To what does one refer in relation to the nature of God, if not that? It is the background of this entire debate. — Wayfarer

Someone needn't be Jewish or Christian to believe in God. One could be a non-denominational theist, a deist, a pantheist, etc.

I've read Dawkins' characterisation of chance in evolution, and I accept it. He says, iit is chance constrained by many other factors, so that in the context of evolutionary adaption, it's not simply random. I get that.

Ok. Is there any reason that you consistently mischaracterize Dawkins's position, then?

But why living things exist in the first place, and why intelligent, self-aware beings evolve, is a different kind of question altogether. It's much more a question about telos, about whether there is a reason for living things, in a general sense, that is assumed by, for example, Aristotelian philosophy.

But, in smuggling a "why" question into such matters you are presupposing what you set out to prove. Why not ask "how"? I see no reason at all that abiogenesis or the evolution of intelligence are not scientific matters. The evolution of, say, feathers, is a matter for science, is it not? Why should intelligence not be? Because we exult sentience (H. sapiens's defining feature, conveniently enough) over all else? So, too, might a sparrow exult feathers over all else, and proclaim that no "scientistic" philosophy could ever begin to pierce the eternal mystery of "why" birds have feathers.

Now, this is not to say that a natural history of intelligence is understood in much detail, only that there's no reason for ruling it out of bounds for a scientific discussion.

Is there any reason that you consistently mischaracterize Dawkins's position, then? — Arkady

I don’t believe I do.

I see no reason at all that abiogenesis or the evolution of intelligence are not scientific matters. The evolution of, say, feathers, is a matter for science, is it not? Why should intelligence not be? — Arkady

Well, back to the Wieseltier review that started this thread:

It will be plain that Dennett's approach to religion is contrived to evade religion's substance. He thinks that an inquiry into belief is made superfluous by an inquiry into the belief in belief. This is a very revealing mistake. You cannot disprove a belief unless you disprove its content. If you believe that you can disprove it any other way, by describing its origins or by describing its consequences, then you do not believe in reason. In this profound sense, Dennett does not believe in reason. He will be outraged to hear this, since he regards himself as a giant of rationalism. But the reason he imputes to the human creatures depicted in his book is merely a creaturely reason. Dennett's natural history does not deny reason, it animalizes reason. It portrays reason in service to natural selection, and as a product of natural selection. But if reason is a product of natural selection, then how much confidence can we have in a rational argument for natural selection? The power of reason is owed to the independence of reason, and to nothing else. (In this respect, rationalism is closer to mysticism than it is to materialism.) Evolutionary biology cannot invoke the power of reason even as it destroys it.

Bolds added.

I don’t believe I do. — Wayfarer

You don't believe you consistently misrepresent his position, or that you don't misrepresent it simpliciter? If the former, then we can debate that, if the latter, then that belief should be negated by our discussion in this thread alone.

Well, back to the Wieseltier review that started this thread:

It will be plain that Dennett's approach to religion is contrived to evade religion's substance. He thinks that an inquiry into belief is made superfluous by an inquiry into the belief in belief. This is a very revealing mistake. You cannot disprove a belief unless you disprove its content. If you believe that you can disprove it any other way, by describing its origins or by describing its consequences, then you do not believe in reason. In this profound sense, Dennett does not believe in reason. He will be outraged to hear this, since he regards himself as a giant of rationalism. But the reason he imputes to the human creatures depicted in his book is merely a creaturely reason. Dennett's natural history does not deny reason, it animalizes reason. It portrays reason in service to natural selection, and as a product of natural selection. But if reason is a product of natural selection, then how much confidence can we have in a rational argument for natural selection? The power of reason is owed to the independence of reason, and to nothing else. (In this respect, rationalism is closer to mysticism than it is to materialism.) Evolutionary biology cannot invoke the power of reason even as it destroys it. — Wayfarer

Evolutionary arguments against naturalism are an interesting (IMO) and challenging area of inquiry to naturalistic theories of the evolution of intelligence. However, I'm not sure that appeals to supernaturalism, Aristolelian telos, or anything else really solves the problem, as ultimately we employ reason to analyze our reasoning faculties, whatever the origin or providence of said faculties is presumed to be. There may well be an inescapable circularity to such inquiries (albeit a very large circle, perhaps).

Does any reputable scientist claim that science will someday explain - what ever that means - everything?

