to break free. (Of course, life being what it is, I turned out pretty middle-class after all. But that's what was the original motivation.) That lead to reading a lot of spiritual books and working back from them, through the various philosophical traditions. Later in life, I've realised the profoundness of the classical Western philosophical tradition, on which I see scientific materialism as kind of parasitic outgrowth. (Not for what science can do, but when it becomes a kind of belief system in its own right, as I've been saying.)

(Speaking of which, one of the seminal writers for me was Theodore Roszak, who coined the term itself in his book 'Making of a Counter-Culture') — Wayfarer

I happen to know that book. I stumbled on a yellow copy in a used book store. He turned me on to other writers, and he was interesting in his own right.

Later in life, I've realised the profoundness of the classical Western philosophical tradition, on which I see scientific materialism as kind of parasitic outgrowth. — Wayfarer

I suppose we vary here. Though I have been intensely moved at times by 'positive' philosophers (those offering systems), I especially relate to the spirit of someone like Hume these days.

By the way, you didn't actually answer my question (which is fine if you don't feel like it, but I thought you might like to clarify your position.)

I don't call that metaphysics. As I mean metaphysics, it's the discussion of what discussably, describably is.

In your quote of Plotinus, he's talking about something other than metaphysics. He isn't discussing, but only asserting. — Michael Ossipoff

It was not a quote of Plotinus, it was me describing Plotinus' metaphysics, in a very brief way. The assertions were mine, as part of my description. When one describes something that person makes assertions about the thing.

Metaphysical statements should be supportable and supported. Because there are one or more metaphysicses that neither have nor need any assumptions or brute-facts, then there's no need for brute-facts or assumptions in metaphysics. — Michael Ossipoff

You'd have to read the entire "Enneads", (and some Plato and Aristotle as well) for that support.

Plotinus's statement sounds similar to things that are said in Vedanta writings. Those Vedanta writings, and Plotinus's statement, could be interpreted as meta-metaphysics that I don't understand, and which (I feel) says more detail than can really be said about meta-metaphysics--or else as metaphysics that doesn't meet my standard of support, and absence of assumptions or brute-facts. ...and of complete uncontroversialness. — Michael Ossipoff

Are you saying that you think metaphysics must be completely uncontroversial to be metaphysics?

If you mean this question:

Do you understand yourself to be stating preferences? Doing politics at an abstract level? 'Our culture would be better if...X' Or are you ultimately saying that science is blind to an important objective truth. — foo

Some of my contemporaries went into politics; one became a leader of a State Greens party. No, all I’m doing is discussing and debating philosophy, from a counter-cultural/contrarian viewpoint.

With respect to the last question - nothing is ultimately objective. I take that to be one of the most important implications of the Critique of Pure Reason. But I’m also not an out-and-out relativist. Understanding the implications of that is one of the main tasks of philosophy.

With respect to the last question - nothing is ultimately objective. I take that to be one of the most important implications of the Critique of Pure Reason. But I’m also not an out-and-out relativist. Understanding the implications of that is one of the main tasks of philosophy. — Wayfarer

Thanks for clarifying. I don't disagree with this 'ultimately,' but my anti-metaphysical streak (influenced by linguistic philosophy) ushers me away from 'ultimately' as it might from brains in a vat. So I can agree and yet think such an agreement is not terribly important. Why? Because 'ultimately' is so elastic that it can always be stretched to counter objections. I do see that objective reality can be understood as intersubjective overlap. I've been down the rabbit hole and came up with a sense that I didn't bring back anything valuable apart from a sense of the futility of trying to fuse all of our specialized vocabularies into one harmonious vocabulary.

We know that there is stuff out there that is not us, yet we have to be here for it to be here, etc. No matter. Never mind. The chair is atoms or waves. Or the chair is concept organizing sensation. Or the chair is a thing for sitting on. Or the chair is the product of human history. Or the chair is crystallized labor. Or the chair is a node in the one object, a self-contemplating God. Or the chair exists primarily as possibility, as what we might do with it or call it in the future. Or the chair is all of these things, and whatever I left out, including the interpretations that I can expect generally but not predict in particular. One can imagine how these statements would fit within various conversations and put to various purposes. I can understand the desire to tame this proliferation, but I no longer think it's plausible to do so.

