I’m not pretending to have transcendent access to absolute truth. — apokrisis

Actually that claim is ‘transcendental realism’, in philosophy speak. ¹ Despite the fancy title, it’s what most folks believe. It’s the belief in the ‘there anyway’ world which persists in the absence of any observer, the vast universe in which, today, we see ourselves as ‘mere blips’.

What that form of realism doesn’t come to terms with is the role of the brain in constructing that ‘there anyway’ world. This is not to say that there isn’t a world ‘there anyway’, but the realist depiction of that world always overlooks the pivotal role of the brain in ‘constructing’ that ‘there anyway’ world. (There are quotes around ‘constructing’ because we’re not talking of literal construction, but of the generation of a world-picture within which we make sense of everything and orientate ourselves.)

That world, which is the world we inhabit, is a meaning-world; which is another reason why semiotics helps make sense of it.

My point is that we are getting at what reality is like (the apple being either ripe or rotten) independent of our goals. It is our goals that simply determine which information is currently relevant, not whether the information is actually accurate or not. Isn't survival the greatest catalyst for seeking knowledge - for being informed about how the world really works and how your body works and how it is all related? To be better informed about the world (how it works, it's current state, etc.) is to be better able to survive in it. — Harry Hindu

You touch on a very interesting point. One of our goals is the goal-independent truth. This seems impossible in its purest manifestation. The scientist is a human who wants to make discoveries. But there is a relative goal-indenpendence. The knowledge sought is re-purposable, durable. So I look at the scientific image of reality that way, as a tool that we have come to value and trust. To sharpen this tool requires a kind of discipline. We don't want "local" goals (bias) to get in the way the grand goal, which is the increase in durable knowledge about what's durable in human experience. We assume the uniformity of nature. We ignore Hume's problem because we are just wired in a way that keeps us from taking it seriously.

What we want is the most efficient and useful image of reality. — apokrisis

Indeed, and this statement above is itself an efficient and useful image of inquiry. Pragmatism, which understands theories as tools, is itself a meta tool-theory.

If you say that it is indirect, or models, all the way down, while at the same time saying, "all we are able to get at is the model", or "all we can do is get at it indirectly", then you are saying that we are actually getting at the truth, as everything is indirect, or just models, then us having models is us having the truth! — Harry Hindu

I think I understand your frustration, but isn't this a problem with philosophy generally? As we try to think our own cognition we inevitably get tangled up. Can we really present any philosophy as a consistent system in a single moment with all of the meanings of each of its terms fixed? I don't think so. Instead we have systems of related maxims. We pull out the one we need for a particular context. No doubt we want these maxims to fit together as much as possible, but that's where efficiency and utility slip back in. A coherent system is economical and runs smoothly.

We definitely have an image of the true world, but it's a transcendental background. So I agree that it's hard if not impossible to make avoid making assertions about the model-independent truth. We have to be modelling something, right? I think we self-consciously fallibly act as if reality was X. Then the modelness of this X is only our consciousness of its fragility and imperfection.

It’s the belief in the ‘there anyway’ world which persists in the absence of any observer, the vast universe in which, today, we see ourselves as ‘mere blips’. — Wayfarer

I suggest that our own birth and the deaths of others are a big part of our belief in the "there anyway." We seem to arrive in a world after many, many generations have come and gone. We are told of human events that happened thousands of years ago. More vividly, we can see pictures of our parents before they met one another. So belief in others more or less demands a belief in a "there anyway" world.

It was here before us, and we seem to have our foundation in it. It is strange indeed that "mind" has "matter" for a vehicle. Yet "matter" only appears for us through or for our mind.

I suppose many see us as mere blips, but I look up at the stars and see an ocean of stupidity. That's an intentionally perverse way of putting it. What I mean is that the fascinating complexity IMO is concentrated down here. The stars are cute, but I think of them as stupid machines.

