• Janus
    6.1k
    You'll need to clarify what you mean by "frame beliefs". I don't apprehend a difference between a belief and the frame of a belief. What could frame a belief, but another belief. And if this is the case, the framed belief, being supported by the frame, is just as fallible as the frame.Metaphysician Undercover

    The same beliefs can be framed in different languages. Languages cannot be fallible or infallible they are just tools, just know-how. We cannot frame a belief without a language, but it doesn't follow from this that we cannot believe without a language.

    The uncertainty, which you say is an extra element of belief, not found in knowing-how, is actually very evident in knowing-how as well. No matter how many times we've done the same thing over and over again, there is still the possibility we might fail in the next time. That is why those of us who work with machinery must be very careful every day, and never let down our guard, no matter how well we know how to do what we do, lest we be injured.Metaphysician Undercover

    No, that uncertainty consists in our belief that we know how to do something, not in our knowing how to do something. People can certainly believe that they know how to do things that they do not know how to do. Your 'operating machinery' example is not relevant; the kinds of failures you are referring to are failures of attention, not failures of know-how.

    As I argued earlier, the certainty of knowledge is only produced by separating knowing-that from knowing-how, and allowing that knowing-that obtains levels of certainty not obtained by knowing-how. If you reduce all knowledge to knowing-how, then all knowledge suffers from the fallibility of knowing-how.Metaphysician Undercover

    No, the separation of knowing-that from knowing-how produces only doubt (out of which certainty cannot ever be derived). There is no fallibility in knowing-how, but only in believing that you know-how; if you know-how, then you know-how, end of story.
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    4.8k
    The same beliefs can be framed in different languages. Languages cannot be fallible or infallible they are just tools, just know-how. We cannot frame a belief without a language, but it doesn't follow from this that we cannot believe without a language.Janus

    So the belief is framed by language. I assume then, that know-how is required to frame a belief. With know-how we put a belief into language.

    So I don't understand what a belief is then. My beliefs are in language, I believe this, and I believe that, all statements of language. They are formed in language and they exist in language. Never do they exist in any other form, needing to be framed in language, because they are created in language. How do you think that the belief is framed in language, when the belief itself is created out of language?

    Your 'operating machinery' example is not relevant; the kinds of failures you are referring to are failures of attention, not failures of know-how.Janus

    Well that's nonsense. A failure in attending to what you are doing, when you are doing it, is obviously a failure in your know-how. What could 'know-how" be, other than the capacity to attend to what you are doing, and get it done? If you can't attend to it and get it done, then clearly you don't have the know-how. Being able to focus your attention on the task at hand is an integral part of know-how.

    There is no fallibility in knowing-how, but only in believing that you know-how; if you know-how, then you know-how, end of story.Janus

    OK, that's your assertion then. If someone has the know-how to carry out a particular procedure, then it is impossible that the person will ever make a mistake, and fail in carrying out that procedure. However, evidence demonstrates that this assertion is wrong. People make mistakes and fail in tasks that they have already been successful at numerous times before. And to say that the person's failure is a failure of something other than the person's know-how, like a failure in the person's attention, is just nonsense. Because if in some instance, the person cannot maintain one's attention long enough to get the job done, then that's a failure in the person's capacity to do the job, and therefore a failure in the person's know-how.
  • creativesoul
    3.7k
    I would only point out here that Meta is not drawing the crucial distinction between thought, belief, and thinking about thought and belief...

    Same problem historically that epistemology has succumbed to...

    The logical consequence is either non linguistic agents have no belief or propositions are prior to language. Neither is acceptable.
  • creativesoul
    3.7k
    So, back to Jack's toy...

    There's no reason to deny talking in terms of Jack believing that the toy is under the rug, but we must be careful to not personify Jack(anthropomorphism). He doesn't believe the statement. He believes that the toy is under the rug. Our statement sets out the way things are. Jack's belief is made up of much the same, but without language. We draw meaningful correlations between language use and the way things are with the terms "rug", "cat", and "rug" and the spatial relationship between them. We know what sort of situation that statement describes. Jack doesn't have a clue about describing the situation, nor need he. He witnessed it.

    If our language sets out a situation which does not require being set out in order for it to obtain(be that way), then we've hit upon a case of our describing something that is not existentially dependent upon language.

    Language allows us to become aware of(discover) things that are not existentially dependent upon language, and things that are. Jack knows nothing about nouns or verbs or any other sort of syntax, nor can he. He can, however, hold belief about some things we name.

    The difficulty lies is knowing the limits.
  • creativesoul
    3.7k
    We cannot frame a belief without a language, but it doesn't follow from this that we cannot believe without a languageJanus

    That is the distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief. Framing a belief is thinking about it, assuming we're framing it on purpose, as in offering our ground for assent.

