So any usual notion of "material" goes right out the window. The image left in the physicist's mind is of a pure mathematical object. And then even the object gets chucked out as what the mind's eye "sees" is really all the possible rotations and translations that are the set of possible actions such an object would have. The mind's eye is left only with the ghostly kinesthetic play of pure relata. — apokrisis
If a physicist is really pushed (and I am talking about the metaphysically informed ones, of whom there are plenty) then the question of "what is real?" does become pretty Platonic. A particle is a point. Unless we consider it as a string, or a loop, or a knot - each of those conceptions speaking to some different set of symmetries or invariances that seem to explain the symmetry breakings we actually then measure.
So any usual notion of "material" goes right out the window. The image left in the physicist's mind is of a pure mathematical object. And then even the object gets chucked out as what the mind's eye "sees" is really all the possible rotations and translations that are the set of possible actions such an object would have. The mind's eye is left only with the ghostly kinesthetic play of pure relata. — apokrisis
But notice I didn't disagree with you regarding the idea of learning making the distinction occur. — schopenhauer1
In other words SOME event of internal aspect is occurring to the newborn, even if not the one we are familiar with as discriminatory perception. There is some internal aspect of what it is like to be a newborn. Your major problem is replacing the HARD PROBLEM with EASY PROBLEMS and then constantly dodging the real question when it goes back to it. The result is that now we have semi-absurd answers like newborns do not have inner sensations. — schopenhauer1
So, putting our faith in uniformity is a bet, but why not? — T Clark
The question I place – to myself if not others – is whether or not these mathematics (and in theoretical maths, many disperse systems can be fathomed) are themselves constrained by something that is absolute objectivity (for lack of better terms) or, alternatively, themselves encompass the very notions we hold of absolute objectivity? — javra
Stated differently, are the maths themselves representations of something deeper that is – only allegorically stated - immovable or are the maths that go beyond the mind’s eye reality itself? — javra
Hence, for example, is that which is referred to by 0 and 1 – however codified by us - the reality itself, or are these referents universally applicable representations that both stem from a deeper reality which is impossible to represent? (most definitely not via relations) — javra
But if not, on a metaphysical level of contemplation, are the foundations of mathematics (regardless of how universal and elusive to the mind’s eye) the foundational reality to you? Or do they, in a sense, emanate as very abstract, manifested representation of a deeper reality that cannot be itself represented? — javra
I think you are talking about yourself and not "the physicist." — T Clark
What fascinates me about the mitochondria I referenced earlier is that the battle occurred in the pitch dark. The chemically formed cell doesn't possess the sentience to know that there is a physical body inside it. The story is that a foreign cell (a mitochondria) invades a eurkaryote. Chemicals go crazy. In the end, rather than killing the mitochondria, the very exact part required for reproduction of the mitochondria is deleted from the mitochondria and appears in the nuclear DNA of the cell. WTF
--Chemistry would have an awfully hard time explaining that based on reactions. — MikeL
The mitochondrion (or ancestral bacterium) lost the need for a lot of its genes as it was now safely tucked inside the host archaeon. — apokrisis
It only retained the genes most critical for regulating its highly volatile respiratory activity. — apokrisis
So the proteins needed to maintain control were kept close at hand. Then the other less time-critical genes could migrate be part of the DNA in the central nucleus. — apokrisis
Thus all can be explained by constraints of metabolic efficiency and genetic evolvability. — apokrisis
A replicating lifeform inside another lifeform will kill it, cold. — MikeL
That was a very smart decision. When did it come to this decision? Before or after it killed the host? — MikeL
Could they? How did they come to that arrangement? Enterprise bargaining? The blind mitochondria said to the blind cell, "I don't know what the hell you are or where the hell I am but here comes some genes. Catch." — MikeL
What fascinates me about the mitochondria I referenced earlier is that the battle occurred in the pitch dark. The chemically formed cell doesn't possess the sentience to know that there is a physical body inside it. The story is that a foreign cell (a mitochondria) invades a eurkaryote. Chemicals go crazy. In the end, rather than killing the mitochondria, the very exact part required for reproduction of the mitochondria is deleted from the mitochondria and appears in the nuclear DNA of the cell. WTF
--Chemistry would have an awfully hard time explaining that based on reactions. — MikeL
The Peircean or systems approach is about having three categories, with vagueness or firstness as the undifferentiated from which generality vs particularity arises. — apokrisis
A replicating lifeform inside another lifeform will kill it, cold.
— MikeL
Well it was nice knowing you then. Goodbye to you and the 100 trillion bacteria living mostly symbiotically in your gut. And the vast variety of retroviruses hijacking a ride on your DNA. — apokrisis
That was a very smart decision. When did it come to this decision? Before or after it killed the host?
