• Sam26
    414
    So I think that Wittgenstein has taken two world views which are completely incompatible and attempted to establish compatibility between them with the proposal of hinge-props. In my opinion it fails because the two world views are incompatible, and so the attempt is misguided.Metaphysician Undercover

    You know MU, I read your responses not only in this thread, but your responses to Micheal in another thread, and the only one misguided is you. What you write isn't even coherent at times. You talk about Wittgenstein, but you don't even understand much of what he is saying. So don't give me this crap about being misguided, or that Wittgenstein's proposals fail, because it's clear that you're the one who doesn't understand what you're criticizing. Reading your posts reminds me of reading Ron L. Hubbard, most of it is gibberish.
  • Luke
    78
    What kind of existence do the rules have? If they always existed, then they are eternal platonic Forms. If they are not eternal Forms, then we have to allow for them to come into existence. If they come into existence, then they are most likely created by the human beings playing the game. But then the game analogy gets lost because the players really do not have to follow the rules, they use their free will to decide, and create the rules as they go.Metaphysician Undercover

    Consider board games that usually come with a written set of rules. These games are man-made, but this doesn't mean that anyone can use their "free will to decide" what the rules of this game are. You have to follow the rules to play the game, otherwise you aren't playing that game.

    If two (or more) players agree to play by a different set of rules then they are no longer playing the same game. In order to play the game named on the box, you can't make up the rules as you go. Even if two or more players agree to play a different game with a different set of rules, one person can't simply decide that those rules don't apply to her (and still be playing the same game).
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    3.2k
    Sure, and the existence of the tree is dependent on the seed, the sunlight, the rain and the nutrients within the ground in which it is anchored and growing and so on. I don't see the relevance to the point, though, which was concerned with the discernibility of entities.Janus

    The point is, as I stated earlier, that we in general, do not have a good clear idea of what it means to exist. Therefore doubt concerning claims of existence is warranted.

    You know MU, I read your responses not only in this thread, but your responses to Micheal in another thread, and the only one misguided is you. What you write isn't even coherent at times. You talk about Wittgenstein, but you don't even understand much of what he is saying. So don't give me this crap about being misguided, or that Wittgenstein's proposals fail, because it's clear that you're the one who doesn't understand what you're criticizing. Reading your posts reminds me of reading Ron L. Hubbard, most of it is gibberish.Sam26

    Thanks for your opinion Sam26, though this post is not at all helpful. Hubbard is an extremely accomplished author so you honour me with this comparison, despite your idiosyncratic designation of "gibberish".


    Consider board games that usually come with a written set of rules. These games are man-made, but this doesn't mean that anyone can use their "free will to decide" what the rules of this game are. You have to follow the rules to play the game, otherwise you aren't playing that game.Luke

    Right, I agree with this.

    If two (or more) players agree to play by a different set of rules then they are no longer playing the same game. In order to play the game named on the box, you can't make up the rules as you go. Even if two or more players agree to play a different game with a different set of rules, one person can't simply decide that those rules don't apply to her (and still be playing the same game).Luke

    The point I was trying to make is that in the case of language and knowledge, unlike games of chess and such, we actually do make up the rules as we go. This is very evident from history. So that is where the "game" analogy falls short. When we reach the limits of an analogy we ought to drop it and move on, rather than trying to clutch for straws and apply the analogy where it is not suited.
  • Luke
    78
    The point I was trying to make is that in the case of language and knowledge, unlike games of chess and such, we actually do make up the rules as we go. This is very evident from history. So that is where the "game" analogy falls short. When we reach the limits of an analogy we ought to drop it and move on, rather than trying to clutch for straws and apply the analogy where it is not suited.Metaphysician Undercover

    That's different to what I responded to before where you said that if the rules of the game are man-made instead of existing in eternal Platonic Forms, then the players don't have to follow the rules and basically anything goes.
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    3.2k

    Right, if the rules are created by human beings, then human beings do not have to follow any existing rules because they create the rules which they follow, as they go..
  • Luke
    78


    But you also agreed with the following..?

