Then what did you mean by this?
"We've known that all Turing machines are equivalent since 1930s" — charleton

Since the 1930s, we have known that all Turing-complete architectures are EQUIVALENT. i.e. they can all perfectly emulate each other. Because you seem to be struggling with this, perhaps I need to point out that equivalence does not mean the SAME.

Architectures can be different, and because of that we know that computational states cannot be determined by the state of the computer, even if the computer is itself an abstraction. The identical computational state may be implemented in an infinite number of ways.

Now, you asserted it was logically impossible for computers to emulate any physical system. Please explain.

The paper that proves that any finite physical system may be emulated... — tom

Finite might be an important qualification don't you think?

Deutsch certainly believes so....

The statement of the Church-Turing principle (1.2) is stronger than what is strictly necessitated by (1.1). Indeed it is so strong that it is not satisfied by Turing’s machine in classical physics. Owing to the continuity of classical dynamics, the possible states of a classical system necessarily form a continuum. Yet there are only countably many ways of preparing a finite input for T . Consequently T cannot perfectly simulate any classical dynamical system.

Of course I realise that you take as unarguable that the MWI interpretation (your so-called non-interpretation interpretation :) ) is proven and quantum computation tapping unlimited resources is as good as a done thing. But I wonder what Popper would have said about such unqualified conviction?

That'd fine; just my own musings.

I've been busy with other things lately, so I haven't had much time to respond. Hopefully I'll get back to this soon. — Sam26

I look forward to your return. I guess I will have to stop procrastinating in the interim.

Finite might be an important qualification don't you think? — apokrisis

The entire observable universe is finite.

Of course I realise that you take as unarguable that the MWI interpretation (your so-called non-interpretation interpretation :) ) is proven and quantum computation tapping unlimited resources is as good as a done thing. But I wonder what Popper would have said about such unqualified conviction? — apokrisis

Quantum computation has nothing to do with interpretation. I merely asks new questions that are unanswerable in interpretations other than MW. A bit like the old questions, only more pressing.

Popper wrote a book on the subject, "Realism and th Aim of Science".

The entire observable universe is finite. — tom

And continuous? That was the issue.

The observable universe is finite due to the constraint of there being a lightcone limited observer. So its a special kind of boundedness. And again a reminder of the lack of a definition of an observer in QM ontology of course.

A bit like the old questions, only more pressing. — tom

Maybe it will answer the question whether reality is either fundamentally continuous or discrete then? :)

Of course I argue for the third option - that it is fundamentally vague. The continuous and the discrete are then both mutually emergent.

And that is remarkably compatible with a quantum interpretation that sees indeterminism as fundamental, and a classically structured Cosmos as emergent.

I mention that just because you post as if it is already case closed when it comes to anything His Holyness, Pope Deutsch, has said on the issue.

The last time I tried to make up my own rules in a game I got kicked out of the game. No one yet has denied me the right to use language, though Sam26 might like to kick me out of the thread. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not a fair comparison. If you were to speak nothing but gibberish (e.g. Forest the upon warmly eight marshmallow Lebanon it unicycle), then you might get kicked out of a conversation. But denying you the right to use language is like denying you the right to play any and all games. Has anyone denied you the right to play all games? I doubt it. And surely you and your friends/family have made up your own games or made up your own variation of the rules of an existing game before? Maybe to finish up a game quickly, you invent the rule that the person who wins the next point wins the game, or something similar. Similar variations to the rules of language get made all the time, either by a small subset of the community or by the entire community.

I went through this, I interpret the symbols. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's a huge dodge. You claim that the rules are not part of any external object such as a game, yet you refer to the written rules of the game to help settle disputes? Clearly the written rules of the game are external to you. If the rules are entirely "within the individual's mind" (which individual, btw?) then why do you need to consult the external written rules? Are they not the rules?

Either the rules are entirely "within the individual's mind", as you claim, or else the external written rules printed in the game's instructions are not rules at all. But if they aren't the rules of the game, then why do we call them that? Is everybody but you using the word "rules" incorrectly?

