Just as brute matter is effete (meaning "no longer effective") mind, so mind would be considered by Peirce to be evolved matter. — Janus
Generality is not transcendent because without particularity there can be no generality; it cannot be any more transcendent that particularity. — Janus
Agree up to this point. I don't think that second statement stacks up in the least against what Peirce thought. — Wayfarer
I think the depiction of 'universals' as simply 'generalities' amounts to psychologism i.e. it equates them purely with habits of thought. — Wayfarer
Matter is effete mind, ineffective mind, consciousness is thus evolved effete mind, — Janus
The thing that is not in Peirce's ontology is the idea of a foundational pervasive consciousness (as opposed to ineffective mind). — Janus
there is no reason that I can see to believe this is evidence of a transcendent realm of universal forms — Janus
I think the problem is, that this notion of 'transcendental' sits uneasily with current philosophy. That is why such Platonistic intuitions are more than unfashionable, they're almost politically incorrect. — Wayfarer
Oh well, I remain unconvinced that you have any idea what was on Peirce's mind. — Janus
We have of course no reason to assume that our discrete representations are literally representative of a discrete reality undergoing state transitions, for we never observe precise and static states undergoing transition, rather we just see a fuzzy dynamic procession that we carve up into neat pieces for sake of approximate analysis. — sime
So perhaps you argument should be interpreted as a modus-tollens that leads to a rejection this assumption, rather than an argument for a separate mental substance. — sime
I'm not even sure how introducing an overseer solves the problem without introducing it at another level. — sime
And you do? First you didn't even know about his own writings on the subject. Then, when presented, you completely ignore it. — Rich
I asked you to cite passages and provide arguments for your particular interpretation o — Janus
Continuing your example, say there is a determinable state A followed by a determinable state B, and we call the transition from the first to the second states 'C'. You claim that C must be "nothing". I say that it must be an indeterminable state because "nothing" is impossible. C is something but it is not a determinable something. — Janus
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.