Saith he, quoting scripture! As it happens this is a philosophy forum, the subject of the discussion is the incorporeal nature of ideas in the Platonic tradition. — Wayfarer

A very disappointing response; although not a surprise. I certainly didn't merely quote scripture. I outlined my standpoint; which you haven't really attempted to respond to at all, other than to needlessly pontificate about "this being a philosophy forum". I am well aware that the subject of the discussion is "the incorporeal nature of ideas" and I believe I have given good reasons why I think the notion of "incorporeal ideas" is not a genuinely coherent one at all.

Anyway, I'm happy enough to leave it at that. It was probably a mistake to attempt to engage you in discussion, since you don't seem to be open to alternative ways of looking at things at all and it always seems to end up this way. No need to worry; I won't ever trouble you again.

Anyway, I'm happy enough to leave it at that. It was probably a mistake to attempt to engage you in discussion, since you don't seem to be open to alternative ways of looking at things at all and it always seems to end up this way. No need to worry; I won't ever trouble you again. — Janus

Heavens' sake. Your first response was: hey you're talking about 'existential truths', the kinds of truths you live, rather than scientific, objective facts'. 'Yes', I said, 'that is what I was getting at'. But then, you dismiss any possibility of discussion, quoting The Bible in bold face, as if that settles the matter. As it happens, I am trying to present a rational argument for the fact that information is not physical. I think that this is true, but that one of the reasons it is such a controversial argument is because it goes against the grain of much modern philosophy. So now I'm being criticized both for being 'not scientific enough' and now 'not heeding the bible'. Maybe it's me who should be giving up. ;-(

No, you misunderstood. Yes, I said they are existential truths; the kinds of truths that have been extensively forgotten. But I was asserting that there is no other knowledge that has been forgotten than the kind of living revelation that is available to "little children"; not any kind of inter-subjective knowledge, in other words.

The bible quote was not intended to "settle the matter" but merely to offer an instance of the same idea; that the kind of "living knowledge" under discussion has nothing to do with sophisticated information and/or the corporeality or incorporeality of information. You don't have to agree with that of course; but I have offered my reasons for thinking that; and if you really wanted to engage in open discussion, then you should proffer your reasons for disagreeing with it. It is your apparent unwillingness to do that which "dismisses any possibility of discussion" as I see it.

You don't have to agree with that of course; but I have offered my reasons for thinking that; and if really wanted to engage in open discussion, then you should proffer you reasons for disagreeing with it. It is your apparent unwillingness to do that which "dismisses any possibility of discussion" as I see it. — Janus

I am willing to discuss it, but I think that quoting Biblical scripture in support of an argument kicks the ball into the long grass. (I will sometimes refer to a Christian aphorism, as there is a lot of wisdom in them, but scripture is another matter,)

I have noticed that you tend to draw a pretty sharp boundary when it comes to what you regard as the subject of mystical experience. Anything beyond that boundary - can't say anything about it. There's the quotidian, and the mystical.

But the actual Christian mystical tradition - speaking here of the tradition of Eckhardt and Pseudo-Dionysius - are both Platonic *and* mystical, and often rely on reasoned argument - indeed often to point towards something which is beyond reasoned argument.

Back to the point about existential truths - the epistemological issue is that the modern mind, modern naturalism, is characterised by a fundamental orientation, that of being separate from the Universe. Man, the scientist, the observer, there, nature before his gaze. Now there has been a shift in the nature of our understanding, in that the pre-moderns didn't live in this sense of otherness or separation. But we live in that sense, 'modernity is a state of consciousness', so we are not aware of it. (Owen Barfield has a lot to say about this point; there's also an echo of it in Julian James' 'bicameral mind'.)

But because of that attitude, 'scientific fact' is by definition centred around measurement; as I said before, spiritual philosophy (I used the term 'religion') is concerned with a metaphysic of value. (Actually I think I got that idea from Zen and the Art of Motorcyle Maintenance.) So Plato's philosophy is both concerned with objective facts, proto- or early science, AND ALSO a metphysic of vallue. Where, notice the constant tension between those two in these discussions.

