Scientism, the view that science can explain all human conditions and expressions, mental as well as physical, is a superstition, one of the dominant superstitions of our day; and it is not an insult to science to say so. — Wayfarer

Scientism, as here defined is as here described. But is that the criticism? Of a word? If it's about scientism, then no complaint here - but also who cares? The author says it's "no insult to science." But if its a stealth/covert attack on science, then the argument is an utter straw man, and as such worse by virtue of misdirection than a complete waste of time.

Is it about science? Let's rather discuss science. Is science a superstition? Does any reputable scientist claim that science will someday explain - what ever that means - everything? (And maybe someday it won't be a "superstition" but a fact!)

I'm intrigued that Leon W should have taken such a dislike to Dennett's 'Breaking the Spell' book. I borrowed it from the library a few years back and recall finding it surprisingly gentle and non-dogmatic. Perhaps my expectations had been set too much along the lines of fiery anti-religious diatribes, because so many commentators had grouped Dennett with Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens and Sam Harris, all of whom are dogmatic and arrogant (although I forgive Hitchens his arrogance because he was also very perceptive and funny).

I didn't find Dennett's book arrogant at all. To me it read like a collaborative exploration of possibilities. I was surprised to find later on that some of his other writing - particularly that on consciousness - is quite dogmatic. I felt that the accusations of scientism and reductionism could fairly be levelled at his writing on consciousness, but not at Breaking the Spell.

Perhaps I'm not remembering the book very well. Can you quote pieces you found particularly scientistic or reductionist? I couldn't see any in the review you linked. Indeed I though it was a sloppy, tendentious review, partly because most of the reviewer's opinions about what Dennett thinks were supported by paraphrases rather than actual quotes.

Is it about science? — tim wood

No, it's about 'the question of the place of science in human life'. It often occupies a de facto role of moral normativity to which it is not entitled.

Can you quote pieces you found particularly scientistic or reductionist? — andrewk

Dennett's life-work is scientistic and reductionist. By all accounts he's a very nice person, and also great company, good teacher, excellent jazz piano player, but in my view this is in spite of his philosophy, not because of it.

That's simplistic and dismissive. Where has your principle of charity gone?

I don't think you could describe anybody's life work as 'scientistic and reductionist' - not even Richard Dawkins. After all, Dawkins did plenty of actual biology, which has nothing to do with Scientism or Reductionism, both of which are philosophies.

I probably dislike Christian apologists like William Craig as much as you dislike Dawkins but although I find Craig a terrible philosopher, I would not go so far as to dismiss his life work as 'apologetics' or in fact as anything. A person's life's work is a many-splendoured thing. Even Craig has done some things that I would find admirable - becoming fluent in German being one of them.

I repeat that I found 'Breaking the Spell' not at all scientistic or reductionist, in contrast to writings such as 'Consciousness Explained', which were. Unsubstantiated sweeping statements won't change that.

No, it's about 'the question of the place of science in human life'. It often occupies a de facto role of moral normativity to which it is not entitled. — Wayfarer

The second sentence is easy to understand, if you're careful to avoid trying to understand it. But I'm having trouble understanding it, and I'm trying to understand it. Maybe I shouldn't try?

Does it mean the that sometimes science "occupies a de facto role of moral normativity" to which it is entitled? Does it mean that some people sometimes consult their own understanding of something of science (or science itself?) to inform their own decisions about what is mainly a moral question, and that sometimes they're wrong to do so, and sometimes right? Or perhaps sometimes should not do so, and sometimes should? Or is it all categorical?

Where has your principle of charity gone? — andrewk

An ad hominem defense!

But anyway, according to Dennett, charity is really only one of the many devices by which the gene seeks to replicate itself. You may think that 'being charitable' is virtuous, but this is an illusion, created by the Darwinian processes of survival, the real intention of which is always the same thing:

Dennett, in one of his characteristic remarks, says that 'through the microscope of molecular biology, we get to witness the birth of agency, in the first macromolecules that have enough complexity to "do things." ... There is something alien and vaguely repellent about the quasi-agency we discover at this level — all that purposive hustle and bustle, and yet there’s nobody home.' Then, after describing a marvelous bit of highly organized and seemingly meaningful biological activity, he concludes:

'Love it or hate it, phenomena like this exhibit the heart of the power of the Darwinian idea. An impersonal, unreflective, robotic, mindless little scrap of molecular machinery is the ultimate basis of all the agency, and hence meaning, and hence consciousness, in the universe'.

