I see no reason to accept that.

First, we use sensory experience to justify a belief. For example, you might ask how I know the orange juice is sweet, and I may respond with, "I know it's sweet, because I tasted it." — Sam26

I do not believe that one can justify a belief simply by referring to sensory experience. This is because "to justify" means to demonstrate or prove something. If I could justify a belief simply by saying I know that it's the case because I saw it, then many mistaken perceptions and lies would qualify as justification. To justify is to demonstrate that you really did see what you claim to have seen.

One doesn't doubt the foundation of our world any more than one doubts the pieces in a chess game. Just as the game of chess is built around the pieces and the board, so too is our language built around the reality in which we have our life. There are certain fundamentals that are generally not doubted. — Sam26

I would not agree with this either. Just like we can ask the person to justify "I know it's the case because I saw it", we can ask for justification of the fundamentals. The fundamentals are mostly derived from our sense perceptions, and the descriptions of what we perceive all need to be justified. That is why science uses repetition and comparison in experimentation, rather than simple observation. If the reasons for maintaining the fundamentals cannot be justified then we have reason to dismiss them.

The very real problem here is that the most fundamental aspects of knowledge are the oldest, and knowledge evolves. So the time may come when the rapidly expanding body of knowledge with newly established principles, starts to be inconsistent with the foundations. That is why we need to revisit the foundations, and see if they remain strong in light of newly discovered principles. For instance, "the sun rises in the morning" could be such a fundamental principle. But if we revisit it, we can see that it isn't really correct to say "the sun rises". This is a relic left over from an ancient world view, which should really be replaced because it isn't conducive to proper thinking about the relationship between the earth and the sun. We turn toward the sun in the morning, and away from the sun in the afternoon.

I do not believe that one can justify a belief simply by referring to sensory experience. This is because "to justify" means to demonstrate or prove something. If I could justify a belief simply by saying I know that it's the case because I saw it, then many mistaken perceptions and lies would qualify as justification. To justify is to demonstrate that you really did see what you claim to have seen. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, actually we justify beliefs in this way all the time. Do you mean to say that I can't claim to know that the orange juice is sweet because I tasted it? Or, I can't claim to know that a particular tree is in a specific spot in the woods because I saw it? That would be a bit bizarre.

I don't know where you come up with such a limited definition of justify. Moreover, this problem is something I see quite a bit. If you do a careful study of how we use the term justify, it doesn't just apply to logical arguments such as proofs.

There is a difference between the concept of justification, and actually being justified. One may think one is justified based on whatever method of justification one is using, but that doesn't mean you are justified. Obviously if it turns out that what you thought you saw wasn't in fact a tree for example, then you're not justified. Simply saying you're justified doesn't mean you are. Saying you're justified and being justified are quite different. That said, our sensory perceptions are generally correct, if this wasn't the case, then much of what we believe wouldn't be justified, which I assume you believe. Besides we often make claims based on strong inductive arguments that such-and-such is the case, and we are perfectly within our rights based on the rules of good inductive arguments; but that doesn't mean that we're necessarily correct.

So if you ask me how I know the orange juice is sweet, and I say I know it because I tasted it, what kind of claim am I making if it's not a knowledge claim? Is it a mere belief, an opinion?

As to your last sentence in that paragraph, "To justify is to demonstrate that you really did see what you claim to have seen." So if a botanist comes out of the woods, and makes a claim that they know they saw an oak tree, you would say to them - "You don't know it, you only believe it." That would really be strange. You're perfectly justified based on the general accuracy of your sensory perceptions.

I'm not making the claim that all sensory experiences are justified. I'm making the claim that we do generally trust our sensory experiences, and we are generally justified in believing a claim to knowledge based on sensory experiences.

Not all belief statements arrived at through sensory experiences fit within an epistemological structure. This is clearly seen in Wittgenstein's treatment of Moore's claim to knowledge that Wittgenstein critiques in On Certainty. The one question that seems to separate statements that are outside our epistemological language-games, and those that fall within these language-games, is the question of whether it makes sense to doubt the statement. Note how Wittgenstein in On Certainty attacks Moore's propositions by asking if it makes sense to doubt Moore's claim to knowledge.

It seems that our doubting only goes so far, and this seems to be the case with what we know too. For example, "If [such-and-such] deceives me, what does 'deceive' mean any more? What can I rely on? I really want to say that a language-game is only possible if one trusts something (I did not say "can trust something"). (OC 507-509)." There seems to be something basic that we rely on, that we trust, something fundamental.