I suggest that our own birth and the deaths of others are a big part of our belief in the "there anyway." We seem to arrive in a world after many, many generations have come and gone. We are told of human events that happened thousands of years ago. More vividly, we can see pictures of our parents before they met one another. So belief in others more or less demands a belief in a "there anyway" world. — t0m

There is a 'there anyway' world, but the reflexive and uncritical acceptance of its reality signifies the absence of philosophical reflection ¹. The non-philosopher begins with the accepted reality of what s/he thinks of as 'normal perception' and then demands that philosophy provide an account of itself in those terms; a challenge which I declined.

There is a 'there anyway' world, but the reflexive and uncritical acceptance of its reality signifies the absence of philosophical reflection 1. — Wayfarer

Respectfully, this is tautologous. But, yes, philosophy tries to make sense of the complexity that is "invisible" (because "useless") to the non-philosophical practical mind. These days it seems like much of philosophy tries to properly place the scientific image in the context of life as a whole. For me this scientific image is a "mere" tool that exist within a far more "primordial" whole. The table is not "really" atoms. This is simply one useful way that I can look at it, in the context of ultimately earthbound and mortal purposes. I employ "inhuman" science for very human reasons. Some connect it to their spirituality. The pursuit of objective there-anyway knowledge can function as a primary heroic task. I suppose I'm interested in revealing the here-always-with-us structure of revelation/philosophy itself.

Actually that claim is ‘transcendental realism’, in philosophy speak. — Wayfarer

I still prefer to call it naive realism in this case. Transcendental realism would surely be only a position that makes sense as a conscious opposition to Kant. So it would count as at least not being folk metaphysics. :)

Can we really present any philosophy as a consistent system in a single moment with all of the meanings of each of its terms fixed? I don't think so. — t0m

Yep. Knowledge has to bootstrap itself from axioms. We have to risk making a hypothesis that seems "reasonable". But hey, it seems to work pretty well.

Yep. Knowledge has to bootstrap itself from axioms. We have to risk making a hypothesis that seems "reasonable". But hey, it seems to work pretty well. — apokrisis

This comes to mind.

With all philosophers it is precisely the “system” which is perishable; and for the simple reason that it springs from an imperishable desire of the human mind — the desire to overcome all contradictions. — Engels

But under "the good", the divine idea is necessarily "the Ideal", and the Ideal, being the absolute, the best, is necessarily a particular. — Metaphysician Undercover

It seems contradictory to say that an ideal or an absolute is a particular, Can you support this contention?

In The Parmenides he starts to grasp the nature of time, and realizes that every particular material object requires an independent Form to account for its existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

The form of material objects is not fixed, but is something which evolves over time. It is hard to see how it can be "independent" if it evolves over time, as that would make it dependent both on its interactions with other forms, and on time itself.

So, when the material object comes into existence in time, it must be predetermined, in some manner, what it will be, because if it were not, there would be no objects whatsoever, simply randomness. The material object could not come into existence as an object other than itself, and that it is the object which it is requires that its Form determines this prior to its existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

If nature were rigidly deterministic, then what objects will be, the forms they will take, would be predetermined by nature itself. If this were not the case, then the future would be open, which would mean that the evolution of the forms of objects would not be predetermined, but instead would be subject to novel circumstance. I can't see why the absence of predetermination would preclude the existence of objects. Can you give an argument to support that?

The material object could not come into existence as an object other than itself, and that it is the object which it is requires that its Form determines this prior to its existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I already indicated, predetermination of the evolution of the forms of objects would obtain if nature were deterministic. Of course no object could "come into existence as an object other than itself" whether nature were deterministic or not, determined by God or not, the very idea of such a thing is meaningless, like the idea of a round square.

The independent Form actualizes this particular oak tree. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, I can't see that you have provided any argument to support this assertion, or even any explanation as to what it could mean.

...the desire to overcome all contradictions. — Engels

Hah. Isn't that just showing how Hegel got it the wrong way round?

My approach (following Peirce) ends up saying that bare contradiction is instead what everything is founded upon.

So it is a dialectical metaphysics. But it is the fact of symmetry breaking that is the foundation of Being, not the fact of "a pre-existing substantial symmetry".

