In other words, why was it necessary for Everett to propose an hypotheses comprising the apparently radical speculation of ‘infinitely branching universes’? If it turned out not to be tenable, what would we be obliged to accept? — Wayfarer

Everett's theory is just unitary quantum mechanics [*]. Everett was the first to realize that it predicted many worlds (his term was "relative states") when understood as a realist theory. If unitary QM were to be falsified by experiment, then a different theory with different predictions would be required. For example, a dynamical collapse theory like GRW.

--

[*] Unitary quantum mechanics includes only two postulates and is common to every interpretation of quantum mechanics.

What problem is the Many Worlds Theory of Hugh Everett a solution to? In other words, why was it necessary for Everett to propose an hypotheses comprising the apparently radical speculation of ‘infinitely branching universes’? — Wayfarer

You misrepresent what Everett proposes. To quote a paper on this point:

• EVERETT POSTULATE:
All isolated systems evolve according to the Schrodinger equation d/dt |ψ> = - H|ψ>
.
Although this postulate sounds rather innocent, it has far-reaching implications:
1. Corollary 1: the entire Universe evolves according to the Schr¨odinger equation, since it is by definition an isolated system.
2. Corollary 2: there can be no definite outcome of quantum measurements (wavefunction collapse), since this would violate the Everett postulate.

• What Everett does NOT postulate:
At certain magic instances, the the world undergoes some sort of metaphysical “split” into two branches that subsequently never interact. This is not only a misrepresentation of the MWI, but also inconsistent with the Everett postulate, since the subsequent time evolution could in principle make the two terms in equation (2) interfere. According to the MWI, there is, was and always will be only one wavefunction, and only decoherence calculations, not postulates, can tell us when it is a good approximation to treat two terms as non-interacting.

No proposal of new universes. It is not an ontological assertion.
I disagree with the author's proposal of quantum suicide to test the theory since other interpretations predict the same results.

In Bohmian Mechanics the wave function describes quantum potential at both slits - which are the "potential" worlds or branches that are in superposition. Zeh describes them as "empty" wave components since they don't specify where the actual particle is (this is instead specified by the Bohmian guiding function). — Andrew M

A "potential world" (what we see in our minds as virtual action) does not entail an actual world (the MWI) solution. I read Everett's paper, and clearly his ontology is poles apart from Bohm's description and equations. Bohmian Mechanics had no need for an infinite number of universes and measurements which is why he described his interpretation as causal and not deterministic. Zeh wants to make it deterministic which is why he is attempting to create the equivalence. Everett's interpretation stands alone in this regard, and after reading part of his original theses, my eyes glazed over at how extravagant it really was. Really quite an imagination compared to the simplicity of the Bohm model.

No proposal of new universes. It is not an ontological assertion. — noAxioms

The precise ontology of Everett's equations can of course remain a mystery. However, there are some clues as to what he might have been thinking:

http://lesswrong.com/lw/5dh/the_many_worlds_of_hugh_everett/

"Byrne writes of Everett's views: "the splitting of observers share an identity because they stem from a common ancestor, but they also embark on different fates in different universes. They experience different lifespans, dissimilar events (such as a nuclear war perhaps) and at some point are no longer the same person, even though they share certain memory records." Everett says that when a observer splits it is meaningless to ask "which of the final observers corresponds to the initial one since each possess the total memory of the first" he says it is as foolish as asking which amoeba is the original after it splits into two. Wheeler made him remove all such talk of amoebas from his published short thesis."

"Byrne says Everett did not think there were just an astronomically large number of other universes but rather an infinite number of them, not only that he thought there were a non-denumerable infinite number of other worlds. This means that the number of them was larger than the infinite set of integers, but Byrne does not make it clear if this means they are as numerous as the number of points on a line, or as numerous as an even larger infinite set like the set of all possible clock faces, or maybe an even larger infinity than that where easy to understand examples of that sort of mega-infinite magnitude are hard to come by. Neill Graham tried to reformulate the theory so you'd only need a countably infinite number of branches and Everett at first liked the idea but later rejected it and concluded you couldn't derive probability by counting universes. Eventually even Graham seems to have agreed and abandoned the idea that the number of universes was so small you could count them."