Wittgenstein also said, "If my name is not L. W., how can I rely on what is mean by "true" and "false" (OC 515)?" Again the fundamental nature of some of our statements or beliefs. More fundamental than epistemological statements.

and meaning requires interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, no.

If you cannot express a belief as a concept — charleton

But what does this say? How is expressing a belief as a concept different to expressing a belief? How is expressing a belief different to making a sincere assertion?

Your concepts always reduce to speech acts.

Just a note, Sam, that you have presented LW's account neatly and succinctly. I have been over this several times with Meta, to little avail. Cheers.

Moore stands before us, holding up his hands and saying "I have two hands".

@Metaphysician Undercover says "I do not believe that Moore has justified a his belief simply by referring to sensory experience"

What do we make of this? Does Meta not understand what a hand is? Does he not understand how to use the word "here"?

What place does doubt have here?

So far in this thread we've talked a bit about beliefs, and we've talked a bit about justification, or the different ways in which a belief is justified. Next we will talk about what it means for a statement, or more accurately a proposition, to be true. However, we should preface the upcoming remarks with the following: I.e., much of what is written in this thread is based on, or is at least loosely based on Wittgenstein's notes in the Philosophical Investigations, and on his final notes in On Certainty. For example, when trying to give a precise definition of some of the terms used in epistemology, it's the contention of this thread, that it's very similar to trying to give an absolute definition of the concept game. The point is that there is no one thing that is common to all uses of the concept justification, or the concept truth; or there is no one property that can be ascribed to these terms that will cover every possible use within a language. It doesn't mean that every definition has this characteristic, but many definitions, and by extension many theories of epistemology have this problem. Wittgenstein points this out in PI 66, "Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? - Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games'"- but look and see whether there is anything common to all. -For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that....I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members of the a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc overlap and criss-cross in the same way (PI 66,67)."

The problem with many theories, this includes many epistemological theories, is that we (many philosophers) are trying to be as precise as we can. Precision is important, but sometimes concepts don't lend themselves to such precision. Many concepts fit the family resemblance model as presented by Wittgenstein in the quotes above. Just as there is no one definition that can describe all games, so there is probably no one definition that will fit every use of our epistemological concepts. There are just various general definitions that fit a wide swath of uses.

The problem is that when we think we have described every possible use of a concept with a particular definition or theory, and we hear of something that doesn't fit our definition or theory, we have a tendency to think it's not an example of what we're trying to define. And indeed it may not be a counter-example, but one has to "look and see" if the example has a "family resemblance." Of course this is not as easy as it sounds because many philosophers spend their whole lives developing theories, and sometimes one counter-example will destroy much of their work. This is why it's important to not be so dogmatic about some of these ideas or theories.

:-O

Well, actually we justify beliefs in this way all the time. Do you mean to say that I can't claim to know that the orange juice is sweet because I tasted it? Or, I can't claim to know that a particular tree is in a specific spot in the woods because I saw it? That would be a bit bizarre. — Sam26

Take a look at what you're saying with these examples. "The orange juice is sweet". You've tasted the orange juice, but you've given no indication that you know what "sweet" is, to back up your claim. So you've given no justification for your judgement that the juice is sweet, only a statement of judgement. A statement of judgement does not constitute justification for that judgement. How can you accept any such statement of judgement as justification for that judgement? I might taste the juice and claim that I know the juice is tart. Then we have two conflicting descriptions of the juice, each, according to your sense of justification is justified.

Look at your other statement, "a particular tree is in a specific spot in the woods". You haven't identified the tree or the spot. To do this you would have to produce a picture, drawing of the tree, or otherwise describe or identify the tree, and then a map of some sort, showing that the tree which you saw was in a particular relationship with other land marks. Or, you could say that you walked in the woods, and walked past this and that object in these relative locations, and came across a specific tree which looks like this, and describe the tree in its relationship with the other ojects.

Notice how justification of something which was sensed, requires a description. The claimed statement of fact "the orange juice is sweet" requires a description in order to justify it. For example, I tasted it and it was comparable to the honey which we agree is sweet.