Right, that's another reason why the game analogy fails. Not only do we follow "the rules of the game", we make up our own strategies, private rules, which are part of the play, but not part of "the game" itself. So the rule-following employed in actually playing the game goes far beyond the actual rules of "the game". We could not even understand playing a game, by studying the game itself, because how one plays a game goes far beyond the game itself. To understand how different people play a particular game, we must refer to something other than "the game". If studying a game cannot even provide us with an understanding of how different people play that game, and we must turn to something else to obtain that understanding, then clearly the game analogy can only go so far, and it must be dropped at this point. If we cling to it, it will mislead us. — Metaphysician Undercover

Strategies aren't rules of the game. The rules set the boundaries of permissible moves; strategies are employed within these boundaries.

Also, you make no reference to language here and speak only of games, yet you claim to demonstrate how the game analogy fails.

It's clearly relevant to the principles or "rules" of language use, because I choose my words in a similar habitual way. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, but you aren't the only one using the language, and if language is a "method of communication", as you say, then you might want to adopt the habit of using language in mostly the same ways that everyone else does if you want your communication to be effective.

It's not very relevant to "rules" of games though, and that's the point. We use "rules" in numerous ways and we ought not to equivocate when doing philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, don't conflate actual rules, such as the written rules of a board game, with some imaginary private mental "rules" that only apply to you.

I'm going to summarize my theory of epistemology again to make things as clear as possible. I'll do this in a series of numbered posts.

Post #1

First, since my theory starts at states of mind or mind states, whichever you prefer, let me say something briefly about what's meant by this phrase. A state of mind is only meant to point out that there is something going on in the mind that is prelinguistic. This, it seems, is undeniable; you may want to call it something else, you may say that states of mind is not an accurate way of portraying what's happening in the mind, but that something is occurring is undeniable. Moreover, that something is happening in the mind, is also a precursor to linguistics or to language development. This subjective reality is indubitable, i.e., it cannot be doubted sensibly. So this is the first presupposition to this theory.

Second, how do we know that anyone else has a private thought life, we know it by what they do, i.e., it's reflected in their actions. How can it be otherwise? We know, because we are familiar with how we act, and how our actions are associated with our own thought lives. Thus, when we see others acting in similar ways, therefore, we reasonably infer their private thought life too. In fact, this is how we can reasonable say that there are other minds. If there were no acts associated with a thing, how in the world could we say that that thing has a mind, or that the thing can think or have thoughts associated with thoughts/beliefs. After all, how do we know that rocks don't have minds? We know because there is nothing associated with rocks (no acts, as it were) that can be reasonably said to point to the rocks mind or thinking. Thus, there is a kind of correspondence between a mind and the products of minds. This correspondence is a necessary ingredient to the inference that something has a mind/brain. This is not to say that all acts of living things reflect the same level of consciousness, or that all actions are associated with beliefs. Some actions are instinctual. So the second presupposition to this theory is that acts are reflections of mind states, thoughts, beliefs, self-awareness, consciousness, etc.

If you were to speak nothing but gibberish (e.g. Forest the upon warmly eight marshmallow Lebanon it unicycle), then you might get kicked out of a conversation. — Luke

I don't see what speaking gibberish has to do with anything. I don't think you have a point here at all. It seems totally irrelevant. If one judges what another says as gibberish then so be it. Sam26 judges what SR Hubbard says as gibberish. So what? Claiming that what another says is gibberish, to me, is just another way of saying that you are uninterested in trying to understand the person. Intentionally saying something that others will not understand, as you have just done, is done for a reason as well.

That's a huge dodge. You claim that the rules are not part of any external object such as a game, yet you refer to the written rules of the game to help settle disputes? Clearly the written rules of the game are external to you. If the rules are entirely "within the individual's mind" (which individual, btw?) then why do you need to consult the external written rules? Are they not the rules? — Luke

I don't mind saying that rules exist externally to me, in the form of symbols on paper, just like I don't mind saying that concepts exist in that way. Someone might hand me a paper and say "here is my concept". But I do respect the fact that in order to follow such a rule, I must interpret the symbols, and accept the meaning which I derive, as a principle to adhere to. So if I am "following a rule", I am adhering to this principle in my mind which I have derived from my interpretation. You seem to have no respect for this fact.

