There is no objective state of affairs. Everything is in continuous flux. We are all involved and sharing experiences.

And when the heck did I ever use the concept of Laws? Everything is constantly changing. However, habits are formed which appear to be repetitive but are always different.

The fundamental error in all academic and scientific analysis of the universe is replacing symbols (which are static) for flow, which is what we are all experiencing. This is where philosophy can step in and say "what the heck"?. Instead philosophy plays along, even substituting some measurement which science calls time for the real thing. — Rich

"Everything is in continuous flux." and "We are all involved in sharing experiences." are both statements that you believe are true of ALL minds, which makes it a statement about some state-of-affairs that includes ALL minds, which makes it an objective statement about minds.

You don't necessarily need to use a word when you are using it's definition.

Law: a statement of fact, deduced from observation, to the effect that a particular natural or scientific phenomenon always occurs if certain conditions are present.

We are all involved in sharing experiences." are both statements that you believe are true of ALL minds, — Harry Hindu

It is a simple observation. If you noticed any thing that is not changing it any person that is not creating let me know. (There actually is non-duration, but I'll leave that aside for now). All of this subject to change. Everything is evolving. There are no Laws, just some habits.

I don't understand what you are arguing against. Form is nothing than state.

THERE ARE NO STATES in continuous movement. Zeno's paradoxes smartly demonstrate this.

States are a construct of the mind to solve practical problems. It is symbolic. If one substitutes states for the nature of nature, one will get paradoxes. States can be used when appropriate in technological development, not when it comes to a living nature. Philosophers shouldn't use states. The tool doesn't belong because there is nothing static in the universe.

Philosophy is not science. There are huge problems when the tools of one bleed into the other.

Consider three movements:

1) S is hypothesized — Cavacava

Ok.

2) S becomes destabilized as it it is negated (-S) — Cavacava

What is -S? Could you give an example? In my case annihilation just destroys S and leaves us by noting whether S is the ironess of iron or thought for example.

3) S' the synthesis of S & -S

Determinate negation. — Cavacava

What is &? Do you wanted to write "S' is the synthesis of S & -S"?

How could you embed the mind between?

How about it is no longer there, when experienced? Given the time involved in perceptual processing
or It is not as experienced? Given the limitations of perception and the filtering and organization of the perceptual process. — prothero

That is what I am trying to say: What we experience is no longer there. Experience is always comes after existence. This means that there is nothing exist when we experience. The delay due to process (which turns input to mental state) is one obstacle.

Does mind create and destroy "Reality"? — prothero

Yes, we do it all the times. We can create and destroy thoughts. Thoughts are in motion and we have the ability to make them static.

Does mind exist outside of "Reality"? — prothero

Mind to me are ambiguous things. They don't have any location since they are not like stuff out there, physical, yet they could somehow interact with the stuff.

Not as I understand the meaning of the terms but we likely have a language problem as well as a philosophical one. — prothero

Yes, I am not a philosopher and English is not my first language. Thanks for your patience.

THERE ARE NO STATES in continuous movement. Zeno's paradoxes smartly demonstrate this. — Rich

I am not talking about continuous movement. In fact my argument is about a discrete movement.

In fact my argument is about a discrete movement. — bahman

No such animal in this universe. Inapplicable to the study of nature. It is only a game to pass the time - which is perfectly fine as long as it is recognized as such.

There are many discernible states of change within the "one BIG STATE" of change that we call the universe. That is what science studies states of change, rates of change and regularities of change. Do you find a problem with that? — Janus

Well actually there are lots of problems with the assumptions underlying that statement. One is the assumption that the precise state (location in space and time) of anything can be determined to the degree of precision required when talking about infinite divisions of space and time.

Mathematically one can solve Zeno's paradoxes with calculus and infinite series of decreasing numbers the sum of which turns out to be a finite number (Cantor etc.).

When talking about space-time divisions, the assumption that space-time is infinitely divisible is open to question as one approaches the planck length, planck time and considers the notion of space time quantum foam, quantum gravity and looks at the uncertainty principle regarding measurement of position and velocity.

So one must at least consider the discontinuity of space-time at infinitely small distances and thus the quantum collapses or transitions during the "motion" of particles and consider the measurement of macro objects as approximations.

I can't see how any points where what you say here contradicts or constitutes a problem for what I have said there. Perhaps you could indicate those points?