I don't know where you come up with such a limited definition of justify. Moreover, this problem is something I see quite a bit. If you do a careful study of how we use the term justify, it doesn't just apply to logical arguments such as proofs. — Sam26

We are not talking about "justify" in its common use. We are talking about a very specific use of "justify" in a particular field of study, epistemology. Words such as this, which play a very specific role within a field of study have very restrictive definitions within that field of study, and these definitions must be upheld to maintain the principles of that field of study. I think it is very clear, that in epistemology, "justify" requires a demonstration, explanation, or description. You cannot justify a statement simply by saying "I've sensed it to be so".

There is a difference between the concept of justification, and actually being justified. One may think one is justified based on whatever method of justification one is using, but that doesn't mean you are justified. Obviously if it turns out that what you thought you saw wasn't in fact a tree for example, then you're not justified. Simply saying you're justified doesn't mean you are. Saying you're justified and being justified are quite different. That said, our sensory perceptions are generally correct, if this wasn't the case, then much of what we believe wouldn't be justified, which I assume you believe. Besides we often make claims based on strong inductive arguments that such-and-such is the case, and we are perfectly within our rights based on the rules of good inductive arguments; but that doesn't mean that we're necessarily correct. — Sam26

The point is that "to justify" is to demonstrate the correctness of. This means that the people who you demonstrate this to, must accept the demonstration, as a judgement of "correct" is required. So justification is an action, a procedure, which is not necessarily successful. You can attempt to justify something, and fail. Also, you can think that you have justified something when you have not.

In relation to our sense perceptions, the issue of justification is not necessarily a matter of whether or not our sense perceptions are correct, it may be a matter of how we put words to our sense perceptions, how we describe them. If a person does not have the capacity to adequately describe what was sensed, then the claimed sensation cannot be justified. This is where words fail us, in describing new things. Some might argue that this presents us with the limits to knowledge, where words cannot go, but that's not true. What we must do is figure out ways of expressing the new sensations, and new feelings, and that's how knowledge expands, language develops and evolves.

So if you ask me how I know the orange juice is sweet, and I say I know it because I tasted it, what kind of claim am I making if it's not a knowledge claim? Is it a mere belief, an opinion? — Sam26

Yes, that claim "I know it is sweet because I tasted it" is a mere statement belief or opinion. The use of "know" here only indicates your personal certitude, or conviction in your belief. It is not supported by evidence that you know what "sweet" means, and that you are qualified to make that judgement. The problem is that we, your auditors, take it for granted that you know what "sweet" is, and because of this assumption we are inclined in common vernacular to say that you are justified in your statement.

This points directly to your beliefs concerning foundational propositions. Remember in Wittgenstein's "On Certainty", if we keep asking for justification, we get to the bottom, where justification can go no further. This bottom consists of the things which we take for granted. We know what a "hand" is, we know what "the earth" is, we know what "sweet" is, etc.. But I do not agree with Wittgenstein, that we can go no further in our request for justification. I believe that even these fundamentals need to be justified. In some circumstances it is reasonable to ask individuals to demonstrate that they know what these words means, like Socrates asked for a demonstration of "just" from the participants in Plato's "Republic". How we each understand each word may need to be justified because if it comes about, through evolving practises, that "sweet" means something different for you than for me, or "hand", or "earth", or any other words, then our epistemology, the entire structure of knowledge starts to become compromised.

For example. Look at what "justify" means to you, in comparison with what it means to me. I have a much more restricted definition than you. Suppose we apply our competing definitions toward a scientist justifying a theory with reference to what occurred in the lab. Under your definition, the scientist says it's true because I saw it in the lab. Under my definition the scientist must account for exactly what was seen in the lab, such that we can properly judge what is being claimed.

As to your last sentence in that paragraph, "To justify is to demonstrate that you really did see what you claim to have seen." So if a botanist comes out of the woods, and makes a claim that they know they saw an oak tree, you would say to them - "You don't know it, you only believe it." That would really be strange. You're perfectly justified based on the general accuracy of your sensory perceptions. — Sam26

You are just making an appeal to authority here. And an appeal to authority, when the authority is verified, qualifies as justification. The person says "I saw an oak tree". You ask for justification. The person says "I am a botanist, I know what an oak tree is". You may ask for credentials, etc.. But as Wittgenstein indicates, there is no real bottom to justification, we get to the point where we just take things for granted.