Daniel Dennett, from Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life, quoted in Steve Talbott, Evolution and the Illusion of Randomness The New Atlantis

Charity is no exception, although if it makes you feel good then by all means you should engage in it, but know that there's nothing intrinsically good about it.

(By the way, I am not a defender of William Lane Craig. As far as current Christian philosophers go, I much prefer David Bentley Hart and Keith Ward.)

Or is it all categorical? — tim wood

No, it isn't categorical. There are any number of things about which it is essential to consult the science, that's not at issue.

Huh? I asked for evidence for your accusation that 'Breaking the Spell' is scientistic and reductionist, and you provide a quote from a completely different book.

How is that relevant?

I repeat that I found 'Breaking the Spell' not at all scientistic or reductionist, in contrast to writings such as 'Consciousness Explained', which were. — andrewk

Well, fair enough. When I read it, around the time of that review, how it struck me was of a piece with all of Dennett's other work, which is invariably 'scientistic' and reductionist. He is not known as an 'eliminative materialist' for no reason.

No, it isn't categorical. There are any number of things about which it is essential to consult the science, that's not at issue. — Wayfarer

Essential to consult the science appropriately, yes? Am I missing it? Isn't the question about when that consultation is appropriate and when not appropriate?

Perhaps you were prejudiced against it by reading that review, which as I said is very low quality (and more like a sermon than a review).

When Dennett is in reductionist mode he is trying to explain away things like consciousness in terms of subatomic particles. I started reading 'Breaking the Spell' expecting that sort of thing, and was surprised to find that there wasn't any. It was more like anthropology, wondering about why people feel religious and how the phenomenon of religion grows to have such a powerful hold on so many people. As I recall it was speculative, undogmatic, and not pretending to be science.

If there was a section that went into battle against arguments for the existence of god, or mounted arguments for her nonexistence, I either missed it or do not recall it. Ditto for sections that purport to explain consciousness or the origin of life.

OK, I didn't really start this thread to re-discuss the issues that caused me to quote from the review that I started the thread with, but as we're now discussing them, then I will try and respond in some detail.

My objection to Daniel Dennett's philosophical attitude, is that he is a well-known representative of scientific materialism, and also of eliminative materialism. This is the radical claim 'that our ordinary, common-sense understanding of the mind is deeply wrong and that some or all of the mental states posited by common-sense do not actually exist.' (S.E.P.)

In addition, Dennett is well known as one of the so-called 'Four Horsemen' of new atheism (the others being Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens [now deceased] and Richard Dawkins.



The reason I refer to Wieseltier's review of Breaking the Spell, in particular, is not in regard to that specific book, but as a critique of those elements of Dennett's work, which is an epitome of what philosopher Thomas Nagel called 'neo-Darwinian materialism' in his 2012 book, Mind and Cosmos, about which I also started a thread recently. So that is what lead to this question:

Isn't the question about when that consultation (with science) is appropriate and when not appropriate? — tim wood

The Wikipedia definition of 'scientism' is:

Scientism: a term generally used to describe the application of science in unwarranted situations not covered by the scientific method.

In philosophy of science, the term "scientism" frequently implies a critique of the more extreme expressions of logical positivism and has been used by social scientists such as Friedrich Hayek,[3] philosophers of science such as Karl Popper, and philosophers such as Hilary Putnam[5] and Tzvetan Todorov[6] to describe (for example) the dogmatic endorsement of scientific methodology and the reduction of all knowledge to only that which is measured or confirmatory.

**

When Dennett is in reductionist mode he is trying to explain away things like consciousness in terms of subatomic particles. I started reading 'Breaking the Spell' expecting that sort of thing, and was surprised to find that there wasn't any. — andrewk

But, a naturalistic account of religion can't help but be reductionistic, right? I agree, the book is written in a friendly tone, and seems non-dogmatic and helpful, but the central idea that 'religion' (which Dennett defines narrowly, i.e. as a belief in a supernatural being of a personal nature) can be explained in terms other than its own, must necessarily be reductionist.