The logical process itself is the ground, not some kind of further "indeterminate substance" - as Apeiron is often understood.

I agree this is not easy to accept as we are so accustomed to materialist ontologies. It in fact it seems pretty idealist - objective idealism - in laying so much stress on the logic of dialectics or dichotomies as how "anything can happen in the first place".

Yet I am still arguing for physicalism even though it is a pansemiotic physicalism. There is still primal material cause as well as primal formal cause. They are just now themselves to be understood as the originating "logical division which couldn't be prevented from starting to express itself as dialectically structured, or hylomorphic, Being."

Hah. Isn't that just showing how Hegel got it the wrong way round? — apokrisis

My approach (following Peirce) ends up saying that bare contradiction is instead what everything is founded upon. — apokrisis

Hegel is hard to parse, but I think subject = substance is related to "bare contradiction is what everything is founded upon." As I understand it, indeterminate Being "others" and increases its complexity due to internal contradiction until it overcomes all contradiction by knowing itself. So Hegel is just positioned at the end of a historical dialectic that preceded him. He merely describes.

The logical process itself is the ground, not some kind of further "indeterminate substance" - as Apeiron is often understood. — apokrisis

You might be closer to Hegel than you think:

For Hegel, the most important achievement of German idealism, starting with Immanuel Kant and culminating in his own philosophy, was the argument that reality (being) is shaped through and through by thought and is, in a strong sense, identical to thought. Thus ultimately the structures of thought and being, subject and object, are identical. Since for Hegel the underlying structure of all of reality is ultimately rational, logic is not merely about reasoning or argument but rather is also the rational, structural core of all of reality and every dimension of it. — wiki

Hegel is hard to parse, — t0m

You might be closer to Hegel than you think: — t0m

To be honest, I've given up trying to parse Hegel himself. But the key difference that keeps cropping up (apart from the tilting of the argument in favour of theistic readings) is that Hegel stresses the resolution of dichotomies, while I (following Peirce) am stressing the separation that results from dichotomisation.

This is why Peirce had to make a clear distinction between vague being and general being. Hegel was indeed describing the generality that results from difference being self-annihilated. But Peirce's approach shows that the resolution or synthesis lies in the thirdness of habit formation. The dichotomised become equilibrated in the form of a complex mixture. Every part of reality becomes good and bad, or entropic and negentropic, as some generalised "fractal" balance.

So generality can't be where things start. It is where things end because - once achieving equilibrium - a complexly divided systems is now in a state of generalised indifference. It is both completely composed of difference, but none of those differences now make a difference (to the overall state of Being).

This then leaves open the need to characterise the ground that could give rise to this habitual equilibrium thirdness. And that is where vagueness or Firstness - just the pure spontaneity of a difference, not as yet judged or reacted to in any way - comes in.

So Hegel - for me - failed clearly to see that generality is not any kind of ultimate simplicity. It is well organised complexity. We need a developmental opposite to this generality - which vagueness supplies.

The vague and the general then find their own resolution in secondness or actuality. The mix of irreducible freedoms (inexhaustible firstness) and constraining limits (robust emergent habits) is why there is then a material reality that forms in-between these two ontic bounds.

But then again, many passages of Hegel could be read as if he were aware of vagueness in this way too, just wasn't clear on the point as Peirce was.

I still prefer to call it naive realism in this case. — apokrisis

True, but 'transcendental' is more polite.

There is still primal material cause as well as primal formal cause. — apokrisis

I don't see how what is 'material' could be 'primal'. In the Western philosophical tradition the 'primal' was, or became conceived of, as the uncreated. And that is logical, because what is 'made' is obviously derived from something, fabricated from something - but ultimately there must be something unfabricated, which was to become Aristotle's first cause.

