I would only point out here that Meta is not drawing the crucial distinction between thought, belief, and thinking about thought and belief...

Same problem historically that epistemology has succumbed to...

The logical consequence is either non linguistic agents have no belief or propositions are prior to language. Neither is acceptable.

So, back to Jack's toy...

There's no reason to deny talking in terms of Jack believing that the toy is under the rug, but we must be careful to not personify Jack(anthropomorphism). He doesn't believe the statement. He believes that the toy is under the rug. Our statement sets out the way things are. Jack's belief is made up of much the same, but without language. We draw meaningful correlations between language use and the way things are with the terms "rug", "cat", and "rug" and the spatial relationship between them. We know what sort of situation that statement describes. Jack doesn't have a clue about describing the situation, nor need he. He witnessed it.

If our language sets out a situation which does not require being set out in order for it to obtain(be that way), then we've hit upon a case of our describing something that is not existentially dependent upon language.

Language allows us to become aware of(discover) things that are not existentially dependent upon language, and things that are. Jack knows nothing about nouns or verbs or any other sort of syntax, nor can he. He can, however, hold belief about some things we name.

The difficulty lies is knowing the limits.

We cannot frame a belief without a language, but it doesn't follow from this that we cannot believe without a language — Janus

That is the distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief. Framing a belief is thinking about it, assuming we're framing it on purpose, as in offering our ground for assent.

In order to frame one's own belief, one must have belief and an ability(means) to frame it. Belief comes prior to framing... or simultaneously in many cases...

Thoughts and beliefs are already framed in language, and that framing doesn't require thinking about thought and belief. Thinking and believing are not necessarily framed as thoughts and beliefs. though. Thinking about thought and belief is a still further process.

I would only point out here that Meta is not drawing the crucial distinction between thought, belief, and thinking about thought and belief... — creativesoul

I would say you are not drawing the crucial distinctions between thinking and thoughts, and believing and beliefs.

I would only point out here that Meta is not drawing the crucial distinction between thought, belief, and thinking about thought and belief...

Same problem historically that epistemology has succumbed to...

The logical consequence is either non linguistic agents have no belief or propositions are prior to language. Neither is acceptable. — creativesoul

What I am saying is that what is required to fulfill the conditions of what we understand by "belief", is thinking about thought. This is the only thing which can bring about the conviction required by what we understand as "belief". If this produces the conclusion that non linguistic agents have no belief, then you ought to accept this, instead of trying to characterize some type of thinking which does not suffice to fulfill the conditions of "belief" as belief. Calling that type of thinking "belief" is nothing but a misuse of the word.

Thoughts and beliefs are already framed in language, and that framing doesn't require thinking about thought and belief. — Janus

Agreed regarding some kinds of thought and belief, as well as some kinds of talking. However, regarding classic epistemology, one is most certainly thinking about one's own thought and belief. When one argues for what they believe, they are thinking about their own thought and belief. When one is arguing against what another thinks and believes, they are doing the same...

Thinking and believing are not necessarily framed as thoughts and beliefs. though. Thinking about thought and belief is a still further process.

This is just self-contradictory language use. While I would agree that folk frame their own thought and belief using different terms than "thought" and "belief", that is as far as my agreement would stretch.

I would say you are not drawing the crucial distinctions between thinking and thoughts, and believing and beliefs.

I would agree. Thinking is what we do and/or ore doing when we're drawing correlations, and thought is the correlation. The same holds with believing and belief. There is also a clear distinction between thought and belief, if the former is not necessarily held to be true by the agent in question, and that is most certainly thinking about one's own thought and belief.

We - as believing agents - do not determine what our mental ongoings consist of. We believe things long before our ability to talk about our thought and belief. Thus, we can be wrong in how we take account of that which exists - as it is - prior to our awareness of it.

What I am saying is that what is required to fulfill the conditions of what we understand by "belief", is thinking about thought. This is the only thing which can bring about the conviction required by what we understand as "belief". If this produces the conclusion that non linguistic agents have no belief, then you ought to accept this, instead of trying to characterize some type of thinking which does not suffice to fulfill the conditions of "belief" as belief. Calling that type of thinking "belief" is nothing but a misuse of the word. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh, the irony...

What I'm telling you is that in order to fulfill the criterion for your notion of "belief", one must think about one's own thought. Doing that requires complex(written) language use. Thus, according to your criterion for "belief", one cannot have belief until and unless one is already fairly affluent in language use. As a matter of fact, if what you say here is true, when one first learns that that is(called) a "tree", s/he does not believe - cannot possibly believe - that that is there(whatever and wherever that may be). Nor can they believe that that is called a "tree" until after they've learned to consider their own mental ongoings. For fuck's sake, if what you say is true, then one cannot even believe that they have things called "thought" until they've already begun thinking about their thoughts...

Seems to me that you've no idea what you're talking about. The notion of "belief" your working from is found lacking, wanting, and basically begging for truth. Everyday fact contradicts your notion, and yours isn't the only one...

Misuse of a term is neither determined by nor equivalent to being different from your use. I've just shown some of the issues with yours. All you've done is hand wave... Gratuitous assertions won't do Meta. It does not follow from the fact that you work from a different notion of "belief" that I am misusing the term. Take the semantic quibbling elsewhere...

:-}

Thinking about Knowledge and Belief.

It seems to me that Knowledge without Belief is impossible and maybe at a certain level their distinction vanishes, but it is clearly not the other way round, Belief without Knowledge happens all the time.
Belief has an emotive quality, an intensity, perhaps this how we bring value to the epistemic. If belief is traceable back to feeling then language may not necessary for belief, but still some sort of semiotic connection.