Not all books about religion by non-religious authors are reductionist. Consider Max Weber, for instance, whose 'Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism' is a justly famous work. I'm sure are many others by sociologists and anthropologists which provide insights and perspectives into religions. But Dennett can't help but be reductionist about the question, due to his uncompromising allegiance to what he elsewhere called 'Darwin's Dangerous Idea', which he compares to a 'universal acid' that 'eats everything it comes into contact with'. But, all that said:

Perhaps you were prejudiced against it by reading that review, which as I said is very low quality (and more like a sermon than a review). — andrewk

That is why I have created this thread, namely, 'The Sins of Leon Wieseltier'. In that critique of Wieseltier, Epstein does indeed accuse Wieseltier of exactly that kind of sermonising. So, definitely concede that is an element. But, I still think many of his criticisms are warranted.

Also a bit of a back-story - what got me interested in philosophy forums, was the publication of The God Delusion by Dawkins. He said that he hoped that a 'theist' would pick up that book, and put it down an atheist. I'm afraid it rather the opposite effect on me: I found the polemics of all the 'new atheists' so odious, that it mobilised me in the opposite direction. I do acknowledge I probably spend too much time on these issues, but that is the background.

Incidentally, speaking of 'definitions of religion' - notoriously difficult though they might be - I found a pretty good start on Maverick Philosopher's blog:

The need for salvation, for those who feel it, is paramount among human needs. The need for salvation depends on two simpler ideas:

a) There is a paramount end or aim of human life relative to which other aims are vain.

b) Man as he now is, or naturally is, is in danger of missing his highest aim, his highest good.

To hold that man needs salvation is to hold both of (a) and (b). I would put it like this. The religious person perceives our present life, or our natural life, as radically deficient, deficient from the root (radix) up, as fundamentally unsatisfactory; he feels it to be, not a mere condition, but a predicament; it strikes him as vain or empty if taken as an end in itself; he sees himself as homo viator, as a wayfarer or pilgrim treading a via dolorosa through a vale that cannot possibly be a final and fitting resting place; he senses or glimpses from time to time the possibility of a Higher Life; he feels himself in danger of missing out on this Higher Life of true happiness. If this doesn't strike a chord in you, then I suggest you do not have a religious disposition. Some people don't, and it cannot be helped. One cannot discuss religion with them, for it cannot be real to them. It is not, for them, what William James in "The Will to Believe" calls a "living option," let alone a "forced" or "momentous" one.

I don't much care for the word 'salvation' myself - I prefer 'liberation' - but aside from that, this pretty well describes what I understand as the meaning of 'religion'. And notice that it doesn't necessarily rely on a belief in a personal God, as the same passage could be accepted by many Buddhists.

But, a naturalistic account of religion can't help but be reductionistic, right? — Wayfarer

No, I don't agree to that at all. One can be the world's most spiritual person and yet regard all the world's organised religions as a load of bunk that gained currency through a combination of filling a psychological yearning and the exercise of temporal power.

Indeed I wonder whether somebody like Krishnamurti might fit that description reasonably well, and he certainly wasn't a reductionist.

Dennett is an atheist making speculations about why people are religious but it occurred to me as I read his speculations in that book that they could just as easily have been written by a SBNR person. Maybe they could even have been written by an adherent of a semi-organised but non-anthropomorphising religion such as Buddhism.

I think this is relevant because I think the accusation of scientism or reductionism is thrown around far too readily these days. Claiming without evidence that deeply mysterious things like consciousness must somehow be the product of interactions of particles is scientistic and reductionist. Suggesting that Christianity and Islam may have obtained their extraordinary spread and power because of psychological, sociological and geo-political factors rather than because they contain some deep metaphysical truth is not.

One can be the world's most spiritual person and yet regard all the world's organised religions as a load of bunk that gained currency through a combination of filling a psychological yearning and the exercise of temporal power. — andrewk

Beliefs get their validity because of personal prerogative - individuals deserve respect as they have a right to believe as they wish - but religion itself doesn’t. Similar point came up with our debate about Islam earlier this year.

Suggesting that Christianity and Islam may have obtained their extraordinary spread and power because of psychological, sociological and geo-political factors rather than because they contain some deep metaphysical truth is not. — andrewk

‘Social factors in addition to’ a metaphysical basis would not be reductionist, but denying a metaphysical basis is reductionist.

‘Social factors in addition to’ a metaphysical basis would not be reductionist, but denying a metaphysical basis is reductionist. — Wayfarer

Really? For all religions, or just some?

What think you of the metaphysical basis for Scientology?

Is a Christian that denies the metaphysical basis of Islam reductionist?