    Consider board games that usually come with a written set of rules. These games are man-made, but this doesn't mean that anyone can use their "free will to decide" what the rules of this game are. You have to follow the rules to play the game, otherwise you aren't playing that game.Luke
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    3.2k

    I don't see your point. I agree that to play such games you must follow the existing rules. My point is that in language and knowledge we do not need to follow existing rules, we make up the rules as we go. Therefore, in this respect, the game analogy fails.
  • Banno
    1.8k
    You have probably seen it, but I just have to post this again...


    candyland1.jpg
  • Banno
    1.8k
    This is the bit that is relevant to our present discussion...

    candyland2.jpg
  • Luke
    78

    Okay, then I'm confused by you making a distinction between the existence of rules as man-made vs the existence of rules as Platonic Forms. Why make this distinction when games, language and knowledge all have man-made rules?
  • Banno
    1.8k
    The point I was trying to make is that in the case of language and knowledge, unlike games of chess and such, we actually do make up the rules as we go.Metaphysician Undercover

    So I set up that game again, in which we do make up the rules as we go.
  • Banno
    1.8k
    in the case of language and knowledge, unlike games of chess and such, we actually do make up the rules as we go.Metaphysician Undercover

    Now Meta can't mean this as it stands; because obviously if we are making our language up as we go along, and there are no rules, then language would be unlearnable.

    There must be bits of language that we hold reasonably stable, so that others can learn them and use them.

    Now, we could name these bits; let's see, they have simple rules to hold them together, like games, so let's call them language games...

    Now, in such games, we can hold some bits constant while we are playing; but outside of such games, we could muck around with words as much as we like.

    What would then be important would be working out which games we re playing, and which rules we ought be following. Because when we mix the rules of different games, all sorts of weird things might happen. We could invent a sort of therapy that looked carefully at the game we were playing and sorted out what rule goes were, so that we don't get confused... Let's call it "Analytic Philosophy".
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    3.2k
    Okay, then I'm confused by you making a distinction between the existence of rules as man-made vs the existence of rules as Platonic Forms. Why make this distinction when games, language and knowledge all have man-made rules?Luke

    This goes back to Sam26's claim that hinge-propositions (I'll just refer to them as "some rules") ought not be doubted, because they are necessary. If these rules are "necessary" in the sense of determined, necessarily existing, such that they cannot be doubted, rather than "necessary" in the sense of needed for some purpose (in which case it could be reasonable to doubt them) then they are nothing other than platonic Forms. In other words, these rules would require the status of "eternal truth", which is equivalent with platonic Form, in order that it would be unreasonable to doubt them.

    The point being that the game analogy is good, until we get to the point where the rules need to be justified. To say that you ought to follow this rule requires justification because someone might doubt the correctness of this rule. But justification heads toward an infinite regress when this rule is justified by that rue which is justified by another rule, etc. So Wittgenstein and Sam26 propose that some rules, hinge-props have a special status as "unreasonable to doubt", which makes them necessary. But unless they are claimed to be necessary in the sense of "eternally true" platonic Forms (therefore cannot be doubted), then any claim of special status and "unreasonable to doubt" is just arbitrary, as they are really no different from any other propositions.

    So I set up that game again, in which we do make up the rules as we go.Banno

    Now Meta can't mean this as it stands; because obviously if we are making our language up as we go along, and there are no rules, then language would be unlearnable.Banno

    This is not necessarily true, because the learning of language could be grounded in something other than rules. It could be grounded in the desire to learn, and the desire to learn could inspire one to create rules which enable learning. Just because you are unable to conceive of learning language in any way other than learning rules, doesn't mean that this is the case. It may just be that your model of learning is inaccurate.

    I submit to you, that the inaccuracy of your model is produced from a misunderstanding of what it means for a person to follow a rule. When a person follows a rule, that person establishes a principle within the mind, and adheres to that principle. This is what following a rule is, like a New Year's resolution, you adopt a principle, hold it in your mind, and adhere to it in your actions. So the "rule" only has real existence within the mind of the individual who is following that rule. You, on the other hand, think that a rule is something existing externally to the individual's mind, and this external rule is what the individual follows. So you have an odd model of learning where a person comes to obey rules which are external to that person's mind, instead of the more accurate representation in which the person creates rules within one's own mind, to follow.

    You model "learning" as the person coming to follow certain rules which exist outside the mind. In reality, learning is the process whereby a person creates principles and rules to follow within one's own mind. Once you apprehend learning as a creating of rules within one's own mind, which to an extent mimic the rules of others, then you will see that your objection here is meaningless, because learning just requires the capacity to create rules to follow, and this is something other than actually having rules to follow.

