You’re raising a bunch of issues, and they get tangled because “form of life,” “hinge,” and “worldview” are being treated as if they’re the same kind of thing. They're not. — Sam26

I agree that a hinge is not the same kind of thing as a form of life, but the hinge is crucial to there being a form of life in the first place.
=========================

Witt’s “form of life” is usually the shared human backdrop of practices that makes language, rule following, correction, and inquiry possible. It’s not typically “theism versus atheism,” “direct versus indirect realism,” or “democracy versus autocracy.” — Sam26

Are theism and atheism different forms of life in Wittgenstein’s terms?

I would say that they are. Wittgenstein's "form of life" refers to the shared cultural practices, activities, and ways of living that provide the context for language and meaning (Wikipedia), and theism and atheism have many practices, activities and ways of living that are not shared.

One’s language is closely linked to one’s form of life, and the more diverse one’s language the more diverse one’s form of life. The theist and atheist certainly have different language games.

PI 19 And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life
PI 23 Here the term language-game is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life
PI 241 “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” - It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.

I am not saying the situation is black and white, In that there are degrees of difference. For example the form of life of a theist is different to the form of life of an atheist, but not as different as the form of life of a human and the form of life of a lion.

However, that the language game of a theist is different to the language game of an atheist, then so must be their form of life.
======================

We do make choices, shift commitments, and so on, but we’re rarely choosing between forms of life from some meta or neutral standpoint. — Sam26

This is the point I am making. The Wittgensteinian man in the street rarely chooses between forms of life from a meta or neutral standpoint, but this is the role of the philosopher. The philosopher should be trying to choose between forms of life from a meta or neutral standpoint

It is the role of the philosopher, sidetracked by Wittgenstein, to stand outside our language games, forms of life, hinge propositions and rules accepted by custom in order to attempt to understand the bigger picture.

It is the role of the philosopher to break the atheist out of their atheistic language game and the theist out of their theistic language game to arrive at a better understanding of the reality of the world.

Witt’s reply to the rule following question/anxiety isn’t “custom makes it fine, end of story,” and it isn’t “we vote on correctness.” The point is that interpretation isn't the whole story, because interpretations also need a way of being applied. At some point you master of a technique, you go on without consulting a further interpretation. — Sam26

In PI 201 talks about the rule-making paradox, and as you say, grasping a rule is not an interpretation and it is not custom that makes a rule. However, it is more fundamental than mastering a technique.

As with the hinge proposition, the rule is part of the framework of the form of life, within which is the language game. Customs, interpretations and techniques are part of the content of the framework, and as such have no control over the rules to which they are subject to.

Grasping a rule is living within a framework that is exempt from doubt, not an object of knowledge, not open to rational evaluation and an objective certainty.

One should not say “I know how to use the language game”, but should say “I use the language game”.

I don't think we're makiing progress, which is usually what happens in Witt threads. At a certain point, we just keep saying the same thing over and over again. This is one of the reasons I don't always respond to people. It turns into an endless debate. So, the point of my threads is to get the information out and let the chips fall where they may.

I've been working on a better definition of philosophy, and I thought I'd post it here just as an aside.

Philosophy is the fundamental and inescapable activity of creating, analyzing, and assessing belief systems, whether religious, political, scientific, ethical, etc., using a broad range of tools that extend beyond formal logic including sensory experience, language, testimony, and other sources of knowledge. It is not limited to any single discipline or institution but permeates every domain of serious inquiry, because any domain concerned with truth necessarily engages in a philosophical activity. Even very granular philosophical work on specific concepts like causation, knowledge, or identity operates within this broader framework of belief assessment, deriving its significance from its implications for how we understand reality. Philosophy is therefore not a specialized academic enterprise and more a fundamental dimension of thought itself, one that cannot be escaped, since even the attempt to dismiss or define it is itself a philosophical act. What distinguishes philosophy is not a narrow method but an orientation, viz., the continuous, reflective commitment to analyzing what we believe, how we come to believe it, and whether those beliefs are justified, wherever that inquiry takes us.