I'm not sure what you mean by "mind" but I don't believe Peirce intends anything which would suggest panpsychism or idealism as they are usually understood.

Take a look at Peirce's categories of philosophy as cited here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/2783/three-categories-and-seven-systems-of-metaphysics/p1

I'm not sure what you mean by "mind" but I don't believe Peirce intends anything which would suggest panpsychism or idealism as they are usually understood. — Janus

Just read what he wrote. I don't think it needs much deciphering.

Then it would seem that you do not believe in nuanced, informed interpretations of philosophers writings; but prefer to remain tendentious, and cherry-pick to serve your own agenda.

I just don't believe in making up stuff just because it doesn't fit my agenda. If you don't like what he wrote, then just move on and find someone else who agrees with you.

So, you've studied Peirce's works?

I read his paper on THE LAW of The MIND.

You wanted the reference, so you got it. Not my problem that you don't like it.

I have a suggestion. Why don't you just ignore it and pretend it doesn't exist.

So, how do you reconcile your simplistic interpretation with what is cited in the OP, where the following is quoted from Peirce:

"I should call myself an Aristotelian of the scholastic wing, approaching Scotism, but going much further in the direction of scholastic realism."

I see nothing about Mind here. Is this your simplistic idea of quoting Peirce about Mind? You rather ignore his paper? Fine. I'm total ok with you ignoring the paper. Just make up some other word to replace Mind. Whatever works for you.

Peirce refers to himself as being something like a "scholastic realist", and this is not compatible with the idea that he was simply an idealist or a panpsychist; or that he shared their ways of understanding the notion of mind or considering it to be fundamental. If you disagree with this then you are contradicting what Peirce himself wrote, as cited in that OP, which amounts to telling us that you know more about what Peirce thought than he did himself. :-}

"scholastic realist", and this is not compatible with the idea that he was simply an idealist or a panpsychist; or that he shared their ways of understanding the notion of mind or considering it to be fundamental. — Janus

For further amplification in his views about Mind and matter being deadened Mind, I would refer you to his article.

Exactly what do you believe should people do? Ignore Peirce's own succinct description and defer to your biased and goal oriented interpretation? Rather bizarre.

Maybe what you might consider is rethinking your own views?

BTW, I am very much a realist when it comes to the Mind. It is very, very, very real.

If you don't believe that what philosophers write requires deciphering then that explains your tendency towards simplistic interpretations.

Maybe what you might consider is rethinking your own views? — Rich

I haven't said anything about my own views: I have just pointed out that your simplistic interpretation of Peirce is not compatible with what he himself has stated; and I have provided textual evidence for that by referring to what was cited in the other OP.

If you don't believe that what philosophers write requires deciphering then that explains your tendency towards simplistic interpretations. — Janus

Anyone who understands human nature and agendas will always go to the source, and I don't care what discipline is being discussed?

Peirce is not compatible with what he himself has stated; — Janus

It keeps getting more bizarre. I didn't do any interpretation. It was a direct quote right out of his own article on MIND. You just don't like what he wrote. Sorry, can't help you. Maybe someone else can. Maybe someone who had a greater flare for distorting. As for me, I like it simple.

As for me, I like it simple. — Rich

No argument from me on that.

Hey, here is something I wrote not long ago. It kind of solves your problem, I think.

For A to become B the following conditions must be true before B exists: (1) A must exist, (2) the possibilities for both B to exist and the transformation to take place must exist, and (3) A and what would be B after A’s transformation must necessarily be two different things; otherwise, A would still be A after such transformation, which, in strict terms, would really never take place if A and the result of its transformation are the same thing. Following this analogy, it is safe to conclude that in order for B to exist, it must have not existed before; to assume the contrary would be the same as to assume that B came to be out of B. Also, as soon as the possibility for B to exist becomes existent the possibility for the transformation from A to B becomes existent, as long as B is a valid outcome of A's transformation. Therefore, even though during the transformation from A to B, neither A or B exist, by B being the only outcome of A's transformation, the transformation will take place by passing through a series of events whose sum will result in the formation of B.

Peirce refers to himself as being something like a "scholastic realist", — Janus

That makes him a 'medieval' realist, i.e. accepts the reality of universals - so not a 'realist' in the modern sense.