    Now, we could name these bits; let's see, they have simple rules to hold them together, like games, so let's call them language games...

    Now, in such games, we can hold some bits constant while we are playing; but outside of such games, we could muck around with words as much as we like.

    What would then be important would be working out which games we re playing, and which rules we ought be following. Because when we mix the rules of different games, all sorts of weird things might happen. We could invent a sort of therapy that looked carefully at the game we were playing and sorted out what rule goes were, so that we don't get confused... Let's call it "Analytic Philosophy".
    Banno

    I don't see your point. You appear to be suggesting that we could take a language, and use that language to get outside of language. That's simple contradiction.
  • Sam26
    414
    This goes back to Sam26's claim that hinge-propositions (I'll just refer to them as "some rules") ought not be doubted, because they are necessary.Metaphysician Undercover

    MU I never made any such claim, that rules shouldn't be doubted because they are necessary. This is what I mean by not understanding what's written, or at the very least misinterpreting what people are saying.
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    3.2k

    This is what you said:
    There are statements that are necessarily correct. For example, triangles have three sides, or bachelors are unmarried. There are many necessarily correct statements. And I would disagree that this would validate Platonic Realism.Sam26
    To which I replied that to avoid Platonic Realism you would have to be using "necessarily" in the sense of "needed for some purpose". And if you are using necessary in the sense of needed for some purpose, then the statement is doubtable depending on whether or not the purpose of the person considering the statement is consistent with the purpose for which the statement is needed.

    If you are using "necessarily" in the sense of predetermined existence, "impossible to be otherwise", then you have eternal truths, which are nothing other than platonic Forms.

    If you think that I misunderstood you, then you should have clarified your position after I made my post explaining this interpretation. But to keep saying the same thing over and over again, insisting that I misinterpret you, without explaining how you could possibly be interpreted in any other way, does not help.
  • Sam26
    414
    Where did I claim that those were hinge-propositions?
    This goes back to Sam26's claim that hinge-propositionsMetaphysician Undercover
    I never said those propositions were examples of hinge-propositions. We've been talking about this stuff for years. You'd think by now you will know my position.
  • Janus
    4.3k
    The point is, as I stated earlier, that we in general, do not have a good clear idea of what it means to exist. Therefore doubt concerning claims of existence is warranted.Metaphysician Undercover

    Again, this is not to the point. While it is true that there are difficulties in precisely working out the complete scope of applicability of the idea of existence, we know that it refers in a self-evident way to concrete existents; the objects of the senses that we encounter ceaselessly throughout our lives. It makes no sense to question the existence of something which is a paradigm example of the very concept of existence. We only know what 'existence' means insofar as we understand that the term refers first and foremost to those paradigm examples, identifiable concrete entities.
  • Janus
    4.3k
    Deleted
  • Banno
    1.8k
    This is not necessarily true, because the learning of language could be grounded in something other than rules. It could be grounded in the desire to learn, and the desire to learn could inspire one to create rules which enable learning. Just because you are unable to conceive of learning language in any way other than learning rules, doesn't mean that this is the case. It may just be that your model of learning is inaccurate.Metaphysician Undercover

    Let me explain this a bit further. It's an old argument, but probably most familiar from Davidson. A language learner combines a large but limited vocabulary to develop novel utterances using a large but limited grammar. If the language had an unlimited vocabulary, a new word for each situation, it wold be unlearnable. If it had an unlimited grammar, such that words could be arranged in any way, it would be unusable.

    I'm suggesting that you would not advocate anything so obviously impossible as a language in which anything goes. It's not bout the desire to learn, but the capacity to learn.
  • Banno
    1.8k
    When a person follows a rule, that person establishes a principle within the mind, and adheres to that principle. This is what following a rule is, like a New Year's resolution, you adopt a principle, hold it in your mind, and adhere to it in your actions.Metaphysician Undercover

    This rather fits in with Sam's suggestion that you have not understood Wittgenstein. This is exactly the account that Wittgenstein shows to be faulty; here you do no more than blandly assert its truth. But I ma not going to rehash Wittgenstein's arguments against your view of rule-following; I'll just sugest you re-read some sources on private language.

    It's your model of rule following that has been shown to be inept.
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