I like exposing myself to many of these 'vocabularies.' Having done so, I find it hard to be completely taken by any particular vocabulary. I suppose I associate metaphysics with the attempt to give the true and binding vocabulary.

Epistemologists sometimes say that knowledge is "objective" if there is agreement amongst individuals concerning the thing known. Generally, when people say that scientific knowledge is "objective", it is in this sense that they use the word, peer reviewed or something. It doesn't mean "objective" in the sense of "of the object, because knowledge is property of the human beings, not the objects which are known. Nor is it really "objective" in the sense of an aim or a goal of a subject, because it is common to many subjects. It is a sense of "objective" which means "inter-subjective". We must be careful not to confuse this sense of "objective" which is inter-subjective, with "objective" in the sense of "of the object". — Metaphysician Undercover

I think this is exactly what it does mean. It means that, if my knowledge of the object is exactly the same as your knowledge of the object in some meaningful way, then our knowledge must be truly "of the object" because it is unaffected by our own subjectivity, It is related purely to the object. To the extent that my knowledge of the object contradicts yours, then that knowledge cannot truly be "of the object" because the object cannot be both things, our knowledge must therefore be subjective.

The latter form of "objective" is proper to the subject. — Metaphysician Undercover

So this can be true but only if you carefully circumscribe what it is you're referring to. So take God, for example. If we are to say something objective about God in this second sense, then we are specifically talking about your God, the one in your head, not some general God in the public sphere, because only this former type is an 'object' about which something positive can be said objectively. If my God differs from your God, then 'God' is clearly not an 'object' about which we can speak because it cannot have both those contradictory properties. 'My God' and 'Your God' are the only objects which exist in the sense you've defined the term about which we can talk objectively.

I had been saying that I take issue with the idea of science as the ‘arbiter of what is meaningful and important’. And I do maintain that science often occupies that role in modern culture, and that a lot of it is grounded in evolutionary theory. — Wayfarer

Yes, we know you maintain that position, we (or I at least) have been asking for some evidence to back up that claim, some quote or activity of 'modern culture' where science is acting as the arbiter of what is meaningful All you've so far provided is areas where science acts as the arbiter of what is objectively the case and what can be objectively said about the existence of things in the physical world, which is exactly the role of science. Just give me one example of a thing that you think is meaningful that 'modern culture' has arbitrated is not 'meaningful' (not "unlikely to exist", not "not a theory that can be justifiably adopted in a secular democracy", actually "not meaningful").

there have been a large number of popular philosophy books published in the last decade, which appeal to evolutionary science, to argue on the basis of the science to ‘show there probably is no God’. And that is the kind of thinking I’m responding to. — Wayfarer

How are you 'responding to' it? By denying their right to make such arguments? I don't understand what your position is on this at all. Lots of people think your metaphysical is wrong, enough people to constitute the mass of society. It's not a conspiracy, or some kind of mass delusion perpetuated by mysterious powers, it's just that more people think you're wrong than think you're right.

But note that this then relegates beliefs to the domain of individual, the private - tantamount to, if not exactly the same as, a matter of opinion. — Wayfarer

Yes, that is where private beliefs belong, you can discuss them with others, shout them from the rooftops if you want to but what else do you expect people who hold a broadly physicalist metaphysics to do with your private beliefs?

I did not devise the idea that scientific materialism is generally antagonistic to philosophies of those kinds, and that evolutionary theory is often used in support of that. The whole tendency of positivism, of various kinds, and various forms of economic and scientific materialism, is to undermine or attack belief in the spiritual aspect of the human being. So here I’m calling it out, and I willl continue to do so. — Wayfarer

It's not "antagonism", there's no "undermining" and "attacking", we just don't agree with you. Some even think that such ideas as your can be harmful in some way and so are vocal in their disagreement, that's entirely to be expected if they think some harm might result from thinking that way.

If you think that physicalism is wrong, or that evolutionary theory does not apply to the areas others think it does, then make an argument to that effect and present it publicly, but don't expect that it won't get shot down by the people who think it's nonsense, and if that happens to be most people then you're going to have to face a lot of criticism, so I suggest some tougher skin might be in order.