So, no hard feelings, really do appreciate your input, would not want to go without it.

OK, so your principle of identity involves "exact same properties". How does the concept of "five-ness" which is in my mind, qualify as the same concept of "fiveness" which is in your mind, when they are described by these different properties ("in my mind" and "in your mind"). Clearly they don't have the exact same properties, and are therefore not the same concept. — Metaphysician Undercover

Alas, a concept is a peculiar thing, which by definition is composed only of essential properties, and contains no accidental properties. Using again the triangle example: A particular triangle may have accidental properties such as a size, colour, and location. But the concept "triangle-ness" may not have any accidental properties, or else it is not a concept, by definition. Consequently, the accidental property of 'being in my mind' or 'being in your mind' cannot be attributed to concepts. Instead, when we say "the concept in my mind is the same as the concept in your mind", this is just an informal way of saying "The concept I speak of is the same concept you speak of".

Agree. Shows that concepts are both mind-independent - not dependent on your or my mind - but also intelligible rather than physical - can only be known by a mind.

Not even a mathematician can draw a generic triangle, nor can you think of one. Every geometry or trigonometry textbook you will ever see has illustrations in it that are specific triangles. In working a problem using such an illustration, you simply (!) follow a rule not to rely on features of the triangle that, while they are present in the triangle you have drawn or are given, are not specified in the problem.

This procedure might be what Grice refers to as "deeming".

I think that quoting Biblical scripture in support of an argument kicks the ball into the long grass. (I will sometimes refer to a Christian aphorism, as there is a lot of wisdom in them, but scripture is another matter,) — Wayfarer

OK, but I wasn't quoting that in support of an argument, as I already said; I was quoting it as an example of a scriptural expression which embodies the same idea I have argued for, but gives it in poetic or literary language.
Also I wonder what your criterion for thinking aphorism are OK to quote whereas scripture is not. Neither aphorisms nor scripture are substitutes for argument, as I see it; but if arguments have also been given then I see no reason to proscribe the use of scripture for rhetorical purposes.

I have noticed that you tend to draw a pretty sharp boundary when it comes to what you regard as the subject of mystical experience. Anything beyond that boundary - can't say anything about it. There's the quotidian, and the mystical. — Wayfarer

This is not quite right, either. I think lived experience, whether quotidian or mystical, is, as it is lived, prior to any interpretation of it, or any ideas which are developed out of it. You can say as much as you want about it, but what you say will never be living in the sense that living itself is. The closest we can get to that livingness is the kind of evocation which is possible through the arts; through poetic and religious or mystical expression and so on. This is not the same as philosophy although philosophy can be given in this kind of language, and as such is more of an art than a science. I find the way you talk about "lost knowledge" seems to conflate philosophy with some kind of science. Philosophy will always lose if you try to pit it against science on science's own terms.

often rely on reasoned argument - indeed often to point towards something which is beyond reasoned argument. — Wayfarer

I don't believe that reasoned argument, per se, can support anything beyond itself. In other words discursive reasoning cannot support anything but discursive conclusions; and conclusions cannot ever be better, or more, than the presuppositions (which cannot be supported discursively) that underpin them. People are never convinced in their religious faith by reasoned arguments; although they may certainly be led by reasoned argument to see the inaptness and weakness of some commonly held taken-for-granted ideas that might erroneously be thought to stand in the way of religious faith.

the epistemological issue is that the modern mind, modern naturalism, is characterised by a fundamental orientation, that of being separate from the Universe. Man, the scientist, the observer, there, nature before his gaze. — Wayfarer

I don't quite see it this way, or at least I wouldn't put it in those terms. I would say the universe just is the external world where everything is always already separated from everything else and from life as lived. It is for just this reason, being separated from life, that what cannot be revealed to the "wise" may be revealed to babes.

