Ya, I understand the arguments, I just disagree, especially that truth fits into some pragmatic view of epistemology. For me it's much broader in scope, and of course there are those in science and in other fields of study who hold such beliefs, but even this idea is based on arguments within our linguistic framework.

I'm not sure what it would even mean to say that "...no one view of reality is valid in itself..." that is, what is a valid view of reality other than a certain consensus in terms of linguistic meaning. We say this or that about reality, and we reach a certain consensus about the meaning of reality within language. When someone starts using language to suit their own particular world view, then we end up with a subjective view that collapses knowledge.

I don't disagree with everything you're saying, that is, I do think there is a pragmatic approach to epistemology that works in certain cases, but it doesn't explain the many uses of these concepts beyond what's pragmatic. So it's more than just being useful.

scientific constructions of reality become more predictively useful over time. — Joshs

Science is definitely useful. The question at hand is whether its methods and necessary biases preclude it from ever formulating a reasonable theory about life. So far their efforts in this regard and from now my perspective have been an abomination in many dimensions.

Yes, the assumption that "real" and "existent" (and even "is") mean something is the cause of much philosophical confusion.

"Real", "existent" and "is" are metaphysically undefined.

I use "Reality" (capitalized) to mean "All", or "All that is", where "is" is just as broadly defined. I don't use "real" metaphysically, because, as I said, it isn't metaphysically-defined. I avoid "exist" too, for the same reason.

Ii use "is" with the broadest, unlimited, meaning.

I take "exist" to refer only to elements of metaphysics, but I avoid using "exist".

But yes, much of philosophical discussion and debate seems to be unnecessary and pointless quibbling about what exists or is real.

Michael Ossipoff

For example, it's meaningless and silly to quibble about whether NDEs are real. NDEs undeniably are, and what more does anyone expect to say about them?

Michael Ossipoff

scientific constructions of reality become more predictively useful over time. — Joshs

...for the physical relations among physical things.

But many people, known as Science-Worshippers, want to apply science outside that valid area of applicability, and have a belief that science describes, covers, applies to, all of Reality.

The religion of Science-Worship is rivaled only by doctrinaire, dogmatic, Literalist, anthropomorphic, interpretations of Theism, as the official religion in our society.

(Not all Theism is dogmatic, doctrinaire, Literalist, or anthropomorphic.)

But many people posing as dogmatic Literalist Theists are really closet Atheist, Materialist, Science-Worshippers.

Michael Ossipoff

...so Atheists are right when they say that many Atheists need to be closeted, such as politicians trying to appeal to a demographic.

"Many people, known as Science-Worshippers, want to apply science outside that valid area of applicability, and have a belief that science describes, covers, applies to, all of Reality".

IF you believe that philosophy can describe , cover, and apply to all of reality, then I would suggest that so can science for the most part. Not science as it has been conceived over the past 400 years by those working within the natural sciences. Science, as it has been conceived since it stopped being considered a branch of philosophy, didnt concern itself with its origins or gounding, but simply took for granted as its starting point certain presuppositions about subject and object. The limits of modern scientific metaphysics have been brought out by figures such as Husserl and Heidegger, but a postmodern empiricism would be a self-reflective endeavor that recognizes its role as inherently valuative and thus ethical(See Francisco's Ethical Knowhow for an example of this direction). It might still be presumed to treat as implicit what is explicity brought out by philosophy, but would be self-reflective in a way that it has not been in the modern era, and I suspect the dividing line that has been assumed as clear between something like philosophy and something like science will also become more ambiguous. Not
'These are things philosophy categorically can do and science can't' , but 'these are things philosophy can investigate with greater depth and rigor than science'.

"Real", "existent" and "is" are metaphysically undefined. — Michael Ossipoff

Distinguishing 'reality', 'being', and 'existence' is practically impossible in the current English philosophical lexicon, because they are usually considered synonyms. But there are fundamental differences between these words.

'Exist' is derived as follows: 'ex-' to be apart, apart from, outside (as in external, exile), and '-ist', to stand or to be. So to 'exist' is to be 'this as distinct from that', to have an identity. In my heuristic, the 'domain of existents' is basically the realm of phenomena. 'What exists' are all the billions of compound objects that are composed of parts and have a beginning and end in time. Also, existence refers to the living of life considered longitudinally through time, 'our life', and all of the forms of phenomena that exist within that frame.

What is 'real' is another matter. I understand this to denote real numbers, logical, scientific and natural laws and principles, and so on. So in this heuristic, numbers are real, because they're the same for anyone who can count, but they're not existent, because they don't come into and go out of existence. (And prime numbers, in particular, are not composed of parts - see Augustine on Intelligible Objects. Imaginary objects could also be discussed but I will leave that for now.)

The meaning of 'Being' is another matter again. Note that in ordinary speech the term 'Being' usually denotes 'human being', and for good reason. This is because in a Being, the domain of existents and the domain of reals is synthesised into the 'meaning-world' in which we live. But another crucial point about being is that being is never an object of consciousness, because we're never apart from or outside of it. Being is 'that which knows', never 'the object of knowledge' (a fundamental insight of non-dualism. But this is why it can be said that we 'forget what being is' even though it's always 'nearer' than anything else.)

The 'be' of 'be-ing' is a completely different matter to the nature of the existence of objects. This is the distinction basic to ontology.

Typically, in our extroverted and objectively-oriented culture, we accept that what is real is what is 'out there'; as Sagan said, that 'cosmos is all there is'. But Being is prior to the Cosmos, in the sense that if we were not beings, the cosmos would be nothing to us, we would simply react to stimuli, as animals do. It is our insight into principles, laws, logic, and so on, that enables the grasp of the 'logos' of things. Although now this has become very confused, because so-called 'empiricism' doesn't understand these distinctions.

"Being is 'that which knows', never 'the object of knowledge' (a fundamental insight of non-dualism. But this is why it can be said that we 'forget what being is' even though it's always 'nearer' than anything else."