Those scientists who refuse to confront Everett's Interpretation and equations for what they are, are merely trying to save the only deterministic interpretation of quantum theory while avoiding the ontological mythology of everything constantly splitting into probabilistic infinities. The only question that remains is how large are the infinities.

So to maintain a determinist interpretation, we just need to assume an infinite number of infinite numbers of universes?

Everett's equations (interpretation) is the only one that is fully deterministic because everything that the universal wave function describes actually happens as described. It is all real. The problem however is what happened to the other versions (infinite versions?) of myself and everyone else and everything else? We can't see them or measure them? (This really makes the issue of Dark Matter and Dark Energy, Relativity's counterpart seem trivial in comparison).

It seems that they are all "somewhere" in other "worlds" or "universes", depending upon how one wishes to conceive of am infinite number of splitting real things which in turn are splitting all the time. To some, this ontology may seem "extravagant", to others just another mystical attempt by scientists to preserve determinism. Of course the toughest problem for determinists is to weld together Everett's equations with Relativity's block universe. How does one do that? Ugh. I guess the standard answer is that quantum theory and Relativity live in separate universes.

Science can be fun.

You misrepresent what Everett proposes — noAxioms

Well, perhaps the Wikipedia entry on the topic needs to be updated, because it begins:

The many-worlds interpretation is an interpretation of quantum mechanics that asserts the objective reality of the universal wavefunction and denies the actuality of wavefunction collapse. Many-worlds implies that all possible alternate histories and futures are real, each representing an actual "world" (or "universe"). In layman's terms, the hypothesis states there is a very large—perhaps infinite[2]—number of universes, and everything that could possibly have happened in our past, but did not, has occurred in the past of some other universe or universes.

The quantum-mechanical "Schrödinger's cat" theorem according to the many-worlds interpretation. In this interpretation, every event is a branch point; the cat is both alive and dead, even before the box is opened, but the "alive" and "dead" cats are in different branches of the universe, both of which are equally real, but which do not interact with each other.

So - this is all wrong?

Thanks, Andrew, but that response doesn’t really cast any light.

It came to be called ‘the many worlds theory’ because according to it there are an infinite number of universes which allow all possible observations to be realised in one of those universes. Contrary to what noAxioms says, that is an ‘ontological’ argument, in that it really does propose a multiplicity of universes. So, in line with the principle that ‘drastic problems call for drastic solutions’, the question I asked is, if as drastic a solution as ‘many universes’ is warranted, what is the drastic problem that it is responding to? ‘If the many-worlds formulation were found to be impossible in principle, then we would be obliged to accept that: ...’

(Incidentally, there’s an insightful profile of Everett published in Scientific American.)

Also, note from the review linked above:

John Wheeler, Everett's thesis adviser, made him cut out about half the stuff in his original 137 page thesis and tone down the language so it didn't sound like he thought all those other universes were equally real when in fact he did. For example, Wheeler didn't like the word "split" and was especially uncomfortable with talk of conscious observers splitting, most seriously he made him remove the entire chapter on information and probability which today many consider the best part of the work. His long thesis was not published until 1973, if that version had been published in 1957 instead of the truncated Bowdlerized version things would have been different; plenty of people would still have disagreed but he would not have been ignored for as long as he was.

Byrne writes of Everett's views: "the splitting of observers share an identity because they stem from a common ancestor, but they also embark on different fates in different universes. They experience different lifespans, dissimilar events (such as a nuclear war perhaps) and at some point are no longer the same person, even though they share certain memory records." Everett says that when a observer splits it is meaningless to ask "which of the final observers corresponds to the initial one since each possess the total memory of the first" he says it is as foolish as asking which amoeba is the original after it splits into two. Wheeler made him remove all such talk of amoebas from his published short thesis.

My bolds. Make no mistake - ‘many worlds’ means exactly what it says. And all to avoid the embarrassment of consciousness being assigned a foundational role in observation. It's motivation is maintaining the hypothesis of scientific realism at all costs.

And besides - Max Tegmark is the author of speculative science books about the multiverse which make Everett's ideas seem quotidian!

hypothesis of scientific realism at all costs. — Wayfarer

It's not scientific realism, since Bohmian Mechanics does that. It is determinism without the observer that is draw. As I mentioned in my other post, determinism pretty much eliminates philosophy and science as a preferred path for studying nature since either and both are simply Illusions.