I have read most of Barfield's books, and I think he makes the same mistake as his master Steiner, whom I have also read and listened to (via Steiner audio) extensively, in thinking that spirituality is a science. Having said that I also think there are some great insights in both Barfield and Steiner; but I do think there is this fundamental mistake.

Anyway, likewise, I hold no hard feelings. We do seem agree on many things, and I enjoy your posts, too. As long as we can engage and thrash out our differences, then I am satisfied. I mean I'm perfectly happy to disagree as long as we are both clear exactly how and why we disagree, wherever we do.

I don't think that's correct. I think his view was that forms could only be known through the form of concrete particulars, or that the universals could only be known in the form in which they took. But he was no nominalist, in fact nominalism wasn't thought of for millennia afterwards. So I don't think you can say that the form depends on the particular, it is surely the reverse - in hylomorphic dualism, things consist of form and matter. But still reading up on this. — Wayfarer

Aristotle's view was that universals are immanent in concrete particulars not transcendent to them (per Plato). So, for example, there is no universal redness apart from concrete particulars such as apples.

Further, that which is one cannot be in many places at the same time, but that which is common is present in many places at the same time; so that clearly no universal exists apart from its individuals. — Metaphysics Book VII Part 16

Aristotle's dispute with Plato here was not about epistemology, i.e., how one could know about universals; it was about ontology, i.e., whether or not universals were independent of particulars.

it was about ontology, i.e., whether or not universals were independent of particulars. — Andrew M

Interesting. I wonder why bother persisting with universals at all. Need to read up!

Alas, a concept is a peculiar thing, which by definition is composed only of essential properties, and contains no accidental properties. Using again the triangle example: A particular triangle may have accidental properties such as a size, colour, and location. But the concept "triangle-ness" may not have any accidental properties, or else it is not a concept, by definition. Consequently, the accidental property of 'being in my mind' or 'being in your mind' cannot be attributed to concepts. Instead, when we say "the concept in my mind is the same as the concept in your mind", this is just an informal way of saying "The concept I speak of is the same concept you speak of". — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't think I can agree with this. If being within a mind is not an essential property of a concept, then we must consider concepts which are not within a mind. So the concept which you speak of "fiveness", is not necessarily in a mind. What identifies it as a concept then?

To me, what identifies something as a concept is that it is an idea, a notion in the mind, so being in a mind is an essential aspect of a concept. If it's not within a mind, it's something other than a concept. Now you've denied me of that identifying feature. So ideas and notions within your mind are not necessarily concepts either, they could be something else. I have a notion in my mind of "fiveness". I cannot assume that it is the concept of fiveness. Where can I find the concept of fiveness in order that I can confirm that my idea of fiveness corresponds with the concept of fiveness.

I only have to find that my states of belief are reliable in minimising the surprises I encounter in the world. — apokrisis

All this is is more naive realism, Apo (you refering to some real thing that is happening with scribbles on a screen, as if you have a clear, unimpeded view of what is really happening in reality). Its what everyone in this thread is doing, everytime they post anything.

I can't help it if you don't get the difference between direct and indirect.

I can't help it if you don't get the difference between direct and indirect. — apokrisis

I can't help it if you don't get my point in questioning the distinction when it comes to causation and information flow.

The cause is NOT the effect. That is an inherent aspect of causation. So, how do you expect to have a "direct" view when what you are is the effect, not the cause? How else could you have a "direct view" other than "being" the thing itself? Views are always third person, and our language is third person whenever we talk about how reality is.

This is how information is carried. The effect carries information about the cause. The mind is about the world and our perceived place in it.

I keep asking you how you came to know semiotics and pragmatism. How did that information get from "out here" to "in there"? Did it take time? Was causation involved?

@mcdoodle noted the mechanical nature of the translations in your example. So mechanical in fact that a machine could clearly perform these translations and send these signals. I think your argument really only cares about the first and last steps: seeing something and symbolizing it; seeing a symbol and interpreting it. These functions you attributes to intelligent minds, therefore these functions are mental, therefore they are not physical. I don't think the translation has anything to do with it.

a machine could clearly perform these translations and send these signals. — Srap Tasmaner

If programmed to do so by humans.