I don't understand what your position is on this at all. — Pseudonym

Evidently.

we (or I at least) have been asking for some evidence to back up that claim, some quote or activity of 'modern culture' where science is acting as the arbiter of what is meaningful — Pseudonym

You asked, and I answered. I mentioned Steve Pinker. He's a prominent popular intellectual (and one whom I think has a lot of worthwhile and interesting things to say), and also a prominent advocate of just the kind of point of view that I am criticizing. This sub-debate started when you asked me to 'quote from one person who says that science is the arbiter of what is important and meaningful'. So I referred to an essay by Pinker, who says exactly that, in an essay devoted to that very topic.

That elicited the following self-contradictory response:

I don't think anyone is seriously claiming that science is the arbiter of what is meaningful and important.
— Pseudonym

Wayfarer: Many serious people claim it regularly, e.g.:

"the worldview that guides the moral and spiritual values of an educated person today is the worldview given to us by science" — Steve Pinker — Wayfarer

Not that I wouldn't rather cut my own arm off than agree with anything Steven Pinker says, but he specifically says here that science guides moral and spiritual values, not 'all that there is'. — Pseudonym

But what was at issue, was whether Pinker's quote is evidence of the claim that 'science is the arbiter of what is meaningful and important'. And this is exactly what he says it is.

He's claiming that science can provide us with a method of obtaining morals and of determining what have traditionally been called 'spiritual' values. That is a far cry from your claim that it tries to be "the arbiter of what ought to be considered meaningful and important." — Pseudonym

But in claiming that science 'provides us with a method of obtaining morals, etc', he is making the exact claim that you said that 'nobody is seriously making'.

Now you continue to ask for evidence. First, address the evidence that has been provided.

But in claiming that science 'provides us with a method of obtaining morals, etc', he is making the exact claim that you said that 'nobody seriously is making'. — Wayfarer

I don't get why you can't see the difference between someone claiming that science can make falsifiable statements about morals and someone claiming that science can decide everything in the world that is meaningful.

Are you suggesting that morals constitute 'everything that is meaningful'? If not then how do you get from someone claiming science can say something about morality to science is claiming to be able to decide what is meaningful? If a scientists claims to be able to say something about gravity, are they not also making some kind of statement that their theory says something about what is meaningful?

It sounds like you're just opposed to science making any claims at all that you don't personally approve of, and you're opposing that, not by presenting arguments against those particular claims, but by invoking some false 'slippery slope' argument that because scientists claim to be able to make falsifiable statements about morality they're suddenly claiming authority over everything that's meaningful.

I don't get why you can't see the difference between someone claiming that science can make falsifiable statements about morals.... — Pseudonym

Popper (as I explained yesterday) devised the criterion of falsifiability specifically for the kinds of empirical claims that science is suited to examine. So falsifiability doesn’t come into it. (And what would ‘a science of morality’ look like...)

The whole question of ‘meaning’ is not an obviously scientific matter. The term ‘meaning’ obviously has many applications, but in respect of ‘the meaning of ethical statements’, then that is plainly not a concern of science as such. And I can say that without at all impugning science. Science is concerned with measurable data, with a methodology to discover facts about the vast domain in which it is applicable. But it is generally not the least applicable to what ought to be the case. This is the import of the well-known ‘is/ought dichotomy’ of Hume’s.

It sounds like you're just opposed to science making any claims at all that you don't personally approve of — Pseudonym

Not at all. You’re simply seeing the argument through a perspective which simply assumes that science is the only real source of knowledge. Your approach is textbook positivism: science is the only source of real knowledge, if it can’t obtain knowledge of ethics, then neither can anything else. Oh sure, people can like opera, or religion, or ski-ing, but that’s just their personal stuff. When it comes to what really counts, that’s the knowledge ‘in the public square’, and only science can deliver it.

Tell me if I missed anything.

Popper (as I explained yesterday) devised the criterion of falsifiability specifically for the kinds of empirical claims that science is suited to examine. — Wayfarer

Yes, and some prominent and perfectly rational neuroscientists think that morality contains kinds of empirical claims that science is suited to examine. You're acting as if the matter was settled and all you need to do is point out that it isn't so without any argument to support that claim.

but in respect of ‘the meaning of ethical statements’, then that is plainly not a concern of science as such. — Wayfarer

Again, some people think it is. You have to actually construct an argument if you want to dispute their claim, and if more people agree with their claim than agree with yours then that is the direction rational society will take. You can't win an argument just by repeatedly stating what you think is the case and whining when others don't agree.