Is it about science? Let's rather discuss science. Is science a superstition? — tim wood

Of course not. It's a valid study. In particular, physical science is a valid study and (best yet available) description of physical things and events in the physical universe.

Scientificism isn't science. It's pseudoscience.

Criticicizing Scientificism isn't criticizing science.

I call it "Scientificism" instead of "Scientism" because: What you call a believer in Scientism? A Scientist? No, that word already has a different meaning: A practitioner of science.

So I'd say that a Scientificist is a believer in Scientificism.

Does any reputable scientist claim that science will someday explain - what ever that means - everything?

Probably a few, wouldn't you say? The fact that someone is highly qualified in science doesn't necessarily mean that you should listen to him about philosophy. ...but it doesn't mean that you shouldn't. Michael Faraday, in 1844, was evidently the first Westerner to get it right about metaphysics.

But there might be some scientists who are Scientificists. Look at the scientists interviewed by Kuhn, on Closer to Truth. Many (most or all?) of them seem to think that science has the metaphysical answers.
..

(And maybe someday it won't be a "superstition" but a fact!)

Scientificism? :D

Michael Ossipoff

Claiming without evidence that deeply mysterious things like consciousness must somehow be the product of interactions of particles is scientistic and reductionist. — andrewk

Do you have an alternative to propose? At the heart of this claim I suppose is the failure to make clear a distinction between being something and being a product of something. (And with its "must somehow be" I hear more an appeal than a claim.)

I think we can agree that consciousness is a something, and that being a something is probably a result of something. If the somethings that cause consciousness don't themselves appear to be consciousness, what is remarkable about that? I do agree, though, that some explanations miss the spirit of the thing explained. But that is not an intrinsic flaw, rather a sign that the explanation is not comprehensive, inclusive, and exhaustive. In defense of such explanations, they have to start somewhere. Mature thought acknowledges, recognizes and accepts them for what they are, and not for what they are not.

Does any reputable scientist claim that science will someday explain - what ever that means - everything?

Probably a few, wouldn't you say? — Michael Ossipoff

Reputable scientists? I think rather few or none.

Social factors in addition to’ a metaphysical basis would not be reductionist, but denying a metaphysical basis is reductionist.
— Wayfarer


Really? For all religions, or just some?

What think you of the metaphysical basis for Scientology?

Is a Christian that denies the metaphysical basis of Islam reductionist? — andrewk

My point is, to insist that religions can be explained naturalistically is obviously to deny their central claim of a reality ‘above nature’ (i.e. ‘supernatural’). A lot of people - hey, even Krishnamurti - say nowadays that ‘man invented God’, and I guess I can see some truth in it. But ultimately I think what is happening, is that religions are records of the human encounter with the sacred, which is not something explicable in naturalistic terms. If that makes me ‘a believer’, then so be it.

The basis for the fake ‘religion’ of scientology is not metaphysical but sociological, but if the naturalistic accounts were correct, then so that would be so of all the spiritual traditions.

In terms of a generalised account of the universal intuition of the sacred, Rudolf Otto’s book ‘The Idea of the Holy’, is a standard text.

At the heart of this claim I suppose is the failure to make clear a distinction between being something and being a product of something. — tim wood

That is a fundamental point, and one that is mostly forgotten nowadays. In ancient philosophy, the basis of ontology was that the foundation or ground of reality was ‘the uncreated’. This intuition manifests in numerous forms, but the underlying idea is that ‘what is subject to change’ is of a lower order to what is not; which is the intuition of the ‘temporal’ as against ‘the eternal’. In many respects, ancient philosophy was the quest for the eternal, for the discovery of something beyond change and decay.

One of the solutions to that problem was atomism. The atom - uncuttable, eternal and uncreated - was at the same time, at the heart of the world of change. This is what gave atomism such explanatory power which animated materialism. However with Einstein’s discovery of matter-energy equivalence, and also with the discovery of fields, the atomistic model has been superseded (notwithstanding that most people still think in terms of the Universe being ‘made of atoms’.)

At any rate, the modern mind-body problem is mainly the consequence of Cartesian dualism, and reactions to it. But the archaic formulation of the relationship between ‘the unmade’ and ‘the manifest domain’ has generally been lost, except for in those remnants of traditionalist philosophy that still exist in the modern world, such as Thomism and some schools of Buddhism.