'Machine - an apparatus using mechanical power and having several parts, each with a definite function and together performing a particular task.'

these functions are mental, therefore they are not physical. — Srap Tasmaner

As my argument is only concerned with establishing that information is not physical, the fact that it can be described as 'mental' is neither here nor there.

If programmed to do so by humans.

'Machine - an apparatus using mechanical power and having several parts, each with a definite function and together performing a particular task.' — Wayfarer

But what the machine actually does is physical, right? Just because a human designs a machine to serve a human purpose, doesn't mean the machine itself is doing something non-physical, does it? We use shovels to move physical dirt, physically, don't we?

We use shovels to move physical dirt, physically, don't we? — Srap Tasmaner

But I never denied that 'representation is physical'. And again, what is different about moving dirt, and using dirt to spell something out, is that the latter embodies information. The 'arrangement of dirt' in the latter case is intrinsic to the idea that is being communicated. To push the metaphor, you could use dirt to spell out the message - Greek ship, 3 masts, arrives after noon - in ten different languages, in which case, they would all be different structures. But get one point wrong, and the information is lost.

But what the machine actually does is physical, right? Just because a human designs a machine to serve a human purpose, doesn't mean the machine itself is doing something non-physical, does it? We use shovels to move physical dirt, physically, don't we? — Srap Tasmaner

To the extent that anything we perceive is "physical", ultimately a machine is only transferring and transforming. It is fundamentally without "meaning" until the mind gets involved, and the mind begins the process of pattern discernment from which it may or may not find information. Individual minds will find different or no information within the patterns. The thought itself just sits there and is not tangible or measurable in a "physical" sense.

We've been through this before. How can you claim direct cause and effect if we still see red when the wavelength is not "red"?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Color_constancy

But what the machine actually does is physical, right? Just because a human designs a machine to serve a human purpose, doesn't mean the machine itself is doing something non-physical, does it? — Srap Tasmaner

This skips too fast over the fact that the machine is operating syntactically - according to rules the physics can't see.

This is especially obvious with a computer - an information processing device after all. It is explicit in Turing universal computation that physics falls out of the picture. There is a designed in divorce of hardware and software. And even the hardware is divorced from the physics in being a material structure with no inherent dynamics. You have to plug the computer into the wall to make it go.

So it is missing the point to argue that a computer is "just physics". The essence of computation is the syntax that regulates it. And it is the origins of that syntax which then becomes the larger issue.

It is pretty easy to why the physical structure has been given no choice but to act in a way that has been mechanically determined by some program being executed according to a constraining hierarchy of rules.

So a machine is regular physics silenced and controlled. That creates a space of symbolic freedom. Rules can be freely invented to make the machine "do things".

The loop is then semiotically complete when the whole of this relation is constrained by the general requirement that it pragmatically works. The machine does "useful things". Or indeed "semantically meaningful things".

Suppose I'm an earlyish hominin, and a wild dog is biting me. I involuntarily make a sound of pain. Members of my group who hear my cry will take this to mean I'm in trouble and come to help.

Now suppose I'm a slightly later hominin and I can make the same sound voluntarily when a wild dog is about to bite me but hasn't yet. This rocks. Members of my group who hear my cry will take this to mean I'm in trouble and come to help without my having to get bit.

Now suppose I'm a slightly later hominin and I can voluntarily make a sound that to members of my group means "wild dog", rather than a generic "pain/fear/trouble".

Is there mind involved in some of these but not others? Do some of these hominin sounds carry meaning or information but not others?

Is there mind involved in some of these but not others? Do some of these hominin sounds carry meaning or information but not others? — Srap Tasmaner

I'm sure there's a lot of research on this, which probably Apokrisis is better versed in than myself, but I have a philosophical answer I would like to consider.