Sounds like Heidegger, except that for him Being isnt 'that which knows' but that clearing which is prior to subject and object, in which knowing unfolds, but not itself a particular being.

I'd said:

Many people, known as Science-Worshippers, want to apply science outside that valid area of applicability, and have a belief that science describes, covers, applies to, all of Reality".

IF you believe that philosophy can describe , cover, and apply to all of reality,... — Joshs

I don't.

Metaphysics can describe, cover and apply to the matter of what is that is discussable and describable. That isn't all of Reality.

(I realize that "metaphysics" is a broader term. But it's often used with a meaning similar to "ontology", which I take to mean "metaphysics" as I described it in the paragraph before this one. If anyone says that "ontology" is also about un-discussable, un-desribable Reality, that isn't the meaning that I take "ontology" to have. The "-ology" suffix implies knowability, describabity, disussability.).

... then I would suggest that so can science for the most part.

So you're saying that science can describe, cover and apply to all that philosophy can?

Ethics and Aesthetics are parts of philosophy. Are you saying that science can describe, cover and apply to all issues, topics and questions of Ethics and Aesthetics?

Metaphysics is part of philosophy. Are you saying that science can describe, cover and apply to all that metaphysics describes, covers and applies to? Of course that would have to include Idealist metaphysicses too--all of them.

So science can describe, cover and apply to abstract if-then facts? Which branch of science would that be? Physics?

Not science as it has been conceived over the past 400 years by those working within the natural sciences.

Not just by them. It's now agreed by all that, by the modern meaning of "science", science is about the relations and interactions among the things of this physical universe. In its purest form, that's physics.

Chemistry is about a subset of physics, though its techniques are necessarily somewhat different for that subset. (it's been said that quantum-computing will make more of chemistry calcuable, predictable, by the methods of physics.)

Biology is, at least in principle, derivable from chemistry.

Science, as it has been conceived since it stopped being considered a branch of philosophy, didn't concern itself with its origins or grounding, but simply took for granted as its starting point certain presuppositions about subject and object.

Yes, now "science" conveniently refers only to the study and discussion of the relations and interactions among the physical things of this physical universe.

'these are things philosophy can investigate with greater depth and rigor than science'.

It's a lexicographic matter. Conveniently we now distinguish science from metaphysics. Anything other than the relations and interactions among the things of this physical universe can't be investigated at all by science, because that's all that science is about. (as defined now).

You can discuss how science used to be defined, and that might be of great historical interest, to those who want to pursue the study of history.

Michael Ossipoff

Yes, the assumption that "real" and "existent" (and even "is") mean something is the cause of much philosophical confusion.

"Real", "existent" and "is" are metaphysically undefined.

I use "Reality" (capitalized) to mean "All", or "All that is", where "is" is just as broadly defined. I don't use "real" metaphysically, because, as I said, it isn't metaphysically-defined. I avoid "exist" too, for the same reason.

Ii use "is" with the broadest, unlimited, meaning.

I take "exist" to refer only to elements of metaphysics, but I avoid using "exist".

But yes, much of philosophical discussion and debate seems to be unnecessary and pointless quibbling about what exists or is real.

Michael Ossipoff — Michael Ossipoff

My point isn't that these words lack meaning, or that they're "metaphysically undefined." My point is that they're like other words that tend to be vague, and as a result they don't lend themselves to precise definitions. This doesn't mean we can't use them when speaking about metaphysics, it simply means that we must use them in the same linguistic way. For example, if someone has an NDE and sees their deceased father or mother, then I think it's appropriate to use exist or real in the same way we normally use those words. However, in order to do this, there must be some objective component associated with normal reality, which is the case with a vast majority of NDEs. If one is using the term exists to refer to something completely subjective, then that's problematic, at least in terms of trying to demonstrate that what you're seeing is like seeing anything else.

The other point I was trying to make is that the way we use words given any sensory experience, namely, the commonality of use, is how they should be used in terms of NDEs. If there are a large number of people seeing the same things, and there is some way of objectively verifying what they're seeing, then we can use the words in the same way we normally use them. It doesn't matter, at least to me, that what we're talking about is physical reality or metaphysical reality.

I should add that, of course, Materialists believe that this physical universe is all of reality. So, of course, for them, science does describe, cover, and apply to all of reality.

Michael Ossipoff

What aspects of reality do you think are not discussable and describable(ineffable?)? Are you referring to a spiritual dimension? To me what is of interest is not what supposedly exists in itself out there somewhere that we cannot see, but how our constructions of meaning change. In that sense, what is indescribable now is simply that understanding which lies in our future. To me talking about what is not now describable is like talking about what range of behaviors an organism isn't capable of now but may be in a differently evolved state.

"Are you saying that science can describe, cover and apply to all issues, topics and questions of Ethics and Aesthetics?"

Remember, I said a postmodern science would presumably treat implicitly the most primordial questions that philosophy would discuss explicitly. That means that many, but not all, aspects of aesthetic and ethical domains will be amenable to a self-reflexive postmodern science.
Keep in mind all of the categories of contemporary empirical psychological inquiry that at one time were branches of philosophy(cognition, will, memory, perception).


"Metaphysics is part of philosophy. Are you saying that science can describe, cover and apply to all that metaphysics describes, covers and applies to?"

Metaphysics used to be the crowning achievement of philosophy. Newer philosophical approaches don't believe in metaphysics any more. In fact, they don't exactly consider that it's possible to do philosophy any more in the strict sense( metaphysics as a beyond which organizes the physis, the objects of the world). By the same token, a postmodern science doesn't consider its role a strictly describing objective entities, having rejected the separation of subjext and object which guided modem science.

"It's now agreed by all that, by the modern meaning of "science", science is about the relations and interactions among the things of this physical universe. In its purest form, that's physics."

Yes, but postmodern science, which at this point only includes a subset of the cognitive science community, rejects this definition. My expectation is that, in order for what are now called the physical sciences to advance beyond a certain point, they will eventually have to reorient themselves as postmodern also by moving past this Cartesian dualism.