Perhaps the 'apeiron' was one conception of the uncreated:

From the few existing fragments, we learn that Anaximander believed the beginning or ultimate reality (arche) is eternal and infinite, or boundless (apeiron), subject to neither old age nor decay, which perpetually yields fresh materials from which everything we can perceive is derived. Apeiron generated the opposites, hot-cold, wet-dry etc., which acted on the creation of the world. Everything is generated from apeiron and then it is destroyed by going back to apeiron, according to necessity. He believed that infinite worlds are generated from apeiron and then they are destroyed there again.

His ideas were influenced by the Greek mythical tradition and by his teacher Thales (7th-6th century BC). Searching for some universal principle, Anaximander retained the traditional religious assumption that there was a cosmic order and tried to explain it rationally. — Wiki

Apeiron would seem to precede 'matter' wouldn't it? Matter is derived from, therefore ontologically junior to, the apeiron. And this is before Democritus and Leucippus articulated the idea of the 'atom' which located 'the changeless' in the midst of phenomena.
****

Anyway, this thread is the mother of all digressions. I am going to try and pick out something which I hope relates to the OP.

It has to do with the role of mind in the construction of reality, as touched on above.

Logical laws, numbers, and other intellectual functions, are fundamental to our understanding of reality. They are used to create our 'meaning-world'. And that understanding is in some sense all we have; we can't rise above, or get outside, of our understanding, although clearly we can, and do, alter it, enlarge it, amend it, and sometimes even up-end it.

But the reason that numbers, and the like, are 'real but not existent', is because they pertain to the very nature and structure of the understanding itself; they are that by virtue of which we know things. They're not 'out there somewhere', but they're also not simply 'products of the brain'. That's where 'Platonia' is - in the very structure of our understanding. It's not an external reality or a 'ghostly domain' as it is generally misunderstood to be. And this is the reason that numbers are predictive (i.e. 'the uncanny effectiveness of maths in the natural sciences.') Why this is so hard to see, is because it is not apart from or other to us, we can't objectify it.

Saying there could be primal material cause is different from saying there is primal material substance or being.

That is why I’m talking in terms of a process ontology.

And so too that would be the correct understanding of Anaximander’s apeiron, or even Aristotle’s prime matter.

As to Platonia, again I am arguing that maths structures our experience in a semiotic way.

So number in fact divides experience into theory and measurement. The maths strength concepts and then the values we read off dials.

So both concepts and impressions are rendered as “objectively” symbolised. Reality is understood in mathematically idealised fashion.

And that understanding is objective as it is encoded in actual material symbols. It can be written down and transmitted from one mind to another. It is replicable, and indeed evolvable, as semiotic structure.

Logical laws, numbers, and other intellectual functions, are fundamental to our understanding of reality. They are used to create our 'meaning-world'. And that understanding is in some sense all we have; we can't rise above, or get outside, of our understanding, although clearly we can, and do, alter it, enlarge it, amend it, and sometimes even up-end it.

But the reason that numbers, and the like, are 'real but not existent', is because they pertain to the very nature and structure of the understanding itself; they are that by virtue of which we know things. They're not 'out there somewhere', but they're also not simply 'products of the brain'. That's where 'Platonia' is - in the very structure of our understanding. It's not an external reality or a 'ghostly domain' as it is generally misunderstood to be. And this is the reason that numbers are predictive (i.e. 'the uncanny effectiveness of maths in the natural sciences.') Why this is so hard to see, is because it is not apart from or other to us, we can't objectify it. — Wayfarer

I agree, mostly. But when you say that they are not products of our brain, you are perhaps overlooking our apparent groundedness in our body. Somehow consciousness and meaning-making are tied to the brain. So it seems that the same "stuff" that natural science deals with is the raw material for at least the foundation of consciousness. At the same time, this scientific image is itself grounded in and part of the same meaning-making. It's a Mobius strip.

I agree that the objects of Platonia are ironically invisible to the very science that employs them. "Numbers aren't real because we can't measure them." We need concepts to deny the reality of concepts in the first place. What is strange is the emergence of conceptual consciousness. This was/is probably one of the strongest arguments for God. But the problem with "God" as an explanation is that it seems to simply anthropomorphize the mystery. (I'm not saying that you are proposing a God, just acknowledging that the strangeness of consciousness emerging from "matter" is such that one is tempted to understand it as willed or intended by something itself conscious. It is counterintuitive that the higher can emerge from the lower, even if this is in fact the case.)