You misrepresent what Everett proposes
— noAxioms

Well, perhaps the Wikipedia entry on the topic needs to be updated, because it begins:

The many-worlds interpretation is an interpretation of quantum mechanics that asserts the objective reality of the universal wavefunction and denies the actuality of wavefunction collapse. Many-worlds implies that all possible alternate histories and futures are real, each representing an actual "world" (or "universe"). In layman's terms, the hypothesis states there is a very large—perhaps infinite[2]—number of universes, and everything that could possibly have happened in our past, but did not, has occurred in the past of some other universe or universes.

The quantum-mechanical "Schrödinger's cat" theorem according to the many-worlds interpretation. In this interpretation, every event is a branch point; the cat is both alive and dead, even before the box is opened, but the "alive" and "dead" cats are in different branches of the universe, both of which are equally real, but which do not interact with each other.

So - this is all wrong? — Wayfarer

A lot of it is indeed misrepresented. The people updating the wiki perhaps have not actually read the thesis. The first half of the first sentence is a different wording of what I quoted, that closed systems evolved according to the Schrodinger's equation. The rest is implications of that one presise, not additional premises. Wave function collapse violates the premise, but is not explicitly stated. They put "universe" in quotes there, and that's OK, because they mean 'worlds', which most laymen take for 'planets' instead of the mathematical meaning. There is no implication of actual multiple universes. It is one wavefunction with multiple solutions.

Worlds do not have identity (there is no objective has-split or not state), so the cat being both dead and alive (in superposition) is a relation to something, not an objective state. So while still in the box, it is superposition from the point of view outside the box, but very much not in superposition from the cat point of view. From within the box, the live cat is in a different world from the dead one at all times, despite still being in superposition relative to the external point. Likewise, all worlds are just one universe in superposition from outside the closed system. There is never a new universe.

Not sure how copenhagen interprets the cat thing. Surely the cat observes the quantum event, and if that is denied, put the expendable lab assistant in there instead. Schrodinger's cat exercise has always been MWI of sorts it seems. They have had such boxes a long time, and recently have managed to put a macroscopic object in one, putting a thing visible to the unaided eye, in superposition. Never build a local one that can hold a cat. Trivial if non-local.

There is no implication of actual multiple universes. — noAxioms

You’re mistaken there. It is called ‘many worlds’, because that’s what it says. Read the excerpt above again, on how John Wheeler redacted Everett’s first draft.

The people updating the wiki perhaps have not actually read the thesis — noAxioms

It’s editable by the public, if it’s incorrect, you can change it. (Maybe in some other world, it’s correct :-) )

Not sure how copenhagen interprets the cat thing — noAxioms

two points - the expression ‘Copenhagen interpretation’ wasn’t coined until many years later - 1955, I think - in Heisenberg’s later lectures on physics and philosophy.

Secondly, ‘the copenhagen interpretation’ is neither a scientific model, nor hypothesis. As I understand it (which is probably not much), it’s mainly concerned with what can and can’t be said on the basis of the interpretation of quantum mechanics.

Schrodinger meant his infamous ‘cat’ metaphor to illustrate the apparently absurd entailments of the ‘observer problem’. Schrodinger was said to have found the philosophical conundrums thrown up by quantum physics to be distasteful in the extreme, so his ‘cat’ was a way of pointing out the absurdities it brought up. (Quantum joke; ‘what have you done with the cat, Erwin? It looks half dead’ - Mrs Schrodinger (of which there were actually two)).

I finally found someone who had gone through the calculation of how many universes exist based upon the MWI.

Making Sense of the Many Worlds Interpretation
Stephen Boughn1
Department of Physics, Princeton University and
Departments of Astronomy and Physics, Haverford College

The number here calculated was:

N~10 to the 10th to the 80th power. " A plethora of universes, indeed!"

"Another problem is how are we ever to identify universes like ours with people
like us in the nearly googolplex of universes included in the universal wave function.
This is often referred to as the problem of identifying a preferred basis in Hilbert space.
Clearly most of the universes will be chaotic and bear no resemblance to the one in which
we live but there will still be very many with nearly identical copies of ourselves. A great
deal has been written about how one might identify such bases or equivalently how
universes such as ours naturally emerge. I’ll briefly discuss this issue in Section 5.
Everett, for his part, didn’t worry about the problem and maintained that all components
of all bases are “actual” universes in the same sense. He even supposed that occasionally
different universes could interact with one another. Deutsch (1997) maintains that the
phenomenon of quantum interference is evidence of precisely this sort of interaction."