The one question that seems to separate statements that are outside our epistemological language-games, and those that fall within these language-games, is the question of whether it makes sense to doubt the statement. — Sam26

This point, which Wittgenstein suggests, "whether it makes sense to doubt the statement", is just an arbitrary line, a division which Wittgenstein seeks to impose. In reality, "whether it makes sense to doubt", is just a decision which we all must make, and a decision which is specifically formulated for each particular instance of usage. There is no general principle, of this or that statement ought not be doubted, as Wittgenstein might appear to imply. In reality any statement might be reasonably doubted under the right circumstances. So your claim that there are foundational statements which are outside the epistemological language-games cannot be supported. Otherwise we would have to admit that there are statements which are "necessarily correct". But the correctness of statements is contingent on how the statements relate to the world, and this contingency denies the possibility of "necessarily correct" statements. If you go that route, toward necessarily correct statements you validate Platonic Realism.

Metaphysician Undercover says "I do not believe that Moore has justified a his belief simply by referring to sensory experience"

What do we make of this? Does Meta not understand what a hand is? Does he not understand how to use the word "here"? — Banno

If Moore says "this is a hand", or "here is a hand", and holds up a hand, he is performing a demonstration. If I agree, that what he holds up is a hand, then he has demonstrated to my satisfaction, that he knows what a hand is, and I conclude that he is justified in saying that. He might then proceed to say "I have two hands", and I'd be inclined to say that he is justified in saying this because he has demonstrated that he knows what a hand is.

If, on the other hand, he makes the statement "I have two hands", without demonstrating that he knows what a hand is, then this is a simple statement of claim. This statement needs to be justified unless I am prepared to take it for granted that he knows what a hand is.

In the former case, he is making a demonstration, I except the demonstration as successful, therefore he is justified. In the latter case he is making a statement of claim and unless I am ready to accept his claim on faith and trust, a request for justification is warranted. Sam26, following Wittgenstein, would say that such a request for justification is not warranted, it is unreasonable because I ought to accept on faith the foundations of our knowledge. .

As usual we're just too far apart on these issues.

A place for a discussion to start, not the end of a discussion.

:D

I've felt the same. I suppose the interesting issue here might be working out where Meta goes astray.

I'll be responding Banno, it's just that I had a momentary flashback to some other conversations with MU. In fact, I copied all of the conversations from philosophyforums and I was getting PTSD reading MU's responses. - roflol - I had to take some meds. I'm starting to recover, my head is clearing, and I'm returning to my senses. :B The fight must go on! It reminds of a Jerry Seinfeld episode.

Part of my response to MU...

So there's no confusion, let me suggest that there are sensory statements (like Moore's claims to knowledge about having hands in response to the skeptic) that lie outside of epistemological language-games. However, much of this is driven by context, but not all of it, since one can use statements like "I know..." in context, and still use the words incorrectly (Moore's case). The point is that we need to be able to distinguish between the two, viz., those that are understood in terms of justification, and those that fall outside any need for justification. Wittgenstein makes this distinction in On Certainty again and again. Thus, the question arises, what separates the kind of sensory statements that are perfectly normal in terms of being justified, from those that need no justification (again Moore's statements/propositions)? The answer to this question lies in another question, "Does it make sense to doubt the claim?" One must not forget the language-game of doubting when trying to understand the difference between these two kinds of sensory claims.

Moore is standing before an audience raising his hand and makes the statement that this is a hand, i.e., that he knows it's a hand. But what would a doubt here look like? Did Moore double-check to make sure those were his hands? Moreover, what would making sure look like? We can juxtapose this with a statement that does make sense to doubt, and Wittgenstein gives just such an example in the following: "And if he says he knows it, that can only signify to me that he has been able to make sure, and hence that his arms are e.g. not still covered in bandages, etc. etc. My believing the trustworthy man stems from my admitting that it is possible for him to make sure (OC 23)." In this case one may awaken from an operation in which it was in doubt about whether the infection was so severe that one might lose a hand. I wake up, my hand is still bandaged and numb from the operation, so I'm still in doubt about whether I have a hand, i.e., I don't know that I have my left hand. The bandages are removed, and I see (sensory observation) that my hand was not removed during the operation. I now know, based on what? How did I make sure? What is the justification? Lo and behold, I still have a hand!

Science also makes use of sensory observations in terms of what they claim to know. They observe experiments, and write down their observations. They make discoveries of new planets based on what they SAW through their telescopes. How do you know there is a planet in such-and-such a place? I observed it, and you can observe it too, look and see. These are not subjective observations. They can be objectively verified. The same is true in my orange juice is sweet example. How do I know the orange juice is sweet? I tasted it. Here, you can taste it too. Ahh, yes it's sweet, or no, it's not sweet. Obviously if others taste the orange juice and it's not sweet, then the person wasn't justified in making the claim that it was sweet. Just like scientists can verify a claim that such-and-such is planet, i.e., others can observe (see) whether the claim is true (objective verification) - making sure. Many claims are justified in just this way.

