Where to go.

Only beliefs that do not consist of linguistic content can be held by a non-linguistic agent. — creativesoul

This is the sort of error that creeps in when beliefs are treated as mental furniture. Beliefs are explanations for actions; they are all statements. They are all of them linguistic.

Only beliefs that do not consist of linguistic content can be held by a non-linguistic agent.
— creativesoul

Where to go.

This is the sort of error that creeps in when beliefs are treated as mental furniture. Beliefs are explanations for actions; they are all statements. They are all of them linguistic. — Banno

So then how do you reconcile this with your earlier claim that Jack had belief? Jack certainly does not have explanations for actions; nor does he have statements. Are you claiming that Jack used language to explain to his actions to you?

I find the charge you've levied here to be unfounded. The creeping error is your nearing self-contradiction or reductio.

Have to wonder why the substance of what I've offered has been left neglected.

Do you deny the distinction between cognition and metacognition; between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief?

Around and around. We can use the notion of belief to explain jack's behaviour, even if Jack can't talk...

Beliefs are explanations for action. Beliefs are all statements. All belief(s) is(are) linguistic.

If all of the above is true, then Jack has no belief and you've arrived at self-contradiction.

You're conflating Jacks's belief with your report. That's what happens when you do not correct certain historical mistakes, namely the mistaken belief that the content of belief is propositional. Followers...

Pfft...

Draw and maintain the crucial distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief.

I also note that you never answered my question about whether it is possible to break a rule, which I consider to be a related problem for your position. — Luke

Yes, it is possible to break rules. I don't see the problem. One can hold in one's mind a rule to follow, yet still not follow it. Some other conflicting rule might overrule it.

If the words in your mind are identical to the words you speak, then I have no problem calling them both words, but I do think you are equivocating when you refer to both the written rules of a game, and everybody's alleged differing mental interpretation of those rules, as "the rules". — Luke

The words in my mind are not identical to the words I speak. The words I speak have a physical presence, as sound, and are public. The words in my mind have no such physical presence, and are private. There is only equivocation if we say that our use of "words" to refer to these two distinct types of words, is the same usage of "words".. That's why I am trying to differentiate these distinct usages, such that we do not equivocate.

When an associate comes to me, and says "I have a concept", then later hands me a paper with symbols on it, and says "this is my concept", these are two distinct ways of using "concept". The former refers to what is in a mind, while the latter refers to symbols on the paper. This is despite the fact that we would say that "concept" in each of these instances refers to "the same concept". I believe that this indicates that the same concept can exist in two distinct forms, in the mind (private), and on the paper (public). There are clearly significant differences between these two instances of 'the concept", despite the fact that they are called the same concept.

We have the same two distinct ways of using many words, "rules" being one of them. "Rules", just like "words", and "concept" may refer to what's on the paper, or it may refer to what's in the mind. After I read and understand the rules, I would say that the same rules are in my mind as are on the paper, despite the fact that the use of "same" here is not in strict accordance with the law of identity. The "rules" in my mind are not really the same as the "rules" on the paper. The word "rules" refers to two distinct things here, regardless of the fact that we call them the same rules. This must be the case to account for the fact that I might interpret the rules in a way slightly different from you.

Your attempt to call them "private rules" just adds to the confusion and equivocation. — Luke

Well, the confusion and equivocation is on your part, because you seem to be in denial of the distinction which I have explained above. When someone is using the same word in two distinct ways, and clearly indicates these two distinct ways (as I indicate with 'private' rules), yet the reader fails to acknowledge these two distinct ways, then the reader equivocates.

So, you have made a mention of "actual rules" in the last post, and I asked you in one post to clarify what you mean by this. I'll repost below, so you can address this.

Hi Luke,
Can you just confirm for me that I properly understand what you arguing with respect to the "actual rules". Let's start with the assumption that there are symbols on the paper. I would say that the symbols must be interpreted, and it is the particular interpretation which each of us makes which constitutes the "actual rules". Some would argue that there is a real, objective, or true interpretation of the symbols, independent of how any individual would interpret the symbols, and this constitutes the "actual rules", which would be Platonic Realism. Since I know you reject Platonic Realism, are you arguing that the symbols on the paper are themselves the "actual rules", and that calling them symbols is a false description? — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you understand what I am asking? Suppose we take the numeral "2". I would say that this symbol represents the number two, and the actual number two is the interpretation of that symbol which exists in my mind. A Platonic Realist would say that there is an ideal interpretation of this symbol "2", which exists independently of all human minds, and this is the actual number two. Are you arguing that the numeral "2" is the actual number two? Are you saying that there is no difference between the symbol, and what it represents, that since we commonly call the numeral "2" the "number 2", it actually is the number two

Contingent means that something could be otherwise, correct? But propositions cannot not be part of language, they're a necessary feature of language. — Sam26

While it might be true that a language might not contain any statements, it would not be possible to have a statement without a language. — Banno

Indeed. — creativesoul

Sam26 seems to imply that any language would necessarily have propositions, though this may not be what is meant by sam26.