"So science can describe, cover and apply to abstract if-then facts?"

Let's talk about abstract if-then facts.
What is an if-then relation? I suppose the 'if' part introduces a starting fact, maybe in the form of a proposition? Is this fact then a concept?
What are we assuming about the history of this starting 'if' , this concept, in the individual's experience? Are we assuming that all concepts are mutually defined by reference to other concepts, like the word definitions in a dictionary?
If so, then can we assume that everyone has their own mental dictionary, so that my 'if' concept may mean something slightly different to me than it does to you?
Also, if the starting ' if' concept of an if-then relation presupposes a prior history or context that defines its meaning, isn't this starting 'if' already a 'then' to a prior 'if'? After all, the starting 'if' doesn't come from nowhere, it emerges out of a background of my ongoing interest, concerns, activities. It is already framed in relation to this background.
Now, when we think of all the ways that meanings can be related to each other, all the different types of causative logics(material, efficient, formal, final) ,
I wonder what are the most primordial observations we can make about an if-then statement.
For my money, more primordial than any of these logics I listed is a simple change of sense. Think of it as a gestalt shift. You know, when a cloud can look like a cat one minute and a horse the next. That's a change of sense. A gestalt shift isnt causative in any formal sense. The cloud-as-cat didnt 'cause' the cloud-as-horse. There is no necessary relation of any sort being claimed between the two.
I dont think that's the way you understand if-then. You want to lock in a formal logic causation.
As an adherent of modern scientific metaphysics, that would be not surprising.

I must quit for the evening.

Will reply tomorrow.

Michael Ossipoff

My point isn't that these words lack meaning, or that they're "metaphysically undefined." My point is that they're like other words that tend to be vague, and as a result they don't lend themselves to precise definitions. — Sam26

Sure, all language is a bit vague. No finite dictionary can non-circularly define any of is words. it really always must come down to "You know what i mean", or demonstration-by-gesture.

But "Exist", "Real" and even "Is" are qualitatively more un-defined than other words. Though I refer to Reality, to mean "All", and use "Is" with the broadest interpretation, I don't use "real" for comparison of metaphysical things, and I don't use "exist".

I think there's lots of unnecessary debate in philosophy about what is or isn't "real" or "existent".

If one is using the term exists to refer to something completely subjective, then that's problematic

Of course.

And I claim that our metaphysical world is purely subjective, in the sense that we're primary and central to our life-experience possibility-story. It's entirely about our experience. In that sense, it's completely subjective. The physical world around you is secondary, as the setting for your life-experience possibility-story.

It's there because you're in it, and you're in it because of your predisposition.

As I was saying, it's meaningless to say that NDEs aren't "real".

They're followed by one of two things:

The peaceful rest and sleep at the end of lives.

OR

A next life.

I suggest that, for nearly everyone (including everyone in these forums) it will be the latter.

Michael Ossipoff

I had errands today, and it's a long post, but I'll have my reply finished and posted tomorrow morning. (Tuesday 2/20/18).

Michael Ossipoff

Here is evidence of the persistence if memory through duration? Skills developed over multiple life times.

Maybe, but it sure isn't clear that that's the case. Of course if it's true, as I think it is, that we do live out many lives, then it would seem to follow that some of our knowledge might leak through.

Here is an interesting speculative point: Let's assume that consciousness does survive bodily existence, and that it's true that our consciousness can be inserted into different realities. Moreover, let's also assume that this reality is similar to a holographic program. If this is a program, then it may also be the case that not all who appear to be real, are real. For example, what if some of the humans are merely program generated. In other words, what if being inserted into the program is like going into a game like World of Warcraft, where you assume a character (in our case a body), but that other characters in the program are simply generated by the program (NPCs). It would seem to be a reasonable conclusion to infer based on the assumed premise.

Maybe, but it sure isn't clear that that's the case. — Sam26

Yes, it is never clear. All we have are our observations, some clues, and we try to put together the pieces into some image (ontology) of nature. These are not proofs, they are only clues.

: Let's assume that consciousness does survive bodily existence, — Sam26

Consciousness that includes memory. Memory that is interwoven into the fabric of the universe that persists through so cycles of life so that consciousness can forever perceive it in new forms. It is not a program, but rather life in the form of memory, creative impulse, and will.

Yes, it is never clear. All we have are our observations, some clues, and we try to put together the pieces into some image (ontology) of nature. These are not proofs, they are only clues. — Rich

We are so far apart in our thinking. I'm not saying it's never clear, I'm saying that the assumption you made about evidence of past lives isn't clear. For me it's clear that consciousness survives bodily existence, for example, because the testimonial evidence is very strong.

And everyday experiences of inherited and innate characteristics and skills are not strong evidence? What alternative theory is there? That it just happens?

Like I said, our thinking is so far apart one wonders if there is any common ground epistemologically. The amount of work to bridge the gap isn't worth the time. The effort to bridge the gap would be in proportion to the importance of the topic.

What aspects of reality do you think are not discussable and describable(ineffable?)?

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How broad a range of things do you think that words accurately and completely describe? To me, it seems that the burden of proof is on the person who claims that words accurately and completely describe all of Reality.
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You’re basically saying, discuss what you think is un-discussable :D
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Anyway, in a passage at the end of your post, you answer your own question. I’ll quote it here:
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For my money, more primordial than any of these logics I listed is a simple change of sense. Think of it as a gestalt shift. You know, when a cloud can look like a cat one minute and a horse the next. That's a change of sense. A gestalt shift isnt causative in any formal sense. The cloud-as-cat didnt 'cause' the cloud-as-horse. There is no necessary relation of any sort being claimed between the two.

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That passage hints about something that isn’t discussable or describable. …that words don’t describe or apply to. So, do you really believe that words can be a complete description of Reality?

Anyway, I hear-tell that there were some of them Classical-Greek fellers who also didn’t think that everything was describable and discussable.
So, I must decline credit for inventing that idea.
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I don’t think that's the way you understand if-then. You want to lock in a formal logic causation.