Either the rules are entirely "within the individual's mind", as you claim, or else the external written rules printed in the game's instructions are not rules at all. But if they aren't the rules of the game, then why do we call them that? Is everybody but you using the word "rules" incorrectly? — Luke

As I said, we us the word "rules" in different ways, and we must be careful not to equivocate. I have words in my mind, and there are also spoken words. You seem to be implying that I ought only refer to one or the other as "words". You say either the "rules" exist in my mind or the "rules" exist on the paper, in ignorance of the fact that we use "rules" in both ways. But that's just you being completely unreasonable.

Strategies aren't rules of the game. The rules set the boundaries of permissible moves; strategies are employed within these boundaries. — Luke

Right, now you're starting to understand. When we play games, we use strategies, and strategies are private rules, which are not part of "the game", they are part of the player. This is where we reach the limits of the game analogy. We cannot understand the act of playing the game, by referring to the game. We need to look directly at the player, instead of the game, to understand the phenomenon which is the player creating one's private rules (strategies) for winning the game. Then "the game" becomes irrelevant, because these strategies, private rules, are similar to what the person employs for all of life's endeavours, and we might get a better understanding of this phenomenon by looking at something other than game playing.

Okay, but you aren't the only one using the language, and if language is a "method of communication", as you say, then you might want to adopt the habit of using language in mostly the same ways that everyone else does if you want your communication to be effective. — Luke

Sure, we agree on this.

Right, don't conflate actual rules, such as the written rules of a board game, with some imaginary private mental "rules" that only apply to you. — Luke

As I said, we use "rules' in different ways. To say that one usage refers to "actual rules", as if they are more real than what another usage of 'rules" refers to is just arbitrary without an ontology to support that designation.

Since the 1930s, we have known that all Turing-complete architectures are EQUIVALENT. i.e. they can all perfectly emulate each other — tom

No such thing surely?
You are just bullshitting.
I asked you to show such a thing from the 1930s and you have failed.

Hi Luke,
Can you just confirm for me that I properly understand what you arguing with respect to the "actual rules". Let's start with the assumption that there are symbols on the paper. I would say that the symbols must be interpreted, and it is the particular interpretation which each of us makes which constitutes the "actual rules". Some would argue that there is a real, objective, or true interpretation of the symbols, independent of how any individual would interpret the symbols, and this constitutes the "actual rules", which would be Platonic Realism. Since I know you reject Platonic Realism, are you arguing that the symbols on the paper are themselves the "actual rules", and that calling them symbols is a false description?

This is the second post of my continuing summary of the theory of epistemology as presented in this thread.

Post #2

Third, it's the contention of this theory that not only are actions reflections of a thought life, but that language is also a reflection of a thought life. Therefore, it's a twofold reflection of what's happening in our mind. However, there is a difference in these two reflections. Actions are a necessary feature of minds (thought life), but language isn't. Prelinguistic man can be said to have a mind similar to our own because their actions reflect these similarities. But note that although actions are a necessary byproduct of a mind, language isn't. In fact, it's easy to imagine the existence of only one person (one mind), and the actions that reflect the kind of mind states we see in ourselves, and this is imagined quite easily apart from any language.

Language is primarily used to communicate with other minds, and the rules of usage are developed within a community of language users. The rules of correct usage are not dependent upon any one person, but are dependent on how the users use the words, statements, or propositions. And when one speaks of the logic of correct usage, one is speaking of the agreed upon (implicit or explicit rules) rules of language within a community.

It's also important to point out that words, statements, or propositions, get their meaning from how the community uses them, i.e., meaning is not a reflection of things in our mind. Our actions, though, are reflections of what's happening in our minds; again, linguistic meaning is derived from a community of language users, quite apart from what's happening in the mind. Note that our actions are completely private (actions as reflected in OC 284 and 285), they reflect private thoughts, and can be directly traced to private thoughts. There is a one-to-one correspondence between these actions and one's thoughts.

Statements can and do reflect beliefs (what's happening in our minds, viz., private thoughts), but statements themselves are not private things, and moreover, statements are completely dependent upon something that's not private, viz., language. So unlike actions, statements serve a duel purpose. However, where actions are used to communicate, then these actions would be similar in kind to statements, so not all actions have the requisite privacy I'm referring to, i.e., they too can serve a duel purpose.