But when you say that they are not products of our brain, you are perhaps overlooking our apparent groundedness in our body. — t0m

It’s not embodied cognition I wish to avoid - it is ‘neuro-reductionism’. ‘Oh, that’s just your brain’s way of keeping your genomes alive’. Remember, in our world, the human mind is simply a late arrival, on top of the work of the blind watchmaker, a dollop of apparent meaning-making ability atop the robot that's only mission is to progenerate.

The problem with "God" as an explanation is that it seems to simply anthropomorphize the mystery. — t0m

Of course it does. But as I've said before, we now go to such extraordinary lengths to avoid even the suggestion, that it distorts our thinking the other way. That is one of the things Thomas Nagel, a professed atheist philosopher, has written some really important analyses of (such as his essays Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion, and Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament.)

I agree that the objects of Platonia are ironically invisible to the very science that employs them. "Numbers aren't real because we can't measure them." — t0m

Actually there's a huge disconnect here. Many mathematicians (such as Godel and, I think, Penrose, among others) really are Platonists, they believe in the 'reality of number'. But it can't be accommodated within the standard empiricist accounts so is highly unfashionable. I commented on that in this post, I'd like you to read that as I know you're a maths gun!

And that understanding is objective as it is encoded in actual material symbols. It can be written down and transmitted from one mind to another. It is replicable, and indeed evolvable, as semiotic structure. — apokrisis

Still not 'objective' so much as 'inter-subjective'; we discover and symbolise all of those aspects of experience which we as a culture and as a species have in common. But again, only the symbols are material, the structures they denote are noetic.

It’s not embodied cognition I wish to avoid - it is ‘neuro-reductionism’. ‘Oh, that’s just your brain’s way of keeping your genomes alive’. Remember, in our world, the human mind is simply a late arrival, on top of the work of the blind watchmaker, a dollop of apparent meaning-making ability atop the robot that's only mission is to progenerate. — Wayfarer

I can empathize with that. It does reduce agency to an illusion. I think the theory would only become undeniable if human behavior could be reliably predicted on a gene-computer. And I mean the computer should print off the next philosophical masterpiece or great work of literature, before it would have otherwise been written. Until we get that kind of concrete prediction, we really just have faith in a paradigm.

But as I've said before, we now go to such extraordinary lengths to avoid even the suggestion, that it distorts our thinking the other way. That is one of the things Thomas Nagel, a professed atheist philosopher, has written some really important analyses of (such as his essays Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion, and Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament.) — Wayfarer

You have a point. There is now a bias in the other direction, at least among some. And it's significant that Nagel is an atheist, since he can't be accused of the usual bias. I'll check those out.

Actually there's a huge disconnect here. Many mathematicians (such as Godel and, I think, Penrose, among others) really are Platonists, they believe in the 'reality of number'. But it can't be accommodated within the standard empiricist accounts so is highly unfashionable. I commented on that in this post, I'd like you to read that as I know you're a maths gun! — Wayfarer

Ah, yes. I've read some of Penrose. Also read lots about Godel. As I see it, our ability to conceive of a distinct, ideal unity is at the heart of math. "God created the integers," since we just can think whole numbers. Most math can be built up from that. And then the set, too, is a distinct unity. The same idea in a different flavor. I'll check out your post.

EDIT:
I remember that post. I'm on your side on that one. Meaning (including number) is primary. Only within and from this primary meaning can we hypothesize its emergence. To meaningfully or numerically search for meaning or number is tragicomical.

I think the theory would only become undeniable if human behavior could be reliably predicted on a gene-computer. — t0m

Just seen Blade Runner 2049, which is big on these issues. (I thought it brilliant, by the way, despite some flaws.)

I've read some of Penrose.... — t0m

He's too hard for me. I read the review of Emperor's New Mind, which I naturally agreed with, but couldn't understand the book. Apparently he's 'Road to Reality' is hard for even physicists to read.