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If-then is about logic. There are aspects of our world that are consistent with and described by logic.
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The if-thens in my metaphysics are about one proposition demonstrably inevitably following from another. That can be called causation. And there’s a domain of Reality that is described by logic.
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As an adherent of modern scientific metaphysics, that would be not surprising.

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I’m the one who said that metaphysics, logic, science and words don’t describe all of Reality. You’re the one who thinks that words cover and describe all.
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But yes, while admitting that metaphysics doesn’t and can’t describe all of Reality, I nevertheless say that metaphysics needs to be approached scientifically. Metaphysics has a lot in common with science. …similar requirements. Avoid mutual-contradiction. Statements need to be supported. There are uncontroversial things can be said. Brute-facts, assumptions, and unverifiable, unfalsifiable propositions are rightly suspect.
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I don’t claim to know much about the unknowable. :D
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I can’t prove that something is un-discussable by not discussing it. But you can show that something is discussable by discussing it. So then, do so. Discuss something that you think some people might not consider discussable. …without asking me for the impossibility of discussion about what’s undiscussable.
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Can anything be said about matters that are un-discussable, indescribable, ineffable? You’re asking me for information about un-discussable things.
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Without rigorous proof either way, which of the following is the reasonable presumption?:
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That all of Reality is discussable and describable, or that it isn’t? Or that it might or might not be? If the latter, then any statement purporting to be about all of Reality is questionable.
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Yes, I said that if all of Reality even might not be discussable, then any statement purporting to be about all of Reality is questionable.
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I limit my assertions to uncontroversial ones.
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Materialists claim that the physical world is all of Reality. That’s a broad and big claim, assertion, and assumption.
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Materialists believe in their fundamentally, objectively, concretely existent world as a brute-fact. What else can you call it?
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Are you referring to a spiritual dimension?

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I don’t say that, but it could be taken as referring to meta-metaphysics—undiscussable, un-describable matters.
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That’s probably what someone means when saying that phrase.
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To me what is of interest is not what supposedly exists in itself out there somewhere that we cannot see.

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Yes, O seer of all!
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1. “Exists”: As I said, there’s some agreement that “exists” applies only to elements of metaphysics. …and, in fact, only to elements of metaphysics that come into and go out of existence…that exist temporally. Maybe only physical things. With those limitations, I guess it could be said that “exists” means “is” (when “is” is used at the end of a clause, without a predicate-nominative—saying something about one thing, rather than equating two things).
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2. “..out there somewhere…”
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Out where? So you think that if there’s anything un-discussable, then it must be distantly spatially located “somewhere out there?”
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3.“supposedly”? It sounds if you’re supposing things that I didn’t say.
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Anyway, what’s more unreasonably and vainly “supposed” is your belief that words can describe all of Reality.
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4. “…that we cannot see.” Alright, are we clarifying that we’re a Materialist, who believes that the physical world comprises all of Reality?
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I avoid the word “exist”.
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As for what you’re interested in, of course no one can tell someone else what they should be interested in.
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But let me quote, again, your own assertion about the limitations of logic and words:
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For my money, more primordial than any of these logics I listed is a simple change of sense. Think of it as a gestalt shift. You know, when a cloud can look like a cat one minute and a horse the next. That's a change of sense. A gestalt shift isnt causative in any formal sense. The cloud-as-cat didnt 'cause' the cloud-as-horse. There is no necessary relation of any sort being claimed between the two.

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In any case, yes I suggested that not all of Reality is discussable or describable. When I said that, I thought that it was uncontroversial and universally agreed. But I’m not interested in debating it. I prefer to confine my discussion to something that is known to be discussable: Metaphysics.
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So I’d rather just discuss metaphysics. I’m not interested in convincing anyone about the limits of discussability.
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You said:
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, but how our constructions of meaning change. In that sense, what is indescribable now is simply that understanding which lies in our future.

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So you’re saying that you’re convinced that all or Reality will eventually be known by humans? (…as soon as science become sufficiently advanced)?—Are you a Materialist? …a Science-Worshipper?
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To me talking about what is not now describable is like talking about what range of behaviors an organism isn't capable of now but may be in a differently evolved state.

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See directly above.
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Remember, I said a postmodern science would presumably treat implicitly the most primordial questions that philosophy would discuss explicitly. That means that many, but not all, aspects of aesthetic and ethical domains will be amenable to a self-reflexive postmodern science.

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You just have a different definition of science. There’s nothing wrong with different definitions, as long as they’re carefully specified, and consistently-used.
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What you mean by “science” sounds like a brand of philosophy. It would be difficult to comment on it without knowing more about it.
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I’ve read that relativism about everything is a strong component of Post-Modernism.
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Keep in mind all of the categories of contemporary empirical psychological inquiry that at one time were branches of philosophy(cognition, will, memory, perception).

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So that’s the kind of a science that postmodern science is or will be?

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I’d said:
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Metaphysics is part of philosophy. Are you saying that science can describe, cover and apply to all that metaphysics describes, covers and applies to?"

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You replied:
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Metaphysics used to be the crowning achievement of philosophy. Newer philosophical approaches don't believe in metaphysics any more.

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Metaphysics isn’t, or shouldn’t be, about believing. As I said, uncontroversial things can be said about metaphysics. If you don’t “believe in” them, then you’d be invited to tell why.
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A person can believe in a metaphysics that they can’t defend. A person can express disbelief in a metaphysics with which they can’t find fault.
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Obviously, people can and do believe whatever they’ve already chosen to believe.
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In fact, they don't exactly consider that it's possible to do philosophy any more in the strict sense( metaphysics as a beyond which organizes the physis, the objects of the world). By the same token, a postmodern science doesn't consider its role a strictly describing objective entities, having rejected the separation of subject and object which guided modem science.

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As I said, you have a different definition of what “science” means, and it’s something that, for you, replaces philosophy, including metaphysics. But someone could ask, “But if it replaces metaphysics and philosophy, answers their questions, then isn’t it philosophy? Philosophy and an improved replacement for physical-science, all rolled into one?