    In order to frame one's own belief, one must have belief and an ability(means) to frame it. Belief comes prior to framing... or simultaneously in many cases...
  • Janus
    6.1k


    Thoughts and beliefs are already framed in language, and that framing doesn't require thinking about thought and belief. Thinking and believing are not necessarily framed as thoughts and beliefs. though. Thinking about thought and belief is a still further process.

    I would only point out here that Meta is not drawing the crucial distinction between thought, belief, and thinking about thought and belief...creativesoul

    I would say you are not drawing the crucial distinctions between thinking and thoughts, and believing and beliefs.
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    4.8k
    I would only point out here that Meta is not drawing the crucial distinction between thought, belief, and thinking about thought and belief...

    Same problem historically that epistemology has succumbed to...

    The logical consequence is either non linguistic agents have no belief or propositions are prior to language. Neither is acceptable.
    creativesoul

    What I am saying is that what is required to fulfill the conditions of what we understand by "belief", is thinking about thought. This is the only thing which can bring about the conviction required by what we understand as "belief". If this produces the conclusion that non linguistic agents have no belief, then you ought to accept this, instead of trying to characterize some type of thinking which does not suffice to fulfill the conditions of "belief" as belief. Calling that type of thinking "belief" is nothing but a misuse of the word.
  • creativesoul
    3.7k
    Thoughts and beliefs are already framed in language, and that framing doesn't require thinking about thought and belief.Janus

    Agreed regarding some kinds of thought and belief, as well as some kinds of talking. However, regarding classic epistemology, one is most certainly thinking about one's own thought and belief. When one argues for what they believe, they are thinking about their own thought and belief. When one is arguing against what another thinks and believes, they are doing the same...



    Thinking and believing are not necessarily framed as thoughts and beliefs. though. Thinking about thought and belief is a still further process.

    This is just self-contradictory language use. While I would agree that folk frame their own thought and belief using different terms than "thought" and "belief", that is as far as my agreement would stretch.





    I would say you are not drawing the crucial distinctions between thinking and thoughts, and believing and beliefs.

    I would agree. Thinking is what we do and/or ore doing when we're drawing correlations, and thought is the correlation. The same holds with believing and belief. There is also a clear distinction between thought and belief, if the former is not necessarily held to be true by the agent in question, and that is most certainly thinking about one's own thought and belief.

    We - as believing agents - do not determine what our mental ongoings consist of. We believe things long before our ability to talk about our thought and belief. Thus, we can be wrong in how we take account of that which exists - as it is - prior to our awareness of it.
  • creativesoul
    3.7k
    What I am saying is that what is required to fulfill the conditions of what we understand by "belief", is thinking about thought. This is the only thing which can bring about the conviction required by what we understand as "belief". If this produces the conclusion that non linguistic agents have no belief, then you ought to accept this, instead of trying to characterize some type of thinking which does not suffice to fulfill the conditions of "belief" as belief. Calling that type of thinking "belief" is nothing but a misuse of the word.Metaphysician Undercover

    Oh, the irony...

    What I'm telling you is that in order to fulfill the criterion for your notion of "belief", one must think about one's own thought. Doing that requires complex(written) language use. Thus, according to your criterion for "belief", one cannot have belief until and unless one is already fairly affluent in language use. As a matter of fact, if what you say here is true, when one first learns that that is(called) a "tree", s/he does not believe - cannot possibly believe - that that is there(whatever and wherever that may be). Nor can they believe that that is called a "tree" until after they've learned to consider their own mental ongoings. For fuck's sake, if what you say is true, then one cannot even believe that they have things called "thought" until they've already begun thinking about their thoughts...

    Seems to me that you've no idea what you're talking about. The notion of "belief" your working from is found lacking, wanting, and basically begging for truth. Everyday fact contradicts your notion, and yours isn't the only one...

    Misuse of a term is neither determined by nor equivalent to being different from your use. I've just shown some of the issues with yours. All you've done is hand wave... Gratuitous assertions won't do Meta. It does not follow from the fact that you work from a different notion of "belief" that I am misusing the term. Take the semantic quibbling elsewhere...

    :-}
  • Cavacava
    2.4k
    Thinking about Knowledge and Belief.