So the third presupposition of this theory is noting the difference between statements and actions and their corresponding differences in demonstrating or showing a belief.

Hi Sam26, that's all pretty agreeable for me, except one important part. If you're interested I'll explain it to you.

It's also important to point out that words, statements, or propositions, get their meaning from how the community uses them, i.e., meaning is not a reflection of things in our mind. Our actions, though, are reflections of what's happening in our minds; again, linguistic meaning is derived from a community of language users, quite apart from what's happening in the mind. — Sam26

What you appear to do here is to separate statements and propositions from their contexts, and that is the mind which creates them. So actions, you leave in the context of the mind which creates the action, but a statement or proposition is not placed in the category of an action because you separate it from that context. Now I believe that meaning is inherently related to context in a way such that to take something outside of its context is to take something away from its meaning. This will leave whatever meaning that the statement or proposition is claimed to have, somewhat incomplete or deficient.

Statements can and do reflect beliefs (what's happening in our minds, viz., private thoughts), but statements themselves are not private things, and moreover, statements are completely dependent upon something that's not private, viz., language. So unlike actions, statements serve a duel purpose. However, where actions are used to communicate, then these actions would be similar in kind to statements, so not all actions have the requisite privacy I'm referring to, i.e., they too can serve a duel purpose. — Sam26

I agree that statements are not private, just like meaning is not private, and statements are dependent on something not private, and that's language. But wouldn't you agree that statements and meaning are also dependent on something which is private, and that's the thinking which goes on in our minds when we create propositions and statements? How then, is a statement or proposition any different from any other action? Each of these seems to have an aspect which is private and an aspect which is public.

Being stateable doesn't require that the believer do the stating. If the content of belief is propositional, then it only follows that it can be stated. Earlier I address the linguistic aspect when talking about the coherency aspect of JTB(epistemologists). If propositions are not existentially contingent upon language, then belief can be propositional in it's content, stateable, and not linguistic.
— creativesoul

I understand that "being stateable" doesn't imply that someone actually state the belief. Yes, it seems quite obvious that if a belief is in the form of a proposition, then necessarily it can be stated. — Sam26

Keep in mind here that all I am doing is putting forth what it would take(as far as I can tell) for one to hold both, that belief content is propositional and that pre-linguistic belief is possible.

I am fairly certain that Witt held both. It is common for analytics and others arguing for JTB.

Contingency, being a subset of possibility, implies that things could happen differently, but how is it that propositions are only contingent upon language? Can propositions arise apart from language? I think not, unless you can provide an example. I would say that propositions are necessarily a feature of language. Thus, propositions, in terms of existence, are necessarily dependent upon language, not contingently dependent on language. — Sam26

We agree here Sam, particularly regarding whether or not propositions are existentially contingent upon language. We both hold that propositions are existentially contingent upon language.

What I'm having difficulty having you understand is the bit about the content of belief. Epistemologists arguing for JTB typically hold, as well as many others, that belief has propositional content. Otherwise, how could we talk about and/or report upon it?

I believe 'X' means I believe that 'X' is true. 'X' is always in propositional(statement) form.

So, this poses an issue for the notion that pre-linguistic belief exists, unless it is also the case that propositions are not existentially contingent upon language. That isn't so difficult to accept if we also accept that belief is prior to language. Of course, I accept that belief is prior to language, but I do not accept that the content of belief is always propositional. It is always correlational, and all propositions, statements, and predication consists entirely of correlation.

Your final statement "...then belief can be propositional in it's content, stateable, and not linguistic," seems strange, since if it is linguistic (definition - relating to language), then a proposition is necessarily linguistic. To say that a proposition is stateable, is also to say that a proposition is linguistic. Stating something is a linguistic endeavor, is it not? It seems to me that being stateable is a subset of linguistics. — Sam26

Again, I'm simply arguing the other side(which I'm fairly certain Witt held) that if it is the case that propositions are not existentially contingent upon language, then it can also be the case that belief can have propositional content, be pre-linguistic, unstated, and also stateable.

To say that a proposition is stateable is only to say that it can be stated, not that it has been.