Agreed regarding some kinds of thought and belief, — creativesoul

Note I said "thoughts" and "beliefs" and you responded using "thought" and "belief". I have been referring to thought as 'thinking' and belief as "believing". So, in my terms a thought or a belief, being defined as a determinate entity, must be linguistically framed; whereas thought and belief, or thinkings and believings need not be so framed.

I have been referring to thought as 'thinking' and belief as "believing". — Janus

Not my problem.

So, in my terms a thought or a belief, being defined as a determinate entity, must be linguistically framed; whereas thought and belief, or thinkings and believings need not be so framed. — Janus

The term "thought" can refer to either a plurality of thoughts, or a single one. It can also be used to refer to what one is doing when they are sitting around contemplating their own mental ongoings.

When the discussion is based upon what counts as a single thought, it goes into the direction of content. That's where I've been and will stay.

I've set out the necessary and sufficient conditions for each and every sense of each and every word ever spoken and/or written, regardless of the individual particulars.

Belief must be meaningful. Thought must be meaningful. All meaning consists entirely of correlations being drawn by a capable agent. The capability consists of something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized, and an agent to draw a correlation between the two... All meaning is attribution, and that's precisely how it's done.

Now what?

No, your problem is that you're not interested in anyone else's thoughts and beliefs, even when they are patently more coherent than your own.

Got either an argument or a valid criticism of the ones I've been putting forth?

I'm not interested in such petty bullshit.

We agree that one can believe stuff and think stuff and that doing so doesn't require being framed(taken account of).

The term "thought" can refer to either a plurality of thoughts, or a single one. — creativesoul

No, the term "thought" refers to the process of thinking; it is the noun equiavelnt to the verb "thinking, in other words. The term "a thought" refers to a single thought, and the term "some thoughts" refers to a plurality of thoughts.

It's not "petty bullshit" but suggested refinements, for the sake of greater clarity, of your inadequate terms.

No, your problem is that you're not interested in anyone else's thoughts and beliefs, even when they are patently more coherent than your own. — Janus

That is not a suggested refinement. That's petty bullshit.

Your charge of inadequacy requires more than just gratuitous assertion.

That's right, it's a goad to motivate you to pay attention to suggested refinements.

More adequate terms are more precise in that they enable more distinctions and acknowledge more subtle distinctions.

Provide some, and make sure that these purported 'refinements' are both necessary and/or warranted.

Show the flaw. You've done nothing hitherto aside from teetering upon the fence of equivocation.

I've clarified everywhere you've asked. I said nothing wrong before your asking. Your misattribution of meaning does not count as a problem with the arguments I've provided.

The term "thought" can refer to either a plurality of thoughts, or a single one.
— creativesoul

No, the term "thought" refers to the process of thinking; it is the noun equiavelnt to the verb "thinking, in other words. The term "a thought" refers to a single thought, and the term "some thoughts" refers to a plurality of thoughts. — Janus

Evidently the term "term" refers to more than one. By my lights, not everything captured by quotation marks counts a being a term.

See how this works?

"A" is a term. "Thought" is a term. "A thought" is two terms captured between quotations.

From Google search, here:
https://www.google.com.au/search?q=term+definition&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&client=firefox-b&gfe_rd=cr&dcr=0&ei=amyCWq6XL83N8gealryYAw

Term
təːm/
noun
noun: term; plural noun: terms

1.a word or phrase used to describe a thing or to express a concept, especially in a particular kind of language or branch of study.
"the musical term ‘leitmotiv’"
synonyms: word, expression, phrase, turn of phrase, idiom, locution; More

Sigh...

Got an argument or valid criticism/refutation?

Step one...

Grant the terms.

I suggest that you refine your use of the term "term"...

Sigh...

Got an argument or valid criticism/refutation? — creativesoul

So, you reject the dictionary definition, then?

By my lights — creativesoul

Not so bright! Turn up the wattage; you'll gain clarity... :-}

What I'm telling you is that in order to fulfill the criterion for your notion of "belief", one must think about one's own thought. Doing that requires complex(written) language use. Thus, according to your criterion for "belief", one cannot have belief until and unless one is already fairly affluent in language use. — creativesoul

Right, that's exactly what I am arguing.

As a matter of fact, if what you say here is true, when one first learns that that is(called) a "tree", s/he does not believe - cannot possibly believe - that that is there(whatever and wherever that may be). — creativesoul

Right, I would not call that a belief. When a child learns one's first words, "mommy" and "daddy", for example, I wouldn't say that the child believes these are things called "mommy" and "daddy". The child is just learning how to say things.

For fuck's sake, if what you say is true, then one cannot even believe that they have things called "thought" until they've already begun thinking about their thoughts... — creativesoul

Correct. Why is this a problem for you? It's nonsense to say that a person would believe oneself to have something called "thought" unless one was already thinking about thought. Would you say that a person could believe that there's something called a "tree" without having thought about a tree?

Seems to me that you've no idea what you're talking about. The notion of "belief" your working from is found lacking, wanting, and basically begging for truth. Everyday fact contradicts your notion, and yours isn't the only one...

Misuse of a term is neither determined by nor equivalent to being different from your use. I've just shown some of the issues with yours. All you've done is hand wave... Gratuitous assertions won't do Meta. It does not follow from the fact that you work from a different notion of "belief" that I am misusing the term. Take the semantic quibbling elsewhere... — creativesoul

As I said, you describe "belief" in your way, I describe it in my way. I think mine looks toward what "belief" really is, and yours just looks at common usage of "belief', which is varied and ambiguous. That's why I think mine is better, it provides a clear indication of what a belief is, while you just insist that if something is thinking, it has beliefs.