You’re simply seeing the argument through a perspective which simply assumes that science is the only real source of knowledge. Your approach is textbook positivism: science is the only source of real knowledge, if it can’t obtain knowledge of ethics, then neither can anything else. Oh sure, people can like opera, or religion, or ski-ing, but that’s just their personal stuff. When it comes to what really counts, that’s the knowledge ‘in the public square’, and only science can deliver it. — Wayfarer

Yes, that's pretty much it, when it comes to knowledge about physical things (including people), and your opposing argument is....?

some prominent and perfectly rational neuroscientists think that morality contains kinds of empirical claims that science is suited to examine. — Pseudonym

Such as...?

some people think it is. — Pseudonym

Such as...?

You can't win an argument just by repeatedly stating what you think is the case — Pseudonym

Right, so I suggest you desist.

if more people agree with their claim than agree with yours then that is the direction rational society will take — Pseudonym

I was reading about John Stuart Mill recently. He was concerned with 'the tyranny of the mob'.

I don't get why you can't see the difference between someone claiming that science can make falsifiable statements about morals and someone claiming that science can decide everything in the world that is meaningful. — Pseudonym

I think W is talking about science claiming moral authority, or, actually, certain individuals claiming moral authority in the name of science. To the degree that morality is 'visible' (certain practices that are publicly accessible), it's clear that predictions can be made. We have of course social and behavioral sciences.

But it's not clear to me how "the extent to which an action is right or wrong" is in the domain of science. What people tend and will tend to call 'right' or 'wrong' does seem to be in that domain. But what we (or specifically I or you) should seek as oppose to what we tend to seek does not seem to be in that domain. I can't think what it would mean to test an 'ought.' Science seems to live on the 'is' side of the is/ought divide. Just the preference-independent facts, please.

I don't generally share W's position, but I do think you are somewhat justifying his concern by sneaking over the is/ought line or misreading his point.

Thanks, well put.

This is an OP I often refer to in respect of this question.

some prominent and perfectly rational neuroscientists think that morality contains kinds of empirical claims that science is suited to examine. — Pseudonym


Such as...? — Wayfarer

Patricia Churchland, Sam Harris, for example.

some people think it is. — Pseudonym


Such as...? — Wayfarer

See above

You can't win an argument just by repeatedly stating what you think is the case — Pseudonym


Right, so I suggest you desist. — Wayfarer

If you can't tell the difference between constructing an argument and repeating statements as if they were fact then I'm not sure I can help you, but let me try.

"Science can talk meaningfully about an increasingly wide range of subjects because it can demonstrate the remarkable predictive power of its theories, and thereby show a remarkable justification for it's metaphysical presumptions in terms of utility." - An argument, note the key use of the word 'because'. One thing I claim is the case 'because' of another which I think logically causes it.

"...in respect of ‘the meaning of ethical statements’, then that is plainly not a concern of science as such." - A statement, not an argument. No "X is because of Y".

If you’re going to quote the Churchlands and Sam Harris as authorities, then we really have nothing to discuss. But, thanks for engaging.

But what we (or specifically I or you) should seek as oppose to what we tend to seek does not seem to be in that domain. I can't think what it would mean to test an 'ought.' — foo

This is probably a question for a thread of its own, but to give you a brief reply, although there are a number of responses, I will outline my personal approach.

Basically I consider the evidence from neuroscience to be sufficient to consider that the self and free-will are both illusions. They are ad hoc stories our brain tells us to reconcile our actions into a coherent teleology.

As such there is no 'ought', there is only what we 'are' going to do.

Science can therefore make predictions (which is its job) about what we 'are' going to do and how we 'are' going to feel in certain circumstances. Therefore, given that we definitely 'are' going to want to bring those circumstances about, science can make statements about what courses of action are most likely to succeed. There's no further debate about whether we 'ought' to do these things because we just will, or will not depending on how convinced we are of them.

Science can therefore make predictions (which is its job) about what we 'are' going to do and how we 'are' going to feel in certain circumstances. — Pseudonym

Really? What kind of predictions? How we are going to feel if we drown? Or maybe the level of ecstacy if we win $100 million. Maybe we should study the effects of losing a parent? Sadness? Grief?

I just read a study that predicts lonely people tend to be less happy than people with a large community of friends. And what are we supposed to do about this if we have no choices? If we are just neurons that are slaves of those Laws of Physics? What's the point?