Peirce understood nominalism in the broad anti-realist sense usually attributed to William of Ockham, as the view that reality consists exclusively of concrete particulars and that universality and generality have to do only with names and their significations. This view relegates properties, abstract entities, kinds, relations, laws of nature, and so on, to a conceptual existence at most. Peirce believed nominalism (including what he referred to as "the daughters of nominalism": sensationalism, phenomenalism, individualism, and materialism) to be seriously flawed and a great threat to the advancement of science and civilization. His alternative was a nuanced realism that distinguished reality from existence and that could admit general and abstract entities as reals without attributing to them direct (efficient) causal powers. Peirce held that these non-existent reals could influence the course of events by means of final causation (conceived somewhat after Aristotle's conception), and that to banish them from ontology, as nominalists require, is virtually to eliminate the ground for scientific prediction as well as to underwrite a skeptical ethos unsupportive of moral agency.

Review of Paul Forster, Peirce & the Threat of Nominalism.

I find the distinction of 'reality and existence' mentioned in that passage highly significant; it is practically the only recent source I have seen that understands this distinction.

I don't believe Peirce intends anything which would suggest panpsychism or idealism as they are usually understood. — Janus

He most certainly was a self-described idealist. From the SEP entry on C S Peirce

This notion of all things as being evolved psycho-physical unities of some sort places Peirce well within the sphere of what might be called “the grand old-fashioned metaphysicians,” along with such thinkers as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Whitehead, et al. Some contemporary philosophers might be inclined to reject Peirce out of hand upon discovering this fact. Others might find his notion of psycho-physical unities not so very off-putting or indeed even attractive. What is crucial is that Peirce argued that mind pervades all of nature in varying degrees: it is not found merely in the most advanced animal species.

(my emphasis.)

There's a helpful essay on Peirce's idealism The Intelligibility of Peirce's Metaphysics of Objective Idealism, Nicholas Guardiano. My view is that the sense in which Peirce understands 'mind' is directly descended from the Platonic tradition via Augustine; which was preserved in German idealism, and is also found in Emerson (who was also influenced by Eastern monism, as described in the above essay.) There is an appendix to the SEP article on Peirce's relationship to German idealists. (Recall this was well before G E Moore's 'Refutation of Idealism'; at the time Peirce was active, idealism was still the reigning paradigm in American and English universities; Peirce's contemporaries, such as Joshia Royce and Borden Parker Bowne, were similarly idealistic philosophers.)

That makes him a 'medieval' realist, i.e. accepts the reality of universals - so not a 'realist' in the modern sense. — Wayfarer

It is the nominalist who does not accept the reality of universals. Realists of various kinds accept their reality, just not their transcendent reality.

He most certainly was a self-described idealist. — Wayfarer

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/2783/three-categories-and-seven-systems-of-metaphysics/p1

Have a look at this OP where Peirce is directly cited and you will see that Peirce was no idealist in the ordinary sense of the term.

I don’t see anything there in which Peirce is said not to be idealist. Universals have to be ‘transcendent’ insofar as not being characteristic only of particulars.

Therefore, even though during the transformation from A to B, neither A or B exist, by B being the only outcome of A's transformation, the transformation will take place by passing through a series of events whose sum will result in the formation of B. — Daniel

The problem is when neither B or A exist. This means that you have nothing so this question becomes relevant that how you could have B from nothing?

I don’t see anything there in which Peirce is said not to be idealist. — Wayfarer

Peirce sees himself as belonging himself with the third group, with those who acknowledge the reality of all three categories of monadic affectivity, brute physicality and "triadic regulative habit". I think Peirce's conception of matter as "effete mind" indicates not that he believed anything such as "all is consciousness", but that the "habit-taking" of matter shows it to be best thought of as 'mind-like'. Just as brute matter is effete (meaning "no longer effective") mind, so mind would be considered by Peirce to be evolved matter. Remember, Peirce utterly rejected any notion of mind as substance or duality of substance.

Universals have to be ‘transcendent’ insofar as not being characteristic only of particulars. — Wayfarer

It seems to me that universality (or better, generality) is co-constitutive of particulars, just as particularity is. There cannot be particulars without generality. A thing cannot be anything without being some kind of thing. Equally it cannot be any kind of thing without being a particular thing. Generality is not transcendent because without particularity there can be no generality; it cannot be any more transcendent that particularity. The two are utterly co-arising and codependent, I would venture to say.

Why can't there be something which is neither A nor B, but something of both?