More generally, is a belief somehow represented in the mind? That raises the obvious question of what form that representation might take.

I think we're getting into semantics here. We could say that beliefs are attitudes to a proposition that have to be contained in a mind, but there would be no epistemological reason to, just if we preferred to differentiate particular types of response and call them something different. As I say, I don't see any epistemological reason to do this, but that doesn't mean we can't.

Thing is, if we say the we're going to artificially restrict the use of the word 'belief' to humans (or other animals?) then we have two problems.

1. Where do we draw the line? Can an unconscious person have a belief, can a bacteria?

2. What do we call the same attitude to a proposition when it's contained in a computer, do we have another word that does the job?

What other animals have beliefs? Or is that just a PC concession?

That raises the obvious question of what form that representation might take. — Banno

I don't see any problem with it not having a representation. When John says "the sky is blue" we can propose the causal explanation of that John might 'believe' the sky is blue. Likewise if we were privy to all of John's thoughts we might say the same when we see some internal reaction. But until that time we have no justification for making the statement about John's beliefs, so I don't think there's any need for them to be contained anywhere, they are the causal chain.

What other animals have beliefs? Or is that just a PC concession? — Wayfarer

All other animals have beliefs. The tiger 'believes' that the antelope will alleviate its hunger. If it turns out the antelope was a cardboard cut out, then it will have had a false belief. In what way are human beliefs different?

Well, if thermostats have beliefs then there is no problem saying that cats, horses, mosquitos and viruses have beliefs.

In what way are human beliefs different? — Pseudonym

You can ask humans about it and they will explain it. The rest is just stimulus-and-response.

No I can't. I cannot ask a Polynesian to explain their beliefs because they will have no idea what I'm saying and I will be unable to understand any response.

So having a belief requires language, and for the belief to be explainable. Adding this allows one to keep the intuition that thermostats do not have beliefs.

One can translate Polynesian into English.

Also, how is not just stimuli-respone that when you hear the words "explain your beliefs" you respond with words which correspond to the way you intend to react to certain propositions?

What about: In order to count as a belief, the believer must know what the proposition means.

It does not seem too unreasonable to suppose that belief has some dependence on meaning.

Many marine biologists can understand a significant part of dolphin communication. Can they have beliefs? What about babies before language, do they not have beliefs?

We're just fishing about for a sufficiently complex definition to satisfy our anthropocentrism when the simplest definition already suffices.

What job is being done by restricting the term 'belief' to those in possession of language?

What about: In order to count as a belief, the believer must know what the proposition means.

It does not seem too unreasonable to suppose that belief has some dependence on meaning. — Banno

Then how are we to assess whether the believer 'knows' what the proposition means. We're getting circular here. Would we not have to say they had a 'belief' about what the proposition means?

Then, by your definition they would have to know what it means to have such a belief. If we knew that we wouldn't be having this discussion would we?

What job is being done by restricting the term 'belief' to those in possession of language? — Pseudonym

So we would have that

• A belief is a relation between an individual and a proposition.
• The individual must understand the meaning of the proposition in order to believe that proposition.

Then how are we to assess whether the believer 'knows' what the proposition means. — Pseudonym

In the obvious case, the same way we find out that someone knows anything. Ask.

In other cases, watch how they act.

we would have that

A belief is a relation between an individual and a proposition.
The individual must understand the meaning of the proposition in order to believe that proposition. — Banno

But why do we need these things, what purpose does this restriction of the definition serve?

In other cases, watch how they act. — Banno

Which brings us back to cats, and thermostats. The thermostat certainly acts as if it knows what the temperature reading means. Why else would it turn the heating on when it learns that the room is cold. It must know what coldness means in terms of what must be done next.

I cannot ask a Polynesian to explain their beliefs because they will have no idea what I'm saying and I will be unable to understand any response. — Pseudonym

you might, though. It’s only a matter of translation. Polynesians are humans. Unlike, say, lions.

how is not just stimuli-respone that when you hear the words "explain your beliefs" you respond with words which correspond to the way you intend to react to certain propositions? — Pseudonym

Find me a thermostat which suspects you’re materialist.

But why do we need these things, what purpose does this restriction of the definition serve? — Pseudonym

To sort belief out from other propositional attitudes.

We should add the obvious:

To believe something is to hold it to be true.

which often entails a value judgement.

Good point. Often but not always?

Perhaps we should say that the individual judges the proposition to be true?

well it’s unargauale with respect to what can be measured. The arguments generallly start with ‘what to measure’.

To sort belief out from other propositional attitudes. — Banno

Yes but why? Why are you wanting to give a special word to some responses to propositions just because those responses are carried out by a human?

you might, though. It’s only a matter of translation. Polynesians are humans. Unlike, say, lions. — Wayfarer

How do you know it isn't possible to communicate with lions? Many people have effective communication with animals. Plus, you're neatly dodging how babies have beliefs, what about deaf mutes, are they incapable of belief?

Belief tends to arise in threads hereabouts. I'm curious.

Find me a thermostat which suspects you’re materialist. — Wayfarer

Why would the content of a belief make any difference? I can find you a thermostat which clearly 'beleives' it's cold. I can find you a human who is incapable of believing I'm a materialist because they don't know what the word means. Your point is?

Belief tends to arise in threads hereabouts. I'm curious. — Banno

If you're curious then coming at the problem with an already fixed human-shaped answer isn't going to help.

So show me how to proceed.

I know humans have beliefs. It's not an unreasonable place to start.

You're looking to define belief. The usual method for defining something is broadly either analytical (what should it mean) or linguistic (what is it used to mean). Personally I think both have their uses, but what it is used to mean is of little use philosophically, it's more a sociological excersice.

Analytically then, we're looking to put a circle around some group of things on the basis of a set of shared properties which give us further insight. Defining those properties too narrowly is useless, it gives very little insight. If nothing turns out to be in the set that we didn't already know was in it then no useful information has been found. That's what I'm suggesting your anthropocentrism is doing. You're creating a definition in such as way as you already know everything that's in it. That's fine, but philosophically useless.

I have to do some real work now, but I look forward to reading your response later in the day.

I agree that belief is a propositional attitude, specifically; an attitude which accepts a proposition as true with insufficient evidence (i.e., having mind-to-world fit).

False beliefs contribute to bias, illusion, and error.

If "mind" is the set of conditions experienced, and functions exercised, by an organism which produce behaviour, then; belief is a mental function. Therefore, it doesn't make sense to ask,"Where is mind?", or "Where is belief?"

Criterial evidence in the form of observed behaviour suggests that animals have attitudes (e.g., prey having a negative evaluation of predator). But inasmuch as propositions presuppose language, it is unlikely that animals have beliefs.

an attitude which accepts a proposition as true with insufficient evidence — Galuchat

(My emphasis)

But hang on - can't one believe something that is indeed true? I believe this sentence is in English.

belief is a mental function. — Galuchat

So believing is something the mind does? That's interesting.

Indeed, we seem to be ruling out animal belief along with thermostat belief.