First, hinges aren’t just a “corrective to radical skepticism.” — Sam26

Of course. A part of something is not the whole of it. The question I asked is:

... what is their function beyond being a corrective to radical skepticism? — Fooloso4

Part of the difficulty we are having is that, as you say:

I’m also extending some of his insights into my own thinking on epistemology — Sam26

I have no issue with that. It is a common practice, but the first question raised in my post is about:

... whether hinges are given undue attention and importance. — Fooloso4

You say:

I do aim to be faithful where it matters ... — Sam26

Whether it matters depends on one's goals. If your goal is extend concept of hinges beyond Wittgenstein use then it matters less that you means something different than him then if the goal is to understand what he means by hinges. The attempt to extend an insight can be at odds with determining what that insight might be.

For doubt to be intelligible, some things have to stand fast — Sam26

It goes even further than that. For anything to be intelligible some things have to stand fast. This is an ancient problem that goes back at least to Parmenides and Heraclitus. It is both an epistemological and ontological problem. Wittgenstein touches on this at OC 96-97, even using Heraclitus' metaphor of the river. The concept of flux is a hinge belonging to our system of scientific investigations.

Third, you ask “what turns on” claims like “there is an external world” or “other people exist.” The answer is everything ordinary. — Sam26

There is nothing ordinary about these claims. In what situation might this claim be made? Someone who seriously doubts them or thinks there is need to make them is in need of psychological therapy not philosophical therapy.

Fourth, the “Witt doesn’t tell us what counts as a hinge” complaint sets the wrong expectation. — Sam26

It is not about Wittgenstein giving a list of hinges, but about claims that are made by others about Wittgenstein and hinges. To what extent are they faithful to the concept as used by him? In order to consider this we must piece together the few things he says.

341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

Hinges are not simply things you don't doubt, they are things that are exempt from doubt. There are many things we do not doubt that are not exempt from doubt. The fact that we do not doubt them does not mean that they are indubitable.

This is followed by:

342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted.

His concern is not the plurality of things said and done that some commentators claim are hinges. Hinges are propositions that belong to our scientific investigations.

Followed by:

343. But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.

While it is true that we can't investigate everything, it is not as if one assumption is as good as another. Science does not simply rest content with assumptions. It tests them and alters them when necessary. In some cases the change is minor adjustment to the system propositions, but in some other cases we are forced to make changes to our fundamental orientation as was the case with the Copernican revolution. Hinges had to be replaced with new ones.

655. The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of incontestability. I.e.: "Dispute about other things; this is immovable-it is a hinge on which your dispute can turn."

This is pretty straight forward, but he follows it by saying:

656. And one can not say that of the proposition that I am called L. W. Nor of the proposition that such-and-such people have calculated such-and-such a problem correctly.

657. The propositions of mathematics might be said to be fossilized.-The proposition "I am called . . ." is not. But it too is regarded as incontrovertible by those who, like myself, have overwhelming evidence for it.

Both the propositions of mathematics and the proposition that "I am called" or 'such and such people have calculated a problem correctly' are said to be incontrovertible but but unlike the propositions of mathematics they are not explicitly identified as hinges. What is the distinguishing difference? The proposition "I am called '' and the claim that people calculate correctly may be incontrovertible but they do not belong to our system of scientific investigations. Nothing related to our investigations hangs or turns them.

“Just for once, don’t think of understanding as a ‘mental process’ at all! … Instead, ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say ‘Now I know how to go on’?” (PI 154)

He is not denying that there are mental processes (like some people think in this thread), images, feelings, neural activity, whatever you like. He concedes the ordinary point that there are processes “characteristic of understanding.” But then he adds the grammatical correction: in that sense, understanding is not itself a mental process. That is, understanding is not the name of an inner item whose occurrence constitutes correctness. It's a word whose use is anchored in criteria in our practices, in being able to go on correctly.

So, I suspect Witt would say, cognitive science is entitled to investigate the causal and psychological things that typically accompany, enable, or disrupt our ability to go on. What it can't do, by its own methods, is answer what's grammatical, namely, what makes a move count as following the rule rather than merely seeming to. What it means to count as is not an extra inner process waiting to be found, it is part of our public grammar.