"Probably a few, wouldn't you say?" — Michael Ossipoff


Reputable scientists? I think rather few or none. — tim wood

Well, listen to the scientists interviewed on Closer to Truth. They pretty much invariably give science as the answer to metaphysical questions.

And it's something that we regularly encounter elsewhere too. I'm not criticizing them--people in general have been taught that science has all the answers. With many or most people, Scientificism is now the official religion, and Materialism is the official metaphysics.

Every Materialist is a Scientificist, and vice-versa.

By the way, every Materialist is an Atheist, and every typical orthodox Atheist is a Materialist. (I'm not saying every Atheist here is a Materialist.)

Michael Ossipoff

Wieseltier, it seems, has been caught up in the slipstream of the Weinstein scandal — Wayfarer

Interesting. Even the great Searle has a harassment problem as you may know.

No, hadn’t heard that, although in the current climate, the question ‘who is next’ certainly looms large.

***

I don’t believe I do [misrepresent Richard Dawkins' position]

— Wayfarer

You don't believe you consistently misrepresent his position, or that you don't misrepresent it simpliciter? — Arkady

Dawkins is known for, not only being critical of religion, but also being deliberately insulting about it, by way of making the point that the reverence with which it is treated is unjustified. As Nagel says in his review of TGD, 'one of Dawkins’s aims is to overturn the convention of respect toward religion that belongs to the etiquette of modern civilization. He does this by persistently violating the convention, and being as offensive as possible.' He has now extended that behaviour to other targets, earning him approbation even from some earlier admirers.

So the fact that he is so routinely hostile about his targets, does provide a certain latitude to return serve in kind, I would have thought. But the really grave error that Dawkins makes is a much more serious matter. In that same panel discussion with Pell (incidentally, I thought Bishop Pell's performance on that occasion, as a representative of the Church, was lamentably poor), Dawkins is asked the question:

REBEKAH RAY: Okay, my question for you today is: without religion, where is the basis of our values and in time, will we perhaps revert back to Darwin's idea of survival of the fittest?

...

RICHARD DAWKINS: I very much hope that we don't revert to the idea of survival of the fittest in planning our politics and our values and our way of life. I have often said that I am a passionate Darwinian when it comes to explaining why we exist. It’s undoubtedly the reason why we're here and why all living things are here. But to live our lives in a Darwinian way, to make a society a Darwinian society, that would be a very unpleasant sort of society in which to live. It would be a sort of Thatcherite society and we want to - I mean, in a way, I feel that one of the reasons for learning about Darwinian evolution is as an object lesson in how not to set up our values and social lives.

Of course I perfectly agree with that statement, and believe it's commendable of him to say so. But the point which Dawkins doesn't seem to grasp is that, whilst he might agree that 'Darwinism is an appalling basis for a social philosophy', he has devoted enormous effort to methodically undermining the philosophical and spiritual foundations of Western culture, which might provide an alternative. I mean, I have seen nothing from Dawkins about a real alternative philosophy, save for a kind of starry-eyed wonder at the 'marvels of science' (and also, I have to say, at a sense of his own cleverness for being so very good at it.) Dawkins is a textbook case of scientism.

Furthermore, whereas the likes of Camus, Sartre, and Nietzsche - convinced atheists all - grappled with the implications of 'the death of God', Dawkins seems to show no awareness of its implications. As David Bentley Hart said in one of his OP's on 'the new atheism':

Nietzsche understood how immense the consequences of the rise of Christianity had been, and how immense the consequences of its decline would be as well, and had the intelligence to know he could not fall back on polite moral certitudes to which he no longer had any right. Just as the Christian revolution created a new sensibility by inverting many of the highest values of the pagan past, so the decline of Christianity, Nietzsche knew, portends another, perhaps equally catastrophic shift in moral and cultural consciousness. His famous fable in The Gay Science of the madman who announces God’s death is anything but a hymn of atheist triumphalism. In fact, the madman despairs of the mere atheists—those who merely do not believe—to whom he addresses his terrible proclamation. In their moral contentment, their ease of conscience, he sees an essential oafishness; they do not dread the death of God because they do not grasp that humanity’s heroic and insane act of repudiation has sponged away the horizon, torn down the heavens, left us with only the uncertain resources of our will with which to combat the infinity of meaninglessness that the universe now threatens to become.