So, sure stating something is a linguistic endeavor. However, being stateable requires only that the belief have propositional content. Following this logic, a pre-linguistic creature could have belief and the belief could be stateable. It does not follow that such belief has linguistic content unless propositions are existentially contingent upon language.

We both hold that they are.

Did Witt? Did his contemporaries? Did anyone prior to Witt? I think not. Witt struggled to ascertain what specific sorts of belief could be foundational to all others because he failed to draw the crucial distinction between belief and thinking about belief, and he was most certainly not alone. The former does not require language. The latter most certainly does. The former does not have propositional content. The latter does. The latter is built upon the former. Both have correlational content. All proposition, all statements, all assertions, and all predication consists entirely of correlations.

For me it's quite clear that beliefs can be shown in what we do apart from what is sayable. I can't make any sense out of the idea that pre-linguistic man did not have beliefs apart from language. If pre-linguistic man was observed building something, then necessarily his actions of gathering material shows his belief that the materials are in a certain spot, and that the materials are used for a specific purpose. Thus, he shows his beliefs quite apart from any statements or propositions. Moreover, it seems to me that one of the functions of language is to convey my thoughts and/or beliefs to someone else. — Sam26

No argument from me here.

I also can't make sense of animals having beliefs, if beliefs are necessary to language. Animals also show what they believe apart from saying something. For example, a dog may express its belief that its master is home by jumping up and down and barking - thus, the dog also shows what it believes based on its actions.

Thoughts/beliefs are pre-existent necessarily, if not then language would develop in a vacuum.

"William James, in order to show that thought is possible without speech, quotes the reminiscences of a deaf-mute, Mr Ballard, who wrote that in his early youth, even before he could speak, he had had thoughts about God and the world. -What could that mean!- Ballard writes: 'It was during those delightful rides, some two or three years before my initiation into the rudiments of written language, that I began to ask myself the question: how came the world into being?" - Are you sure - one would like to ask - that this is the correct translation of your wordless thoughts into words?...... (PI 342)." — Sam26

Again, we agree. It is of no issue for either of us as a result of neither one of us holding that the content of belief is propositional.

Also you can't just dismiss OC 284 and 285 by saying that Wittgenstein just didn't have time to edit his remarks, as though he would have edited this out of the final draft. If this is your position, then any of Wittgenstein's remarks could be dismissed based on this criteria.

While I can understand how one would think that I flippantly dismissed OC 284 and 285, I didn't.

I asked you earlier to explain what needs reconciled? Witt simply offered examples of belief that was not being stated. He did not claim that it could not be.

Whereof one cannot speak...

The reminder that Witt did not finish his work is germane. Quite. For me, it ensures a more charitable reading of him, particularly when something he says doesn't quite fit with the thrust of his other work(s).

In summary...

You and I agree regarding whether or not the content of belief is propositional. Where we seem to not see eye to eye is regarding whether or not Witt agrees with us on that matter. I put it to you that he held that the content of belief is propositional, that propositions are not necessarily contingent upon language, and that pre-linguistic creatures could therefore have belief that they could not possibly justify, but we could report upon(state it).

That is precisely what I think that he was attempted to take an account of with the notion of hinge propositions...

P.S.

This was written prior to your latest post...

If I may make an attempt to reflect on your new account, @Sam26...

First we have a picture of things happening in minds and brains, such that some particular states of the brain and states of mind are effectively the same thing; so for example some particular state of mind just is a certain state of mind. And further, language is a result of, and hence secondary to, these mental and brain states.

Second, these states of mind and brain are in some sense private, yet can be shown by various actions and utterances. In effect we infer from the actions and utterances that the other has a mind similar to our own that reflect the otherwise private mind states.

Third, the subset of actions that are linguistic differ from other actions in that they have a meaning that is given them by the community of speakers.

How close is that?

Post #1

First, since my theory starts at states of mind or mind states, whichever you prefer, let me say something briefly about what's meant by this phrase. A state of mind is only meant to point out that there is something going on in the mind that is prelinguistic. This, it seems, is undeniable; you may want to call it something else, you may say that states of mind is not an accurate way of portraying what's happening in the mind, but that something is occurring is undeniable. Moreover, that something is happening in the mind, is also a precursor to linguistics or to language development. This subjective reality is indubitable, i.e., it cannot be doubted sensibly. So this is the first presupposition to this theory. — Sam26

A state of mind is a picture in time, so to speak, of an otherwise ongoing process. There are mental ongoings prior to language acquisition and/or invention.