That's why I resist the phrasing “simply accept mental processes as given,” especially if it mean, “leave the topic untouched and let science do the work.” Wittgenstein’s move is not to abandon the mental, it is to stop trying to make words like understanding function as names for occult inner objects. He untangles the knot so we stop demanding the wrong explanation, and then both philosophy and science can do their work without talking past each other. — Sam26

I’d go along with this, as long as we’re careful not to treat as a division of labor the fact that cognitive science “is entitled to investigate the causal and psychological things that typically accompany, enable, or disrupt our ability to go on,” while philosophy handles what “makes a move count as following the rule.” Grammar isn’t a kind of normative layer sitting atop empirical psychology, with philosophy policing the boundary. We dont want to say science studies causes, philosophy studies norms, because we are not dealing with a stable dichotomy but attempting to dissolve that kind of thinking.

“Just for once, don’t think of understanding as a ‘mental process’ at all! … Instead, ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say ‘Now I know how to go on’?” (PI 154)

He is not denying that there are mental processes (like some people think in this thread), images, feelings, neural activity, whatever you like. He concedes the ordinary point that there are processes “characteristic of understanding.” But then he adds the grammatical correction: in that sense, understanding is not itself a mental process. That is, understanding is not the name of an inner item whose occurrence constitutes correctness. It's a word whose use is anchored in criteria in our practices, in being able to go on correctly.

So, I suspect Witt would say, cognitive science is entitled to investigate the causal and psychological things that typically accompany, enable, or disrupt our ability to go on. What it can't do, by its own methods, is answer what's grammatical, namely, what makes a move count as following the rule rather than merely seeming to. What it means to count as is not an extra inner process waiting to be found, it is part of our public grammar.

That's why I resist the phrasing “simply accept mental processes as given,” especially if it mean, “leave the topic untouched and let science do the work.” Wittgenstein’s move is not to abandon the mental, it is to stop trying to make words like understanding function as names for occult inner objects. He untangles the knot so we stop demanding the wrong explanation, and then both philosophy and science can do their work without talking past each other.
— Sam26

I’d go along with this, as long as we’re careful not to treat as a division of labor the fact that cognitive science “is entitled to investigate the causal and psychological things that typically accompany, enable, or disrupt our ability to go on,” while philosophy handles what “makes a move count as following the rule.” Grammar isn’t a kind of normative layer sitting atop empirical psychology, with philosophy policing the boundary. We dont want to say science studies causes, philosophy studies norms, because we are not dealing with a stable dichotomy but attempting to dissolve that kind of thinking. — Joshs

I'm not sure what you need to be "worried" about. I've been consistent that the point isn't to establish separate jurisdictions. When I say cognitive science is entitled to investigate causal and psychological accompaniments, I'm not parceling out a territory, I'm saying Wittgenstein's grammatical work doesn't shut down our empirical inquiry. That's not a division of labor; it's just not making the mistake of thinking one kind of investigation negates the other.

If the concern is that someone might read me as reinstating a dichotomy, fine, but that's a misreading. The statement "I'm worried that..." has a way of suggesting the other person hasn't thought something through, when in fact the very point being "worried" about is one I've already addressed. It's a rhetorical move that positions the other person as needing correction before they've actually made the error being attributed to them.

But look, I don't want to get hung up on tone. The substantive point stands, Wittgenstein dissolves the knot, he doesn't leave us with two tidy halves. I've said that. If we agree on that, then we agree.

I've been working on a better definition of philosophy, and I thought I'd post it here just as an aside. — Sam26

I like that.

:up:

I don't think we're makiing progress.................So, the point of my threads is to get the information out and let the chips fall where they may. — Sam26

I am doing the same. I believe the points that I am making are correct, even if no one else agrees. But what else can one do? At the very least I am improving my own understanding. If someone accepts my arguments, then that is a bonus.

As long as you are making progress and I am making progress, perhaps that is sufficient, even though our progress is different, even though our language games are different.
==========================================================
EDIT - I have deleted the rest of the post as it did not add much.