But, a naturalistic account of religion can't help but be reductionistic, right? I agree, the book is written in a friendly tone, and seems non-dogmatic and helpful, but the central idea that 'religion' (which Dennett defines narrowly, i.e. as a belief in a supernatural being of a personal nature) can be explained in terms other than its own, must necessarily be reductionist. — Wayfarer

The claim that any naturalistic account of religion must also be reductionistic is the very claim I questioned you on in the other thread, by asking if you think this applies to so-called 'process theologies', since process theologies are not religion-as-belief-in-a-supernatural being at all. In any case you never answered the question or provided any argument for your sweeping claim.

Not all books about religion by non-religious authors are reductionist. — Wayfarer

And here you seem to be contradicting yourself, at least if those accounts by the non-reductionistic "non-religious authors" are understood to be naturalistic accounts.

The claim that any naturalistic account of religion must also be reductionistic is the very claim I questioned you on in the other thread, by asking if you think this applies to so-called 'process theologies', since process theologies are not religion-as-belief-in-a-supernatural being at all. — Janus

If they’re not, then how are they theologies at all?

Personally I think ‘supernatural’ gets a bad rap, it’s become a boo-word, something which no respectable person ought to believe or accept. We’ve drawn this tight boundary around ‘the natural’ as if ‘the natural’ is something self-contained, self-explanatory or thoroughly understood, when it’s clearly not.

The non-reductionist theories about religion may examine various sociological or anthropological dimensions of religious cultures, without claiming to have explained the origin of those religions in sociological or naturalistic terms.

If they’re not, then how are they theologies at all? — Wayfarer

Why not? Are you at all familiar with Whitehead's or Hartshorne's theologies? Even Spinoza's God is not a supernatural God, it is "deus sive natura": God or Nature. What do you think the concept of a supernatural God necessarily consists in: what are the essential characteristics of such a God?

The non-reductionist theories about religion may examine various sociological or anthropological dimensions of religious cultures, without claiming to have explained the origin of those religions in sociological or naturalistic terms. — Wayfarer

Then they are not really "books about religion" or " theories about religion", but descriptive accounts of religious social practices.

Whitehead and Hartsthorne - I’ve read a little (mainly due to Prothero). I’ve given up on Spinoza - I did a semester on him in undergraduate studies but I’ve decided I’ll never understand him.

But one reason I am not committed to naturalism is that I accept the theistic argument that ‘nature doesn’t contain its ground or explanation’. I think this is demonstrably the case, even with regard to current science. So I am inclined to favour the arguments of natural theology over their opponents. But, that said, I know that I don’t know, and that the argument can’t be settled one way or the other.

Notice the definition in this post that I found on Maverick Philosopher’s blog. It gives what I consider a fair account; it’s what has always motivated my search, it even mentions my nickname! X-)

But one reason I am not committed to naturalism is that I accept the theistic argument that ‘nature doesn’t contain its ground or explanation’. — Wayfarer

Does supernature "contain its ground or explanation"? If so, what might that be? At some point, we may well just bump up against brute facts, right? Is supernaturalism allowed brute facts, but naturalism is not? If so, what would be the justification for this claim?

So I am inclined to favour the arguments of natural theology over their opponents. But, that said, I know that I don’t know, and that the argument can’t be settled one way or the other. — Wayfarer

No offense, but you have screamed bloody murder of the position of some scientists (e.g. Dawkins) who have claimed that the existence of God can be investigated on scientific grounds. And now you profess sympathy for natural theology...which purports to demonstrate God's existence on scientific grounds. So, is your position that such investigation is acceptable only if one believes in an affirmative answer to the question? I know you say that no definitive resolution can be reached, but this is nevertheless something of a double standard, wouldn't you say?

Does supernature "contain its ground or explanation"? If so, what might that be? — Arkady

I recall many prior conversations with your good self about 'the ground of being', in terms of Paul Tillich, Pseudo-Dionysius, the Christian mystical tradition, and so on. Deep questions.

The point about the naturalist approach, however, is that 'naturalism assumes nature'. That sounds obviously a truism, but here's what I mean. Natural philosophy, which is what science used to be called, observes the behaviours and entities and forces that are found in nature. Actually, borrowing a term from Francis Bacon, it does more than 'observe' - it puts nature 'on the rack' by way of such devices as the LHC. But always, it's us here, the scientist, examining that there, the animal, or the atom, or whatever. There's the entire vast domain of scientific analysis.