— MikeL
Did you miss the key point? The host was a handy supply of its food. While it was a handy source of energy for its host. So the situation was SYMBIOTIC. :) — apokrisis
They went together so exactly that they created a whole new evolutionary era. All their fellow microbes were left in the dust. In 4 billion years, the other guys have shown no essential structural change. — apokrisis
But it floats in a gene pool - a metagenome - of 18,000 genes that it can pick up as it needs as food sources change and a different kind of digestion might be needed, or whatever the environmental challenge happens to be. — apokrisis
Could they? How did they come to that arrangement? Enterprise bargaining? The blind mitochondria said to the blind cell, "I don't know what the hell you are or where the hell I am but here comes some genes. Catch."
— MikeL
This is a bit of smart alec reply given the realities of bacterial and archaeon sex. — apokrisis
However, mitochondrial ancestors that had the mutations that allowed for them to not reproduce but continue to survive in the cell, and the cells that had the mutation to allow the mitochondria to stay and provide its energy were selected for — schopenhauer1
If the mitochondrial ancestors had a mutation that didn't allow them to reproduce, guess what? No mitochondria. The assertion is that just by chance a mitochondria that will soon perish off the face of the earth because it can't reproduce drifts into a cell, that rather than killing it in fact has the capacity to allow it to reproduce and maintain it's health? That's one hell of a happy coincidence. — MikeL
Idealism - if it follows its own logic - rejects material and efficient cause. Or it is forced to dualise them. — apokrisis
its to do with very fact of explanation at all, which Wayfarer sees as a kind of existential threat to his worldview. — StreetlightX
Newborn human babies have wired and functioning brainstems and so the level of sensory and orienting processing that goes with that. — apokrisis
But it is surprising how lacking in neural differentiation they still are at the cortical level. — apokrisis
You see it is you that is wedded to a Cartesian theatre. You can't conceive of mind except that it is already like that. A space with a self watching a parade of definite sensations. But a baby has only the vaguest notion of a self separate from a world. It doesnt even have hands it controls.
So yes, the traditional Jamesian blooming, buzzing, confusion is as apt a characterisation as any. — apokrisis
It is the third thing of their interaction which is the process making a world. — apokrisis
What you cannot do is get something from nothing like so much fiat — schopenhauer1
But properly speaking, the life of discipleship is living in that light, whilst still in ordinary existence. Of course, there is also a sense in which this is a hopeless quest, an utterly quixotic undertaking. But one has to persist, regardless. — Wayfarer
this problem you pose of why the mitochondria survived the engulfment of the cell without being destroyed or destroying it is simply natural selection. — schopenhauer1
So if you want to imagine a vague state of sensation, it is like a blooming, buzzing, confusion. Maybe like getting tumbled in a heavy surf, but without yet any sense of self as well as just sensory noise. — apokrisis
Well, again the "interaction" and "process" is "something" a phenomena in and of itself which must be explained as it is. The interaction is happening in this event called experience. What is that as opposed to simply naming its constituents? — schopenhauer1
I think this is the existential truth you are expressing. If we are always looking, then there must be something to find. Otherwise why the heck are we always looking? And can we actually continue the habit of looking knowing there is nothing to find? Can the habit itself fill a void despite its ultimate futility? — apokrisis
This is where the sleight of hand occurs. Somehow, somewhere, something called natural selection emerges. It is not the end of the sleight of hand, but it permits others down the road. One by one, human traits (e.g. selection) are buried somewhere in the explanation. Where is this natural selection coming from? From around the cell? From within the cell. It's somewhere, it is guiding, and it's persistent, and it's repetitive. Very much like the mind.
It is absolutely mandatory that traits of the human mind are introduced in where explanation. The reason is because it actually is the mind that is doing it.
As the story builds, the introduction of mind traits becomes more and more egregious, but it is acceptable because we have already established that chemicals can be viewed as little minds. — Rich
Natural selection is simply the name for differential reproduction survival rates among a range of differences amongst a population. — schopenhauer1
This is an observation after the fact. It is not causal onto itself. — Rich
To be a materialist is to believe in the reality of substances. Stuff that exists in some brute fashion and has inherent properties. Dualists are just believers in two kinds of material - a matter stuff and a soul stuff. — apokrisis
The scientific revolution of the 17th century, which has given rise to such extraordinary progress in the understanding of nature, depended on a crucial limiting step at the start: It depended on subtracting from the physical world as an object of study everything mental – consciousness, meaning, intention or purpose. The physical sciences as they have developed since then describe, with the aid of mathematics, the elements of which the material universe is composed, and the laws governing their behavior in space and time.
We ourselves, as physical organisms, are part of that universe, composed of the same basic elements as everything else, and recent advances in molecular biology have greatly increased our understanding of the physical and chemical basis of life. Since our mental lives evidently depend on our existence as physical organisms, especially on the functioning of our central nervous systems, it seems natural to think that the physical sciences can in principle provide the basis for an explanation of the mental aspects of reality as well — that physics can aspire finally to be a theory of everything.
However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.
So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained.
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