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"It's now agreed by all that, by the modern meaning of "science", science is about the relations and interactions among the things of this physical universe. In its purest form, that's physics."

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Yes, but postmodern science, which at this point only includes a subset of the cognitive science community, rejects this definition. My expectation is that, in order for what are now called the physical sciences to advance beyond a certain point, they will eventually have to reorient themselves as postmodern also by moving past this Cartesian dualism.
[/quote]
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Is that a quote from Post-Modernists?
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Cartesian Dualism, like Dualism in general, is a metaphysics. Science (including physics) doesn’t subscribe to a metaphysics at all. Science-Worshippers want to make science into a metaphysics (Materialism) and a religion (Sciece-Worship). But, really, science has nothing to do with metaphysics, and shouldn’t be worshipped as a religion.
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Science can’t “move past” Cartesian Dualism, because science isn’t in Cartesian Dualism. Cartesian Dualism, or any Dualism is a metaphysics. Science has nothing to do with metaphysics.
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…though a respected university physics professor and established specialist on quantum-mechanics has said that quantum mechanics lays to rest the notion of an objectively-existent physical world. …a (uniquely?) rare instance of science saying something about metaphysics.
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I’d said:
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"So science can describe, cover and apply to abstract if-then facts?"

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You replied
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Let's talk about abstract if-then facts.
What is an if-then relation? I suppose the 'if' part introduces a starting fact

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The “if-then” fact’s “if “ premise isn’t necessarily a fact. It’s only a hypothetical proposition. I make no claim that the premises or conclusions of the “if-then” facts that I refer to are true. If a proposition isn’t true, then it isn’t a fact. But there are abstract timeless hypothetical if-then facts that are demonstrably inevitably true. …regardless of whether or not their premises are true.
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I’m talking about worlds of “if “, as opposed to worlds of “is”.
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, maybe in the form of a proposition?

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Yes.
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Is this fact then a concept?

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“Fact”:
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I’m not saying that the premises of the if-then facts that I refer to are true. If a premise isn’t true, then it isn’t a fact.
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“Concept”:
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The premise is a hypothetical proposition. I guess you could call it a “concept”, except that I like to keep what I say uncontroversial, and keep it plain. The word “concept” might imply more than I mean. I prefer to just call the premise a hypothetical proposition.
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What are we assuming…

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You’re asking me what you and I are assuming. How would I know what you’re assuming? Only you know what you’re assuming. Why ask me?
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…about the history of this starting 'if' , this concept, in the individual's experience?

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What “starting if”? By that, do you just mean the “if “ premise of any particular if-then fact?
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Its history is that timelessly is, as a hypothetical proposition that’s (at least part of) the “if “ premise of an abstract timeless if-then fact.
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But no assumption is involved, required, or used.
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Do I assume that the timeless abstract if-then fact, or its premise(s) or its conclusion “exist” or are “real”? No.
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No assumptions. No brute-facts.
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Are we assuming…

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You’re asking me what you and I are assuming. How would I know what you’re assuming? Only you know what you’re assuming. Why ask me?
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…that all concepts are mutually defined by reference to other concepts, like the word definitions in a dictionary?

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No. I’m not talking about concepts. I’m talking about timeless abstract if-then facts, and their hypothetical premises and conclusions. I try to avoid using unnecessary terms that might have different meaning than I intend. I don’t use the word “concept” when describing my metaphysics.
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But yes, a proposition, such as a hypothetical physical-quantity-value, can be (at least part of) the premise of one abstract if-then fact, and can also be the conclusion of another abstract if-then fact.
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And no, that isn’t an assumption.
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Dictionaries are finite. Experience is open-ended, and therefore so is the system of inter-referring timeless abstract if-then facts about hypotheticals that comprises a life-experience possibility-story. For example, of course there remains much physics yet to be discovered. Current explanations themselves call for explanations of them. And no one knows the physics that will explain the acceleration of the recession-rates of the more distant galaxies—though I don’t think anyone doubts that, at least potentially, in principle, physics will find an explanation that’s consistent with other physical observed facts.
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In the past, there were seeming inconsistencies: Black-body radiation’s energy/wavelength curve; the result of the Michaelson-Morely experiment; the unexpected large direction-change of particles directed into a piece of metal-foil by Ernest Rutherford; The planet Mercury’s seemingly anomalous rotation of apsides; Olber’s paradox. …etc.
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Those seeming inconsistencies were later consistently explained in terms of new physics or new theories and explanations that were well-confirmed.
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If so, then can we assume that everyone has their own mental dictionary, so that my 'if' concept may mean something slightly different to me than it does to you?

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Your life-experience possibility-story is yours only, though all of our stories take place in the same possibility-world. That’s really no surprise: For your story to explain or account for you, there must be a species that you belong to, and it must have other members in your world.
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There are infinitely many life-experience possibility-stories, and so of course there’s one about every being in your world. You experience only your own experiences. The experiences, and experience-story of other beings is theirs only, just as yours is yours only.
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Because we live in the same world, we experience many of the same facts about that world. For instance, we both know that, in the measurement-systems used by humans on this planet, there are 12 inches in a foot, and 100 centimeters in a meter.
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Also, if the starting ' if'…

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I don’t know what you mean by “starting “if “. A person’s experience is open-ended, and therefore so is the complex system of inter-referring abstract timeless if-then facts that constitutes a story about that experience.
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I’ll assume that, by “starting ‘if’ “, you just mean the “if “ premise of an if-then fact.
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…concept

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I don’t use the term “concept” in my description of my metaphysics.
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…of an if-then relation presupposes a prior history or context that defines its meaning, isn't this starting 'if' already a 'then' to a prior 'if'?

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It certainly can be, and (at least) often is.
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I don’t use the word “concept” in my description of my metaphysics. I speak of hypothetical propositions, and of if-then facts.
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Sure, a proposition can be (at least part of) the premise of one if-then fact, while also being the conclusion of another if-then fact.
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After all, the starting 'if' doesn't come from nowhere, it emerges out of a background of my ongoing interest, concerns, activities.