I think this is exactly what it does mean. It means that, if my knowledge of the object is exactly the same as your knowledge of the object in some meaningful way, then our knowledge must be truly "of the object" because it is unaffected by our own subjectivity, It is related purely to the object. — Pseudonym

This is clearly wrong though. If you and I both agree that the sun moves around the earth every day, then this is not knowledge "of the object", because it is just an incorrect opinion which we both hold. So agreement between us, though it does make "objectivity" in the sense of "inter-subjective", it does not make "objectivity" in the sense of "of the object" because it still might be wrong. That we both believe the same thing does not make our knowledge truly "of the object", because all this is is consistency, agreement in our subjectivity.

So agreement between us, though it does make "objectivity" in the sense of "inter-subjective", it does not make "objectivity" in the sense of "of the object" because it still might be wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Science does not claim to achieve objectivity any more than it claims to achieve truth, its about methods which approach those things.

If you and I both think the sun goes around the earth, that is a good deal closer to being likely to be a property of the object than my personal opinion that the sun is held up by the moon on strings, which no one else seems to share.

Its not that the scientific method is a guarantee of objectivity and truth, it's a far cry from that. But it's the best system we have, nothing else is going to get closer to true knowledge 'about the object'.

Science does not claim to achieve objectivity any more than it claims to achieve truth, its about methods which approach those things. — Pseudonym

I agree that science does not make such claims concerning "objectivity", as I said, that's what philosophy does. But you had made the contrary claim. "Scientists certainly do not consult philosophers to check whether their results are objective. They already know whether their results are objective by the confirmation of others." So that's one thing I objected to, and I'm glad you now realize that what you said wasn't really correct.

If you and I both think the sun goes around the earth, that is a good deal closer to being likely to be a property of the object than my personal opinion that the sun is held up by the moon on strings, which no one else seems to share. — Pseudonym

But both descriptions are clearly wrong, and so both are obviously not properties of the object. Why do you think that one is "closer to being likely to be a property of the object"? Each is a description, and as such it is subjective, of the subject. Subjects make descriptions so a description, though it describes an object, is property of a subject. That you and I agree on a description doesn't mean that the description is any closer, or more likely to be "of the object", because a description is always something made by subjects, so to be "of the object" is a completely different category.

Its not that the scientific method is a guarantee of objectivity and truth, it's a far cry from that. But it's the best system we have, nothing else is going to get closer to true knowledge 'about the object'. — Pseudonym

I tend to disagree. The scientific method deals with descriptions so it is inherently subjective in the way that I described. This is the problem which Kant exposes with the distinction between phenomena and noumena. Our descriptions are based in phenomena, how the world appears to us through sensation. To gain knowledge about the object, we need to go beyond this, and ask what does it mean to be an object, to exist as an object, and these are the question which ontology and metaphysics are concerned with. While the scientific method, on the other hand, due to its standards of empiricism, is restricted to dealing with descriptions, so it has no approach to the object itself.

The scientific method deals with descriptions — Metaphysician Undercover

Common sense knowledge deals with descriptions; science moves to the next level; the level of explanation.

Basically I consider the evidence from neuroscience to be sufficient to consider that the self and free-will are both illusions. They are ad hoc stories our brain tells us to reconcile our actions into a coherent teleology. — Pseudonym

What a sadly impoverished worldview!

Common sense knowledge deals with descriptions; science moves to the next level; the level of explanation. — Janus

The point being that the explanations are description based, i.e. empirically verified. There is no scientific explanation of what it means to be an object, or to be a property of an object, because these are not empirical principles, empiricism being fundamental to the scientific method.

There is no scientific explanation of what it means to be an object, or to be a property of an object, because these are not empirical principles, empiricism being fundamental to the scientific method. — Metaphysician Undercover

What it means to be an object can be thought in at least two ways. First it can be thought as a sheer definition, which would be a common sense descriptive approach.

Or the attempt can be made to think it in a comprehensive way that incorporates common sense, scientific knowledge, epistemology, phenomenology and metaphysics; an all-encompassing investigation, which will yield a picture that includes the human cognitive process as it is experienced, understood and judged to be. Obviously this second view of what it means to be an object cannot be a static, timeless one; it will be evolving along with the rest of human thought.

The same process will apply to what it means to be a property of an object.