Dennett, on the other hand, does at least acknowledge this. In a conference called Moving Naturalism Forward, the sense in which the 'acid of Darwin's dangerous idea' really is a threat to the social order was discussed:

Some of the biologists [on the panel] thought the materialist view of the world should be taught and explained to the wider public in its true, high-octane, Crickian form [a reference to Francis Crick, discoverer of DNA and author of The Astonishing Hypothesis, another materialist manifesto]. Then common, non-intellectual people might see that a purely random universe without purpose or free will or spiritual life of any kind isn’t as bad as some superstitious people—that is, religious people—have led them to believe.

Daniel Dennett took a different view. While it is true that materialism tells us a human being is nothing more than a “moist robot”—a phrase Dennett took from a Dilbert comic—we run a risk when we let this cat, or robot, out of the bag. If we repeatedly tell folks that their sense of free will or belief in objective morality is essentially an illusion, such knowledge has the potential to undermine civilization itself, Dennett believes. Civil order requires the general acceptance of personal responsibility, which is closely linked to the notion of free will. Better, said Dennett, if the public were told that “for general purposes” the self and free will and objective morality do indeed exist—that colors and sounds exist, too—“just not in the way they think.” They “exist in a special way" - which is to say, ultimately, not at all.

(The author of that review says 'I was reminded of the debate among British censors over the publication of Lady Chatterley’s Lover half a century ago. “Fine for you or me,” one prosecutor is said to have remarked, “but is this the sort of thing you would leave lying about for your wife or servant to read?”)

So, these two really don't seem to understand that they are actually blowing up the ethical foundations of Western culture, even though Dawkins freely admits that Darwinian theory is 'an appalling basis for a social theory'. At least Sam Harris has recognised this, by venturing a warmed-over utilitarianism based on neuroscience. Personally I don’t think highly of it, but at least it's an effort.

I was referring to your characterization of Dawkins's position that life (or its adaptive features) is an "accident," which, again, you pretty much admitted above was not accurate. As I've said many times, he not only does not believe that, it is almost exactly contrary to his actual views on evolution by natural selection.

But one reason I am not committed to naturalism is that I accept the theistic argument that ‘nature doesn’t contain its ground or explanation’. — Wayfarer

Doesn't that just mean that nature cannot show us any explanation for being? Does it follow from that that there must be an explanation for being? What if non-being is simply an impossibility, and nature is as necessary as God is? This is the process view that God and nature are not separate processes. Just as the cells that make up our bodies are not separate processes from the body as a whole, so nature is not a separate process from God, nor God from nature.

This is a view that entails that God is immanent in Nature, not separate from it. Of course God is transcendental to (not transcendent of) us, only in the sense that it is not an item of sensory experience. In another sense we are God and God is us, but this is obviously not to say that we are the whole of God or that we are all that God is.

The supernatural view of God is that He is remote, perfect, omnipotent and changeless; this is not the process view; where God is understood to evolve along with nature, and to suffer and enjoy along with His creatures. In this view God is a companion to be found within, not an unapproachable remote lawgiver.

it is almost exactly contrary to [Dawkin's] actual views on evolution by natural selection. — Arkady

If he had stuck to his biological knitting I would have had no reason to discuss his books on a philosophy forum. It's the inferences he draws from biology to philosophy that are at issue.

The supernatural view of God is that He is remote, perfect, omnipotent and changeless — Janus

I don't know if that is really what it means; it's more like, how it appears when the original teachings are crystallised into a dogmatic form. That is like an image of God, but without agápē, the revivifying love that animates the Universe, that became characteristic of Deism, where 'God' is reduced to an intellectual image - an idol, even.

And I think a Catholic is quite entitled to answer that God does 'suffer along with us', precisely by assuming birth as a human baby.

In any case, my remark about nature not being 'self-explanatory' is a concession to the argument from philosophical theology - that the organising principle of nature can't be found within nature. According to philosophical materialism, that organising principle was to be found in the 'motions of atoms' but that model has long since perished.

The supernatural view of God is that He is remote, perfect, omnipotent and changeless — Janus


I don't know if that is really what it means; it's more like, how it appears when the original teachings are crystallised into a dogmatic form. — Wayfarer

OK, I should have added "loving" or at least "benevolent" to that, but it nonetheless seems to be a conception of love "from afar", all except for the Incarnation. As to God's incarnation as Jesus constituting "suffering along with us" I agree, But that is a single historical instance and not like the process notion that God suffers along with all His creatures all the time. In any case by incarnating God does become part of nature and thus shows Himself to be not supernatural.