It would be ludicrous to claim that sensory experiences are not acceptable methods of justification. Obviously this doesn't mean that we accept every sensory observation, but generally it's true that we can rely on sensory observations as a perfectly acceptable method of knowledge.

As usual we're just too far apart on these issues. — Sam26

Don't you see this as a big problem for any epistemology? What "justify" means for me is completely different from what it means for you. Isn't it absolutely necessary to have some form of agreement on word usage in order to have any success in epistemology?

It appears to me like you want to take such agreement for granted, "here is a hand", "I live on the earth", etc.. That we agree on these things, you want to take for granted. My argument is that we ought not take such agreement for granted, that in reality this agreement must be created, established, maintained, and this is not a simple thing. The Catholic Inquisition (as misguided as it was) was begun as a direct attempt to restrict language usage; belief and word usage are closely tied. Sure, the epistemologist might be inclined to take some fundamental principles of word usage for granted, as you are, but my argument is that this "taking for granted" creates an illusion of necessity, and behind this illusion hides the true nature of language use and knowledge, as contingent. The claim that some things cannot be doubted creates the illusion that they are necessary, when they are not.

It is natural that the epistemologist will seek something "necessary" as the foundation of knowledge, which would ground and support all the conceptual structures of the human mind, but that necessity is not to be found in language use, by the very nature of language use.. So we must push deeper into the habits of the human mind in order to locate this fundamental necessity.

I copied all of the conversations from philosophyforums and I was getting PTSD reading MU's responses. - roflol - I had to take some meds. — Sam26

I'm sorry for any unnecessary stress. From my perspective though, I see that sometimes people get very stuck in their own way of seeing things, and you need to hit them over the head with a brick or something to make them see that there are other ways, completely different ways, of seeing the very same thing. Each of the different ways may be true and valid, though they appear inconsistent at the fringes. But that they are different, yet true, indicates that no one single perspective is complete. So we must approach the different perspectives of the different human beings, as if each perspective is as valid as our own, despite the inconsistencies at the fringes.

The point is that we need to be able to distinguish between the two, viz., those that are understood in terms of justification, and those that fall outside any need for justification. — Sam26

So this is my problem right here. Why ought we assume that some statements fall outside the need for justification? We are talking epistemology here, and knowledge is assumed to be justified true belief. So if a statement falls outside justification, then what that statement says cannot, by definition, be considered to be knowledge.

The answer to this question lies in another question, "Does it make sense to doubt the claim?" — Sam26

Since these statements fall outside the need for justification, and therefore are not knowledge, then it clearly makes sense, to doubt them.

If you follow my argument, then you ought to see that Wittgenstein has gone wrong at this point. The statements which are "outside the need for justification" cannot be knowledge because knowledge requires justification, and since they are not knowledge, doubt concerning them is warranted. If we do doubt them, then they may in fact become justified, and be admitted as knowledge. But we cannot allow that something unjustified, or unjustifiable, is the foundation of knowledge, when knowledge specifically requires justification. If those things are outside justification, then they are outside of epistemology as well, and cannot be allowed within until they are justified.

So no statement is beyond doubt. And if in common usage we allow such things, and we allow people to say "I know this", or "I know that", without proper justification, then they are using "know" in a less restrictive way than the epistemologist would use "know" as defined by justified true belief.

How do you know there is a planet in such-and-such a place? I observed it, and you can observe it too, look and see. These are not subjective observations. They can be objectively verified. — Sam26

It appears like you haven't really considered what I said about justification. To say "I observed it" does not justify the claim. To explain where and how it was observed, such that another person can observe it as well, is to justify the claim. The statement "I observed it" adds nothing more to the claim, and therefore cannot possibly justify it. To justify it requires a demonstration, explanation, or description of exactly what you observed, which is used to support your statement of claim.

Moore is standing before an audience raising his hand and makes the statement that this is a hand, i.e., that he knows it's a hand. But what would a doubt here look like? — Sam26

Now consider this example again. Moore stands before the audience, holds up his hand, and says "this is a hand". He is not making a statement of claim, "I know that this is a hand", he is making a proposition, and supporting it with a demonstration. This thing I am holding up is what I call a "hand". If the audience accepts this proposition, without objection, then he is justified in calling that thing a hand. If he was holding up a foot, the audience would probably reject the proposition.