Now this is interesting, since Everett appears to back away from assigning any intimidating to his interpretation :

"Another indication of Everett’s take on
realism appeared in the second appendix to the preliminary, long version of his thesis.
The title of the appendix was “Remarks on the Role of Theoretical Physics” and in it he
notes:
The essential point of a theory, then, is that it is a mathematical model…
However, when a theory is highly successful and becomes firmly
established, the model tends to become identified with “reality” itself,
and the model nature of the theory becomes obscured. The rise of
classical physics offers an excellent example of this process. The
constructs of classical physics are just as much fictions of our own
minds as those of any other theory we simply have a great deal more
confidence in them. It must be deemed a mistake, therefore, to attribute
any more “reality” here than elsewhere… Once we have granted that
any physical theory is essentially only a model for the world of experience,
we must renounce all hope of finding anything like “the correct theory.”
Everett seems to be telling us that the notion of a universal wave function is actually just
a “fiction of our own minds”.

This last point had always been my point? Mathematical equations are fictions of our minds. No ontology can or should be assigned to mathematical symbology.

A "potential world" (what we see in our minds as virtual action) does not entail an actual world (the MWI) solution. — Rich

Yet despite not being actual, it has actual effects. This is why Bohmian Mechanics requires two equations. The wave equation to describe the quantum potential. And the guiding equation to describe the potential's effect on actual particles.

As I see it, this is analogous to Descartes' res cogitans and res extensa where the mind guides the body. Would you agree with that analogy?

On the Everettian model, there are just particles and the wave equation is sufficient to describe their dynamics. There is no need for a superfluous guiding equation.

Yet despite not being actual, it has actual effects. — Andrew M

The quantum potential had possibilities? That it's all. Ontologically one can say that the human mind considers possibilities but only one is actually acted upon. MWI says all are acted upon. That is a huge difference. In Zeh's attempt to make Bohmian Mechanics deterministic, which it isn't, he misses the whole point.

Yes, MWI doesn't need a guiding wave, it only needs a googleplex of universes which apparently even he described as fiction.

It came to be called ‘the many worlds theory’ because according to it there are an infinite number of universes which allow all possible observations to be realised in one of those universes. — Wayfarer

I think you're getting needlessly distracted by the idea of "infinite universes". Unitary quantum mechanics postulates only one universe and it is described by the universal wave function. Given the premise (which I accept) that the universe has a finite age, size and divisibility, there can only be a finite number of branches. I recommend reading Max Tegmark's, "Infinity Is a Beautiful Concept – And It's Ruining Physics". As he says, "This means that today's best theories need a major shakeup by retiring an incorrect assumption. Which one? Here’s my prime suspect: infinity."

So, in line with the principle that ‘drastic problems call for drastic solutions’, the question I asked is, if as drastic a solution as ‘many universes’ is warranted, what is the drastic problem that it is responding to? ‘If the many-worlds formulation were found to be impossible in principle, then we would be obliged to accept that: ...’ — Wayfarer

... the theory is wrong and so back to the drawing board.

Now let me try to explain as clearly as I can why Everett seems likely to be correct.

The problem is to account for observed quantum phenomena. Unitary quantum mechanics (a.k.a. Everettian QM) does that in a simple and elegant way with only two postulates. It does not postulate many worlds, they are emergent in the theory.

Every quantum interpretation depends on unitary quantum mechanics. If the emergent worlds are not desired, then the general strategy is to add postulates until they go away, while being careful to continue matching the predictions of unitary quantum mechanics.

So your question could be put in another way. Why is it so important to match people's prior expectations about how the universe should be? Both Bohmian Mechanics and the various collapse interpretations are analagous to utilizing the heliocentric model to make all the predictions and then packaging it as a geocentric model. Alternatively, we could all accept that the underlying predictive model just seems to be the correct theory.