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Exactly.
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It is already framed in relation to this background.

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Yes. It’s part of the complex system of inter-referring abstract timeless if-then facts about hypotheticals that is your life-experience possibility-story.
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Now, when we think of all the ways that meanings can be related to each other, all the different types of causative logics(material, efficient, formal, final) ,I wonder what are the most primordial observations we can make about an if-then statement.

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The most basic requirement for your life-experience possibility-story is that it be self-consistent, without contradictions. It’s based on if-then facts, and there’s no such thing as mutually-inconsistent facts.
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But, as for an if-then fact itself, there’s nothing more primordial about it than itself. Such a fact, and a complex system of inter-referring abstract timeless if-then facts about hypotheticals, doesn’t need a context, or a medium in which to be…like some kind of potting-soil.
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It’s premise needn’t be true. In fact it’s irrelevant and meaningless to even speak of the “reality” or “existence” of such a system of inter-referring abstract timeless if-then facts.
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For my money, more primordial than any of these logics I listed is a simple change of sense. Think of it as a gestalt shift. You know, when a cloud can look like a cat one minute and a horse the next. That's a change of sense. A gestalt shift isnt causative in any formal sense. The cloud-as-cat didnt 'cause' the cloud-as-horse. There is no necessary relation of any sort being claimed between the two.

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Yes. I’ve twice quoted that passage above, because it shows you agreeing that words and logic don’t cover and describe everything.
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I dont think that's the way you understand if-then. You want to lock in a formal logic causation.
As an adherent of modern scientific metaphysics, that would be not surprising.

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As I answered above (when quoting that same passage), I’m not the one claiming that words and logic describe all of Reality.
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Above in this reply, I explained that metaphysics has much in common with science…has some of the same requirements that science has. …and is valid in its domain, as science is.
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Michael Ossipoff

Thanks for the response. The challenge in our discussion I think is this: I'm familiar with the history and nature of the ideas you're presenting. Im not saying that I'm familiar with what you believe to be original in your model. But the history of Western metaphysics going back to the Greeks is something that I am well acquainted with, and what you've come up with is, as youve indicated, a variation on the modern scientific metaphysics. So you're prepared to go back and forth on definitions that come from various eras and chapters in that history, picking and choosing among them to build your own approach(I'm not sure how well versed you are in German Idealism or the analytic tradition. It's possible youre reinventing the wheel).

What I wrote you was not coming from that tradition, so all of my definitions will be alien to you, and they would not be something I could explain in a single post. So your response is not just a matter of disagreeing with my assertions, it's not having a sense of what kind of metaphysics ( or post-metaphysics) they're coming from. My terms will essentially be a foreign language to you unless you're well versed in writers like Nietzsche, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze, Heidegger, Derrida.

For instance, you say there are aspects of reality that language can't describe. In my chapter of philosophy , reality isnt a collection of things, and language is not a tool to describe those things. Language is a transformation.
Imagine trying to insert your ideas into a conversation that is taking place among Ancient Greek philosophers. You would be able to intepret their concepts and state your preferences among their various models, but their unfamiliarity with modern scientific metaphysics, the empiricism of Locke, the idealism of Berkeley, the subjectivism of Kant, would make it impossible for them to make sense of your approach before you taught them this new language.

Because I can understand where you're coming from, I could choose to keep my own terms within the confines of the part of Western scientific and philosophical history you're familiar with. I could choose not to introduce into the discussion this other world of philosophy that is alien to you, where logic, language, reality, objectivity and subjectivity mean something very different than what they mean to you

There is one good reason I can think of to venture beyond your familiar territory, but it depends on the purpose that your model serves for you. What would you say it is intended to clarify about the world?
For instance. If your main interest is offering a new philosophical clarification on how today's physical science(physics, chemistry) is understood, then I don't think it would be particularly useful to you to insert Derrida or phenomenology into the conversation. As far as I'm concerned, your account is perfectly respectable for that purpose and I have nothing to critique in it.

But if you are trying to use your model to get a better understanding of ethics, aesthetics, affect and emotion, the nature of psychopathologies like schizophrenia and autism, biological evolution, the development of culture, social relationships, empathy, then I would argue that you are handicapped by the metaphysical
tradition from which your concepts are derived.

I can elaborate further on this if you could say a few worlds about how your model deals with any of the areas I mentioned above. Also, what motivated you in the first place to create your model? What specifically were you dissatisfied with in the way that other philosophies address the issues above?

"Your life-experience possibility-story is yours only, though all of our stories take place in the same possibility-world. That’s really no surprise: For your story to explain or account for you, there must be a species that you belong to, and it must have other members in your world."


Just out of curiosity, do you have any familiarity with psychological constructivism? Constructivists believe that we use a construct system to interpret our world, a kind of narrative lens. I wonder if we can use this as a bridge to your account.

As it's almost dinner-time, this will be a brief preliminary reply, in which I try to say something about a few of the most easily-answered or important topics. But it'll be real brief, and my main reply will be tomorrow morning (February 21).

Thanks for the response. The challenge in our discussion I think is this: I'm familiar with the history and nature of the ideas you're presenting. Im not saying that I'm familiar with what you believe to be original in your model. — Joshs

Good question. I'm not sure how much is original my metaphysics is.

I got the idea from a book, a long time ago. I don't remember the author's name, or the name of his book. Nor do I remember enough detail about it to know where, how much, or if my metaphysics differs from his.

At that time, I hadn't heard about Faraday, Tippler or Tegmark.

I haven't found any details of Faraday's metaphysics.

I disagree with Tippler and Tegmark about a number of things. I once listed them in a post at these forums.

A few details tomorrow.

But the history of Western metaphysics going back to the Greeks is something that I am well acquainted with, and what you've come up with is, as youve indicated, a variation on the modern scientific metaphysics. So you're prepared to go back and forth on definitions that come from various eras and chapters in that history, picking and choosing among them to build your own approach(I'm not sure how well versed you are in German Idealism or the analytic tradition. It's possible youre reinventing the wheel).