    It seems to me that Knowledge without Belief is impossible and maybe at a certain level their distinction vanishes, but it is clearly not the other way round, Belief without Knowledge happens all the time.
    Belief has an emotive quality, an intensity, perhaps this how we bring value to the epistemic. If belief is traceable back to feeling then language may not necessary for belief, but still some sort of semiotic connection.
  • Janus
    6.1k
    Agreed regarding some kinds of thought and belief,creativesoul

    Note I said "thoughts" and "beliefs" and you responded using "thought" and "belief". I have been referring to thought as 'thinking' and belief as "believing". So, in my terms a thought or a belief, being defined as a determinate entity, must be linguistically framed; whereas thought and belief, or thinkings and believings need not be so framed.
  • creativesoul
    3.7k
    I have been referring to thought as 'thinking' and belief as "believing".Janus

    Not my problem.
  • creativesoul
    3.7k
    So, in my terms a thought or a belief, being defined as a determinate entity, must be linguistically framed; whereas thought and belief, or thinkings and believings need not be so framed.Janus

    The term "thought" can refer to either a plurality of thoughts, or a single one. It can also be used to refer to what one is doing when they are sitting around contemplating their own mental ongoings.

    When the discussion is based upon what counts as a single thought, it goes into the direction of content. That's where I've been and will stay.

    I've set out the necessary and sufficient conditions for each and every sense of each and every word ever spoken and/or written, regardless of the individual particulars.

    Belief must be meaningful. Thought must be meaningful. All meaning consists entirely of correlations being drawn by a capable agent. The capability consists of something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized, and an agent to draw a correlation between the two... All meaning is attribution, and that's precisely how it's done.

    Now what?
  • Janus
    6.1k


    No, your problem is that you're not interested in anyone else's thoughts and beliefs, even when they are patently more coherent than your own.
  • creativesoul
    3.7k
    Got either an argument or a valid criticism of the ones I've been putting forth?

    I'm not interested in such petty bullshit.
  • creativesoul
    3.7k
    We agree that one can believe stuff and think stuff and that doing so doesn't require being framed(taken account of).
  • Janus
    6.1k
    The term "thought" can refer to either a plurality of thoughts, or a single one.creativesoul

    No, the term "thought" refers to the process of thinking; it is the noun equiavelnt to the verb "thinking, in other words. The term "a thought" refers to a single thought, and the term "some thoughts" refers to a plurality of thoughts.
  • Janus
    6.1k


    It's not "petty bullshit" but suggested refinements, for the sake of greater clarity, of your inadequate terms.
  • creativesoul
    3.7k
    No, your problem is that you're not interested in anyone else's thoughts and beliefs, even when they are patently more coherent than your own.Janus

    That is not a suggested refinement. That's petty bullshit.
  • creativesoul
    3.7k
    Your charge of inadequacy requires more than just gratuitous assertion.
  • Janus
    6.1k


    That's right, it's a goad to motivate you to pay attention to suggested refinements.
  • Janus
    6.1k


    More adequate terms are more precise in that they enable more distinctions and acknowledge more subtle distinctions.
  • creativesoul
    3.7k
    Provide some, and make sure that these purported 'refinements' are both necessary and/or warranted.

    Show the flaw. You've done nothing hitherto aside from teetering upon the fence of equivocation.
  • creativesoul
    3.7k
    I've clarified everywhere you've asked. I said nothing wrong before your asking. Your misattribution of meaning does not count as a problem with the arguments I've provided.
  • creativesoul
    3.7k
    The term "thought" can refer to either a plurality of thoughts, or a single one.
    — creativesoul

    No, the term "thought" refers to the process of thinking; it is the noun equiavelnt to the verb "thinking, in other words. The term "a thought" refers to a single thought, and the term "some thoughts" refers to a plurality of thoughts.
    Janus

    Evidently the term "term" refers to more than one. By my lights, not everything captured by quotation marks counts a being a term.

    See how this works?

    "A" is a term. "Thought" is a term. "A thought" is two terms captured between quotations.
  • Janus
    6.1k


    From Google search, here:
    https://www.google.com.au/search?q=term+definition&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&client=firefox-b&gfe_rd=cr&dcr=0&ei=amyCWq6XL83N8gealryYAw

    Term
    təːm/
    noun
    noun: term; plural noun: terms

    1.a word or phrase used to describe a thing or to express a concept, especially in a particular kind of language or branch of study.
    "the musical term ‘leitmotiv’"
    synonyms: word, expression, phrase, turn of phrase, idiom, locution; More
  • creativesoul
    3.7k
    Sigh...

    Got an argument or valid criticism/refutation?
  • creativesoul
    3.7k
    Step one...

    Grant the terms.
  • creativesoul
    3.7k
    I suggest that you refine your use of the term "term"...
  • creativesoul
    3.7k
    Sigh...

    Got an argument or valid criticism/refutation?
    creativesoul
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