Now consider this:

Third, it's the contention of this theory that not only are actions reflections of a thought life, but that language is also a reflection of a thought life.

...

It's also important to point out that words, statements, or propositions, get their meaning from how the community uses them, i.e., meaning is not a reflection of things in our mind. Our actions, though, are reflections of what's happening in our minds; again, linguistic meaning is derived from a community of language users, quite apart from what's happening in the mind. — Sam26

Sam26 has produced a division between language and meaning. Language is a reflection of a thought life, while meaning is a reflection of a community. But since Sam26 then goes on to describe language as public, communal, what Sam26 should really have said is that language as well as meaning is a reflection of a community, not a reflection of thought life.

So Sam26 then makes the further claim "statements are completely dependent upon something that's not private, viz., language", to confirm that what is really meant is that language is not a reflection of thought life, but a reflection of the community.. This is what I disagree with, especially since Sam26 began with the premise that just like other human actions, "language is also a reflection of a thought life". This seems to acknowledge a relation between language and the private. If by making language a reflection of the community rather than a reflection of the thought life, the problem can be avoided, this would disassociate language from action, such that language is no longer a human action, but a passive thing, as a property of the community.

Therefore Sam26 has exposed two distinct ways of looking at language. One is as a reflection of the community (public), and this according to sam26 is where language relates to meaning, and the other is a reflection of thought life (private), and this is where language relates to thought and human actions. I would think that unless these two ways of looking at language, (1)in relation to meaning and the community, and (2)in relation to thought and human actions, are completely distinct, there should be some degree of compatibility between the two.

If all of the above is true, then Jack has no belief and you've arrived at self-contradiction. — creativesoul

Only if you continue to believe that a belief is a think inside Jack's head.

Ah,yes, the alluring scent of reification in the morning! Or, as Whitehead liked to call it, the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness'.

X-)

>:O The Wagner seems to the the point, although, curiously I cannot say in what way. ;)

"Much ado about nothing" and "full of sound and fury, signifying nothing" come to mind.

@Sam26

Tomatoes make good food.

SO I seek out and buy tomatoes, I store them in a certain way, I plant seeds or buy seedlings and water them and pick off the bugs and watch for the reddening fruit. I say things like "We need some tomatoes" and I write "Tomatoes" on the shopping list and say "this tomato is not ripe" and so on.

Sometimes folk might say that Banno believes tomatoes are good food.

Is that any more than shorthand for the set of behaviours described above?

In particular, does it follow from the use of this shorthand that there must be a brain state that corresponds to Banno's belief that tomatoes are good; and further that this brain sate is distinct from and yet somehow responsible for all of those behaviours?

Or does that belief amount to nothing more than the collection of tomato-related behaviours? Including that internal soliloquy that just came up with this post...

You claimed...

1.) Beliefs are explanations for action.
2.) Beliefs are all statements.
3.) All belief(s) is(are) linguistic.

I noted that if all three are true, then Jack has no belief and you've arrived at self-contradiction(at worst) and/or equivocation(at best). Instead of directly addressing what is clearly an issue with your position here, you've offered the following...

Only if you continue to believe that a belief is a think inside Jack's head.

Imaginary opponents are easily defeated. Bad form Banno. You know better.

The purported reification fallacy mentioned by Janus doesn't hold water either, and you know it. It dubiously presupposes an untenable and purely imaginary distinction between abstraction and being real. Chock full of irony as well...

If you do not - or will not - recognize/acknowledge the self-contradiction regarding what your saying about belief, then I do not know what else to say. It's there. Your belief isn't required. It's clear that you will not or cannot address the underlying issues here.

Yes, we can infer that non-linguistic agents/creatures display belief by virtue of behaving certain ways. They do not display statements.

You can lead a horse to water...

You can lead a horse to water... — creativesoul

...but you can't make him think.

Jack's beliefs are not something that is inside his head.

Jack's beliefs are ascribed to him by language users in order to explain his behaviour.

Jack does not, so far as I can tell, ascribe beliefs to himself.

Janus doesn't hold water either, and you know it. It dubiously presupposes an untenable and purely imaginary distinction between abstraction and being real. Chock full of irony as well... — creativesoul

Are you, or are you not, imputing a mental state of 'having a belief' to the animal?

The only coherent way that it could be said that I am having a belief is if I am internally reciting a statement or proposition that expresses the belief, and even that does not consist in a state but in an activity.

'Being disposed to believe X' is not coterminous with 'having a belief that X' and there does not seem to be any coherent meaning of the former which is not coterminous with 'being disposed to act as if X'.