Another issue here in regard to the purported supernaturalness of God is about His ability to suspend or contravene the so-called Laws of nature; and that is certainly not the process view, according to which God cannot do any such thing. In any case my original point was merely that naturalistic theologies are possible; and I was not aiming to argue for any particular theology.

I know what I wanted to say here. The debate about naturalism comes down to whether the world is 'self-organising' or whether it's 'organised by an external intelligence'. Now, I strongly suspect this whole dilemma resembles one of Kant's 'antinomies of reason' ¹, i.e., it is not a question that can ever be rationally resolved as persuasive arguments can be made for either case.

But if you look at the way the question has unfolded historically, you can see a kind of dialectic, between theism and idealism on one side ('God's handiwork' or 'higher intelligence') and materialism on the other (it's 'self-organising', 'matter in motion'.)

But at this point in history, it seems to me that the argument that it is self-organising, and that the principle of that organisation can be known by empirical means, is not sustainable - well, not without writing a large number of promissory notes. And the evidence for that are the crises and unanswered questions of physics (and physical cosmology generally) on the one hand, and the yawning gaps in evolutionary science, on the other. I don't think we're remotely close to understanding the foundation or fundamental principle, should there be one. So the appropriate response maybe is a kind of scepticism - in the original sense of 'epoche', the suspension of judgement.

There's a great essay, written by Tom Wolfe in 1997, called Sorry, but your Soul Just Died. It's about the entire debate over genetics, brain science, the Death of God, and so on, but written 10 years before the New Atheists' first books were published. It's a long read, but superbly written, and it being a Sunday, might be well worth the time. And it has a great punchline. ;-)

I know what I wanted to say here. The debate about naturalism comes down to whether the world is 'self-organising' or whether it's 'organised by an external intelligence'. — Wayfarer

Why can't it be organized by an internal intelligence? That would be the central idea of the alternative naturalistic process theology. Your claim that I have arguing against was that there simply cannot be a naturalistic theology.

an internal intelligence? — Janus

How does it work? Is it the consequence of molecular action, as Dennett says? If not, then how is it ‘internal?’ Cosider Bergson’s ‘Elan vital’ - that might be considered ‘internal’ but it’s an idea that’s generally been rejected by both philosophers and scientists.

What I’m owning up to, is that I don’t buy the kinds of arguments that Dawkins and Dennett both deploy: that scientific discovery has undermined the possibility of there being God. I have already described in this thread and many others, some of the issues that I think are involved. So Arkady asked me, if I think that science presents a kind of ‘proof’ of the opposite case. I don’t believe that, either. I have said, I find the arguments of natural theologians, such as Keith Ward and Alistair McGrath, quite persuasive - but neither of them are advocating any kind of intelligent design theory. My view is, if you believe that science can either prove or disprove God, then that tends towards either American-style fundamentalism (in the first case) or scientific materialism (in the second).

As for Whitehead and Hartsthorne, I have read a little of them, but they’re not part of my ongoing curriculum.

How does it work? Is it the consequence of molecular action, as Dennett says? If not, then how is it ‘internal?’ — Wayfarer

Perhaps "internal" has befuddled you. What I mean is that it is an intelligence immanently bound into the nature of things. I can't tell you "how it works", but everything we observe and experienceis its working. Why do you think it makes it easier to understand "how it works" if you postulate a transcendent, that is separate, intelligence? That just creates the further problem of interaction that bedevils Descartes' dualistic 'two substance' idea of a mechanical nature and a transcendent God that creates (and sustains?) it. So, you seem to be caught up in, and thinking from within, the very model ( nature as mechanism) that you want to refute. :s

What I mean is that it is an intelligence immanently bound into the nature of things — Janus

Spirit, perhaps?

Yes, But spirit understood to be immanent in, not transcendent of, nature. So, it is not a supernatural conception of spirit. Nature just is spirit. It's not hard to understand the difference in conception here.

And you didn't attempt to answer my question, which is, I think, the salient point.

You mean, this question:

Why do you think it makes it easier to understand "how it works" if you postulate a transcendent, that is separate, intelligence? — Janus

Because it is impossible to demonstrate that there is anything answering to the description of ‘spirit’ that is ‘imminently bound to the nature of things’. If you claim such a thing exists, Daniel Dennett is quite within his rights to ask ‘well, what is this “spirit”? What is the evidence that any such thing exists?’ And I’m pretty sure you won’t be able to show any evidence.