I agree.

Second, how do we know that anyone else has a private thought life, we know it by what they do, i.e., it's reflected in their actions. How can it be otherwise? We know, because we are familiar with how we act, and how our actions are associated with our own thought lives. Thus, when we see others acting in similar ways, therefore, we reasonably infer their private thought life too. In fact, this is how we can reasonable say that there are other minds. If there were no acts associated with a thing, how in the world could we say that that thing has a mind, or that the thing can think or have thoughts associated with thoughts/beliefs. After all, how do we know that rocks don't have minds? We know because there is nothing associated with rocks (no acts, as it were) that can be reasonably said to point to the rocks mind or thinking. Thus, there is a kind of correspondence between a mind and the products of minds. This correspondence is a necessary ingredient to the inference that something has a mind/brain. This is not to say that all acts of living things reflect the same level of consciousness, or that all actions are associated with beliefs. Some actions are instinctual. So the second presupposition to this theory is that acts are reflections of mind states, thoughts, beliefs, self-awareness, consciousness, etc. — Sam26

Some acts are reflections of mental ongoings.

I agree.

Third, it's the contention of this theory that not only are actions reflections of a thought life, but that language is also a reflection of a thought life. Therefore, it's a twofold reflection of what's happening in our mind. However, there is a difference in these two reflections. Actions are a necessary feature of minds (thought life), but language isn't. Prelinguistic man can be said to have a mind similar to our own, because their actions reflect these similarities. But note that although actions are a necessary byproduct of a mind, language isn't. In fact, it's easy to imagine the existence of only one person (one mind), and the actions that reflect the kind of mind states we see in ourselves, and this is imagined quite easily apart from any language.

Language is primarily used to communicate with other minds, and the rules of usage are developed within a community of language users. The rules of correct usage are not dependent upon any one person, but are dependent on how the users use the words, statements, or propositions. And when one speaks of the logic of correct usage, one is speaking of the agreed upon (implicit or explicit rules) rules of language within a community.

It's also important to point out that words, statements, or propositions, get their meaning from how the community uses them, i.e., meaning is not a reflection of things in our mind. Our actions, though, are reflections of what's happening in our minds; again, linguistic meaning is derived from a community of language users, quite apart from what's happening in the mind. Note that our actions are completely private (actions as reflected in OC 284 and 285), they reflect private thoughts, and can be directly traced to private thoughts. There is a one-to-one correspondence between these actions and one's thoughts.

Statements can and do reflect beliefs (what's happening in our minds, viz., private thoughts), but statements themselves are not private things, and moreover, statements are completely dependent upon something that's not private, viz., language. So unlike actions, statements serve a duel purpose. However, where actions are used to communicate, then these actions would be similar in kind to statements, so not all actions have the requisite privacy I'm referring to, i.e., they too can serve a duel purpose.

So the third presupposition of this theory is noting the difference between statements and actions and their corresponding differences in demonstrating or showing a belief. — Sam26

Language is not necessary for all mental ongoings(brain states).

Again. I agree.

The difficulty, as far as I can tell, is properly taking account of what sorts of thought and belief are existentially contingent upon language and what sorts are not. Hence...

The importance of getting thought and belief right, in terms of it's content. Pre-linguistic thought and belief cannot consist of that which is existentially contingent upon language, but rather, if thought and belief begins non-linguistically, and thought and belief is accrued, then pre-linguistic thought and belief must consist of that which language is existentially contingent upon.

We agree here Sam, particularly regarding whether or not propositions are existentially contingent upon language. We both hold that propositions are existentially contingent upon language. — creativesoul

That's not what I said, I was arguing that propositions are necessarily a feature of language, not arguing that propositions are a contingent feature of language. Why would you say this, when I explicitly said, "...propositions, in terms of existence, are necessarily dependent upon language, not contingently dependent on language." Are you following the difference between propositions being existentially contingent on language, as opposed to their existence being necessarily dependent on language?