I want to speak to something that keeps happening in this thread, because it's a good example of the very confusion Witt's tools are meant to address. — Sam26

A useful post

I will give my solution to meaning in language, and try to show it answers all of your questions.

My solution to meaning in language

As in PI 258, I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of my sensation of sadness. Therefore, every time I have the sensation of sadness, which causes me to cry, I record my crying in my calendar by writing the sign “S”.

The sign “S” cannot point to the private sensation of sadness, which is hidden, but can point to the public behaviour of crying, which is not hidden.

There is no criteria for correctness between the sign "S" and the private sensation of sadness, but there is a criteria of correctness between the sign “S” and public behaviour of crying.

The sign “S” is an ostensive definition that points at the public behaviour of crying, not the private sensation of sadness.

I know that if I feel sadness then I cry, so when I see someone else cry I can infer that they too also feel sadness. I can never know that someone else feels sadness, but I can infer that they do from their behaviour.

For example, if you saw a cat with all the behaviours of being in pain, would you walk on past saying “I don’t know that this cat is in pain” or would you say “I infer that the cat is in pain from its behaviour” and take the cat to the vets?

Therefore, the sign “S” refers to and means the behaviour of crying, from which it can be inferred that the person is experiencing sadness.

=======================================================================

Several responses keep making the same argument but in different forms.......................… without inner feelings there'd be no language games………………..Without oxygen there'd be no fires. From that statement it doesn't follow that "fire" means oxygen — Sam26

Without the sensation of sadness there would be no sign “S”.

You are correct that the sign “S” does not mean the sensation of sadness. The sign “S” means the behaviour of crying, from which the sensation of sadness is inferred.
=========================================================

If meaning were fixed by private inner objects, you'd need a way to pin the right word to the right inner item privately, with no public check, which is crucial. — Sam26

You are right that there is no criteria of correctness between the sign “S” and the private inner sensation. The criteria of correctness is between the sign “S” and the public behaviour of crying.
====================================================================

What drives the misreading is the assumption that meaning must work by a word pointing at some thing, and if outer objects are ruled out, then an inner object is all we're left with. — Sam26

Meaning must work by pointing at something, and it is not the case that outer objects are ruled out, as it is the outer object of crying that is being pointed at.
====================================================

Meaning doesn't need a hidden referent, inner or outer. It needs a practice, i.e., training, use, correction, context, the possibility of getting it right or wrong in ways others can recognize — Sam26

You are correct that language would not work if the referents of the words were hidden. Language works because the referent of behaviour is not hidden.

Even when the meaning of a word is the referent of behaviour, you are correct that this still needs practice, training, use, correction, context and right or wrong.

It is true that the behaviour of crying may have different causes, such as sadness of losing a family pet or watching a particularly funny comedian, and this is where other factors such as context are needed. Is the person crying looking at an empty dog kennel or looking at someone on a stage.
==================================================================

When I say "inner states don't fix meaning," I'm not saying they don't exist or don't matter. I'm saying they can't play the specific role that keeps being assigned to them, the role of a private foundation that makes meaning possible by itself, apart from any shared practice. — Sam26

Wittgenstein agreed in PI 304 that there are inner feelings

You are correct that inner feelings cannot make meaning in language possible by itself, because it is the behaviour caused by inner feelings that makes meaning in language possible.

Philosophy is the fundamental and inescapable activity of creating, analyzing, and assessing belief systems — Sam26

:up:

This does not sound very Wittgensteinian, who accepted hinge propositions rather than assess them.

I think you're a bit confused about Witt, but so aren't most people.

Yes, I believe that concepts like 3 and polygon exist as individuals following prescriptive rules, — Metaphysician Undercover

Meno's paradox.

I believe Plato resolved Meno's paradox in The Republic, by positioning "the good" as outside of knowledge.

I believe Plato resolved Meno's paradox in The Republic, by positioning "the good" as outside of knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover

Meno's paradox is supposed to support past lives. It just as well supports the idea that much of our knowledge arises from an innate framework.