Are you saying that you think metaphysics must be completely uncontroversial to be metaphysics? — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't mean to go that far. I just meant that I myself want to avoid saying things that can be convincingly disagreed-with, and that a metaphysics that depends on controversial statements, or needs assumptions, or brute-facts isn't very competitive with metaphysicses that don't..

...like the metaphysics that I've been proposing.

For example, the statement about Plotinus's position sounded a lot like Advaita. I used to assume that some Advaita statements were probably right, as metaphysics, just because I have great respect and regard for the philosophers of India.

I even tried to rationalize those statements into the metaphysics that I was proposing in a different forum some years ago. The result was that my metaphysical proposal was criticizable as unsupported.

Then I decided that I didn't want to say anything that can be disagreed-with, or anything that depends on any assumption or brute-fact.

But, in my previous post to this thread, I mentioned 2 possible interpretations for what Advaita and Plotinus said: Metaphysics, or else meta-metaphysics that I don't understand.

The latter interpretation is maybe the better interpretation of those statements from Advaita and from Plotinus.

Meta-metaphysics isn't a matter of proof or argument, or any claim of complete or accurate description.

It's about impressions.

So the Advaitists' and Plotinus's meta-metaphysical impression is different from mine. I don't say that they're wrong. As I said, my feeling is that they're saying more detail than can rightly be said about meta-metaphysics. ...but that's just my impression. I certainly don't claim to be in a position to say someone else is wrong about meta-metaphysics.

I feel that we're exactly what we seem to be: Individual animals. Sure, at the end-of-lives, identity and individuality don't remain. And, as I've said, the timelessnesss of that identity-less sleep beats the temporary life (or lives) during which we strive as individuals. The final and timeless state-of-affairs is the more natural and normal state-of-affairs, I claim.

So there is a sense in which we (eventually) won't be individuals with identity.

So there's that sense in which I don't disagree so much with Advaita. I just claim that right now we're individuals, instead of saying that we aren't, but seem to be individuals. But, because I also don't make any claim that our life-experience possibility-story, or its constituent if-then facts, are "real", then it could be said that my disagreement with Advaita is about a matter of wordings.

I've also been saying that the Nothing that's the quiescent background behind the hypothetical if-then facts is arguably what's more fundamental and natural. ...and it's what we approach at the end of lives.

So, the difference could just be a matter of wording.

Michael Ossipoff

the difference could just be a matter of wording. — Michael Ossipoff

In neither Plotinus nor Advaita is physical death understood in terms of non-existence or non-being. What it does mean however is obviously not going to be an easy thing to say or to fathom. Suffice to say that the common aim of those traditions is to realize an identity that is not subject to death.

In Plotinus, that is through seeking the identity of the soul with the One - very similar to Vedanta.

So the purpose of the spiritual discipline or sadhana is to ‘realize the Self’ (in Vedantic terms) instead of identification with ego and sense-objects. Realizing that identity is called mokṣa.

What it means to be an object can be thought in at least two ways. First it can be thought as a sheer definition, which would be a common sense descriptive approach.

Or the attempt can be made to think it in a comprehensive way that incorporates common sense, scientific knowledge, epistemology, phenomenology and metaphysics; an all-encompassing investigation, which will yield a picture that includes the human cognitive process as it is experienced, understood and judged to be. Obviously this second view of what it means to be an object cannot be a static, timeless one; it will be evolving along with the rest of human thought. — Janus

I think you have something mistaken here Janus. The second view, what it means to be an object cannot be changing or evolving, or else existence itself would be evolving and changing. But what really changes is the properties of an object, and what it means to exist as an object remains the same. Existence remains the same. Otherwise, if what it means to be an object is changing along with the rest of human thought, you have just reduced the second way to the first way, what it means to be an object is how we define it.


What do you mean by meta-metaphysics?

Basically I consider the evidence from neuroscience to be sufficient to consider that the self and free-will are both illusion — Pseudonym

Which is why discussion is pointless - because if that is true then there is no means of ‘persuasion by rational argument’. You can’t change someone’s mind if there’s no mind to be changed.

Which is why discussion is pointless - because if that is true then there is no means of ‘persuasion by rational argument’. You can’t change someone’s mind if there’s no mind to be changed. — Wayfarer

I guess determinists don't realize (because it had been determined so) how meaningless is everything that say or do. It has sunk in because the Laws of Physics doesn't allow it to be sink it.