I'll check those out. — t0m

PDF of the latter here. The former is not online as far as I can tell although his review of Dawkins' 'The God Delusion' covers some of the same ground.

The fear of religion leads too many scientifically-minded atheists to cling to a defensive, world-flattening reductionism. Dawkins, like many of his contemporaries, is hobbled by the assumption that the only alternative to religion is to insist that the ultimate explanation of everything must lie in particle physics, string theory, or whatever purely extensional laws govern the elements of which the material world is composed.

It seems contradictory to say that an ideal or an absolute is a particular, Can you support this contention? — Janus

If it is "the ideal", it is the absolute perfect, meaning that everything about it must be precisely according to that ideal, or it will be less than the ideal. Therefore it is completely distinct from all others, it is particular, as nothing but the ideal could be the ideal.

This is why the phrase "a difference which makes a difference" is very misleading. It implies that there is such a thing as a difference which doesn't make a difference. But in the case of the ideal, as in the case of the particular, there is no such thing as a difference which doesn't make a difference. In fact, this is a bold contradiction. If we allow contradiction into our ontological principles, intelligibility is lost as in Peirce's vagueness. To hold that the ideal is necessarily particular, as a singular, unique, unity, "One", and not just any "one", is very important.

The form of material objects is not fixed, but is something which evolves over time. It is hard to see how it can be "independent" if it evolves over time, as that would make it dependent both on its interactions with other forms, and on time itself. — Janus

Yes, the form is changing with the passing of time, that is exactly the point. For a material object to exist as a definite state, we must assume a time when it exists as such. However, prior to existing as that material object, it is becoming that object. The argument demonstrates, that at this time, prior to the object having material existence, when it is "becoming", the form of that object exists independently of the material object (being prior to it), causing the "becoming" to create that particular object rather than something else.

There is nothing here to indicate that Forms wouldn't interact with other Forms, clearly they do. And that's why Neo-Platonists like Proclus described a complete procession of forms.

If nature were rigidly deterministic, then what objects will be, the forms they will take, would be predetermined by nature itself. If this were not the case, then the future would be open, which would mean that the evolution of the forms of objects would not be predetermined, but instead would be subject to novel circumstance. I can't see why the absence of predetermination would preclude the existence of objects. Can you give an argument to support that? — Janus

The future is open, that's what the freedom of the will demonstrates to us. Because the future is open there are many possibilities for material existence at each moment of the present. There is no material existence on the future side of the present, but there must be something there that "chooses" which possibilities will be actualized into material existence at each moment of the present. The Forms are responsible for this. So the future is open, but material existence, existence at the present, is determined by the Forms which exist on the future side of the present, prior to material existence. Therefore we must assume the procession, which occurs at each moment of passing time, and determines the material existence at each moment of the present. The future is open, but what exists in the future, the Forms, determine which possibilities will have material existence at the present.

Of course no object could "come into existence as an object other than itself" whether nature were deterministic or not, determined by God or not, the very idea of such a thing is meaningless, like the idea of a round square. — Janus

This is correct, and that's why Aristotle's argument is so forceful, it begins with this principle of identity which cannot be denied without leaving one in the meaninglessness of contradiction. But that's what happens when we allow that there is differences which do not make a difference, we open the door, and allow ourselves to walk right into this realm of meaningless contradiction. If we hold fast to this principle of identity, we disallow such nonsense which threatens to undermine the foundations of logical process. Then we can accept the reality of, the beauty of, and the importance of, particularity. From here we can proceed toward a true ontology which has respect for the greatest aspect of existence, particularity.

Again, I can't see that you have provided any argument to support this assertion, or even any explanation as to what it could mean. — Janus

I'll state the same argument again then, in slightly different words, because it appears like you didn't apprehend it as an argument. This time, pay attention, and address whatever problems you perceive. A material object cannot come into existence as an object other than itself. You seem to agree with the premise. Material objects exist, so it is not the case that what is existing is random, disordered, or nonsense, there are objects. Therefore there must be a cause for every material object being the particular object which it is, and this is what we call the object's Form. As the cause of the object's material existence, it is prior in time to the object's material existence, and therefore independent from the object's material existence.