There's a recent book co-authored by Chomsky, which is about exactly this question, called Why Only Us? Language and Evolution. The central point that it makes is that there is a radical (I would say ontological) difference between animal and human speech, on the grounds that the latter embodies an hierarchical syntax.

human language involves the capacity to generate, by a recursive procedure, an unlimited number of hierarchically structured sentences. A trivial example of such a sentence is this: “How many cars did you tell your friends that they should tell their friends . . . that they should tell the mechanics to fix?” (The ellipses indicate that the number of levels in the hierarchy can be extended without limit.) Notice that the word “fix” goes with “cars,” rather than with “friends” or “mechanics,” even though “cars” is farther apart from “fix” in linear distance. The mind recognizes the connection, because “cars” and “fix” are at the same level in the sentence’s hierarchy. A more interesting example given in the book is the sentence “Birds that fly instinctively swim.” The adverb “instinctively” can modify either “fly” or “swim.” But there is no ambiguity in the sentence “Instinctively birds that fly swim.” Here “instinctively” must modify “swim,” despite its greater linear distance.

Animal communication can be quite intricate. For example, some species of “vocal-learning” songbirds, notably Bengalese finches and European starlings, compose songs that are long and complex. But in every case, animal communication has been found to be based on rules of linear order. Attempts to teach Bengalese finches songs with hierarchical syntax have failed. The same is true of attempts to teach sign language to apes. Though the famous chimp Nim Chimpsky was able to learn 125 signs of American Sign Language, careful study of the data has shown that his “language” was purely associative and never got beyond memorized two-word combinations with no hierarchical structure.

The book provides a lot of information from evolutionary biology, linguistics and so on, but that particular snippet conveys one of the important points.

Review by Stephen M. Barr.

So what I would like to believe, putting my Platonic hat back on, is that at a certain point the human (not homonym) mind is able to perceive these hierarchically-ordered sequences of meaning - at which point they are no longer biologically determined in the way that animals are. Whereas, to the ultra-Darwinists, everything is biologically determined, and speech and abstract thought are no different in essence from a peacock's mating display - they only serve to 'propagate the genome', no matter how elaborate the output.

I hope you don't think I was claiming there's no difference between animal signaling and human language.

The question is whether language has a monopoly on meaning or on information or both. And if there is a sort of meaning unique to human language, does it have nothing at all to do with animal signaling? (I believe Chomsky's position is nearby. As I recall, he postulates a single huge leap to language rather than a gradual development.)

The question is whether language has a monopoly on meaning or on information or both. — Srap Tasmaner

Clearly my answer is that it doesn't. And I also pointed out that semiosis recognises grades of "communication" here, like your shift from indexical shrieks to iconic social signalling to symbolic speech acts.

Is there mind involved in some of these but not others? Do some of these hominin sounds carry meaning or information but not others? — Srap Tasmaner

What do you mean by "mind"? Is there a useful distinction in operation here?

What do you mean by "mind"? Is there a useful distinction in operation here? — apokrisis

That question wasn't for you.

I hope you don't think I was claiming there's no difference between animal signaling and human language. — Srap Tasmaner

I thought was that you were positing a pretty straightforward explanation in terms of natural selection, which I'm sure is part of the picture but not the whole picture. (It's the last bit which is controversial.)

My understanding of mind is that all sentient beings (sentience is the capacity to feel, perceive, or experience subjectively) have minds - even very simple organisms. But in h. sapiens it has evolved to the point of language use, abstraction and rationality. I am inclined towards some form of dualism, whereby what is described as 'mind' in sentient beings, has no counterpart in inorganic nature.

That question wasn't for you. — Srap Tasmaner

And yet the question was quite clearly addressed to me. So what's the game here?

You did actually address that question to both Apokrisis and myself.

Sorry. Trying to address you and Wayfarer simultaneously, and that's bound to be confusing!

Instead of responding directly to your last post about computing, I thought I'd take another shot at explaining my general approach to both of you at once.

I'm still mulling over your specific points. (I wasn't actually arguing that machines are just physics, but I did deliberately let the implication hang there in hopes of eliciting the sort of response you gave, which is helpfully specific.)