That's not what I said, I was arguing that propositions are necessarily a feature of language, not arguing that propositions are a contingent feature of language. Why would you say this, when I explicitly said, "...propositions, in terms of existence, are necessarily dependent upon language, not contingently dependent on language." Are you following the difference between propositions being existentially contingent on language, as opposed to their existence being necessarily dependent on language? — Sam26

Calm down Sam. Just a simple misunderstanding.

I am not using the term "contingent" in the manner of contingency/necessity.

Rather, when I say that propositions are existentially contingent upon language, it means that propositions require language, depend upon language... for their very existence. No language. No propositions.

I think we agree here, right?

:(

Finally, someone who understood what I said. Yes, you have captured the essence of some of what I said. I don't find any disagreement, and only one point of clarification, which I'll get to after I think a bit about it.

Thanks. Looking good.

I'm calm, why would you think I'm not. The bold is for emphasis, not for yelling, if that's what you're referring too. Although it can be frustrating when people continually misunderstand what I'm writing. This happened a lot in my thread on Wittgenstein, so I'm use to it.

Good. Glad you're calm. Did I clear up the misunderstanding?

Rather, when I say that propositions are existentially contingent upon language, it means that propositions require language, depend upon language... for their very existence. No language. No propositions. — creativesoul

I know what it means, and this is a disagreement still. Contingent means that something could be otherwise, correct? But propositions cannot not be part of language, they're a necessary feature of language. So this is not a misunderstanding, since you have just reiterated the very thing I was arguing against. Do you follow? By the way, I'm not angry, just so you know.

I know what it means, and this a disagreement still. Contingent means that something could be otherwise, correct? — Sam26

No. When something is existentially contingent upon X, it cannot exist without X.

But propositions cannot not be part of language, they're a necessary feature of language. So this is not a misunderstanding, since you have just reiterated the very thing I was arguing against. Do you follow? By the way, I'm not angry, just so you know. — Sam26

I'd rather not bicker over this. You haven't granted my terms, which is fine for what we're doing. I'll gladly switch to your way in order to move on.

Replace all my uses of the term "contingent" with "dependent" and you'll see that we are saying the same thing in two different ways. I'll make sure to follow this switch henceforth.

No. When something is existentially contingent upon X, it cannot exist without X. — creativesoul

This is a point about modal logic, and it's important. When something is contingent upon X, it means that it's possible for it to be otherwise. Thus, it's a subset of possibilities. If you say that X cannot exist apart from Y, then it's necessarily dependent on Y, i.e., there is no possible way for it to exist apart from Y. For example, contingent truths are truths that can be otherwise. It's true that the glass is sitting on the table is a contingent truth, but not a necessary truth. Contingent truths can be otherwise, necessary truths cannot be other than what they are "Triangles have three sides."

Sorry I made a typo.

Yeah. I know Sam. I reject modality. Necessity amounts to nothing more than by definitional fiat. No matter...

Do we agree that propositions cannot exist without language?

I think we do, despite the misunderstanding regarding my use of the term "contingent".

Do we agree that propositions cannot exist without language? — creativesoul

Not really, because what you mean by contingent and dependent is a bit different, especially if you reject modal logic. If you reject modal logic why didn't you say that several posts ago? We'll just move on like you say.

Yeah, I dunno Sam...

I've just acknowledged your usage. I've already explained mine and the difference. I've already said that I've no problem setting my own aside for our purposes here. So, I'm honoring your usage.

What is so difficult about agreeing that propositions cannot exist without language? I'm granting that propositions are necessarily dependent upon language(without exception). That is where I thought that you and I agreed(despite this misunderstanding regarding my terms).

:(

I was simply saying that I do not believe that Witt agreed.

What about my summary regarding your posts? Again, I'll gladly replace "mental ongoings" with "brain states"... if you like.

So we agree, I hope, that we cannot have a statement without a language?

In philosophy, contingent does tend to be used for things true but not necessarily true. While it might be true that a language might not contain any statements, it would not be possible to have a statement without a language.

A side issue, I hope.

So we agree, I hope, that we cannot have a statement without a language?

In philosophy, contingent does tend to be used for things true but not necessarily true. While it might be true that a language might not contain any statements, it would not be possible to have a statement without a language.

A side issue, I hope. — Banno

Indeed.

A bit on modality...

Talking terms of necessary and contingent 'truth', where the term truth refers to a statement that is said to be true does little to impress me, because it is true by definition alone. It is tautological in the only sense I care about here. A tautological truth is a modal one, and it's truth is established by definition alone. These are Kant's a priori, whereas a posteriori are the contingent truths. On my view a priori and a posteriori are methods of justification, and the latter always verifies/falsifies the former.

I'm partial to my own understanding of Quine's Ontological Relativity here, despite my increased effort to put that part to bed. I differ from Quine on the following...

We can define certain kinds of things incorrectly. Things that exist in and of themselves prior to our discovery of them. Rudimentary(pre-linguistic) thought and belief are such things. These are the sorts of things that do not require language in order for them to emerge. Some of these things are what are commonly called "thought", "belief", "thinking", "believing", "remembering", "statements", "belief statements", "pondering", "envisioning", "picturing", etc. On my view they are all mental ongoings. Some are dependent upon language for their existence and others are not. That all depends upon the complexity of the candidate we're discussing.

Witt never drew and maintained the crucially meaningful distinction between thought, belief, and thinking about thought and belief. That is a fatal flaw. A self-imposed inadequacy.

Drawing and maintaining the distinction between thought, belief and thinking about thought and belief is the only thing that allows us to further discriminate between the sorts of belief that do not have linguistic content and the sorts that do.

Only beliefs that do not consist of linguistic content can be held by a non-linguistic agent. Those are the aim. Those need properly accounted for. Those are what an agent later learns to think about via written language. The basics of the first language cannot consist of that which is existentially dependent upon language.

Thinking about thought and belief requires pre-existing thought and belief. It requires something to think about. Thought and belief come first. It also requires an agent's ability to become aware of and isolate it's own mental ongoings in order to talk about them. We use the aforementioned terms and more to do this. Language facilitates this. Thought and belief that comes prior to thinking about thought and belief(pre-linguistic thought and belief) cannot consist of that which owes it's very existence to language. Statements and propositions are dependent upon language. They are a feature thereof. They owe their very existence to language.

Thinking about thought and belief requires thinking about something other than statements and propositions. These are the considerations that facilitate better understanding.

I don't mind saying that rules exist externally to me, in the form of symbols on paper, just like I don't mind saying that concepts exist in that way. Someone might hand me a paper and say "here is my concept". But I do respect the fact that in order to follow such a rule, I must interpret the symbols, and accept the meaning which I derive, as a principle to adhere to. So if I am "following a rule", I am adhering to this principle in my mind which I have derived from my interpretation. You seem to have no respect for this fact. — Metaphysician Undercover

Except one of these is the rules, and the other is your claimed interpretation of the rules, yet you wish to call them both "the rules". On your view, you always remain one step removed from the rules since you need to interpret them, and everyone has their own interpretation, and nobody can ever really know what "the symbols" truly mean. But that's just rubbish. We (English-speakers) all know how to speak English, and misunderstandings or ambiguous meanings are the exception rather than the norm.

I also note that you never answered my question about whether it is possible to break a rule, which I consider to be a related problem for your position.

As I said, we us the word "rules" in different ways, and we must be careful not to equivocate. I have words in my mind, and there are also spoken words. You seem to be implying that I ought only refer to one or the other as "words". You say either the "rules" exist in my mind or the "rules" exist on the paper, in ignorance of the fact that we use "rules" in both ways. But that's just you being completely unreasonable. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the words in your mind are identical to the words you speak, then I have no problem calling them both words, but I do think you are equivocating when you refer to both the written rules of a game, and everybody's alleged differing mental interpretation of those rules, as "the rules".

Right, now you're starting to understand. When we play games, we use strategies, and strategies are private rules, which are not part of "the game", they are part of the player. This is where we reach the limits of the game analogy. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is simply you again misusing the word "rules". Strategies employed within the game are not rules of the game. Your attempt to call them "private rules" just adds to the confusion and equivocation. You seem to agree to the distinction between the written rules of a game and your interpretation of those rules, so stop conflating the two. Until then, I see no merit in discussing the game analogy.