Meno's paradox is supposed to support past lives. — frank

That is the solution posed in The Meno. But I think it is actually posed as obviously unacceptable.

It just as well supports the idea that much of our knowledge arises from an innate framework. — frank

What Plato does in The Republic is place "the good" (and this would be the grounding for correctness as well), as outside of knowledge. That is similar to what Kant did with "noumenon". Notice that for Kant the a priori intuitions of space and time provide for your "innate framework". But Kant produced a grounding for empiricism, and Plato was a skeptic in relation to sense experience. Plato's skepticism would doubt the intuitions of space and time. For Plato, the senses often mislead us, as evidenced by pleasure leading us away from what we know is good. This means that the "innate framework" which would support "the good", or correctness, must extend beyond, or prior to even sensation. It must be prior to any form of knowledge whatsoever. That's why Plato argued that virtue cannot be a form of knowledge.

In relation to this thread, Wittgenstein judged such extreme skepticism of sense experience, as fundamentally irrational. So he proposed hinges or bedrock as a foundation which would be irrational to doubt. However, I believe that this position is based in some unjustifiable assumptions about the nature of doubt. We can take a look at what Sam26 says:

For doubt to be intelligible, some things have to stand fast, not because we’ve proved them, but because they are part of what makes checking, testing, and correction possible. That’s a conceptual point about how doubt, evidence, and investigation function, not a special attack against skeptics. — Sam26

The basic mistake made by Wittgenstein here, is the assumption that doubt ought to be intelligible. This is a mischaracterization of doubt. Doubt does not arise from within any intelligible system, it always comes from a source which is external to whatever it is which is supposed to be intelligible. That is fundamental to doubt. We may have a system of explanation (intelligibility), which is mostly closed around itself, as a closed system, but it necessarily must have openings where it relates to, and interacts with the world which it explains. Doubt enters at these openings, as what appears to be unintelligible from the precepts of the intelligible system. The important point, doubt cannot come from within the system, as the system is modeled as closed to the inside. Doubt must come from outside

So Wittgenstein makes a fundamental mistake by casting doubt as something rational, then putting a boundary where doubt would be irrational. "Doubt" is in its basic nature irrational because "rational" is a judgement or determination based on the rules enforced by the system, which doubt is opposed to. Therefore doubt must be classed as fundamentally irrational.

When we put this into relation with what is exposed by Meno's inquisition, we see that doubt must be prior to all knowledge, and is in some sense the source of knowledge. As Socrates said, philosophy is sourced in wonder. This means that a proper understanding requires that we invert the relation between knowledge and doubt, from that described by Wittgenstein. Instead of portraying doubt as something which inheres within knowledge, like Wittgenstein does, (doubt is rational), we need to portray knowledge as a culture which propagates within an environment of doubt.

The "innate framework" referred to by @frank is a framework of doubt. The cultures of certitude which pop up within that framework are illusions of certainty, produced from empiricism and the notion that the senses are infallible. Meno's paradox is resolved by revealing that it is produced from a faulty representation of knowledge, that it is constituted with infallible principles. This faulty representation of knowledge is also exposed in The Theaetetus. Once we realize that knowledge is classed as becoming, rather than being, seeking knowledge is not portrayed as seeking the correct principles.

Philosophy is the fundamental and inescapable activity of creating, analyzing, and assessing belief systems — Sam26

I think you're a bit confused about Witt, but so aren't most people. — Sam26

I think I have been reasonably clear in setting out my understanding where Wittgenstein is correct, incorrect or vague.

Understanding has two aspects. First there is understanding what Wittgenstein wrote about meaning in language, and second there is understanding whether Wittgenstein was correct, incorrect or vague about what he wrote about meaning in language. The first aspect is the role of the historian, the second aspect is the role of the philosopher.

As you say “Philosophy is the fundamental and inescapable activity of creating, analyzing, and assessing belief systems”, but it should be noted that first one must create a belief system in order to be able to analyze and assess other belief systems.

Therefore, I needed to set out my own belief system as regards meaning in language, which I think was reasonably clear, prior to being able to judge Wittgenstein’s belief system for correctness, incorrectness and vagueness.