I don't know much about those two things, but I've heard at these forums that Wittgenstein said that there are no things, just facts. That sounds lot like a brief summary of what I've been saying.

What I wrote you was not coming from that tradition, so all of my definitions will be alien to you, and they would not be something I could explain in a single post. So your response is not just a matter of disagreeing with my assertions, it's not having a sense of what kind of metaphysics ( or post-metaphysics) they're coming from. My terms will essentially be a foreign language to you unless you're well versed in writers like Nietzsche, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze, Heidegger, Derrida.

Yes, fair enough.

For instance, you say there are aspects of reality that language can't describe. In my chapter of philosophy , reality isnt a collection of things

Things are elements of metaphysics. I don't claim that metaphysics or its things are all of Reality.

, and language is not a tool to describe those things. Language is a transformation.

Yes, I regard language as a way of describing things, events, and relations. But if it's worded as a transformation, then i still don't claim that words apply to all of Reality

Imagine trying to insert your ideas into a conversation that is taking place among Ancient Greek philosophers. You would be able to intepret their concepts and state your preferences among their various models, but their unfamiliarity with modern scientific metaphysics, the empiricism of Locke, the idealism of Berkeley, the subjectivism of Kant, would make it impossible for them to make sense of your approach before you taught them this new language.

Yes, but I've heard here, and read elsewhere that Aristotle said that Good is the basis of what is, and that's my impression as well. I regard that as meta-metaphyscs, not metaphysics, and not a matter of debate, proof or argument.

Because I can understand where you're coming from, I could choose to keep my own terms within the confines of the part of Western scientific and philosophical history you're familiar with. I could choose not to introduce into the discussion this other world of philosophy that is alien to you, where logic, language, reality, objectivity and subjectivity mean something very different than what they mean to you

There is one good reason I can think of to venture beyond your familiar territory, but it depends on the purpose that your model serves for you. What would you say it is intended to clarify about the world?

i regard and treat metaphysics like science. ...in the spirit of science. ...as explanation for metaphysical and physical reality, and as a description of what metaphysicsally (describably and discussably) is.

However yes, I also feel that my metaphysics has implications on subjective matters, suggesting the meta-metaphysical impression about Good being the basis of what is. More about that tomorrow.

For instance. If your main interest is offering a new philosophical clarification on how today's physical science(physics, chemistry) is understood, then I don't think it would be particularly useful to you to insert Derrida or phenomenology into the conversation. As far as I'm concerned, your account is perfectly respectable for that purpose and I have nothing to critique in it.

But if you are trying to use your model to get a better understanding of ethics, aesthetics, affect and emotion,

The Hindus discuss those applications of philosophy, and I've found their writings helpful and worthwhile. More tomorrow.

I can elaborate further on this if you could say a few worlds about how your model deals with any of the areas I mentioned above.

Explanations interest me. I regard metaphysics in the spirit of science, with similar requirements, and even with applications and implications. ...just as physics has those.

Also, what motivated you in the first place to create your model? What specifically were you dissatisfied with in the way that other philosophies address the issues above?

Reading about Vedanta, reading that book that I mentioned, and the question about why there's something instead of nothing.

Materialism is to be rejected because of its big brute-fact.

I'll look up phenomenology and constructivism. I've read just a bit about phenomenology, and it had something to do with science of mind. I didn't disagree with its relevance as a topic. The dictionary confirms that it can be about science of mind.

My science-of-mind position is that we're animals, and animals are purposefully-responsive devices, in principle like a mousetrap. ...but more complex, and with a natural-selection origin. I don't subscribe to Mind or Consciousness separate from body, Animals are unitary.

My metaphysics is from the subjective point of view. That relates to the dictionary's other definition of phenomenology, relating to awareness and its objects.

I'd better get back to my cooking.

More tomorrow.

Here's a link to a constructivist approach. It may give you a feel for the discourse.
http://www.oikos.org/mairstory.htm

Also, check out Vaihinger's 'As If' philosophy, which influenced the constructivist George Kelly.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_Vaihinger

How broad a range of things do you think that words accurately and completely describe? To me, it seems that the burden of proof is on the person who claims that words accurately and completely describe all of Reality. — Michael Ossipoff

Words don't accurately and completely describe any reality. People who have had NDEs are able to describe their experiences, and that which they are unable to describe, is just a matter of expanding our language to include new descriptions or explanations. Moreover, if you can experience something, then it can be described in some way.

What is it exactly that you're claiming we can't describe? I can't make any sense out of a reality that can't be described. Are there objects in this reality, is there light and darkness, is there space, are there beings? There maybe aspects of reality that we know nothing about, but that's different from saying we can't describe some reality. And if it comes down to being able to accurately and completely describe some reality your not saying anything new or significant.

What is it exactly that you're claiming we can't describe? I can't make any sense out of a reality that can't be described. — Sam26

Well, let me quote you:

Words don't accurately and completely describe any reality. — Sam26

But now you say:

Are there objects in this reality, is there light and darkness, is there space, are there beings? — Sam26

You mean the one about whose complete and accurate describability with words you're contradicting yourself? :D

Which is it?

that's different from saying we can't describe some reality. — Sam26

Did I say there isn't any reality that we can describe? I've been saying that there's a domain of what is (apart from the physical sciences), that can be discussed and described, and it's what I mean by metaphysics.

And if it comes down to being able to accurately and completely describe some reality your [sic] not saying anything new or significant. — Sam26

Did i say that it was an original statement? :D

Actually, many agree with me about that.

As I've already clarified more than once, I'm not interested in debating whether or not all of Reality is describable and discussable.

If you think it is, then fine. Let's just agree to disagree on that.