To describe MWI as simply one universe, masks entirely the sheer audacity of the model. The paper I referenced actually goes through the trouble of trying to leave disect what the model is implying, ending with the implication that Everett assigned no ontological value to his invention. The difference between Bohmian Mechanics and MWI it's that one can actually contruct an ontology around it that fits experimental evidence and makes sense. At the same time BM is real, causal, and allows for creativity. It is not one of these heavy-handed, fantastical, deterministic theories that lies contra to everyday human experience.

there can only be a finite number of branches — Andrew M

Well, my physics is crappy, but my English is excellent - and ‘many’ means ‘more than one’ ;-)


But, thanks for taking the time to spell that out.

To begin with, I find that there is ambiguity with "self" which I think I should try to expose to some extent... — Metaphysician Undercover

Hi,

Yeah, I noted the great ambiguity, here! I think that both "mind" and "self" can cause confusion, so I go with "soul" ;)

Special relativity explicitly denies that there is such a thing as absolute rest, and by replacing absolute rest with the constant, the speed of light, it produces a condition in which the "correct" way of representing motions is in relation to light. However light is itself a thing in motion, and this assumes that time is necessarily passing. The constant, or fundamental premise is the activity of light, and activity assumes that time is passing. So this is fundamentally different from the premise of absolute rest, which assumes the immaterial soul to be at a point where no time is passing. The difference being that absolute rest provides a viewpoint for the observation of time passing and therefore all motions, while special relativity ties "time passing" to the activity of light. So special relativity provides no viewpoint to observe the activity of light, and if there is any inaccuracy in the assumed relationship between time passing and the activity of light, then there is a tinted glass problem.

The consequence of this difference is that the premise of the non-dimensional point, absolute rest provides a position to view all motions in relation to each other, including the motion of light. The premise of special relativity does not allow this, because it sets as the viewpoint, the activity of light. So the soul's perspective, from special relativity, is as moving light, a photon or some such thing, and all other motions are viewed from this perspective. If we had a complete understanding of the activity of light, and how other activities related to it, then we could use this as an accurate viewpoint. But we do not, so we have created for ourselves, a tinted glass problem. We have assumed a perspective, the activity of light as a constant, without properly understanding that perspective, and what it adds to (how it tints) our observations. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see your point, now! Since we cannot define a particular reference frame for light, then we have still to resolve the tinted glass problem. After all light is still "physical". And the tinted glass problem seems to require that we must have a "reference" frame outside all physical processes. Right now I cannot find a counter-argument to make SR compatible with the tinted glass problem. (If I manage to find a solution, I will let you know BTW...). So I declare my "defeat" in this debate :wink: ... (for now :cool: )

However there are still two possible (very inelegant, but possible) solutions, maybe.

The first is this: "c" is the speed limit of relativity. Strictly speaking relativity does not imply that light moves as fast as "c". Interestingly you can read this article https://www.sciencealert.com/heavy-light-could-explain-dark-energy . This solution is very inelegant, especially due to Gauge symmetry problems. But IMO it is possible. If indeed no particle is massless, then IMO the tinted glass issue can be circumvented.

Another possibility maybe is Lorent ether theory (LET), which posits a preferred frame of reference. There is a serious attempt to explain gravity in this framework http://ilja-schmelzer.de/gravity/.

What do you think about them?



Yeah, IMO an universe seen as an inscindible net of interaction is compatible to "panpsychism"!

I would disagree. Opponents take a distinction that arises naturally in everyday experience and then their conclusion generally involves denying that same distinction. For example, "How do you know everything isn't an illusion?" or "We don't perceive things as they really are, because illusions". — Andrew M

Ah ok! Yes, with this I would agree. In fact "illusionism" if we want to call it in this way, is a very peculiar form of "direct realism". But I was thinking about the "common-sense direct realism".

Perhaps so, but his "primary qualities" and "secondary qualities" isn't a natural distinction. Trying to draw a line regarding which qualities the apple "primarily" has is to misunderstand the nature of language abstraction. — Andrew M

Yet, If we close our eyes reality is not coloured, anymore. So IMO if we want to avoid solipsism, a distinction between "how we percieve reality" and "reality beyond our perception" is necessary. In the case of Locke the second one was given by the "substances". Since the apple does not appear "red" if we close our eyes, then its colour is not a "property" of the apple itself, but of our perception of it (of course I accept that science explain why we percieve a red apple instead of a blue apple, but I am thinking about the "redness" of our experience!).