The material object exists as the object which it is, at each moment of the passing time. There must be a cause of this, and the cause is the object's Form. As the cause of the material object's existence, rather than being the material object itself, the Form is independent from the material object

As much reason to take the fantasy of mind emerging from "physical" seriously. — Rich

Can you support your claim that there's equal reason to take the opposite sort of alternative seriously? I've been unable to find a satisfying argument along those lines, but I'm interested in reasonable suggestions.

When I say that to all appearances, minds emerge in the natural, physical world, I mean something along these lines: It seems to me I have a concept of the mental that's informed primarily by my experience of myself as a thing that perceives and imagines, remembers and intends, believes and doubts, thinks and speaks and moves in the world it appears to inhabit; as well as by my experience of others like me, who seem sentient in about the same way. So far as I can tell, all the sentient creatures I've encountered are living animals with nervous systems.

That much seems about as evident as anything, and about as evident as the fact that each such sentient animal is born and dies. Each such organism emerges in the world and endures for a while; and its nervous system emerges and grows and develops in the world and endures for a while. These are familiar observable phenomena, not controversial claims.

It's equally evident that the mental activity, or mind, of each such organism, depends on its body and on other physical states of affairs in familiar and predictable ways. If you call my name and wave, and I look up and see you there, you change the content and character of my experience. If you clap my shoulder, pluck out my eyes, or stimulate regions of my brain with electric current, you change the content and character of my experience. When a sentient organism's brain is damaged by injury or disease, its power of sentience is altered. When a sentient organism dies, there is no sign of sentience persisting.

Accordingly, I say the claim that minds emerge in the natural world is no more controversial than the claim that organisms emerge in the natural world. As I understand them, these claims are neither fantastic nor metaphysical, but phenomenological and empirical, and I'm not sure what it would mean to deny them without denying the whole world of appearances.

I'm aware there's a great variety of claims made by many people in various times and places, about things called minds and souls, spirits and ghosts, demons and deities, said to exist somewhere beyond the natural world of our experience, or somehow independent of anything like an animal organism. I suppose some of these views are consistent with my claim that minds emerge in the world. But so far as I can see, none of them is supported by the balance of appearances. And if that's the case, what reason is there to take them seriously?

I have no idea what you mean by physical things doing mental things. Are they little humanoids? — Rich

I'm not sure I follow.

Are the cells and organs of your body little humanoids? I expect not. Nevertheless, it seems all the functions of your body, including its mental activity, depend on their good work.

As I understand them, these claims are neither fantastic nor metaphysical, but phenomenological and empirical, and I'm not sure what it would mean to deny them without denying the whole world of appearances. — Cabbage Farmer

Your claims are certainly not fantastic or metaphysical; they’re naturalistic, and, as such, perfectly sane. However it might be worth considering the fact that Greek philosophy itself is not naturalistic although it is in parts. But Platonic philosophy is not naturalistic - its primary concern with the state of the soul. (The most recognisably naturalistic of the Ancient Greek schools was the Epicurean). That doesn’t make your approach wrong or right, but I thought it is worth mentioning, as naturalism is the prevailing attitude in many quarters, and accordingly it is simply assumed by many people to be obvious.

I generally share this phen. grounded approach. But I think it's fair to add that the physical is also grounded in the mind. The world disappears when we sleep dreamlessly. We might speculate that this inspired the whole problem to begin with. Privately mind grounds matter, but publicly matter grounds mind. We experience the world after the deaths of others but seemingly not after our own. — t0m

Perhaps a solipsist may find some way to argue consistently with his principles that the world disappears when he sleeps. I'm a skeptic, not a solipsist. It seems to me that solipsism of the present moment indicates a point of maximum certainty from the first-person point of view, but I see no reason to suppose such certainty is required for knowledge.