But the philosophical quest for the understanding of the ground of being, is of a different order to that. It is concerned with understanding reality as lived. For instance, from the SEP entry on Schopenhauer:

It is a perennial philosophical reflection that if one looks deeply enough into oneself, one will discover not only one’s own essence, but also the essence of the universe. For as one is a part of the universe as is everything else, the basic energies of the universe flow through oneself, as they flow through everything else. For that reason it is thought that one can come into contact with the nature of the universe if one comes into substantial contact with one’s ultimate inner being.

Among the most frequently-identified principles that are introspectively brought forth — and one that was the standard for German Idealist philosophers such as Fichte, Schelling and Hegel who were philosophizing within the Cartesian tradition — is the principle of self-consciousness. With the belief that acts of self-consciousness exemplify a self-creative process akin to divine creation, and developing a logic that reflects the structure of self-consciousness, namely, the dialectical logic of position, opposition and reconciliation (sometimes described as the logic of thesis, antithesis and synthesis), the German Idealists maintained that dialectical logic mirrors the structure not only of human productions, both individual and social, but the structure of reality as a whole, conceived of as a thinking substance or conceptually-structured-and-constituted entity.

(Actually I'm reading a study by Dermot Moran, on the influence of the monastic scholastic Eriugena on the origin of German idealism - will report back later.)

And now you profess sympathy for natural theology...which purports to demonstrate God's existence on the basis of scientific grounds. — Arkady

Not demonstrate - only suggest.

For instance, from the SEP entry on Schopenhauer: — Wayfarer

Nothing in that quote really answers my question, sorry. I don't even see what it has to do with supernaturalism, specifically.

Not demonstrate - only suggest. — Wayfarer

What does "suggest" mean? In my experience, a "suggestion" of something (as it is used in this context) is akin to a hint, or a weak form of evidence. Does empirical investigation provide evidence for or against the existence of God? Does it justify claims to the effect of "God [does/doesn't] exist"? If not, then what is the "suggestion" which you speak of here? If so, why do you have a bee in your bonnet about Dawkins and likeminded folks who also believe that empirical investigation can shed light on the existence of God (albeit coming at it from another angle)?

Does empirical investigation provide evidence for or against the existence of God? Does it justify claims to the effect of "God [does/doesn't] exist"? If not, then what is the "suggestion" which you speak of here? If so, why do you have a bee in your bonnet about Dawkins and likeminded folks who also believe that empirical investigation can shed light on the existence of God (albeit coming at it from another angle)? — Arkady

I suppose it's a case of abductive inference - arguing from effect to cause. I prefer the traditional belief that 'the heavens bespeak the divine word' to the opposite. But I can't make the leap from there to 'therefore the Bible is the Revealed Word of God', as I am by no means exclusively attached to the JC tradition.

But one thing I will say is that the belief that it is not God, or the requirement to exclude any such idea from consideration, has consequences. For example, there's the role attributed to chance - that living organisms are essentially the outcome of chance and physical necessity, that life is a cosmic accident. Scientists, generally, are concerned with disclosing causal relationships - yet curiously, when it comes to why evolution has produced intelligent self-aware beings capable of asking such questions, they are silent; we're simply the outcome of an algorithmic process rather like a chemical reaction, which in this case, has happened to result in h.sapiens . But in what other field of science would that be accepted as amounting to an hypothesis?

Nevertheless, the question is beyond the scope of empiricism, by definition. Maybe if we found a bunch of other life-bearing planets, and found they were inhabited by beings somewhat like us, and not like the denizens of a Star Wars bar, then perhaps we'd be obliged to re-consider. But I don't see it happening in my lifetime.

have a bee in your bonnet — Arkady

I'm performing the modest public service of showing up the fallacies in Dawkins' anti-religious polemics.

I suppose it's a case of abductive inference - arguing from effect to cause. I prefer the traditional belief that 'the heavens bespeak the divine word' to the opposite. But I can't make the leap from there to 'therefore the Bible is the Revealed Word of God', as I am by no means exclusively attached to the JC tradition. — Wayfarer

I didn't say anything about the Bible or the Judeo-Christian tradition; I was asking about the existence of God. Is it that nature provides "suggestions" to the effect that God exists, or is it merely that you prefer that belief to its contrary? If the former, then I'd ask again what "suggestion" means in this context, because it seems a lot like "basis for rational belief," "justification," "evidence," and the usual accoutrements of abductive reasoning (the sort of reasoning employed by scientists, you will recall).