The first step in avoiding philosophical confusion is in creating one’s own belief system, against which other belief systems may be judged for correctness, incorrectness and vagueness.

Although there are other aspects of Witt's toolbox that could be added, I think I'm going to move on. I want to start a new thread, but I'm not sure of the topic yet. Any suggestions?

Wittgensteinian, who accepted hinge propositions rather than assess them. — RussellA

At the risk of repeating myself I will repeat what Wittgenstein actually says about hinges: They are propositions that belong to our scientific investigations. As such they are epistemological in the traditional sense. He does not simply accept them, he concludes that they are incontrovertible. (OC 657)

There is not textual support or evidence that Wittgenstein uses the term 'hinge' to mean anything other than these incontrovertible propositions that belong to scientific investigations.

Wittgensteinian, who accepted hinge propositions rather than assess them.
— RussellA

At the risk of repeating myself I will repeat what Wittgenstein actually says about hinges: They are propositions that belong to our scientific investigations. As such they are epistemological in the traditional sense. He does not simply accept them, he concludes that they are incontrovertible. (OC 657)

There is not textual support or evidence that Wittgenstein uses the term 'hinge' to mean anything other than incontrovertible propositions that belong to scientific investigations. — Fooloso4

You’re overreading Witt when you say he “concludes hinges are incontrovertible” and that hinges “belong to scientific investigations” which makes them similar or like traditional epistemology.

Ya, Witt says things like “it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted” (OC 342), and he uses “hinge” talk around there. But he’s not defining hinges as “scientific propositions” or giving an epistemological assessment that hinge propositions are “incontrovertible” in the strong sense. He’s describing a role that some propositions play, viz., as what stands fast so that doubt, evidence, checking, and inquiry can operate at all. Science is one clear instance where this structure shows up sharply, but it definitely isn’t the whole story.

Also, “incontrovertible” in OC shouldn’t be read as “a priori, guaranteed true, immune to revision.” Witt’s own river-bed imagery is an e.g., of what stands fast can harden and later shift. The point is grammatical, within a practice, some things are not treated as things to be tested, they are part of the framework that makes testing possible. That's not “epistemological in the traditional sense,” it’s closer to demonstrating what gives epistemic assessment its sense in the first place.

Finally, limiting hinges to the three times he uses the word “hinge” is just bad method in OC. The same thought is developed throughout OC, for e.g., “what stands fast,” “framework,” “world-picture,” and the contrast between propositions we test and propositions that function as the background of testing. It’s not that there’s “no textual support” for a wider reading; the wider reading is exactly what the text is mostly doing.

So RussellA’s caution is fair, not everything undoubted is a hinge. But your reply goes too far in the other direction by shrinking hinges into a scientific subclass and turning “incontrovertible” into a strong epistemic point. That’s not Wittgenstein’s point.

They are propositions that belong to our scientific investigations. — Fooloso4

Not what I understood from my reading. He mentions method, sure, but his examples are quite varied and not all of them mere science. Many are from mathematics, but also included are things as prosaic as "So-and-so was with me this morning and told me such-and-such" and "I am called....".

There is not textual support or evidence that Wittgenstein uses the term 'hinge' to mean anything other than these incontrovertible propositions that belong to scientific investigations. — Fooloso4

I call bullshit.

You’re overreading Witt when you say he “concludes hinges are incontrovertible” and that hinges “belong to scientific investigations” which makes them similar or like traditional epistemology. — Sam26

He says that both mathematical hinges and "I am called ..." are incontrovertible (657) but you cannot say of the latter that it is an unmovable hinge. (656)

Ya, Witt says things like “it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted” (OC 342), and he uses “hinge” talk around there. But he’s not defining hinges as “scientific propositions” — Sam26

It is not just" talk around there". The statements are connected. He begins both "341" and "342" with the statement "that is to say". To say that "some propositions are exempt from doubt are as it were like hinges on which those turn" is to say " it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted".