It seems my view of the world is grounded in my mind. But I see no way to support the claim that the whole world is grounded in my mind, or in anyone else's mind. I see no way to support the claim that the world disappears when any one animal goes to sleep; nor the claim that the world disappears when any one animal dies.

Of course anything's possible. But it seems that very little of what's possible is supported by the balance of appearances.

To join you in speculating about the history of ideas: I prefer to imagine our problem has its roots long before the advent of abstract conceptions of isolated subjectivity, in the animist impulse that seems to come natural to human beings, an impulse we share perhaps with other animals who jump at shadows and howl at thunder.

I think the theory would only become undeniable if human behavior could be reliably predicted on a gene-computer. And I mean the computer should print off the next philosophical masterpiece or great work of literature, before it would have otherwise been written. Until we get that kind of concrete prediction, we really just have faith in a paradigm. — t0m

That sort of prediction is impossible because it leaves off the environment required to create the next philosophical masterpiece. It also leaves off the brain. Genes don't encode everything about the brain. Rather, it's just enough information for brains to form. All the learned behaviors and knowledge of a brain are because of the brain, not the genes. And brains live inside bodies, and bodies live inside environments with other bodies. Genes can't predict culture.

It's like imagining that you could predict what sort of cultural artifact an intelligent robot would make loosed upon the world from just it's circuit diagram.

It’s not embodied cognition I wish to avoid - it is ‘neuro-reductionism’. ‘Oh, that’s just your brain’s way of keeping your genomes alive’. Remember, in our world, the human mind is simply a late arrival, on top of the work of the blind watchmaker, a dollop of apparent meaning-making ability atop the robot that's only mission is to progenerate. — Wayfarer

One of The Partially Examined life podcasts on Buddhism dealt with this. They argued that although evolution resulted in our brains being what they are, the brains themselves created a whole new means for generating rich mental life that was not specifically selected for by evolution.

It's basically an argument for emergent behavior, and thus genetic-reductionist view is faulty.

I'm also a bit skeptical of Dawkins gene-centric view of evolution. Seems to me the organism is the instrument of evolution, not the genes themselves. And in the case of social species, it's the group as much as the individual, even though group selection is controversial.

Genes can't predict culture.

It's like imagining that you could predict what sort of cultural artifact an intelligent robot would make loosed upon the world from just it's circuit diagram. — Marchesk

I agree. I don't think it's possible. I suppose I am suggesting that the "true" epistemology is pragmatic. A scientific paradigm really earns our trust through prediction and control. I'm no expert, but I don't find it likely that we either have or will have the "whole story." We get more and more effective and convincing stories. Is it possible that we are the result of a blind machine? Yes. Is it ridiculous to be a little skeptical of this paradigm? I don't think so. And yet I don't have some other theory to suggest. I just keep a certain distance from any particular theory, especially when the limits of its ability to predict and control are manifest.

I was unclear about your position in the last comment. My bad. I think the theory is very close to what you suggest. It is about stripping off the accidental properties and retaining the essential ones, the unchangeable ones, the ones that, if removed, then the object would lose its nature. E.g. a property of me is to have long hair. If I lose this property, I am still me? What if I lose the property 'ability to think'?

I read the review. It was pretty great. His position is roughly my own. He notes that either explanation is not really an explanation. It points back at an unexplained given. There could be a transcendent God. He or It could be the brute fact behind which we cannot peer. I still hold that explanation cannot be total.

I also find Dawkins shrill, and that shrillness reminds me of the dark side of investment. There's an "absoluteness" in it that suggests a hardening of thought. We can also recall atheistic religions becoming dogma (dialectical materialism).

I think it's wrong to think religion only in theist terms. A generalized religion is a set of fixed beliefs centered on a value or image. For instance, the Russian nihilists were Utopian fanatics. They murdered in the name of abstractions. It's not hard to imagine (and films have been made) a rigidly secular dystopia where all dissent is "diagnosed" as a mental health problem. Ironically, Dawkins himself has the dark side of the religious personality.