If the latter, then I'd ask what your preferences have to do with what is true or false?

But one thing I will say is that the belief that it is not God, or the requirement to exclude any such idea from consideration, has consequences. For example, there's the role attributed to chance - that living organisms are essentially the outcome of chance and physical necessity, that life is a cosmic accident. Scientists, generally, are concerned with disclosing causal relationships - yet curiously, when it comes to why evolution has produced intelligent self-aware beings capable of asking such questions, they are silent; we're simply the outcome of an algorithmic process rather like a chemical reaction, which in this case, has happened to result in h.sapiens . But in what other field of science would that be accepted as amounting to an hypothesis?

Ok, we've been over this before. I don't say this to be condescending, but you honestly do sometimes seem incapable of imbibing information which goes against your set viewpoints. For the umpteenth time, evolutionary biologists do not regard life or the adaptive features thereof as an "accident." Dawkins goes positively apeshit when anyone characterizes his position thus; he does not believe that.

Furthermore (another thing we've covered, albeit fewer times, probably), evolutionary biology is not divested of causal relationships (how could it be, if there is to be any meaningful link between environment and phenotype?). It simply posits that life and the adaptive features thereof are a product of random variation and non-random selection. As I've said before, science does not eschew chance: on the contrary, it is the default position (i.e. null hypothesis) in the context of hypothesis testing! So, to answer the final question in your above paragraph: every other field of science!

Nevertheless, the question is beyond the scope of empiricism, by definition. Maybe if we found a bunch of other life-bearing planets, and found they were inhabited by beings somewhat like us, and not like the denizens of a Star Wars bar, then perhaps we'd be obliged to re-consider. But I don't see it happening in my lifetime.

Um, what would such a thing prove about the existence of God?

I didn't say anything about the Bible or the Judeo-Christian tradition; I was asking about the existence of God. — Arkady

To what does one refer in relation to the nature of God, if not that? It is the background of this entire debate.

For the umpteenth time, evolutionary biologists do not regard life or the adaptive features thereof as an "accident." Dawkins goes positively apeshit when anyone characterizes his position thus; he does not believe that. — Arkady

I've read Dawkins' characterisation of chance in evolution, and I accept it. He says, iit is chance constrained by many other factors, so that in the context of evolutionary adaption, it's not simply random. I get that. But why living things exist in the first place, and why intelligent, self-aware beings evolve, is a different kind of question altogether. It's much more a question about telos, about whether there is a reason for living things, in a general sense, that is assumed by, for example, Aristotelian philosophy.

The book that spells out the viewpoint of evolutionary materialism is Jacques Monod's Chance and Necessity. He follows the implications of the non-intentional or non-purposive nature of life to its logical conclusion and in rigorous detail:

“It necessarily follows that chance alone is at the source of every innovation, and of all creation in the biosphere. Pure chance, absolutely free but blind, at the very root of the stupendous edifice of evolution: this central concept of modern biology is no longer one among many other possible or even conceivable hypotheses. It is today the sole conceivable hypothesis, the only one that squares with observed and tested fact. And nothing warrants the supposition - or the hope - that on this score our position is ever likely to be revised. There is no scientific concept, in any of the sciences, more destructive of anthropocentrism than this one.” — Monod

And, as far as that question of final causes is concerned, materialism must deny that there is anything of that kind, or any type of cause beyond the purely chemical or physical. So asking 'why' life exists in the first place, is a meaningless question, when looked at that way. And Dawkins definitely does believe that. The following is an excerpt from an exchange between a Bishop, George Pell, and Dawkins on a televised debate:

PELL: It’s part of being human to ask why we exist. Questioning distinguishes us from the animals. To ask why we're here, I repeat and this is a commonplace in science, science has nothing to say about that. …

RICHARD DAWKINS: The question why is not necessarily a question that deserves to be answered. There are all sorts of questions that people can ask like “What is the colour of jealousy?” That’s a silly question.

GEORGE PELL: Exactly.

RICHARD DAWKINS: “Why?” is a silly question. “Why?” is a silly question. You can ask, “What are the factors that led to something coming into existence?” That’s a sensible question. But “What is the purpose [of the] universe?” is a silly question. It has no meaning.

It's a clear indication that Dawkins' has no grasp of what is involved in the basic philosophical conundrum of 'why there is something rather than nothing'. He thinks it's a silly question.