Also, are you claiming there is no coherent distinction between the abstract and the concrete?

Jack cat is behaving as if there is a mouse under the bed.
Jack thinks there is a mouse under the bed.
For Jack, there is a mouse under the bed.
For Jack, it is true that there is a mouse under the bed.
Jack believes there is a mouse under the bed.

You can lead a horse to water...
— creativesoul

...but you can't make him think.

Jack's beliefs are not something that is inside his head.

Jack's beliefs are ascribed to him by language users in order to explain his behaviour.

Jack does not, so far as I can tell, ascribe beliefs to himself. — Banno

Gratuitous assertions Banno.

Where's the argument?

Ooops. Posted without refreshing. I'll address the last...

Are you, or are you not, imputing a mental state of 'having a belief' to the animal?

The only coherent way that it could be said that I am having a belief is if I am internally reciting a statement or proposition that expresses the belief, and even that does not consist in a state but in an activity. — Janus

If we first hold that i the content of belief is propositional, or ii we do not draw and maintain the pivotal distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief - which in turn - allows us to draw the distinction between thought and belief that is existentially dependent upon language and that which is not. I do not hold that belief content is propositional. I do draw and maintain the crucial distinction between cognition and metacognition(between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief), and thus I also draw and maintain the distinction between thought and belief that is existentially dependent upon language and that which is not.

Try again...

The namesake for your avatar is a bit ironic here isn't it?

Couldn't it be any other way?

Jack cat is behaving as if there is a mouse under the bed.
Jack thinks there is a mouse under the bed.
For Jack, there is a mouse under the bed.
For Jack, it is true that there is a mouse under the bed.
Jack believes there is a mouse under the bed. — Banno

Here we need to draw and maintain the crucial distinction between our talking about Jack's belief and Jack's belief. The two are not one in the same thing. So...

Agree?

No, actually.

But I am much more interested in what @Sam26 has to say on the issue, since he has a demonstrably strong grasp of the issues with regard to Wittgenstein.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/144648

So be it...

Enjoi...

Agreeing with Witt on certain things doesn't count - on my view at least - as having a demonstrably strong grasp of the issues with regard to Witt.

He was wrong in one fundamental way.

Enjoi Banno. It's always thought provoking to interact with you.

X-)

Here we need to draw and maintain the crucial distinction between our talking about Jack's belief and Jack's belief. The two are not one in the same thing. So...

Agree? — creativesoul

No, actually. — Banno

And I'm the one being accused of mistaking abstraction(our meaningfully taking account of Jack's behaviour) with concreteness(Jack's behaviour)???

;)

Or does that belief amount to nothing more than the collection of tomato-related behaviours? — Banno

Jack's beliefs are ascribed to him by language users in order to explain his behaviour. — Banno

I think the issue here is whether the belief is the behaviour itself, or the description of the behaviour. Remember Sam26's categorization is to place meaning, language, propositions, and statements as communal. If "belief" falls into this category, as communal, then it would not refer to the behaviour but the description of the behaviour.

I think the issue here is whether the belief is the behaviour itself, or the description of the behaviour. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think the issue is thinking that the belief is either...

Tomatoes make good food.

SO I seek out and buy tomatoes, I store them in a certain way, I plant seeds or buy seedlings and water them and pick off the bugs and watch for the reddening fruit. I say things like "We need some tomatoes" and I write "Tomatoes" on the shopping list and say "this tomato is not ripe" and so on.

Sometimes folk might say that Banno believes tomatoes are good food.

Is that any more than shorthand for the set of behaviours described above? — Banno

Is that any more than a metacognitive endeavor?

In particular, does it follow from the use of this shorthand that there must be a brain state that corresponds to Banno's belief that tomatoes are good; and further that this brain sate is distinct from and yet somehow responsible for all of those behaviours?

No, it doesn't. I concur.

Or does that belief amount to nothing more than the collection of tomato-related behaviours? Including that internal soliloquy that just came up with this post...

Why the either/or here?

Those aren't the only two logical possibilities.

Where is meaning in all of this? Is there such a thing as meaningless belief?

Not on your life, my friend... nor my own.

Where is meaning in your account of Jack's belief? Is Jack's belief only meaningful to us and not him?

Surely not. Eh?

Jack's mental ongoings are not meaningful to Jack?

Nah. If that were the case, there would be no reason to attribute anything at all to Jack aside from his behaviour. What's driving the behaviour?

Statements?

Please...

Our account of Jack's belief can be wrong in terms of what we attribute to it's content. Jack is non-linguistic. His belief cannot consist of elementary constituents that are existentially dependent upon language. That is as common sense as logic can get.

Jack's belief cannot require language. Our report on Jack's belief not only can but they always do. Conflating the two is a grave error.