I find Rovelli's RQM very intriguing as well, but it is a realism of sorts. Its difference to MWI is that only interactions of other systems with the system in question define what is real for that system. So you can't compare accounts between systems until they interact, in which case their respective accounts will always be found to be consistent. — Andrew M

Agreed!

It seems only as many as is necessary. Note that the vast size of Hilbert space is the same under all interpretations. If it is not interpreted physically, then where do the unitary transformations happen? — Andrew M

Well, here is the contention! The problem is IMO that you are regarding the "Hilbert space" as something actual. Even if we accept "mathematical realism" we can think about different "levels" of reality: the other branches exist potentially, and not actually. I concur that this solution appears inelegant, mathematically. But as I said I find alla interpretations somewhat "lacking". In some sense I agree with Einstein. And because of this I find Bohr's epistemogical take as "the most correct".

In my view the universe just is quantum mechanical at base. If decoherence emerges from QM, then perhaps gravity does as well. For a possible explanation along these lines, see Sean Carroll's recent talk entitled "Extracting the Universe From the Wavefunction". The main idea starts at 29:49. — Andrew M

Yeah, I respect your viewpoint (and thanks for the video! I'll surely watch it...). You are maybe right. However, personally I find "many-worlds" idea quite "inelegant" (ontologically, so to speak). Also the idea that "what is mathematical is actually existing" presupposes that (1) our world is no different from a mathematical structure (2) that the mathematics we "use" is a perfect representation of the "actual existing". Again, while I respect that viewpoint, I do not think that (1) and (2) are correct. I know that, strictly speaking, is not a "scientific" argument, though.

There are several other reasons for my not acceptance of MWI. But in this discussion are quite useless, so I do not write them (unless one is VERY curious and VERY patient to read them, of course ;) ).



Hi,

I agree with you. There is indeed the splitting (we infer it because we observe a "classical" world). However all "universes" are in fact an "aspect" of the same "thing" in MWI!

However all "universes" are in fact an "aspect" of the same "thing" in MWI! — boundless

The problem with this "thing" is that the ontology of life becomes unknowable and unintelligible. As does determinism, it makes rubbish out of the meaning of life, philosophy, and science. Understanding this, even Everett didn't try very hard (not at all) to defend it as an ontology. He just saw it as mathematical equations that worked out fine for his theses. Invisibility, illusions, are just Alice in Wonderland holes. They are good stories. Once you travel down them as ontologies, everything, including science, becomes meaningless. Are we trying to understand the nature of nature or is it something else?

However there are still two possible (very inelegant, but possible) solutions, maybe. — boundless

The alternative which I was trying to lead our discussion toward earlier, is to assume that the tinted glass cannot be avoided. This is to deny the reality of the non-dimensional point at the present, and to deny the soul its immaterial view point, as impossible, unreal. That is the result of your objection earlier, which is a standard materialist objection to dualism, that such a point would disallow the possibility of interaction between the soul and the physical world. All of this lead me to the long digression concerning the nature of "matter".

So we assume that the soul is fundamentally united with matter, and cannot be separated the immaterial perspective is impossible. We assume that the glass through which the world is observed is tinted, and this cannot be avoided, the tinting of the glass cannot be removed to give us a clear perspective. Therefore we must determine the nature of the tinting and account for this. Now we're back to where we began the discussion, with a slightly different perspective. The soul "interacts" with the world, and this means that it is a cause and an effect. An observation cannot be pure because we cannot adequately distinguish cause from effect, and this is the tinting of the glass. So we must determine the nature of the tinting. The soul interacts with the world through the concept of "matter" (in modern physics, "energy"). Matter is the potential for change.

The illusion, which results in a failure to properly account for the tinting, is in the assumption that matter or energy is something physical rather than something conceptual. If the soul is fundamentally united with matter, or energy, denying the possibility of a clear perspective, then matter or energy is conceptual, of the soul. The soul observes the world through this concept (tinted glass), and when it is not diligent it perceives this matter, or energy, to be a property of the thing being observed, rather than as the concept (tinted glass) through which the world is being observed. The fundamental point being, that "matter" is a concept introduced to allow us to understand the nature of change in the world. There is nothing to prove that "matter" refers to anything real, independent of the mind (what Berkeley demonstrated). Aristotle simply assumed "matter" as a necessary assumption in order to make change intelligible. So it is something we assume "about the world", but it is fundamentally conceptual, therefor not really "of the world"

So what is revealed is that the tinting of the glass is what is referred to by the concept of "matter" and "energy". To the extent that this concept does not adequately represent the real tinting of the glass, i.e. what really prevents the soul from having the pure non-dimensional perspective, then we have misunderstanding.