If he had stuck to his biological knitting I would have had no reason to discuss his books on a philosophy forum. It's the inferences he draws from biology to philosophy that are at issue. — Wayfarer

You are of course free to critique his philosophy, but when you misrepresent basic tenets of Dawkins's thinking, it does you no service, and it makes one think that perhaps you are engaging with a caricature of what you think Dawkins is, and how he's been represented in the sources you prefer, rather than engaging with the man and his works.

I read the Pinker/Wieseltier spat with great interest in 2012, and found Wieseltier to be insufferably smug without justification, given the poverty of his arguments. In fact, I recall having discussed this in the old Philosophy Forum.

Adoption of one metaphysics or another is not driven by "evidence" if that is taken in the empirical sense. People choose the metaphysics that seems most logically coherent. consistent with their experience and feels right to them if they think about it, or they may adhere to the metaphysics that was drummed into them as a child.

So, I am referring to the choice between one conception of spirit (or theology) and another; which refers back to your statement that there cannot be a naturalistic theology (or by implication a naturalistic conception of spirit), and has nothing to do with Dennett.

found Wieseltier to be insufferably smug — Maw

If you read the OP that this thread starts off with, it does highlight that aspect of his character.

I am referring to the choice between one conception of spirit (or theology) and another; which refers back to your statement that there cannot be a naturalistic theology (or by implication a naturalistic conception of spirit), — Janus

But the problem I then have is distinguishing this from naturalism at all. I have the same difficulty with Spinoza, for that matter. I don’t understand why it isn’t simply a natural philosophy, in which case, what it has to offer over and above science.

You are of course free to critique [Dawkins] philosophy, — Arkady

That’s all I’ve ever done, as far as I am concerned. Dawkins makes many sweeping philosophical claims on the basis of the biological sciences, which is generally what I think deserves criticism. If I wanted to discuss Dawkin’s contributions to evolutionary biology, then I would read his books on that, and discuss it on a biology-related forum.

But the problem I then have is distinguishing this from naturalism at all. I have the same difficulty with Spinoza, for that matter. I don’t understand why it isn’t simply a natural philosophy, in which case, what it has to offer over and above science. — Wayfarer

Spinoza's idea of God as the substance of nature is metaphysical and rationalistic. It has nothing to with science (the empirical).

That’s all I’ve ever done, as far as I am concerned. Dawkins makes many sweeping philosophical claims on the basis of the biological sciences, which is generally what I think deserves criticism. If I wanted to discuss Dawkin’s contributions to evolutionary biology, then I would read his books on that, and discuss it on a biology-related forum. — Wayfarer

That's all well and good, but don't you think said criticism should be based upon an accurate understanding and presentation of his position? Because you've said things here about Dawkins, evolutionary biology, and science generally which are grossly inaccurate. Ergo, I don't see how your critiques can have much merit. I daresay that you appear to be as unacquainted with the subject of your critique as you purport Dawkins to be with regard to religion.

Because you've said things here about Dawkins, evolutionary biology, and science generally which are grossly inaccurate. — Arkady

I stand by all of them. Again, my criticism of Dawkins, Dennett, and their ilk is purely on the grounds of their scientific materialism for which they are known public advocates.

It seems to be more of a condemnation than a criticism, and it seems you condemn them simply because they hold different worldviews than you do.

If you would like to argue specifics, rather than just throw lazy ad homs, I would be more than happy to participate.

How is that an "ad hom"? Criticisms deal with arguments on their own terms not on yours. That's why what you say about Dennett looks more like a condemnation.To point this out is not adhominous at all because it is about your argument not about you.

Because you’re saying, I don’t have any argument or reasoned criticism, but just a ‘condemnation’, when I make an effort to present reasons for my views in this regard, as I have gone to some lengths to do in this thread.

Can you quote pieces you found particularly scientistic or reductionist?
— andrewk

Dennett's life-work is scientistic and reductionist. By all accounts he's a very nice person, and also great company, good teacher, excellent jazz piano player, but in my view this is in spite of his philosophy, not because of it. — Wayfarer

Speak about ad hominem! This is one example of your failure to address Dennett's work on its own terms.

Can you show us an example of where you have produced any critique which does address his actual work?

Many, over the years. But that's *not* ad hominem, 'attacking the person' - it says, Dennett is a great person (which I'm sure he is) but NOT because of his 'philosophy'.

The general criticism I have of Dawkins/Dennett is in this post.