Michael Ossipoff

I was up all night with the matter of the choice of a map-projection. When I was younger, I used to stay up all night whenever I was reading something interesting, or pursuing an interesting math-problem. I thought that I knew better now. Anyway, I was up till 8 a.m., and that’s why I’m a bit late in getting on the computer.
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Additional comments in more detail:
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You wrote:
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I’m not saying that I'm familiar with what you believe to be original in your model.

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Litewave has suggested something similar to what I propose. He posted it before I did. His proposal probably isn’t identical to mine.
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The first Westerner I’ve heard of, who beat me to it with Elminative Ontic Structural Idealism was Michael Faraday, in 1844. But I couldn’t find details of his metaphysics.
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As I was mentioning last night, I got the idea of possibility-worlds (and that term “possibility-world”) a long time ago, from a book whose author and title I don’t remember. But he spoke of possibility-worlds. It seems to me that if he’d spoken of, let alone emphasized, individual subjective life-experience possibility-stories, I’d have remembered that.
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Also, although if-then facts might be implicit in possibility-worlds, I don’t remember him emphasizing if-then facts. I don’t remember mention of logic in the book.
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So, so far as I know, my metaphysics is original in some regards.
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Also, another difference from other Eliminative Ontic Structural Idealism proposals is that I claim and emphasize that it’s completely uncontroversial.
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For example, Tegmark calls MUH a hypothesis.
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Tegmark has said that his proposal explains Reality. I certainly don’t make that claim. I think that’s too much to ask of metaphysics.
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Tegmark emphasizes the objective, universe-wide point-of-view for MUH. In fact, he states the External Reality Hypothesis as a starting principle.
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Tippler believes in, and emphasizes, the Simulated-Universe Theory, and has spoken of a future time when the entire physical universe will be converted to one big computer, to simulate everyone’s lives.
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Some computer-scientist authors have made that suggestion too.
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I don’t think the Simulated-Universe-Theory makes any sense, because possibility-stories are timeless, and aren’t “created” by the writing of a program or the running of a computer. They could only displayed for the computer’s viewing-audience.
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Tegmark has expressed support for the Simulated-Universe Theory.
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Those considerations seem to suggest that my proposal might have originality.
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But the main difference between my proposal, and the other Eliminative Ontic Structuralisms that I’ve heard of is that mine is from the individual subjective point of view.
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It's possible you’re reinventing the wheel.

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That’s entirely possible. I can’t say for sure that there isn’t already a proposal that’s just like mine.
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If anyone has heard or read my metaphysical proposal before, from someone else, I hope you’ll mention it.
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The mention that there’s a hypothetical experience-possibility-story, consisting of a system of inter-referring timeless abstract if-then facts, whose events and relations are those of our experience in our apparently objectively-existent world--a world that we describe in declarative indicative grammar—and that there’s no reason to believe that our experience is other than that, is a lot to ask someone to accept. But I claim there’s no objection to it, and that there aren’t really any controversial statements in that proposal.
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My suggestion is that our world is better described by conditional grammar, rather than our useful and convenient declarative, indicative grammar.

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They say that schizophrenia and autism are physically-caused. Hereditary, or physically-environmental. There are physical-environmental theories of autism’s cause, to explain the drastic increase in the incidence of autism in recent times.
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But, aside from that, obviously people can mess-up eachother’s lives, without any hereditary or physical-environmental help, especially when socially-caused damage to someone’s life starts in early life. The familial and societal environment in which someone is raised can surely make all the difference.
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But if you are trying to use your model to get a better understanding of ethics, aesthetics, affect and emotion, the nature of psychopathologies like schizophrenia and autism, biological evolution, the development of culture, social relationships, empathy, then I would argue that you are handicapped by the metaphysical
tradition from which your concepts are derived.

I can elaborate further on this if you could say a few worlds about how your model deals with any of the areas I mentioned above.

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It seems to me that metaphysics has implications.
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I suggest that the metaphysics that I propose is about a metaphysical reality that is insubstantial and ethereal, and implies an openness, looseness, and lightness. …in contrast to Materialism’s grim (and insupportable) “objective” accounting.
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I don’t mean to say that you always live in logic, facts, verbal description, etc. But, when you visit them, they aren’t as bad as you’ve been taught. In fact they’re pretty good.
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Metaphysics is a verbal discussion about what logically, factually is. What factually is, is pretty good.
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So it’s my impression, and that of some other people, that what-is, is pretty good, and inspires gratitude.
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An impression that the whole overall metaphysical what-is, is very good—Is that different from an impression that Good is the character or basis of what-is?
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These are impressions, or the same impression. But if your subjective impression is that something is good, then isn’t there a real sense in which it is good, as far as you’re concerned? So the distinction between impression and belief isn’t really so distinct.
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…because none of this has anything to do with convincing anyone else.
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And, if there’s an impression that Good is the basis of what-is, then isn’t that really just another way of saying an impression that there’s good intent behind what-is?
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Also, what motivated you in the first place to create your model? What specifically were you dissatisfied with in the way that other philosophies address the issues above?

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As I mentioned, the question of why there’s something instead of nothing leads to such a metaphysics.
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I wanted a metaphysics that doesn’t have any brute-fact, and which doesn’t need or make any assumptions.
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And I’ve tried to avoid saying anything controversial, anything that anyone would disagree with.
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I wanted to send this as soon as possible, having said that I’d reply in the morning today.
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Thanks for the references. I’ll check them out now.
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Michael Ossipoff

What?! Saying that "words don't accurately and completely describe any reality," contradicts the statement "Are there objects in this reality, is there light and darkness, is there space, are there beings?" Where in the latter statement do you see me accurately and completely describing any reality? These are general statements that have very little specificity to them in terms of kinds of objects, the kind of light that may or may not be in this reality, whether it's 3 or 10 dimensions of space, and, are the beings biological or composed of pure light. If anything the statement supports the contention. It surely doesn't contradict the former statement.

Let me also remind you of what the thread is about, viz., NDEs, and whether they support the inference that consciousness survives bodily existence. If you people want to talk about whether your opinions support some theory of metaphysics, start up another thread. Thank you. :nerd: