So this is my problem right here. Why ought we assume that some statements fall outside the need for justification? We are talking epistemology here, and knowledge is assumed to be justified true belief. So if a statement falls outside justification, then what that statement says cannot, by definition, be considered to be knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover

The problem with this is that you're not following closely what I'm saying, and that's part of the problem. I answered this a few posts back. Wittgenstein points out, and I believe correctly so, that Moore statements are outside the purview of epistemological concerns. And of course, if a statement is outside of epistemology, then it doesn't concern itself with JTB, and that's the point. Moore's propositions are nonsensical, it's not about knowing, it's about something that's bedrock or basic, which is why Wittgenstein refers to them as hinge-propositions. Think of the door as the language-game of epistemology, and the hinge allows it to swing. Without such basic beliefs there would be no epistemology. The door wouldn't swing, so to speak.

Just remind me about how you deal with the obvious circularity: should you doubt that you ought doubt every statement? — Banno

I didn't say that you ought to doubt every statement. I said that every statement is inherently doubtable, that is the nature of statements in general. Whether you ought or ought not doubt any particular statement is a decision which must be made according to the circumstances of the situation. But since every statement is inherently doubtable, then we ought to make that decision as to whether or not to doubt the statement, with respect to every instance statement.

Yes, it's important to understand what it means to justify a belief, and I'm not sure we can come to any agreement on a general definition. — Sam26

I find it very interesting that the word "justify" is quite similar to the word "just", and "just" is the word which Plato had extreme difficulty in finding any consensus of meaning in The Republic. They are both very difficult words because what they refer to is a very important social relation, correctness. That this relation is important, produces the inclination within individuals to ensure that they have it their way. When something is important to me, I want to make sure that I make it go my way.

I think we might agree that "justify" relates to "the correctness, or rightness of", in a general sense. Whereas "just" refers to correctness in a more restricted sense, a moral sense. Do we agree, that both "just" and "justify" refer to human actions? The former, "just" refers to morally correct actions, but a human being who is prone to carrying out just actions might also be called a just person. So we'd also use "just" to refer to a person who would likely make just actions. The latter, "justify" refers to an action which is carried out in order to show the correctness of something, in our case, a belief. So "justified" refers to a belief which has been shown, and therefore judged to be correct.

Where we seem to disagree is with respect to what qualifies as justification. I believe that a demonstration, a "showing" must be carried out in order that a belief may be justified. You seem to think that a person may be justified in one's belief without any such demonstration. So to take your example, the person drinks some orange juice, judges it as sweet, and is justified in this belief, without any "showing" of the correctness of this belief. The person is justified simply by judging it according to one's senses.

I would say that this person has a true belief, truth being dependent one's own sincerity, such that the person truly believes that the juice tastes sweet. That the juice is sweet is a true belief. And so I would differentiate between true and justified in this way. Justification requires the social aspect, the confirmation that what I truly believe, based on my sense observations is consistent with what others truly believe. This confirmation can only be produced from the "showing", the demonstration, which I call justification.

The problem with this is that you're not following closely what I'm saying, and that's part of the problem. I answered this a few posts back. Wittgenstein points out, and I believe correctly so, that Moore statements are outside the purview of epistemological concerns. And of course, if a statement is outside of epistemology, then it doesn't concern itself with JTB, and that's the point. Moore's propositions are nonsensical, it's not about knowing, it's about something that's bedrock or basic, which is why Wittgenstein refers to them as hinge-propositions. Think of the door as the language-game of epistemology, and the hinge allows it to swing. Without such basic beliefs there would be no epistemology. The door wouldn't swing, so to speak. — Sam26

These propositions cannot be bedrock, or basic at all. They must be considered to be completely outside epistemology, a completely different language-game. Describing them as bedrock implies that epistemology is structured on them as if they were a foundation, but we cannot consider them in that way. They are simply figures of speech, implements of communication, and unrelated to the epistemological structure. If I taste the orange juice and say "I know that the orange juice is sweet because I tasted it", this is simply know-how (knowing how to judge the taste of the object), and is not related to knowledge as epistemology is concerned with, knowing-that, because the "I know that it is sweet" has not been justified. So it is not a true case of knowing-that. The use of "know" here is no different from its use if we were to say that the dog knows how to bark. "Know" is not used in the epistemological sense, which requires justification. Justification is required in order to prove that what I perceive with my senses is consistent with what you perceive with your senses. So simply perceiving something with my senses doesn't provide justification, corroboration is required.

So I would not even relate these so-called "hinge-propositions" to epistemology at all, they are in a completely different game. Since they are not justified we should not allow ourselves to fall for the illusion that they are actually related to epistemic knowledge. We must create a separation between them and epistemic knowledge, such that real knowledge can only be based in properly justified principles.

↪creativesoul Thanks Creative. My ontology of a belief is that it starts pre-linguistically, so it tends to be broader in its scope. — Sam26

You're more than welcome, my 'friend'...

I would actually like to get into that part, if you'd like. I mean, I was offline when this thread was first posted, but I find your and Banno's conversation regarding pre-linguistic beliefs quite interesting. He and I have had several conversations skirting around such things, but I've always been disappointed in the end. I'm always left wondering if I've said something wrong, or offensive, or somehow otherwise unacceptable to him. Usually it's about truth though, so...

Anyway, I like the suggestion you gave to Meta about keeping it short and simple... easy to follow. Could we perhaps get into the ontology aspect of belief, particularly regarding the existential role that language has?

Didn't Witt use the notion of "well-grounded" as compared to "justified"?

If a prelinguistic belief cannot be argued for, which by definition it cannot, does that mean that it cannot be well-grounded?

Banno's cat Jack. Jack can believe his bowl is empty. Does his inability to argue for that render his belief unjustifiable, and hence he cannot know that his bowl is empty simply by virtue of looking?

I said that every statement is inherently doubtable, — Metaphysician Undercover

So "every statement is inherently doubtable" is doubtable?

I like to use my old stand-by... the fire example.

A non and/or pre-linguistic creature can learn that touching fire hurts. That is not to say that it can learn how to say "touching fire hurts". It most certainly cannot. Is Witt on the right track when demanding that a belief be stateable?

If a belief is a statement, as suggested earlier, then a non-linguistic creature which learns that touching fire hurts would have to be learning a statement. That can't be right.

So it seems that the content of such a creature's belief is not linguistic, nor could it be. Yet it clearly learns that touching fire causes pain. How can that be the case?

Same old.

There is a difference between a belief being unstated and its being unstateable.

That Jack cannot say that his bowl is empty does not prevent him from believing that his bowl is empty.

You are puzzled because you think a belief is mind-furniture.

I agree with the difference between a belief being unstated and it's being unstateable.

I agree that Jack's failure to say that his bowl is empty does not prevent him from believing that his bowl is empty.

Jack cannot say that. We can. Are we to conclude that we have the same belief?

Why is Jack meowing and rolling on the floor? Because his bowl is empty.

Why is Jack meowing and rolling on the floor? Because he thinks his bowl is empty.

Why is Jack meowing and rolling on the floor? Because he believes his bowl is empty.

So "every statement is inherently doubtable" is doubtable? — Banno

Of course. Absolute certainty is impossible, and the request for absolute certainty becomes circular as it revolves around a requirement for the impossible. Doubt on the other hand may become an infinite regress, and that's why Wittgenstein insists on putting an end to doubt at hinge-propositions. My argument is that whether or not it is reasonable to doubt a particular proposition is not a function of the proposition itself, it is a judgement made by the rational human being, a judgement based in the particularities of the circumstances.



I think I see more clearly now, what you mean by "hinge-propositions", and why you assume that they are bedrock, or foundational. Is it correct to say that hinge-propositions would demonstrate, or show the use of the individual words, such that the hinge propositions act as fundamental justifications in themselves? Moore's "here is a hand" acts to demonstrate the meaning of "hand". If this is the case, then the hinge-proposition would take the place that definitions hold in formal logic, or axioms in mathematics.

What remains is our difference as to whether or not it is reasonable to doubt such things. In philosophy it is often said that a proposition is beyond doubt if it is self-evident. But self-evidence requires that the meaning of the terms be already known, and therefore taken for granted. If hinge-propositions are beneath this, demonstrating the meaning of terms, then they cannot be self-evident.

The reason why I claim that hinge-propositions are not beyond doubt, is the issue of ambiguity. If the hinge-proposition acts to define the term, then if there is ambiguity in the hinge-proposition, doubt is called for, just like if there is ambiguity in a definition. So the issue I see with hinge-propositions is ambiguity, and ambiguity calls for doubt.

↪creativesoul Why is Jack meowing and rolling on the floor? Because his bowl is empty.

Why is Jack meowing and rolling on the floor? Because he thinks his bowl is empty.

Why is Jack meowing and rolling on the floor? Because he believes his bowl is empty. — Banno

Does Jack know his bowl is empty?

Didn't Witt use the notion of "well-grounded" as compared to "justified"?

If a prelinguistic belief cannot be argued for, which by definition it cannot, does that mean that it cannot be well-grounded?

Banno's cat Jack. Jack can believe his bowl is empty. Does his inability to argue for that render his belief unjustifiable, and hence he cannot know that his bowl is empty simply by virtue of looking? — creativesoul

I think there is a difference between being well-grounded and being justified, at least as Wittgenstein seems to use the terms. Hinge-propositions are grounded, but not justified. Justification takes place in epistemology, as in JTB. However, hinge-propositions, don't need to be justified, at least generally. We can always think of an example where one could justify Moore's propositions, i.e., where it would make sense to doubt that this is my hand, as in the examples I gave in other posts.

Consider the rules of chess, i.e., we can state the rules, but there is no need to justify the rules. They are simply the ground of the game, and in this case quite arbitrary. But to ask how you justify that the bishop moves diagonally is simply nonsense, and it seems that this is why Wittgenstein referred to such propositions as bedrock or hinge. There seem to be certain things that we just accept as part of reality, things that we trust, things that make it possible to have, for example, the language-game of epistemology.

The cat cannot know in the sense that it can use the language-game of epistemology. It's obvious, at least to me, though, that animals show beliefs, i.e., they act in ways that demonstrate their beliefs.

I think I see more clearly now, what you mean by "hinge-propositions", and why you assume that they are bedrock, or foundational. Is it correct to say that hinge-propositions would demonstrate, or show the use of the individual words, such that the hinge propositions act as fundamental justifications in themselves? Moore's "here is a hand" acts to demonstrate the meaning of "hand". If this is the case, then the hinge-proposition would take the place that definitions hold in formal logic, or axioms in mathematics. — Metaphysician Undercover

Moore is trying to answer the skeptic, who in this case seem to deny the existence of physical objects. Moore points out that there are certain things he knows, things that seem indubitable. These things, like Moore's assertion that has knowledge of his hands, are beyond doubt. Wittgenstein who is sympathetic to Moore's cause, because it seems that in Moore's quest to answer the skeptic has pointed out something special about these kinds of statements, something bedrock. Moore just didn't seem to understand the fundamental nature of these statements. Therefore, we get Wittgenstein's more nuanced view of just what kind of statements, Moore's statements are.

Moore's justification, as far as I know, isn't about the "meaning of hand," which would be a linguistic justification. I don't believe the skeptic is doubting the meaning of the word hand, although in a sense if the skeptics are able to doubt Moore's propositions, then certainly they couldn't be certain of the meanings of their words. However, it's important to keep in mind what Moore is responding to, and it doesn't seem to be about linguistic justification. It's about the knowledge of whether one knows that we have hands, i.e., the object hand. In a practical sense the skeptic probably wouldn't doubt such things, but there seems to be a doubt beyond what's practical, Wittgenstein points this out. So Moore doesn't seem to be "demonstrating the meaning of 'hand.'"

All statements including hinge-propositions show the use of individual words. Here we must be careful what we mean by justification, and we can see this is Creative's question about being grounded as opposed to being justified. These statements are grounded, but not justified in an epistemological sense. Just as the rules of chess are the ground of the game, so to speak.

However, it's important to keep in mind what Moore is responding to, and it doesn't seem to be about linguistic justification. — Sam26

The issue is linguistic right from the start. The skeptic's point is that we do not know what the word "existence" means, to the extent that we can justify the claim that there is such a thing as existence. This, having no clear and concise knowledge of what it means "to exist", is what supports the skeptic's position that there may not be such a thing as existence. Until we can say precisely what existence is, then the skeptic has reason to doubt that things exist.

What Moore does is simply transfer the doubt concerning this generality, "existence", to a particular object, which he identifies as a "hand". He says look, this particular object which we call a hand, clearly has existence, therefore it is unreasonable to doubt, in a general, overall sense, that things exist. It is similar to Descartes' I think therefore I exist, but it says, a hand exists therefore there is existence. But now we have the question of what does it mean to be a "hand". Only if we can show what it means to be a hand, have we demonstrated that hands exist, and therefore refuted the skeptics concerns.

So the issue is linguistic through and through. The skeptic has a concern with the meaning of "existence". Moore transfers the skeptic's doubt from "existence" to "hand". Wittgenstein picks up on the linguistic issue implying that what it means to be a hand, is to be the thing referred to by "hand". This assumes that there is a thing referred to by "hand". The skeptic would be refuted if we ought not doubt whether the thing referred to by "hand" really is a hand, because this would confirm that there really is an existing thing called a "hand".

As I stated, my concern is with ambiguity.

Does Jack know his bowl is empty? — creativesoul

Does it make sense to say Jack thought he knew the bowl was empty?

Absolute certainty is impossible, — Metaphysician Undercover

But what about certainty, without the obtuse adjective?

Until we can say precisely what existence is, then the skeptic has reason to doubt that things exist. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have to know what 'existence' means in order to be able to coherently ask the question as to whether any thing exists.

When Moore shows his hands as an answer to skepticism; I take him to be pointing out that our idea of existence comes from perception. For an object to exist is to be perceptible; so when Moore shows his hands he is showing that they exist, and there can be no coherent skepticism about that. The answer to "How do I know my hands exist?" is " You can see that they are parts of your body".

My argument is that whether or not it is reasonable to doubt a particular proposition is not a function of the proposition itself, it is a judgement made by the rational human being, a judgement based in the particularities of the circumstances. — Metaphysician Undercover

On the language game involved?

So it seems that the content of such a creature's belief is not linguistic, nor could it be. — creativesoul

That a prelinguistic belief is stateable is not that the prelinguistic believer can state it, When you say the cat believes X you are stating her prelinguistic belief for her.

@Metaphysician Undercover, it seems you have committed yourself to doubting that the bishop only moved diagonally.

But what about certainty, without the obtuse adjective? — Banno

That depends on how you define "certainty". As I said I associate doubt with ambiguity. Do you distinguish "certainty" from "certitude"? If so, then when someone states "this is a certainty", how would you know that it is not just a case of certitude?

You have to know what 'existence' means in order to be able to coherently ask the question as to whether any thing exists. — Janus

That's not true. If we learn the meaning of words through demonstration, then to know what "existence" means requires an example or demonstration of existence. If one has not been provided with any examples of what existence looks, sounds or feels like in any way, yet people talk about existence as if it were a property which things have, then that person can coherently ask whether anything really exists.

When Moore shows his hands as an answer to skepticism; I take him to be pointing out that our idea of existence comes from perception. For an object to exist is to be perceptible; so when Moore shows his hands he is showing that they exist, and there can be no coherent skepticism about that. The answer to "How do I know my hands exist?" is " You can see that they are parts of your body". — Janus

The problem with this is that we perceive objects as particular things, and we are sometimes wrong in our perceptions. This is what validates the skeptics position, the fact that we are sometimes wrong in the judgements concerning our perceptions. For this reason we cannot say that to be perceptible is to exist, because hallucinations and other wrong judgements are things perceived. So as I said, when Moore shows his hands, it only serves as proof of existence if they really are "hands". If they are not hands, then our perceptions have failed us, because we have perceived them as hands. And if our perceptions may fail us in this way then we can't rely on them to determine existence. Therefore in order for Moore's argument to work, it is required that there is necessity that what he holds up actually are hands. Language, due to ambiguity doesn't give us that necessity.

On the language game involved? — Banno

Yes, that would be a part of the judgement, a judgement as to what is the language game involved. For instance, earlier in the thread I had to judge whether Sam26 was joking or not. Because I didn't have certitude, I had doubt as to what Sam meant.

it seems you have committed yourself to doubting that the bishop only moved diagonally. — Banno

Why would you say that? I've made it very clear that whether or not one ought to doubt, is dependent on a rational decision of the individual involved, according to the circumstances. I have no reason to doubt that the bishop only moves diagonally, I've played the game before.. But a person not at all familiar with the game of chess would not know what you meant by "the bishop", and "only moved diagonally", so this person would have no certitude with respect to your claim, and it would not be unreasonable for this person to doubt that the bishop only moved diagonally. Doubt is directly related to a person's certitude, and just because one person might doubt what you think ought not be doubted, doesn't mean that the person is unreasonable.

If the person were unwilling to accept your authority, you might have to show them a copy of the rules. But if the person didn't know you at all, why would it be more reasonable for the person to have faith in your authority, than to not trust you, and therefore doubt you? If you met someone on the street whom you had never met before, and this person made a statement about something you knew nothing about, wouldn't it be reasonable to doubt that person, even if to that person, what was being said was an obvious truth.

That depends on how you define "certainty". As I said I associate doubt with ambiguity. Do you distinguish "certainty" from "certitude"? If so, then when someone states "this is a certainty", how would you know that it is not just a case of certitude? — Metaphysician Undercover

Obfuscation. Is there any sort of certainty you are happy with?

Is there any sort of certainty you are happy with? — Banno

Certainty is an ideal, just like justified true belief is an ideal. There is nothing wrong with assuming ideals though, they can be very useful, like the numbers.

I have no reason to doubt that the bishop only moves diagonally, — Metaphysician Undercover

So you are certain of it?

Here is an odd contradiction, since previously you said

The way I see it is that we have to decide with each instance of usage, whether or not it is reasonable to doubt what has been said. This requires that we start with the assumption that any statement is potentially doubted. — Metaphysician Undercover

SO, it seemed to me that each time you moved a piece, it was incumbent on you to first whether or not it is reasonable to doubt that the bishop moved only diagonally.

There is an issue here that we ought sort through. For if, as you say, we must start with the assumption that every statement can be potentially doubted, then we must also suppose that any justification offered in the form of a sentence must also be doubted. So if we doubt that the bishop moves diagonally, we must also doubt that the my authority on the issue, as well as the authority of such Chess Federations as one might choose.

Indeed, it would be incumbent on us to doubt that there were any rules of chess at all.

And further, doubt is appropriate towards any rules, chess or otherwise.

And finally, we doubt that we doubt.

It does not aid your case to simply assert:

since every statement is inherently doubtable, then we ought to make that decision as to whether or not to doubt the statement, with respect to every instance statement. — Metaphysician Undercover

For you must doubt any such decision.

Following your system, rationality does not just fail; it never gets started in the first place.

This point, which Wittgenstein suggests, "whether it makes sense to doubt the statement", is just an arbitrary line, a division which Wittgenstein seeks to impose. In reality, "whether it makes sense to doubt", is just a decision which we all must make, and a decision which is specifically formulated for each particular instance of usage. There is no general principle, of this or that statement ought not be doubted, as Wittgenstein might appear to imply. In reality any statement might be reasonably doubted under the right circumstances. So your claim that there are foundational statements which are outside the epistemological language-games cannot be supported. Otherwise we would have to admit that there are statements which are "necessarily correct". But the correctness of statements is contingent on how the statements relate to the world, and this contingency denies the possibility of "necessarily correct" statements. If you go that route, toward necessarily correct statements you validate Platonic Realism. — Metaphysician Undercover

(My italics)

I decided to quote this in full, since it shows not only the inoperability of Meta's position, but also the misunderstanding of Wittgenstein that underpins his criticism of Sam.

That the bishop moves only diagonally is, in the context, arbitrary. And it makes no sense to doubt it in that context - the playing of chess.

Nor is the movement of the bishop a decision that we all make. I never made that decision. But I did learn the rule. That rule is the general principle that underpins the absurdity of doubting that the bishop only moves diagonally!

And... saying that the bishop moves only diagonally is not playing chess. Similarly, saying "here is a hand" is not doing epistemology. It is a foundational statement that is outside of epistemology. It's not a necessary statement - necessary being a term that Meta uses in his own curious way - it is a foundational statement, in the same way that "the bishop moves only diagonally" is not necessary, but foundational.

So you are certain of it?

Here is an odd contradiction, since previously you said — Banno

I don't see the contradiction. I have no reason to doubt that the bishop moves only diagonally because I know the rules. But this does not mean that the statement cannot be doubted. And doubt is an attitude of the individual, such that every individual must decide for oneself whether or not to doubt this. As in my example, for the person who does not know the game, nor knows whether to trust your authority on this matter, it is reasonable for that person to doubt this.

SO, it seemed to me that each time you moved a piece, it was incumbent on you to first whether or not it is reasonable to doubt that the bishop moved only diagonally. — Banno

No' that's not what I said, nor implied. I was talking about considering statements. In the consideration of statements it is incumbent on me to decide whether or not I ought to doubt the statement. If I were playing chess, I would be considering which moves to make, not considering statements, so the example is not relevant. Though there would still be doubt involved as to which move I ought to make, there would be no doubt in my mind concerning the rules. Any such doubt would have been dealt with when I first encountered, and learned the rules.

There is an issue here that we ought sort through. For if, as you say, we must start with the assumption that every statement can be potentially doubted, then we must also suppose that any justification offered in the form of a sentence must also be doubted. So if we doubt that the bishop moves diagonally, we must also doubt that the my authority on the issue, as well as the authority of such Chess Federations as one might choose. — Banno

You seem to be refusing my distinction between "may be doubted", and "ought to be doubted". So you represent my position as claiming that any justification in the form of a sentence "must" be doubted. But that is not what I am claiming, what I claim is that it may be doubted. Do you recognize the difference between what one may do, because it is possible to do that, and what one ought to do because it is the rational decision?

Further, it is my claim that statements which would be unreasonable for me to doubt, could be reasonably doubted by someone else, and vise versa. So I think it would be very difficult to support a position like Wittgenstein's, which seeks to cast a net on certain statements, saying that it is unreasonable to doubt these particular statements, in a generalized way, because for some people, uder certain circumstances it would be reasonable to doubt them.

For you must doubt any such decision. — Banno

Why must you doubt something just because it is possible to doubt that thing? This does not make sense. Do you think that you must do everything which is possible for you to do?

I don't see the contradiction. I have no reason to doubt that the bishop moves only diagonally because I know the rules. But this does not mean that the statement cannot be doubted. — Metaphysician Undercover

And I am left nonplussed.

Yes, it is apparent you do not see the contradiction, but there it is!

What could @Metaphysician Undercover mean?

Could he be thinking that Wittgenstein is claiming that, that the bishop only moves diagonally must be necessarily true in all situations, and can never be brought into doubt?

But it is clear that Wittgenstein is saying that the doubt is inappropriate given the rules...

Could we reach agreement if Wittgenstein were to say "That the bishop only moves diagonally cannot be reasonably doubted"?

I think there is a difference between being well-grounded and being justified, at least as Wittgenstein seems to use the terms. Hinge-propositions are grounded, but not justified. Justification takes place in epistemology, as in JTB. However, hinge-propositions, don't need to be justified, at least generally. We can always think of an example where one could justify Moore's propositions, i.e., where it would make sense to doubt that this is my hand, as in the examples I gave in other posts. — Sam26

Yes. That seems right. I mean, if justification is either equivalent to or necessary for being justified.

Did Witt ever come up with an example of a hinge proposition?

Consider the rules of chess, i.e., we can state the rules, but there is no need to justify the rules. They are simply the ground of the game, and in this case quite arbitrary. But to ask how you justify that the bishop moves diagonally is simply nonsense, and it seems that this is why Wittgenstein referred to such propositions as bedrock or hinge.

There seem to be certain things that we just accept as part of reality, things that we trust, things that make it possible to have, for example, the language-game of epistemology. — Sam26

While I understand that this is a very common understanding of Witt, and that he used the bishop movement as an example, I suppose that I struggle with the analogy itself. I mean, the rules of a language construct such as chess aren't to be questioned. Justify the rules of a game? Nonsense! That's how it's played. There is no other reason necessary. They provide the very foundational structure by which we play the game. Remove and/or change them and it's no longer chess. Thus, doubting them makes no sense for it would be like doubting the game itself.

However, reality doesn't seem to be the same sort of thing with regard to epistemology. When I attempt to make good sense of this parallel between the rules of chess and reality, I can only surmise the following...

It seems to me that one could hold that ipropositions are a part of external reality, iithought and belief have propositional content, and iiithought and belief are accrued. That would make more sense regarding the analogy, at least it seems that way to me at this moment. Unless my understanding is mistaken, I think that Witt held all three of those. In that sort of foundational sense, thought and belief would begin simply and gain in complexity. This kind of process would not only allow for some bedrock, indubitable propositions that others would rest their laurels upon, but it would require it... Would it not? The justification of the more complex would hinge upon these bedrock propositions(well-grounded, indubitable belief(s)). It also meshes quite nicely with Witt's insistence that a belief be stateable(it must if it has propositional content).

That's my understanding of Witt's thoughts/ponderings on the matter. I'm wondering Sam, do you find this problematic according to your own?

The cat cannot know in the sense that it can use the language-game of epistemology. It's obvious, at least to me, though, that animals show beliefs, i.e., they act in ways that demonstrate their beliefs. — Sam26

What follows here is a rough synopsis of my own position. I do not wish to derail the thread, which is more about your extrapolations based upon Witt's writings. That said, you may find it worthwhile. I certainly hope you do...

I agree that animals certainly hold beliefs. While Jack cannot believe that "the bowl is empty", he most certainly can look at the bowl and see that there is no food in it and hence believe that the bowl is empty. If that is not well-grounded and true belief(assuming it's empty) then nothing can be. Moreover, on my view, a justified belief does not necessarily require justification(providing one's grounds to another). So, with that in mind, Jack has formed and holds justified true belief. Jack knows that his bowl is empty, despite his not being able to justify his belief. That is a metacognitive endeavor. It requires thinking about one's own thought and belief. Metacognition requires language. Thus, Jack cannot justify his own belief to us, nor can he even be aware that he has such belief.

Does Jack know his bowl is empty?
— creativesoul

Does it make sense to say Jack thought he knew the bowl was empty? — Banno

No. That would be to say that Jack thought about his own belief. That requires written language. Jack has no such thing.

Does knowing the bowl is empty require being able to think about one's own belief?