However, it is not necessary that the audience accepts Moore's proposition, "this is a hand". They may, for one reason or another reject this proposition, and that's the point I'm trying to make. You would say, following Wittgenstein, that there is no reason to reject, or doubt this, but I disagree. We might for instance ask Moore to be more specific. He is holding up his entire arm, and saying this is a hand. Is his arm a hand? His wrist? His fingers? What exactly is he referring to with "hand"? We don't ask these things because in this example it is unimportant, we take it for granted that there is a hand there somewhere, exactly where it begins and ends, we might not really know, but we do not care. If he is to proceed forward with this knowledge though, of what a hand is, and apply it toward logical proceedings, to gain further knowledge, he may need to address these questions.

Suppose he starts talking about the bones in his wrist, as if they are part of his hand, and some people are confused because they are trying to locate these bones in the palm. That is why I argue that as a principle of epistemology, the usage of the terminology must be justified for each application according to the circumstances of the application. We cannot just assume that there are some words whose meaning we take for granted, and therefore the meaning of these words does not need to be justified, because this will result in ambiguity and very sloppy epistemology.

The PTSD comment was a joke. lol

The PTSD comment was a joke. lol — Sam26

Thanks for the reassurance. I was pretty sure that it was meant solely as a joke, but it would have been very poor etiquette for me to have laughed if it wasn't completely a joke.

I like to lighten things up, a lot of people are just too serious. Life's too short.

I agree, but we generally all take what we say seriously, though we tend to lighten things up now and then with jokes. For some reason though, if someone's joke is taken seriously, we brush it off as a mistake of misunderstanding, but if someone's seriousness is taken as a joke, it turns out to be an insult.

Not that this refers to you, but some people like to hover along the division between being serious and being joking. If they are always joking then they should never get offended, but they are never always joking, so they always end up getting offended.

Nice OP Sam...

Very similar to my own views, although I find that our ontology regarding belief is remarkably different, particularly with regard to the role that language has in thought and belief.

:(

Forums are like that sometimes.

I see that sometimes people get very stuck in their own way of seeing things, and you need to hit them over the head with a brick or something to make them see that there are other ways, completely different ways, of seeing the very same thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

So true. I hope you take your own advice...

Since these statements fall outside the need for justification, and therefore are not knowledge, then it clearly makes sense, to doubt them. — Metaphysician Undercover

Think I will sit back and watch.

I see these other different ways, and I accept them. Sam's way of seeing things is not incompatible with mine they are actually very similar. The problem I have is that Sam wants to draw an absolutely arbitrary line between what is and is not reasonable to doubt. And since this line is arbitrary I see no reason to respect it. In fact, the line seems more hypothetical than anything else, and I see it as hindering rather than enhancing understanding.

The way I see it is that we have to decide with each instance of usage, whether or not it is reasonable to doubt what has been said. This requires that we start with the assumption that any statement is potentially doubted. If we start with the assumption that some statements are not doubtable then we approach with a prejudice, and will not be inclined to decide with each instance of usage, whether or not the statement ought to be doubted.

Just remind me about how you deal with the obvious circularity: should you doubt that you ought doubt every statement?

Don't you see this as a big problem for any epistemology? What "justify" means for me is completely different from what it means for you. Isn't it absolutely necessary to have some form of agreement on word usage in order to have any success in epistemology? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, it's important to understand what it means to justify a belief, and I'm not sure we can come to any agreement on a general definition. I'm with Wittgenstein when it comes to understanding the meanings of words, viz., that how we use words tells us much more about correct usage than looking at a definition. I look at definitions simply as guides, but not the be all and end all of meaning. So my examples of justification point to the many uses of the word in various language-games. That said, a very simple definition is that a belief is justified if there are good reasons or good evidence to support the belief.

Getting back to sensory experiences, do our sensory experiences give us reasons or evidence to believe, for example that the desk is hard by touching it. If someone asks me how I know the desk is hard, my evidence for the claim is that I touched it. You can either accept the claim, based on the knowledge that most people don't make false claims about the hardness of desks, and most people know the difference between a hard surface and one that's not hard.

I think we should try to address the justification problem first, and we should also try to keep the posts limited to a couple of paragraphs if possible. It's much easier for people to follow.

Thanks Creative. My ontology of a belief is that it starts pre-linguistically, so it tends to be broader in its scope.