The first is this: "c" is the speed limit of relativity. Strictly speaking relativity does not imply that light moves as fast as "c". Interestingly you can read this article https://www.sciencealert.com/heavy-light-could-explain-dark-energy . This solution is very inelegant, especially due to Gauge symmetry problems. But IMO it is possible. If indeed no particle is massless, then IMO the tinted glass issue can be circumvented. — boundless

Light is fundamental to the concept of energy, and the concept of energy relates light to matter and mass. As described above, the tinting of the glass is this concept, we interact with the physical reality through this concept. The extent to which this concept misrepresents itself, is the extent to which the tinted glass is a problem.

Imagine these three scenarios:
1. You're looking through a tinted glass and you do not know that it's tinted. You believe that your observations are providing a real description, despite the fact that your descriptions are inaccurate because the glass is tinted.
2. You're looking through a tinted glass and you know that it's tinted, but you do not know in which way it's tinted. You know that your observations are inaccurate because of the tinting, but you do not know how to rectify that, because you do not understand the tinting. Therefore you must determine how the glass is tinted in order to produce accurate descriptions.
3. You're looking through a glass and you know that it's tinted, you've determined exactly what the tint is, therefore you can produce accurate descriptions.

What I suggest is that physicists are at position #2. The concept of matter, energy and mass, is the tint. The physicists know that they are looking at the world through this tint, but they do not actually know the tint, and how it affects the observations. The appropriate metaphysical procedure is to recognize that we must determine precisely how the glass is tinted, before we can produce any accurate descriptions. However, the commonly practised metaphysics is to claim #3, that the physicists already know exactly what the tint is, they know what the concept of energy, mass and matter, "adds" to the observations, and therefore accurate descriptions are being produced. Adopting this metaphysical perspective amounts to, in reality, #1, that they are looking through a tint which they do not know is there, because they have assumed that all the tinting has been accounted for within the concept. This is why I say that if the concept represents itself, or is represented as, accounting for the tint, when it really doesn't, then there is a problem.

However all "universes" are in fact an "aspect" of the same "thing" in MWI! — boundless

The fact that whenever talking about this theory that ‘worlds’ or ‘universes’ have to be enclosed in quote marks is a warning, in my view.

In my opinion the advocates of MWI are not acknowledging the radical implications of the idea - that the theory really does entail parallel or many universes - literally and physically, nothing allegorical about it. As per the quotation given above, Everett’s thesis supervisor had him strip out all reference to ‘splitting’ (even an analogy of the observer multiplying ‘like an amoeba’) in order to make the thesis more acceptable. But it was clear that Everett really did believe in many worlds and ‘splitting’.

Also, as is well-known, Everett later left academic life and made his fortune creating the systems that enabled ICBM warheads to theoretically wreak maximum possible desctruction in the event of a catastrophic nuclear conflict. He was plausibly identified as one of the characters being portrayed in Dr Strangelove.

It is clear from Everett's own writings that he considers mathematical models fiction of the mind. He says so, in the text I referenced above. He did not consider them reality and even commented that all too often equations are used to replace reality instead of just leaving them for what they are, symbolic representations with some practical usefulness just like any language.

Also I note in his favour, this paragraph from the review you linked:

Everett was disappointed at the poor reception his doctoral dissertation received and never published anything on quantum mechanics again for the rest of his life; instead he became a Dr. Strangelove type character making computer nuclear war games and doing grim operational research for the pentagon about armageddon. He was one of the first to point out that any defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles would be ineffectual and building an anti-balistic missile system could not be justified except for "political or psychological grounds". Byrne makes the case that Everett was the first one to convince high military leaders through mathematics and no nonsense non sentimental reasoning that a nuclear war could not be won, "after an attack by either superpower on the other, the majority of the attacked population that survived the initial blasts would be sterilized and gradually succumb to leukemia. Livestock would die quickly and survivors would be forced to rely on eating grains potatoes and vegetables. Unfortunately the produce would be seething with radioactive Strontium 90 which seeps into human bone marrow and causes cancer". Linus Pauling credited Evert by name and quoted from his pessimistic report in his Nobel acceptance speech for receiving the 1962 Nobel Peace prize.