This leaves open the possibility that some propositions are exempt from doubt that do not belong to our scientific investigations. He does say that there are some propositions that are incontrovertible and backed by overwhelming evidence such as "I am called ..." but he goes on to say that we cannot about them what we say about them mathematical proposition:

The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of incontestability. I.e.: "Dispute about other things; this is immovable-it is a hinge on which your dispute can turn." (655 -657)

What we cannot say about them is that they are immovable hinges. (656-657)

Also, “incontrovertible” in OC shouldn’t be read as “a priori, guaranteed true, immune to revision. — Sam26

Of course not! Scientific investigations are not a priori.

Finally, limiting hinges to the three times he uses the word “hinge” is just bad method in OC. — Sam26

Quite the opposite. If our interpretive method aims at understanding an author on his own terms then this requires us to attend to what he says and not extend terms beyond the way they are being used.

There is not textual support or evidence that Wittgenstein uses the term 'hinge' to mean anything other than these incontrovertible propositions that belong to scientific investigations.
— Fooloso4

I call bullshit. — Banno

I am glad that you challenged my claim, but just calling bullshit is not to give textual support. Please provide some of the varied examples of hinges.

I am called.... — Banno

He explicitly denies that this is a hinge. See my response to Sam.

There's a difference between considering scientific statements amongst those of mathematics, trips to China, the shape of trees, pictures and railway timetables; and restricting one's proposals only to scientific investigations. He is clearly considering scientific investigations as one class amongst many. As for textual support, you are simply selecting only those parts that suit your odd perspective. I'll invite folk to read the document for themselves.

That is the solution posed in The Meno. But I think it is actually posed as obviously unacceptable. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not posed as unacceptable, though it may well be unacceptable to you. Any solution is going to end up arguing that some knowledge must be innate, whether we explain that as anamnesis, Kantian categories, hinges, or what have you.

He explicitly denies that this is a hinge. See my response to Sam. — Fooloso4

655. The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of incontestability. I.e.: "Dispute about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your dispute can turn."
656. And one can not say that of the propositions that I am called L.W. Nor of the proposition that such-and-such people have calculated such-and-such a problem correctly.
657. The propositions of mathematics might be said to be fossilized. - The proposition "I am called...." is not. But it too is regarded as incontrovertible by those who, like myself, have overwhelming evidence for it. And this not out of thoughtlessness. For, the evidence's being overwhelming consists precisely in the fact that we do not need to give way before any contrary evidence. And so we have here a buttress similar to the one that makes the propositions of mathematics incontrovertible.

Notice the italic I and the bit after the "but..." where he says that it can be regarded as incontrovertible. What's a hinge and what isn't, isn't fixed, but is an aspect of the game being played.

If you are not careful I'll use a Chess analogy on you... :wink:

"And so we have here a buttress similar to the one that makes the propositions of mathematics incontrovertible."

He is clearly considering scientific investigations as one class amongst many. — Banno

What other classes of investigation is he considering with regard to hinges?

As for textual support, you are simply selecting only those parts that suit your odd perspective.

I selected the three parts that explicitly refer to hinges. This was not done to suit my perspective. My perspective is shaped by what he says and does not say. Again, if there are other parts that address hinges once again please point to them.

I'll invite folk to read the document for themselves. — Banno

This is good advise.

Note that he says "our scientific investigations" (342) He does not mean simply what scientists do. He is talking about us, about our worldview. This is a theme that runs throughout his work.

298. We are quite sure of it' does not mean just that every single person is certain of it, but that we belong to a community which is bound together by science and education.

." where he says that it can be regarded as incontrovertible. — Banno

Yes, I discussed this above. He says the mathematical propositions is a hinge but one cannot say that about the proposition "I am called ...". It being incontrovertible is not sufficient for it to be a hinge. Why not? What is missing?

There's no point to this line of discussion. "Hinge" is not well defined, and as I explained above, this approach is nothing but a Wittgensteinian mistake anyway. The proposal of "hinges" is not real, a false proposition, derived from a misunderstanding of doubt and skepticism. There are no such hinges. So attempting to determine what qualifies as a hinge will be fruitless.