The review ends:

Hugh's daughter Liz Everett killed herself a few years after her father's death, in her suicide note she said "Funeral requests: I prefer no church stuff. Please burn me and DON'T FILE ME. Please sprinkle me in some nice body of water or the garbage, maybe that way I'll end up in the correct parallel universe to meet up with Daddy". And so she was.

:groan:

I refer again to the news item Quantum Mysteries Dissappear if Possibilities are Realities

In the new paper, three scientists argue that including “potential” things on the list of “real” things can avoid the counterintuitive conundrums that quantum physics poses. ... At its root, the new idea holds that the common conception of “reality” is too limited. By expanding the definition of reality, the quantum’s mysteries disappear. In particular, “real” should not be restricted to “actual” objects or events in spacetime. Reality ought also be assigned to certain possibilities, or “potential” realities, that have not yet become “actual.” These potential realities do not exist in spacetime, but nevertheless are “ontological” — that is, real components of existence. [In my heuristic: real but not existent.]

“This new ontological picture requires that we expand our concept of ‘what is real’ to include an extraspatiotemporal domain of quantum possibility,” write Ruth Kastner, Stuart Kauffman and Michael Epperson.

Which is related to what I argued for in the OP of this thread, and also the OP Being, Reality and Existence.

From which perspective, the many-worlds interpretation is forced on us only because there is no provision for ‘degrees of reality’. In that view, something is either real or unreal. Whereas in fact, there are degrees of reality, and consciousness plays a role in actualising the potential through the process of observation. It is, I suppose, much nearer the Copenhagen interpretation, but I still think it is philosophically preferable to the alternative.

By expanding the definition of reality, the quantum’s mysteries disappear. In particular, “real” should not be restricted to “actual” objects or events in spacetime. Reality ought also be assigned to certain possibilities, or “potential” realities, that have not yet become “actual.” These potential realities do not exist in spacetime, but nevertheless are “ontological” — that is, real components of existence. [In my heuristic: real but not existent.]

This is the issue with the nature of time. Common sense shows us that we need to accept as brute fact the substantial difference between past and future. Things which have become actual are all in the past, and the future consists of possibilities, "potential". We ought to confine "physical existence" "spatial-temporal existence" to the past, because the future consists only of possibilities, whereas the past consists of what has actually occurred. But this produces an ontology where the physical world must be continually coming into existence (becoming), from possibilities, at each moment of the present.

Each moment of passing time must be represented not as a state of physical existence, but as the entire physical world actively coming into existence at each moment of passing time. You can imagine that the speed at which the spatial temporal world comes into being at each passing moment, from the world of possibility, must be so incredibly fast, to give us the appearance that there is a state of physical existence corresponding to each moment of passing time. So the emergence of the physical world, from the "extraspatiotemporal domain" of possibility, at each moment of passing time, must consist of activity which is faster than anything we could imagine.

All of this wavers very closely to Bergson's view of time, which in turn is in close proximity to new efforts to define gravity and quantum information entanglement as holographic in nature. The trajectory is clear. Even Ellis' interpretation of z Relativity pretty much turns Relativity topsy-turvy into this type of ontological mode, i..e. the past with the unfolding present pressing into possible future.

I must admit, I cannot grasp the holographic concept. I've read Bohm's "Wholeness and the Implicate Order", but I find that there is something missing in the conception which renders the whole holonomics movement unintelligible to me. Doesn't a hologram require a medium?

Bohm was off the mark but moving in the right track trajectory. What I've done is combine Bergson/Robbins (Robbins is phenomenal in presenting Bergson's views on holographic perception with Erik Verlinde's holographic theory of gravity. Put it all together and you'll probably come up with your own take on the ontology as I did.

The holographic universe might be imagined as quantum foam or an information (memory) fabric which the quantum foam represents.



The information (memory) is not in the brain. The information, like TV signals) are out there in the holographic universe. The brain is merely reconstructing/constructing images as can transmitter/receiver might. Rupert Sheldrake came up with a similar analogy. The mind constructs space from the memory hologram. Gravity emerged from the information entanglement. If you follow this trajectory you'll notice that space-time is headed for the c elephant burial ground.